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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the significance of institutions, discourse, and agency in determining the 
opportunities for mainstrearning gender in state development policy at the national and 
subnational level in India. It seeks to address lacunae in the literatures on Indian development 
policy and gender mainstrearning. The methodology combines insights from feminist 
institutionalism and feminist discourse analysis, to enable an exploration of both the institutional 
context of gender mainstrearning as well as how some gendered discourses of development 
become dominant and how others are marginalized. The comparative analysis of two case 
studies, the southern Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, draws on fieldwork based 
on interviews conducted in these two states, and in New Delhi, as well as an analysis of policy 
documents and other relevant government and non-government documentation. I argue that 
similarities and differences in institutions can be observed both between and within the two 
states. The analysis demonstrates how the Indian state is not a monolith but a highly complex 
and differentiated set of institutional norms, structures, and practices, which offer varying 
possibilities for feminists engaging the state. Three gendered discourses of development 
dominate policy in these two states, namely, protective-patemalist, competitive-capability, and 
structural-transformative. These discourses interact with the states' two wider discourses of 
development (reformist and populist). Their discursive framing has significant effects on how 
gender is constituted in development policy, as well as how actors are positioned as subjects and 
objects of development. Considerable differences can be observed between the two states 
regarding the dominance or marginalization of each discourse, suggesting that both the 
institutional context and the broader socio-political and historical context matter. This research 
shows that the institutional and discursive constitutive contexts combine to create varying 
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INTRODUCTION 
The research problem 
Increasingly since the 1970s, the Government of India has formulated and enacted policy 
initiatives which recognize the gendered character of national development. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, the development policy of the Indian state shifted towards a neo-liberal economic 
discourse. This coincided with the international growth of gender mainstrearning strategies, 
consolidated at the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. 
While development policy formation in India has been more extensively theorised, especially 
economic policy, less is known about the factors influencing gender and development policy 
formulation in India, particularly in terms of gender mainstrearning strategies. Evidence suggests 
that the self-help group model of women's empowerment is becoming almost ubiquitous as a 
policy instrument of the Government of India, and in turn, the proportion of self-help groups 
(SHGs) in India which are promoted by government agencies as opposed to- civil society 
organisations is increasing, with one study estimating that SHGs promoted by the government in 
2005 constituted approximately half of all SHGs in India, compared'to only II per cent in 2000 
(EDA/APMAS, 2006: 20). Furthermore, while several relationships between key actors are long 
established, the emergence of a donor relationship between international development 
institutions and multilateral partners such as the World Bank and DFID, bring to light new 
patterns of influence at the subnational level of India's state government. ' More than a decade 
ago, two Indian feminists, K. Lalitha and Mary John, suggested that in the post-1991 policy 
environment, where states now have more autonomy in formulating development policy, 'there 
may be new opportunities at the [subnational] state level to demand more comprehensive 
policies on gender and funding commitments for-women' (IDS Bridge, 1995: 4-5). Yet very few 
studies have emerged since, exploring the importance of state government gendered development 
11 am thankful to Andrew Wyatt for this observation on the emerging relationship between State level governments 
and the World Bank. See also Jenkins (2003) for a related discussion regarding India and the World Trade 
Organization. 
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policy and the subnational context for gender mainstreaming strategies. This highlights the need 
ý A- LCO-AA Cý A. Alý ý111"LlgL 1 "al 
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these new initiatives, particularly in the face of gender-differentiated effects and outcomes of 
development policy. 
Situating the thesis in the literature 
This thesis feeds into two broad literatures: the literature on development policy in India and a 
literature on gender mainstreaming in development institutions. It also feeds into debates on the 
Centre-State relationship in India, including a growing interest in intra-state comparisons 
(Jenkins, 2004b). Within the first literature of Indian development policy it aims to contribute a 
gendered analysis of the institutional, discursive, and agential factors that have influenced gender 
and development policy since 1991. Within the second literature on gender mainstreaming in 
development policy it builds on the work of Kabeer and Subrahmanian (1999a), Rai (2001, 
2003b), Goetz (1997a); and Miller and Razavi (1998b), Moser (1993) and Kapadia (2002b). 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in the area of gender mainstreaming in 
development policy in India. It makes an original contribution as an in-depth, comparative study 
of Indian subnational policy on gendered development which looks explicitly at the role of three 
factors (institutions, discourse, and agency) in determining the possibilities for mainstreaming 
gender in development policy. Where studies exist on gendered development policy and 
programmes in India at the subnational level (such as comparative evaluations of self-help group 
programs in different states), few consider the relationship between subnat ' 
ional level factors and 
their impact on possibilities for gender mainstreaming. Furthermore, few studies have considered 
in-depth the broader institutional context for gendered development policy at the subnational 
level, beyond more focused issue-based studies of policy. 
This thesis will make a timely contribution to studies on the Indian empirical case. 
Methodologically, it will also feed into calls for combining discourse analysis with more 
conventional political science methods to build on new feminist research methodologies for 
research on gendered state action and policies (Mottier, 2004). As such, this research 
differentiates itself from the feminist comparative politics literature which focuses mainly on 
2 
formal institutions and advanced industrial democracies, and which is currently moving towards 
more quantitative analyses (Stetson and Mazur, 1995; RNGS, 2002). 





GM in development 
GM in development policy in India 
The research question, aims and objectives 
The research question driving this thesis is: 
In what ways is gender mainstreaming in development policy affected by institutions, 
discourse, and agency? 
The research aims to understand: (a) the politics of formulating and implementing gendered 
development policy in an institutional context; (b) how the process and content of policy-making 
is affected by discourse; and (c) how particular agents are positioned as more influential than 
others in the development policy-making process. The more specific objectives of the research 
are firstly, to discern how institutional structure and context affects the efforts to mainstream 
gender in development policy; secondly to discern how specific discourses of development, with 
particular reference to gender issues, become prevalent in governmental and non -governmental 
institutions and produce certain effects; and thirdly to discern how individuals or groups are 
influential in promoting or obfuscating gender mainstreaming in development policy. 
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To operationalise the research objectives, I focus on the following factors, which map on to the 
categories outlined above. For institutional context, both formal and informal norms, structures, 
processes, and practices are encompassed including institutional, structures and mandates of the 
main policy-making institutions and national women's machinery, as well as institutional norms 
and culture- For discourse, I analyse gendered development discourses articulated in government 
policy both at the Centre (national) and State (subnatio'nal) level. 'I- identify three prominent 
ý4, 
discourses: protective-paternalist, cof7 etitive-capability, and structural-transformative. For 
"0. 
agency, I explore how the discursi 6`ýý&_institutional 'context offers. positions subjects of 
development within development diff6rentially, and how this creates various possibilities for 
agency. I then compare these forms "of ag6ntic capacity to determine their 'potential enabling or 
constraining opportunities for gender mainstreaming in development policy. 
The analysis presented in this thesis rests upon three sets of specific theoretical arguments (with 
subsets) which map on to the concepts of institutions, discourse and agency, one comparative 
argument, and one more general argument about the state. Firstly, on institutions, I argue that i) 
institutional context matters, ii) that different institutional contexts produce different policies on 
gendered development and iii) that this creates diffe'rýent opportunities fibr, ihe, impliemeý'n'tation of 
gender mainstreaming strategies. Secondly, on discourse, I argue that i) multiple, discourses of 
gender and development exist, ii) that these -discourses 
frame different policies on . gýndered - 
development, and that iii) these discourses vary both within and across- states' within,! ndia. 
Thirdly, on agency, I argue that i) agency is a product of institutional norms and practices and 
institutionally embedded discourses, ii) that, agency. is also made possible as. a product. of the 
conflicting positions possible within. competing institutions and discourses, and that iii) some 
forms of agency will be enabling for ý, gender ý mainstreaming efforts and others -,. will, be 
obfuscatory. I also argue that the broader social context matters to the extent that it, provides the 
conditions of possibility for which institutional norms and which discourses are, appropriate, and, 
therefore that differences between states at the subnational level may generate differences in the 
institutional norms and discourses arising in each state. Finally, at the most general level I argue 
that the, state is not a monolith but, a heterogeneous, internally differentiated collection of 
institutions, which offers complex and varying opportunities for feminists engaging the state. 
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With these aims, objectives, and arguments in mind, this thesis sets out to address a number of 
sub-questions related to the broader research question. 
On institutions: What are the institutional contexts in which these discourses emerge? What do 
we know about how institutions themselves affect the formulation of development policy? What 
kind of institutional structures and cultures are conducive to gender mainstreaming? To what 
extent can mainstreaming strategies be institutionalised into the existing institutional norms and 
culture of development planning institutions in India? 
On discourse: What are the main ways of thinking, speaking and practising development in 
India? What are the effects of these discourses on formulations of development policy.? How do 
they define the subjects, objects, techniques and practices of development? How do these 
discourses make some strategies possible and not others? To what extent is the current neo- 
liberal discourse dominant and pervasive in development? To what extent has it closed off other 
alternatives? How do the discourses of donor development organisations influence government 
discourse? Are the goals of the dominant development discourse congruent with the goals of 
gender mainstreaming? 
On agency: What role do political leaders, bureaucrats, and the women's movement play in 
influencing gendered. development policy? What kind of agency is available to these actors and 
is it conducive to gender mainstreaming? Can any of India's top political leaders be called 
4policy entrepreneurs' in this sense? What are the options available to the women's movement 
for influencing development policy towards the goal of gender equitable development processes? 
How can bureaucrats become internal advocates and play a role in transformative change 
through mainstrearning gender? Which kinds of agency are enabling for gender mainstreaming 
and which kinds of agency are constraining? 
The methodology underpinning the research in this thesis argues in favour of methodological 
pluralism. Firstly, it utilizes the emerging approach of feminist institutionalism to conceptualise 
institutions, combining the feminist focus on power and change with the new. institutionalist 
focus on informal institutional norms and practices. Secondly, it draws on a poststructural 
approach to discourse analysis informed by the Foucauldian concept of discourse. As a product 
5 
of these two methodologies, it engages with a post-structural conception of agency and 
MI :*r "' qualitative twin subjectivity. In ternis ol ri-tethod's for dc-tta collection, this t1hesis adopis a sinaln 04 
case study approach to comparative analysis. The primary reasons for this are firstly, to enable a 
comparative analysis of rich descriptive case studies, and secondly, to identify and compare 
similarities and differences in institutions, discourse, and agency both between the centre and 
state, and between and within states. ' 
Structure and content of the thesis 
The structure and content of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter One, I critically review the most 
relevant literature on development policy in India and on gender mainstreaming. I argue that 
prominent studies on development policy in India do not adequately address the gendered 
dimensions of development, and also that there are very iew studies of gender mainstreaming in 
the Indian case. By bringing together these two literatures, I argue that a lacuna exists in the 
literature on gender mainstrearning in development policy in India, for which this thesis seeks to 
make a contribution. Chapter Two outlines the methodological, theoretical and conceptual 
fmmework that this thesis draws upon, as well as the methods that were employed in data 
collection. I argue that, given the research problem, there is a strong case for methodological 
pluralism: combining feminist institutionalism and feminist post-structural approaches to 
discourse analysis. Informed by these two methodologies, I also outline how the thesis 
conceptualizes agency. The use of case studies, interviews and documentary analysis are detailed 
as the methods of data collection optimally suited to the research problem, and a more post- 
positivist or interpretive approach to the comparative method is presented as an analytical 
strategy for comparing the two case studies. Chapter Two also includes a consideration of 
research ethics, namely issues of data protection and informed consent, reflection on the 
sensitivities pertaining to my position as a Western feminist researcher of gendered development 
informed by 'Third World feminist' debates, and of the power dynamics involved in researching 
policy elites. 
Chapter Three represents the first substantive empirical chapter, and maps the national level 
policy in India since the beginning of the 1990s. This chapter forms the national policy backdrop 
to the case studies which are detailed in the following four chapters. I examine the institutional 
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context for gendered development policy, and discuss gendered institutional norms and practices 
within the Indian bureaucracy, as well as a number of initiatives during the 1990s and beyond 
designed to increase the gender-responsiveness of mainstream Indian state institutions, such as 
the Planning Commission, the Finance Ministry, and the Indian bureaucracy itself. I pay 
particular attention to what these initiatives signified in terms of their approach to gender- 
equitable development and the role of the state. I then discuss the changing discourse(s) 
articulated within national development planning policy beginning from the Eighth Five Year 
Plan in 1992 until the Tenth Five Year Plan in 2002.1 also briefly comment on preparations for 
the Eleventh Five Year Plan, which at the time of writing, had not been finalized. Finally, I 
consider the role of three important actors: bureaucratic actors, political leaders, and the 
women's movement. I argue that initiatives to transform institutional norms and practices have 
met with only limited success and that the state's discourse(s) of gendered development has 
increasingly accommodated concerns of gender equality and women's empowerment, but this 
has involved a 'responsibilisation' of women as agents of the development process, which seeks 
to integrate them into the national process of development without largely altering the main 
development agenda. 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven. represent the core of the original contribution of the thesis, 
which shift the focus from the national level to the subriational level in India. I focus on the two 
case study states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Each chapter presents a comparative 
analysis of the two case studies but each has a different focus: the broader social context 
(Chapter Four), the gendered institutional context of State-level development (Chapter Five), 
state-level discourses of gendered development . 
(Chapter Six), and gendered developmental 
subjectivities and the importance of agency (Chapter Seven). Thus, Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
map onto the three key analytical concepts driving the resýarch questions of this thesis: 
institutions, discourse, and agency. Chapter Four serves as a preliminary chapter to outline the 
broader socio-historical context of the two case studies, highlighting the importance of this 
context for creating the conditions of possibilities for what can be said, thought and done at the 
state level in terms of gendered development policy. This chapter emphasizes the complexity, 
specificity, and internal diversity of these two states providing a rich descriptive profile. Chapter 
Five explores the similarities and differences between state-specific developments of institutional 
7 
norms and structures in each state, in order to understand how each state is an internally 
differentiated gendered institution with varying opportunities for mainstrearning gender at the 
subriational level. Chapter Six compares discourses of state level gendered development through 
analyzing articulations of the three discourses outlined above, to understand the dominant or 
marginal status of each, how they relate to the wider reformist and populist discourses of 
development in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and what opportunities they therefore provide 
for different gender mainstrearning strategies. Chapter Seven explores how the discursive and 
institutional context of state policy on gendered development creates different degrees and kinds 
of agency for different sets of actors: women as subjects, targets and agents of development 
policy and as participants in each state's parastatal program for women's empowerment, political 
leaders, bureaucratic actors, and the women's movement. The final conclusions chapter begins 
by revisiting the research questions, aims and objectives and draws together the findings from 
the four case study chapters into a comparative synthesis. It reflects on the complexity of these 
findings, and suggests implications for mainstrearning gender in development policy in India. I 
discuss some limitations of the research, all of which present significant opportunities for further 
research. I conclude by identifying how the findings of the research build on existing knowledge 
in the literature on gender mainstrearning and development. 
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1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
This literature review presents a critical review of existing knowledge and debates within the 
broad based literatures on development policy and on gender mainstrearning both in general and 
in the Indian context. The analysis of each is structured according to the three analytical concepts 
that are of major concern: institutions, discourse and agency. My aim is to demonstrate two 
substantive arguments. firstly, that several classic works on Indian development policy rarely 
pay attention to development as a gendered concept, process, or outcome; and secondly that the 
growing body of research on gender mainitreaming in development policy has, to date, had little 
to say about the Indian case. Beyond surveying how the central research problem of the thesis 
has been understood so far, the purpose therefore is to outline the lacunae in the literature for 
which this thesis makes an original contribution: mainstrearning gender in development policy in 
India. 
To demonstrate these arguments, in the first section of the review, I present insights from the 
vast literature on Indian development policy, focusing on the institutional norms and structures 
of development policy-making in India and on the changing institutional norms of the federal 
relationship between the Centre and the States in the post- 1991 period, arguing the case for more 
attention to the factors which affect development policy making at the subnational level. I also 
discuss the shifting dominant post-independence discourses of development (bearing in mind 
that these discourses are always context-specific but rarely context-exclusive) as well. as the role 
of different actors in the development policy process, including political leaders, bureaucrats, 
and the women's movement. The review in this section illustrates the complexity of the 
institutional, discursive, and agential influences and relationships in the formulation and 
implementation of Indian development policy. It also provides some informative empirical 
background of the trajectory of Indian development from Independence to the present day. 
However, despite these insights, I conclude this section by noting the largely absent 
considerations in mainstream studies of Indian development policy of development as gendered. 
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In the second section, I review the gender mainstreaming literature, of which a large and 
coherent concentration of acadernic studies is to 'VC found addressing gender mainstreaming 
policies in the European Union (EU) context, and to a lesser extent in the context of development 
organisations and policies. This section identifies the focus of debates in the literature, critically 
reviews some of the concepts and definitions of gender mainstreaming, and draws upon insights 
from several studies to understand the role and strategies of women's national machineries (as 
complementary institutional structures) providing openings for feminists to mainstream gender, 
and the obstacles and resistance they. face. The focus then narrows to studies of gender 
mainstreaming in development policy including the role and influence of bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies. 
Based on the analysis of the two broad literatures discussed, the third section draws from the two 
broad literatures to discuss what appears to be an absence of literature on gender mainstreaming 
in development policy in India. This is not to suggest that the subject of women, gender and 
development in India has not been researched or commented upon - indeed there exists a varied 
literature on this subject, but it is often dispersed and lacks dialogue for the most part, both 
internally and externally with the literatures outlined earlier. Yet, while wider studies on women, 
gender, and development exists, there are less than a handful of relevant studies on gender 
mainstreaming in India. I argue that this is particularly striking given the increasing number of 
initiatives which have been undertaken during the nineties, which I explore in more detail in 
Chapter Three. I discuss the insights of the small number of relevant studies of gendered 
development policy in India including the institutional context such as the national machinery for 
women in India. I conclude by arguing that, given the emergence of new initiatives in the 1990s, 
which highlighted gender mainstreaming as one of a number of strategies to improve the gender- 
responsiveness of Indian development policy, there is a need to research the significance of these 
policy changes and their effects. This is particularly important in respect of the changing 
relationships between key development institutions, discourses, and agents, and how these policy 
changes inform the strategies of feminists seeking to engage the state on gender and development 
issues. 
10 
1.2 Development Policy in India 11 
What do existing studies tell us about the significance of institutions, discourse and agency for 
development policy, both generally and more specifically in the Indian context? India presents an 
interest case for studies of development , although as Harriss (1998) suggests, the literature on 
development in India has developed somewhat disconnected to the more general development 
literature. 
1.2.1 Institutions of development2 
Development has often been identified as primarily a state-led, nationalist, project of 
modernisation, and the state is often presented as a central actor, whether as a director, or a 
facilitator, or as a conduit for interest groups or international capital. Planning for development 
has been a central institutional feature of the Indian state's development policy-making history 
since Independence. The case of development planning in India demonstrates the importance of 
understanding the state not as a coherent, co-ordinated, monolithic entity, but as a differentiated 
account of state institutions involved in formulating development policy. Development planning 
in India took place principally through the Planning Commission, although the authority of this 
institutional structure has not been consistent over the years. 
Hanson's (1966) early study - and possibly the most thorough - of Indian planning offers some 
insight into the relationships between state institutions concerned with development planning, in 
particular the role of the Planning Commission. Particularly useful is his discussion of the 
relationship of the Commission to government ministries and the National Development 
3 Council. Writing in the 1960s, Hanson presented the Commission as primarily a consultative 
body which makes recommendations upon which the government may or may not decide to act. 
He argued however that the Commission had become more of a ministerial body over time, 
which was reflected in its close relationship with the Ministry of Finance, despite a tension 
2 The conceptual approach to institutions is discussed in detail in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to say that a 
new institutionalist approach to institutions informs this section of the literature review, where both formal 
institutional structures as well as informal norms, processes and conventions within and between institutions are 
considered important. 
3 'Me National Development Council brings together the Chief Ministers of all India's subnational state 
governments, is chaired by the Prime Minister, and deputy-chaired by the member-secretary of the Planning 
Commission. 
between a focus on the economy and a focus on development (1966: 5 8). Hanson also charts the 
i 
C) 
A LIJ AN"WUAI"I as a rival to the Plannhig Coininissioii ai -id 
whose influence on the planning process is 'imperfectly revealed' in plan documents (1966: 61- 
24 ). Hanson concludes however that the NDC had far from replaced the Commission at the time 
of writing (1966: 62). - 
Chhibber's analysis (2003) provides a more recent view of the Planning Commission's influence 
and intra-governmental relationship. He traces the decline of the capacity and influence of the 
Planning Commission vis-A-vis the Ministries. Despite significant support from its ardent 
proponent, Jawarhalal Nehru, the Planning Commission experienced considerable resistance to 
operational co-operation from the Ministries. This process accelerated under the leadership of 
Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-67) and Indira Gandhi (1967-77,1980-84), until the Planning 
5 Commission was firmly re-established as a consultative body. The declining influence of the 
Planning Commission shifts attention to the new locus of development policy - the Ministries, in 
particular the Finance Ministry, and the National Development Council, which bears significance 
for the centre-state relationship (Jenldns, 1999: 227). 
Critical analyses of planning have often invoked images of Foucauldian governmentality. James 
C. Scott (1998: 8 8) sees planning or "the administrative ordering of nature and society" as part of 
a wider phase of high modernity whereby pervasive social engineering by the state is 
discursively justified in the name of the people and according to universal benefit. Similarly, 
Arturo Escobar asserts that '[p]lanning techniques and practices have been central to 
development since its inception. As the application of scientific and technical knowledge to the 
public domain, planning lent legitimacy to, and fuelled hopes about, the development enterprise. 
Generally speaking the concept of planning embodies the belief that social change can be 
engineered and directed, produced at will' (Escobar, 1992: 132). Opponents 9f dirigiste 
approaches to development became increasing unpopular from the late 1970s onwards with the 
rise of a neo-liberal discourse of development influenced by neo-classical economics. 
4 Hanson claims that even the anticipated reactions of states' Chief Ministers (among the council members) 
influence the Commission's proposals (1966: 62). - 5 Mathur (2001: 120) makes a similar observation of institutional changes instigating the decline of the Planning 
Commission, including the establishment of a Prime minister's Secretariat as an alternative source of advice. 
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Chatterjee (1997) argues-that even though state institutional bodies, such as the Planning 
Commission in India, are set up to remove politically contentious issues from the political arena, 
and appeal to a panel of technocratic experts for policy decision-making, such an arrangement 
will inevitably become used as a political tool by the very forces it endeavours to transcend. 
This, however, does not presume that the Planning Commission is a neutral institution, devoid of 
its own norms - indeed, as Chatterjee argues, state institutions like the Planning Commission 
will embody their own political objectives and ideals, and they will be designed to legitimate the 
very basis of the state's sovereign power as the sole planning authority 'on behalf of the nation'. 
Despite the reorientation of the state's role in development since 1991 towards a more facilitative 
rather than directive role, the Planning Commission has arguably retained its predominance as 
the preeminent authority on development policy in India. This has led some to question the 
extent to which the change in Indian development discourse since 1991 (discussed further below) 
has actually represented a withdrawing of the state. For example, Gupta (2001), employing the 
example of the Integrated Child Development Scheme, has shown that under a neo-liberal 
governmentality, the government of the population involves more subtle processes of 
intervention, so that while the state appears to roll back, its techniques of normalising the 
population may penetrate deeper into society. To support this claim, he contrasts empirical data 
on cuts in social sector spending under neo-liberal policies with data on increased allocation for 
the ICDS program (2001: 109). Thus, shifts in the form of technologies of development may 
accompany wider discursive sWfts. 
The federal relationship has long been considered an important element with respect to the 
planning process (Chakravarty, 1987: 47). It is a controversial relationship, partly for reasons to 
do with the fiscal redistribution of resources between the Centre and the States, and partly 
because of the historical legacy of the Emergency with regards to the abuse of the Centre in 
interfering or intervening in government at the subriational level of state government. It is also 
significant for the distribution of responsibilities, particularly for the 'ektensive' responsibilities 
of States in the realm of economic and social development (Guhan, 2001 [1995]: 127). 6 
6 Guhan (2001 [1995]: 127) lists the responsibilities of the centre or national government as core elements such as 
defence, foreign policy, currency, central banking, national transport and communication infrastructure, as well as 
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ChakTavarty (1987: 47) briefly outlines the relationship by explaining that due to the Indian 
federallpollitical structure, the planning process takes place at multiple levels and with vertically 
divided responsibilities. Plans are formulated at Central and State levels as well as yearly and 
Five Year Plans formulated by the Planning Commission and approved by the National 
Development Council, the latter of which consists of the Prime Minister as Chairman of the 
Planning Commission and States' and Vnion Territories' chief ministers (Chakravarty, 1987: 
47). Chakravarty presents three common criticisms of the federal planning system, namely a 
perception that state governments are under-funded by the central government, state ministries 
are subordinated under centrally sponsored schemes, and that funds and responsibilities are self- 
allocated to the centre excessively, at the expense of the states (1987: 48). 
But there appear to be two main reasons for the renewed importance of studying the f6deral 
dynamic with regards to development, both of which point to the different developmental 
experiences arising at state level. Firstly, several studies argue that the greater (but still limited) 
fiscal autonomy afforded to the states from the centre as a result of liberalisation has produced 
both varied approaches to development as well as a competitive dynamic for reforms among a 
few states, in the race to produce a conducive environment for private investment (Jenkins, 1999, 
2004; Guhan, 2001 [1995]; Kennedy, 2004). 
Secondly - and this is not such a new development, or perhaps surprising - claims of widening 
disparities between state level indicators of both economic and human development suggest that 
economic growth and improvements in well being in areas such as education and health are not 
occurring universally across Indian states. Chakravarty emphasises the almost inevitability of 
differential growth due to the uneven resource endowment of different regions in India (1987: 
45). But he also asserts that 'the problem of poverty is beginning to emerge as more of an inter- 
regional problem than before ... [11] is no longer homogeneous, regionally undifferentiated 
poverty that we are dealing with, but areas of rising economic well-being accompanied by 
finance, insurance, capital market regulation, electoral regulation and audit, civil and police service recruitment, 
broadcasting, basic employment law, research investment, legislation on industrial regulation and promotion, mines 
and oil resources. It is also responsible for inter-state issues. The states' responsibilities are listed as law and order, 
primaryjudicial administration, and economic and social development. The latter includes agriculture and related 
sectors such as fisheries, animal husbandry and dairying, and forests, irrigation, power, roads (not national 
motorways), education, health, water supply, and urban development. 
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stagnating economic zones' (p. 46-7). However, it is very questionable as to the extent to which 
poverty was ever as inter-regionally homogenous as he suggests, given long-standing divisions 
between class, caste, gender, and religious identities. 
Recent studies have begun to analyse the changing dynamics between the central and state 
governments as well as differences between states in terms of reform packaging due to 
differential development levels. As Kennedy (2004) shows, following the 1991 liberalisation 
reforms, individual states have been afforded much more autonomy from the centre, yet have 
followed different paths. Kennedy (2004) relates this inter alia to varying styles of reform 
"packaging" contrasting the approaches of the state governments of Andhra Pradesh (before the 
fall of the Telugu Desarn Party (TDP) to Congress in 2004) and Tamil Nadu. She argues that 
these different styles of reform packaging derive in turn from two political variables: the extent 
of fragmentation in state-level party system and the extent of political mobilisation of dalits and 
other traditionally low status groups, allowing one state government (Andhra Pradesh) to be 
more vocal about their-reforms agenda than the other. In other words, Kennedy's contribution 
demonstrates the importance of taking into account how differences in the institutional context 
may lead to different outcomes in development policy at the subnational level. Drawing from the 
above insights, the federal relationship is important for both continuous and newly emergent 
reasons and thus warrants attention to how it affects the form and representation of policy, the 
nature of the relationship between the state and Centre in policy debates, as well as the capacity 
for the State to implement development policy. 
The senior Indian bureaucracy, as an all-India institution, also plays an important part in 
formulating development policy. Several studies of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and 
its colonial predecessor, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), have documented characteristic features 
of the Indian bureaucracy (Potter, 1986,1996; Mathur, 1996; Mars, 1974; Bhattacharya, 2003 
[1989]; Rudolph and Rudolph, 2003 [1987]; Thakur, c. 1997,2000). Mathur (1994) for example 
argues that a fundamental tension exists between the elite and professional background of civil 
servants and the constituency-facing politician. Civil servants tend to be careerists and will 
therefore act to support their superiors, and they tend to be educated in cosmopolitan institutions. 
While Potter's study (1986) is certainly not an explicit focus on the gendered institutional norms 
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and practices of the Indian civil services, his observation that a dominant norm of civil service 
was ttý he 'gei-iflien-, anly mode' Is particularily rellevant to widderstandiiig how td-je bureaucracy is a 
gendered institution. The 'gentlemanly mode' emphasised 'the virtue of public service.... the 
amateur ideal, and... the norms of courage, confidence and self-discipline' as well as service- 
class values, namely the importance of being a loyal servant to government in exchange for trust 
from the political leadership and 'autonomy and discretion to act appropriately (in accordance 
with the law) for those they served' (Potter, 1986: 233). 
Some notable features of these studies of the Indian bureaucracy implicitly demonstrate the 
gendered institutional context of the bureaucracy. But what is missing from all of the above 
studies is an explicit and detailed analysis of the gendered character of these institutions, which 
is particularly striking given the extensive literature on other empirical cases (discussed later in 
the chapter). The extent to which development planning institutions produce gendered policy has 
been addressed by studies on gendered discourses of development. It has also been addressed by 
studies of the gendered institutional norms and mandates of development institutions more 
generally, discussed further below. What is specific to the Indian case is that there exists few 
systematic, comprehensive, or detailed study of the gendered institutional contexts (norms, 
processes, structures) of Indian development institutions from within which development policy 
emerges. Two important exceptions to this observation. The first includes Thakur's study 
(c. 1997) of the gendered institutional norms of the All India Administrative Services, which 
features a discussion of recruitment practices, service rules, incentive structures, and gendered 
patterns in postings within the IAS. The second is the collection by Kabeer and Subrahmanian 
(1999a) on the Gender Planning Training Project in India. The third (Kabeer and Murthy, 1999) 
is a study of gendered institutional exclusion within the government development programmes of 
the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Development of Women and 
Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) programme. The latter however is not a study of institutional 
contexts in which policy is formulated but implemented. 7 
7 niS is not to deny the importance of implementation and the distinction is more blurred than suggested here. It can 
provide important policy feedback affecting the for7nulation of new policies and is also a site of contestation and 
struggle within which initial policy intentions may take on new forms. 
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Neither of these studies have, however, formed the basis for, or supplement, further research on 
the gendered institutional context of state development policy-making in India. 8 
4.2.2 Discourse(s) of Development 
What do existing studies tell us about how discourses of development become embedded in 
development policy? What are the main ways of doing, thinking , and speaking about 
development according to the literature? What are the dominant and marginal discourses within 
the field of development? How do they define the subjects, objects, techniques and practices of 
development? What are the effects of these discourses on formulations of development policy? 
How do they make some strategies possible and not others? In what ways are discourses of 
development gendered? To what extent can we identify discourses of development specific to the 
Indian context? 
Before we can explore these questions, a brief note on 'discourse(s)' of development is required. 9 
What do we mean when we talk of a discourse of development? According to Grillo, who draws 
upon Foucault, '[a] discourse (e. g. of development) identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of 
practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it' (1997: 12). Therefore, 
identifying or labelling a discourse of development is more encompassing than identifying only 
theories or only strategies of development. Barbara Harriss-VA-dte (2002) argues that the 
conceptualisation of policy and the policy process can vary according to the discursive context. 
She states that 
in economics, policy is commonly presented and understood as meaning the course of 
action that ought to follow, based on the results of hypothesis-testing or a set of 
deductions from economic theory. In rational choice discourse, policy is seen as the 
product of social interests; and in Foucauldian analysis development agencies generate 
discourse creating in turn a structure of knowledge which, while failing in its own 
terms, has effects including the entrenchment of bureaucratic power and the denial of 
politics. In the case of economics, policy is seen in terms of 'implications' - and neither 
the character of the state nor the operating costs of the policy implications are usually 
considered. In rational choice theory, the metaphors of policy as a 'commodity, of 
lobbies as 'interests' br 'purchasers', and of votes as 'currency' are abstracted from any 
8 In Chapter 71bree, and Chapter Five I engage with Thakur's study to analysis gendered norms in the senior civil 
services at the national and subnational level respectively. 
9A more extensive discussion of the conceptual framework on discourse employed in this thesis is provided in 
Chapter, Two. 
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history - and the history of the evolution of the deep social forces shaping the volatile 
'epipheenomena' of policy is outside the frame. 
(2002: p. 2) 
The body of work once labelled as development 'theory' is now more commonly referred to as 
development 'studies' reflecting the proliferation of different approaches to the study of 
development, some of which are heavily critical of the original modernist project (Leys, 1995; 
Harriss, 1998). Several of the new approaches reflect the incorporation of previously 
marginalised or alternative discourses into dominant policy practices of governmental and 
international agencies and non-governmental organizations involved in development. Since the 
early 1980s, clearly the development industry has diversified enormously, but Mosse (2005) 
suggests that though the industry has experienced an expansion of 'means', it has also witnessed 
a closing down of the 'ends'. 
A common narrative of development theories in the latter half of the twentieth century up until 
the 1970s is usually presented as modernisation theory versus dependepcy theory. The former 
was influenced by normative prescriptions of political development invoking a dichotomy of 
tradition and modernity, and development economics prescribing welfarist state intervention. 
The latter was influenced by neo-Marxist and Latin American structuralist thought. This division 
led to what Schutirman among others have labelled an impasse in development thought, not least 
because both theories were underpinned by a teleological notion of progress rooted in 
Enlightenment thought (Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1995). 'Development' (perhaps an overly 
homogenised discourse) first came under attack from different quarters in the decade of the 
1980s due to several events; the popularisation of postmodern thought and its rejection of 
'development' as one of many grand narratives; growing recognition of the failure of 
development in the 'South'; a problematisation of the state due to the incursion of globalisation 
onto nation-state sovereignty and the rise of neo-liberalism; and capitalist triurriphalism and the 
seeming delegitimisation of soc ialism and planning following the end of the Cold War 
(Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1995). 10 
10 It is acknowledge that 'development' has a long history that precedes the twentieth century post-colonial context 
but will not be traced here for reasons of focus and space. 
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The 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of neo-liberal thought and policy, underpinned by a 
c counter-revolution' of neo-classical economics and liberalisation and restructuring policies 
known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) (Toye, 1993; see Lal, 1997[1983] for a npo- 
classical critique of development economics). The state minimalism of neo-liberalism is 
contrasted against the institutionalist and interventionist theories of the developmental state 
literature, with reference to the development of East Asian economies (Johnson, 1982, see also 
Woo-Cummings, for a collection of this literature). The capitalist triumphalism of thd early 
1990s, spurred on by the end of the Cold War, became faced with new challenges from 
alternative discourses replacing the capitalist adversary of socialism. 
Beyond the 1990s, the neo-liberal agenda adapted to form a post. -Washington Consensus, 
conceding a greater role for the state and institutions in development, while incorporating some 
selective elements of critical opposing discourses such as human, sustainable" and participatory 
development. 12 More recently, development has become increasingly identified by donor 
governments and international development agencies with security issues in the context of 
globalisation and less developed states are identified with instability (Duffield, 2001). 
Development thus becomes identified as an investment in conflict prevention as well as a post- 
conflict issue. 
Feminist critiques of development did not become prominent until the 1970s, and the literature 
conventionally traces the first critique to Esther Boserup's 1970 study Women's Role in 
Economic Development (Boserup, 1970). Boserup's argument drew on liberal feminist theory 
and argued that, to their detriment, women had been excluded from the process of development 
and modernization and that their inclusion would be both beneficial on grounds of equity and 
11 Similarly 'sustainable' development reflected the incorporation of environmentalist, human rights, and (to a lesser 
extent) the impact of development on 'sustainable livelihoods' and community practices. Rai (2001: 114) links the 
impact of these new discourses of development with the 1990 launch of the annual United Nations Human 
Development Reports. 
12 Chambers (1997) is perhaps the strongest proponent of participatory approaches as a means for increasing 
stakeholder participation. Others note however, that despite its radical origins in the 'South', 'participatory' 
development, has been adopted as an attempt to increase, particularly by development 'beneficiaries' and increase 
the effectiveness (read legitimacy) of development programs and projects, utilising techniques such as a 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). However, several examples of bad practice have 
shown efforts to increase the participation of development beneficiaries to be tokenistic (Mosse, 2001), that 
participatory programmes rarely address and may reproduce gendered power relations (Chhotray, 2004) - for some, 
it constitutes the new 'tyranny' of development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). 
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efficiency. Boserup thus saw development as a necessary and positive project, and her critique 
soon forined the basis oi' an emerging discourse later identified as Women in Development 
(WID) which remains popular among development agencies today (Tinker, 1990: 30). 
While initially the WID critique was a major contribution in that it made visible questions 
regarding women in development processes, later critiques highlighted its fundamental 
shortcomings, one of which was its lack of critical attention to gendered structural relations of I 
power. A critical response came from a number of feminist scholars who were associated, with 
-I I the second major discourse of gendered development to emerge, Women and Development I 
(WAD). The emergence of WAD discourse as a critique of WID mirrored dependency theory's 12 
critique of modernisation theory, but incorporated feminist insights. Contrary to WID discourse, 
proponents of WAD argued that women had always been part of the development process, (for 
example, Benerfa, 1982; Beneria and Sen, 1982). Benena and Sen (1982) criticised Boserup in 
particular for lack of attention to women's productive and reproductive roles within the 
household. 
Conceptual shifts in development approaches to women's issues and gender relations and their 
policy impacts have been outlined by several studies (Kabeer, 1994; Visvanathan et al., 1997; 
Parpart and Marchand, 1995; Jackson and Pearson, 1998). The three most frequently identified 
discourses in the literature of women, gender and development are Women in Development, 
Women and Development, and Gender and Development, abbreviated to WID, WAD and GAD 
respectively. Women, Environment and Development (WED) is slightly less common but has 
proved important in the Indian context. 
The WED discourse surfaced as a radical critique of the Western development project, stressing 
the detrimental effects of the project of development upon the environment, and linEng this 
oppression of nature with the oppression of women. However, opinion divided over the reasons 
for this oppression. One strand within this discourse made a crucial link between women's 
frequently overlooked economic role as manager of natural resources and the subjugation of this 
knowledge in development thinking and policy (for example, Agarwal, 1994). WED's accent on 
the importance of subjugated knowledge has influenced the shift to more participatory 
approaches to development, whilst avoiding charges of epistemic privilege that is often attributed 
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to standpoint theory. Another strand draws upon elements of ecofeminist thought, exemplified by 
Shiva (1988), and Mies and Shiva (1993) and Merchant (cited in Agarwal, 1998). It provides a 
romanticised and essentialised account of the relationship between women and the project of 
development by asserting woman's seemingly 'special' relationship with nature (see Agarwal 
(1998) for a critique). In the Indian context, Roy and Borowiak (2003) provide an important 
critique of Shiva by drawing out the gendered essentialisms that she makes explicit in the 
urban/rural dichotomy. Yet ecofeminism has resonated with certain sections of the women's 
. movement 
in India. 
Southern and Third World -feminists' rejection of WID agenda saw the emergence of 
Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), exemplified in the publication 
Development Crises and Alternative Visions (Sen and Grown, 1988). This coincided with the 
shift from WID to gender and development, or GAD, in the 1980s. This shifted the focus from 
women-specific development studies and strategies to one which examined gender, as a socially 
constructed set of differentiated roles and relations of and between men and women, and how 
development affected the roles and relationships of both men and women. It stressed the 
importance of empowerment, rather than equity (WAD) or efficiency (WID) (Kabeer, 1994). 
GAD was initially seen as a potentially more transformative approach than NVID, WAD and 
WED discourses. While state institutions, if professing a gender and development'discourse at 
all, may veer towards the WID discourse, several non-governmental and women's organisations 
can be identified as reflecting a GAD perspective. Arguably, it is a mixture of WID and GAD 
that dominate development discourses in policy-making institutions, although WID discourse 
still informs many women-specific development projects because it is less threatening than a 
GAD perspective (Moser, 1993). 
Despite its more progressive position in comparison to WID and WAD discourse, GAD 
discourse and its discursive practices and effects have also come under scrutiny. Assumptions 
that women's increased participation in the labour force will reduce gender discrimination and 
enhance women's autonomy is both a simplistic assumption (Swaminathan, 2002) and is 
certainly not guaranteed (Mukhopadhyay, 2003a). Jeffrey and Jeffrey (1998) suggest that 
education policies aimed to bring about changes in women's status and behaviour have been 
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used instrumentally rather than aimed at women's empowerment, such as to inform fertility 
A, , CIAOICC3 lin -14111c pursult off populattion control. Furtherniore, development agencies proinoting 
microcredit programs for women have co-opted GAD's language of empowerment (Rankin, 
2001; Rankin, 2002). 
Furthermore, postmodem feminist critiques of development have raised some particularly 
challenging issues that relate to the effects of mainstream and gendered development discourse, 
such as the representations of Third World women as 'the backward, vulnerable, 'other" that 
these discourses construct (Parpart and Marchand, 1995). Catherine V. Scott (1995) provides a 
feminist critical rereading of modernisation and dependency theory and attempts to show that 
both, for different reasons, opt for a scientific and technological pursuit of progress, through 
evolutionary and revolutionary means respectively, and the dichotomy of modernity/tradition is 
reflected in dichotomies - of male/female, independence/dependence, detachment/family, 
city/village, urban/rural. Marchand's and Parpart's edited collection (1995) is a refreshing 
encounter compared to the outright rejection of development of some postmodem theorists on 
development. Parpart and Marchand (1995: 17) underscore the need to deconstruct development 
discourse. It is part of a more general postmodem project of 'deconstructing the West' (Pieterse, 
2001). However, rather than rejecting development, they aim to explore how postniodem 
feminists can contribute to addressing developmental questions. 
Until recently, few studies on the Indian case explicitly identify development as a discourse in 
the definition employed here. As noted earlier, development scholarship on the Indian case has 
tended to develop in a somewhat disconnected manner for the more general literature. One 
exception is the work of Amartya Sen. Sen's work, most notably the capabilities approach 
(summarised in a later collection, 1999; also edited with Nussbaum, 1993) has been influential in 
the reorientation (beyond just the Indian context) towards "human" development, valorising the 
measurement of more social, people-oriented, quality of life development indicators, stressing 
the development of individual capability rather than abstract, impersonal economic goals. 13 
13 Speaking of Sen, and another scholar with a similar message, Sukhatme, Harriss states 'these ways of thinking - 
about "human development" and the conceptualisation of poverty in terms which are wider than those of income 
deprivation alone - are absolutely at the heart of current discourses on development ... If these ways of thinking are 
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Otherwise, the vast scholarship on the Indian post-Independence development path is dominated 
by economic and class-based analyses that attempt to explain the success or failure of state-led 
development policy. Two major periods in the history of post-independent India with regards to 
development discourse are the establishment of planning at Independence accompanied by a 
modernising discourse, and the shift to a neo-liberal economic policy in 1991.14 In the newly 
independent state of India, a non-aligned post-colonial development discourse in India was 
founded on a Nehruvian socialist development strategy in the 1950s aimed at 'redistribution with 
growth'. The Nehruvian modernising approach, underpinned by scientism, based on heavy 
industrialisation, influenced heavily by the economist Mahalanobis, and reflected in the Second 
Five Year Plan, was favoured over the alternative Gandhian approach (Chakravarty, 1987: 8) . 
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Chakravarty's seminal study on development planning in India sums up the debate as 'plan vs. 
market' (Chakravarty, 1987). More specifically, Nayar presents economic planning, autarky and 
socialiSM16 as the three key features particular to the development pattern of post-Independence 
India (2001: 51). Autarky, represented as export pessimism, self-sufficiency, and tight controls 
over foreign investment, has been explained explicitly in terms of the Nehruvian socialist 
not altogether the gift of Indian development scholarship, they have certainly been influenced very profoundly by it' 
(Harriss, 1998: 299). 
"' other notable periods in India's pre-1991 development history that studies focus on have included attempted 
moves towards more market-oriented policies representative of a neo-liberal discourse under the premiership of Lal 
Bahadur Shastri (1964-1966), the shift in agricultural strategy that led to the Green Revolution (through the use of 
imported agro-technologies of high yielding seed varieties), and Rajiv Gandhi's failed attempts at liberalisation in 
the 1980s. While notions of path-dependence suggest these periods will have an effect on current development 
discourse, the focus here is limited on the two major periods mentioned above. 
15 Chakravarty notes how the pre-independence debate polarised around a Gandhian and a Nehruvian approach, but 
that the latter was never a serious contender for strategies of post-colonial national development (1987: 7). He 
asserts that 'the Gandhian approach has never been seriously discussed by either mainstream economists or by its 
left-wing critics. There are good reasons for this neglect as both sides share fundamental propositions regarding the 
way one should view the central problematique of development. [Both mainstream theorists and their critics) have 
largely accepted a commodity-centred approach ... Thus in either system,. more goods are preferred to 
less ... In 
contrast the Gandhian approach has always talked about the voluntary limitation of wants, the need for having self- 
reproducing village communities, and about issues bearing on a better balance between man and nature' (1987: 7-8). 
Chakravarty thus demonstrates the foreclosure of the Gandhian approach as a discursive possibility for India at 
Independence. 
16 The influence of "socialism" in India's developmental outlook is not the same as a socialist approach which 
strictly adheres to Marxist prescriptions, but rather economic development tied to the pursuit of socially beneficial 
outcomes for all Indians, and this is acknowledged in the Second Five Year Plan (Government of India, 1956). 
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approach to development (Nayar, 2001) although Ahluwalia (1998) among others points out that 
sellf-reliarice -was riot a s; gitifitcant feature until the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) .17 
But what was the historical context within which these discourses emerged? Chattedee (1997) 
argues that for the post-colonial Indian state, freed from the impediments and stagnation 
imposed by its former oppressive colonial ruler, the project of development became a national 
imperative. Thus 'a developmental ideology then was a constituent part of the self-definition of 
the post-colonial state' (1997: 277). Drawing on Grarnsci, Chattedee argues that this does not 
involve a radical shake up of existing administrative or class structures hut a ýpassive 
revolution', in which the state 'seeks to limit [the]... former power [of the pre-capitalist 
dominant classes], neutralise them where necessary, attack them only selectively, and in general 
bring them round to a position of subsidiary allies' (1997: 28 8). 
Economic reforms since 1991 have ushered in a neo-liberal discourse with an IMF loan (and its 
accompanying conditionalities of structural adjustment) which had been sought in response to a 
fiscal crisis. This fiscal crisis has been seen by many as a critical juncture although largely as an 
opportunity for neo-liberal proponents to bring in reforms, rather than an ideological conversion 
(Sachs et al., 1999: 22). Analyses have established that by 1991, this neo-liberal shift represented 
far from anything like shock therapy, not least because reforms had already been attempted 
earlier, briefly in the 1960s, and in the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi. 
Debates about the manner and progress of reforms differ over whether their implementation has 
been predominantly incremental and partial (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Nayar, 2001), 
insufficient (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1993), stunted by 'vested interests' (Chhibber, 2003) or 
'demand-groups' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987), or have been implemented with unanticipated 
continuity and skill - by 'stealth' (Jenkins, 1999). This is commonly a discussion about the 
extent to which a neo-liberal discourse of development has become embedded within Indian 
development institutions and policy. 
17 Harriss (1998) asserts that dependency thinking had little influence on development thinking in India, despite a 
significant contribution by Bagchi on underdevelopment (1982). 
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In contrast to the picture of discursive hegemony that Chatterjee portrays of the postcolonial 
project of development (discussed above), Kaviraj (1991) argues that the Nehruvian 
developmental state failed to popularise its modemising discourse and to legitimise state planned 
development. 18 He employs the concepts of 'upper' or elite and 'lower' or mass discourses, 
which he argues both emerged from the colonial period. Williams (1997) takes a more 
favourable view of Kaviraj's account than Jeffrey and Lerche (2000) who problematize the 
absence of a class analysis, although Williams justifiably criticises Kaviraj's account for the 
absence of a 'voice' of the Indian masses (1997: 2102). Corbridge and Harriss (2000) extend this 
to argue that the masses have been able to recycle universalistic values of the Nehruvian era to 
contest state-led neo-liberal development. 
Kavirai's account is useful for an explanation of the (lack of) dominance of neo-liberal 
discourses among the masses. It may also be extended to provide a potential explanation for the 
absence of a mass mobilisation of women beyond the more urban-concentrated women's 
movement engaged in a debate for more gender-aware development policies. Such an extension 
would need to compensate for the fact that Kaviraj does not consider the gendered relations of 
power inherent in the 'lower' discourse. 
To recap, so far I have discussed studies that identify in various ways multiple discourses of 
development both in general and in the Indian context specifically. Generally, the mainstream 
literature on Indian development discourse has not paid attention to the gendered character of 
development. Two exceptions to this are the work of Amartya Sen, most notably on gendered 
patt erns of household resource distribution (Sen, 1990) and (with Jean Dr&ze) on the declining 
female-male child sex ratio in India (Dr6ze and Sen, 2002) , and that also of Partha Chatterjee 
(Chatterjee, 1989) on the nationalist resolution of the women's question at Independence. 
Chatterjee suggests that the question of women's equality was resolved in a way which fitted 
with nationalist sentiments - that nationalists viewed women's domesticity and reproduction of 
cultural values as symbolic of the spiritual superiority of the Indian nation over its colonial 
oppressors. The logical progression of his argument is that the state did not consider women's 
18 Varshney (1999) makes a similar but less nuanced argument that a shift to neo-liberal economic policy has not 
become an important issue in 'mass politics', otherwise dominated by identity politics, but is confined to the realm 
of 'elite politics', of bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals and graduates. 
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inferior status or gender inequitable relations as a central concern of national development in the 
J! I Chaudhuri's anatysis of hurnediate post-Tridependlence years. -IlUs concurs wiln an early planning 
document which suggested while a progressive discussion of women status and gender inequality 
took place among senior nationalist leaders in the years just before Independence, this debate 
almost disappeared without a trace in the years following Independence (Chaudhuri, 1996). 
Feminist critiques of neoliberal -development in India and other national contexts have voiced 
anticipated detrimental gendered effects of neo-liberal economic policies and the adoption of the 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Policies on a state's economy and 
social sector (Craske, 1998; Mukhopadhyay and Sudarshan, 2003; Upadhyay, 2000; Arora, 
1999). In the few studies on India, only some possess detailed evidence on the effects of the New 
Economic Policy on poor and marginalised sections of society despite a proliferation of analyses 
that discuss the predicted effects of both the NEP and structural adjustment programmes in 
general. 19 Little information exists, says Mukhopadhyay (2003b), on the actual presence of 
anticipated gendered effects of structural adjustment programmes. 
Population policy, a central component of Indian national development policy is one of the most 
consistently analysed policy area with an overwhelming bias towards the repressive and coercive 
practices of state fertility programmes (with some notable exceptions). This reflects a strength of 
the more extensively developed feminist literature in India on the gendered violence of the state. 
Chattedee and Riley's analysis (2001) highlights the historically and sustained central position of 
population policies within the goals of Indian planned development, as gendered and class- 
differentiated. Rao (2005) notes that the National Population Policy of 2000 represents a more 
progressive move by the government towards a Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) approach, 
in the spirit of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. 
However, this progression. has been countered by regressive State level policies which have 
reinstated the two-child norm, especially for eligibility to contest panchayat elections. While the 
19 Swapna Mukhopadhyay (2003 a: 9) groups "apprehensive accounts" into three arguments. Firstly, SAPs are 
inherently bias against women due to the partial view ignoring women's reproductive labour in the household. 
Secondly, job security requirements and labour rights are downplayed resulting in lowerjob security in the private 
sector which may effect women more than men due to their greater concentration in the lower end of the labour 
market spectrum. Thirdly, adverse changes in the household economic environment may occur such as increased 
workloads, livelihood and budgetary adjustments and "reduction in state responsibility in the social sector". 
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Centre has reemphasised the non-coercive RCH approach, in some cases the legislature of both 
the Supreme Court and State Governments High Courts have upheld the two-child norm (Rao, 
2005). 1 
1.2.3 Agents of Gendered Development 
Studies of Indian development and development more generally have attributed varying degrees 
of agency to different actors involved in the development process. Generally, political leaders, 
bureaucrats, bilateral and multilateral donors, international development agencies, and powerful 
interest groups in society have been assigned as more powerful actors than those who are often 
the targets or beneficiaries of development policies or those who are facilitators of state policy 
such as non-governmental organisations, civil society groups or voluntary organizations. 
As mentioned already, in the general development literature, the state is often positioned as the 
most prominent agent of national development policy, for benign or predatory reasons, or to the 
benefit or detriment of development, depending on the development discourse. The literature on 
the 'developmental state' is largely devoted to the issue of the capacity of the state to act as an 
agent of development and to implement the state's development agenda. This literature has 
conceptualised the Indian state variously as "embedded" (Herring, 1999), as "soff' (Myrdal, 
1968), as a "pluralist class state" (Bardhan, 1990), and as "weak-strong" (Rudolph and Rudolph, 
1987). These important distinctions represent different arguments about the manner in which the 
definition, structure and characteristics of state and society determine the state's capacity to 
formulate and implement development policy as well as the motivational forces that influence 
the substantive content of policy. 
However, at the risk of simplification, what many of these approaches tend towards, possibly 
with the exception of Herring's embedded state model, is a monolithic representation of the state, 
which obscures the complex and diverse forms of interaction between, and organizational culture 
within, different institutions of the state. While these accounts may illuminate the role of non- 
state actors in relation to the capacity of the state to effect policy, some have a tendency to 
downplay the internal politics among different state actors and institutions - the state is 
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conceived as an undifferentiated entity. Furthermore, these accounts do not make explicit the 
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Studies of political leadership in the pre-1991 national context are dominated by studies of key 
leadership roles and influential policy-makers. Prominent subjects in these accounts are Prime 
Mnister Jawarhalal Nehru (1947-64), as well as other members of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, 
Indira Gandhi (1967-77,1980-84), and her son Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989). The influence of 
Nehru's leadership on the early phase of India's post-Independence development experience is 
well established, as is the centralising, institutional weakening effects and the authoritarian 
aspects of Indira Gandhi's rule. 
While the study of development policy in India has afforded significance to individual political 
leaders, rarely has it occurred without reference to overwhelming structural forces or interest 
groups. This does not however dilute the intentionality of actors in these accounts but limits them 
to the structure-agency dilemma. 21 Jenkins (1999) provides a more institutionalist perspective 
which also touches on motivational issues for political leaders. In his study of the economic 
reforms of the 1990s, Jenkins concludes that 'political actors are more in an ongoing 
improvisation than a scripted piece of theatre' prompted by signals from the elections, protests 
and public opinion (1999: 208). But this 'intransigence' is mediated by the institutional context 
within which political actors operate, the latter being highly influenced by historical contingency 
(Jenkins, 1999: 209-10). If this is taken to be accurate, it demonstrates an important contrast to 
the modus operandi of civil service policy planners discussed above. 
Subnational leaders in TN and AP have also garnered attention, partly due to the recognition of 
the proximity of Chief Ministers to implementation (Manor, 1995). For example, Andhra 
20 Feminists have attempted to theorise the gendered character of the state in more general terms but vary in terms of 
their treatment of the 'state' and the interests it represents. Whereas Marxist and radical feminist accounts have been 
criticised for portraying undifferentiated accounts of the state, institutionalist and post-structuralist feminists have 
seen the state as a heterogeneous set of institutions, agencies and discourses, and the product of a particular 
historical and political conjuncture (Waylen, 1998: 5-6' Pringle and Watson, 1992: 57-58,62-63) 0. The state 
becomes a site of the construction of problems and identities and of contestation and struggle. 21 For example, studies on Rajiv Gandhi associate his leadership inter alia with the failure of liberalisation reforms 
to take off in the 1980s. Manor's (1988) study of the government's failure to implement liberalisation reforms 
placed considerable blame on the personality traits of Gandhi. On the other hand, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
and his Finance Minister tend to accompany each other in studies of the early nineties liberalisation reforms. 
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Pradesh ex-Chief Minister and leader of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Chandrababu Naidu 
(1995-2004) is never far from accounts of nineties economic and governance reforms in AP 
(Kennedy, 2004; Manor, 
' 
2004; Mooij, 2003). Kennedy (2004) and Mooij (2003) in particular 
note the central role of Naidu in the orchestration of reforms with specific insights on the, 
representation of reforms as 'signalling' reform intentions to other key actors. For example, Jos 
Mooij's (2003) study of the policy process in Andhra Pradesh under Naidu focuses on the 
strategic image-building of both Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP regime, the centralisation of 
policy-making (despite more participatory tones in the developmentalist discourse), and the use 
of policy implementation for party-building purposes. Mooij argues that Naidu attempts to 
combine two faces of leadership: the first to enhance regime legitimacy among voters and the 
latter to create legitimacy in the international arena which is consistent with Kennedy's 
signalling theory, discussed above (Mooij 2003: p. 22; Kennedy: 2004). The first consists of 
attempts to ensure the legitimacy of his regime through schemes such as Jamnabhoomi, which 
also has the purpose of strengthening and extending the TDP network by bypassing established 
channels. The second consists of an outward-facing, dynamic, reformist regime and represented 
in Naidu's personal image as IT enthusiast and World Bank client. However, the effect of the 
developmentalist discourse is that it produces expectation of delivery and as such the 
government is under pressure to deliver according to self-established standards in order to secure 
re-election (2003: p. 22). 
Few in-depth studies have linked individual political leaders in India with gendered development 
policy; few have examined the key role that leadership has to play in championing gender- 
sensitive development policy. Can any of India's top political leaders be called 'policy 
entrepreneurs' (True, 2003) in this sense? To what extent have political leaders demonstrated 
accountability to the women's movement? A few studies have discussed how political leaders 
have rhetorically appealed to women and attempted to exploit them as a vote bank. 
An increasing number of studies on female politicians emerged in the 1990s as a result of the 
increas ing number of women (although still in the minority) occupying senior positions within 
Indian electoral politics. What several studies of senior female politicians in India show is that 
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the presence of female political leaders does not guarantee the inclusion into the political agenda 
rj .3 22 of demands central to t1he wort-jen's inovement. 
Bureaucrats have also been an important object of study for analyses of Indian development 
policy, including the way they bring ideas into the policy-making process. Several commentators 
have debated the influence of epistemic communities (although not always employing this term) 
on policy-making, including with regards to 1990s liberalisation reforms. Haas (1992: 3) defines 
an epistemic community as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area'. This differs in relation to advocacy coalitions which are 
conceived as more ad hoc arrangements around certain policy issues and whose members are 
seen as acting according to a logic of self-maximising interest. 
The concept of epistemic communities blurs the line between bureaucrats and political actors. In 
a study of India's liberalisation policies under the premierships of Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) and 
Narasimha, Rao (1991-1996), Vanita, Shastri (1997: 28) depicts the epistemic community around 
liberalisation as consisting of 'political leaders and bureaucrats both career and 'laterals'. 
According to Shastri, the impetus for change emerged from the state: from both political 
decision-makers and bureaucrats situated within state institutions. But 'laterals' - individuals 
entering the Indian civil service laterally rather than through career progression - manage to 
institutionalise external ideas and influences as a result of their foreign-based education (UK - 
older generation, US - younger generation) and exposure to different work ethics and ideas 
(Shastri, 1997: 38). They have diverse career backgrounds and importantly 'they are key links in 
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a process of international networking and policy co-ordination' (ibid). Their significance is that 
'through the 1980s, the "new laterals" have played a key role in developing the more technical 
24 
aspects of the liberalizing program' but not without some resistance (ibid). 
22 Studies of female political leaders that extend beyond the India press include Skoda (2004), Basu (1993), Sarkar 
(1993), Chowdhry (2000), Banerjee (2004), and Keating (2001). 23 For example, Shastri asserts that laterals with experience working in the World Bank "bring to India their cross- 
country experience and knowledge of how similar reform programmes have been introduced and operated 
elsewhere" (1997: 3 9). 
24 Following a similar line, Baldev Raj Nayar (200 1) suggests contact with overseas economists as well as the 
overseas training of many of the top Indian economic theorists and planners may have had a disproportional effect 
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Both Terence Byres and Ashok Rudra (cited in Byres, 1998) disagree with this view of 'foreign' 
influence. While Rudra sees the development of economic models in India as more independent 
and autonomous than Nayar has argued, Byres goes further by posturing that "India's 
contributions have been in advance of contributions made anywhere else" (Byres, 1998: 14). 
However, Byres rejects Bhagwati's and Srinivasan's assertion that , 
[Liberalisation ideas] rejected at the time by our authorities and by many of our 
economists as well, have now been adopted worldwide but have come to be adopted by 
us only at the end of this revolutionary change. Indeed, these ideas have been recycled 
back to us, in many cases, by the staff of the multilateral institutions who learnt them 
from our own pioneering economists. The claim that the ideas are foreign and hence ill- 
suited to us is therefore incorrect. 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, quoted in Byres, 1998: 8, orig. emphasis) 
Arguably, Byres' and Rudrals accounts introduce an unnecessary tension that emerges in 
attempts to distinguish between cnational' or 'Indian' and 'external' influences on policy, not 
least because Byres attributes the architecture of the 1991 reforms to Montek S. Ahluwalia, then 
Finance Secretary of the Government of India but with previous tenure at the World Bank (1998: 
3). Shastri's use of laterals is both a convincing and useful concept but says less about the wider 
epistemic community, for instance the role of members located in international institutions. It 
also says less about how such exposure to a different work ethic and ideas may not be a 
guarantee for progressive reforms, particularly towards more transformative policy proposals 
such as those of gender and development policy advocates, and whether bureaucrats or political 
leaders may also be influenced by, or linked to, wider (trans)national feminist networks. 
Literature on the women's movement in India is extensive and feminist engagement with the 
state is a* prominent topic. 25 A key theme is the crucial importance of the movement in 
carticulating and making demands on the government on specific issues as they arise, and for the 
on the economic outlook of the Second Five Year plan in India's early planning years. Sukhamoy Chakravarty 
suggests a more two-way interaction asserting that "[a]lmost all major contemporary economists who took an 
interest in problems of development had occasion to interact with India's planners and policy-makers in the fifties 
and early sixties ... The result was a process of two-way interaction. Dominant ideas of contemporary development 
economics influenced the logic of India's plans, and correspondingly, development theory was for a while greatly 
influenced by the Indian case. " (1987: 4). - 2s For a general overview see Akerkar (1995), Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995), Kumar (1989), and Forbes (1982).. 
For a detailed history see Forbes (1998). See various chapters in Murthy (2001) and Kannabiran and Kannabiran 
(2002) on capacity-building experiences with women's organisations. See the latter and also Mageli (1997) for 
studies of women's organisations in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu respectively. Akerkar (1995) is particularly. 
interesting as a rare post-structuralist discourse analysis of the women's movement in India. 
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26 setting up of appropriate policies and programmes by the state... ' (Karlekar, 2004: 148 
T, i I- KaFiekar argues t1hat con-ibined with grassroots organisations they have been "imperative for the 
purposes of women's development and empowerment on a wider scale. ' (2004: 148-9). 
Women's organisations are diverse in structure, leadership, and mandate. 27 
The literature centres around key issues such as engagement with the state and the associated 
risks of co-optation, risks of fragmentation and lack of solidarity of the women's movement, 
welfare versus agitational feminist organisations, the structure and leadership style within 
women's organisations, women's organisations as a form of capacity-building and gender 
sensitisation in themselves, and the transforming character of the women's movement in 
response to socio-economic changes in government policy and Indian society. 28 
Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995: 1874) make the important observation that socio-economic 
development policy has provided academics with the impetus to enter the women's movement. 
They argue that, more so than in other areas, academics have entered the movement straddling 
the academic-activist divide, and have been highly influential regarding the 'priorities and lines 
of advocacy for dialogues with policy-makers' (ibid). 
Rai (2003) is right to question, as others have done more generally, whether there is a 
homogeneous 'women's interest' to represent, given the diverse, plural and fragmented nature of 
the women's movement, which highlights the various and potentially conflicting interests of the 
women"s movement. Recent challenges to the women's movement have emerged from the rise in 
Hindu nationalism but Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995) stress that resistance to neo-liberal 
economic policies has proved to be a source of unity. Instead, it may be more productive to adopt 
26 Studies point to the rise and decline and subsequent rise of the women's movement during, respectively, the pre- 
Independence nationalist movement, the early post-Independence period, and the post-Emergency period and 
beyond (Agnihotri and Mazumdar, 1995). 
27 Karlekar (2004: 149-50) divides women's organisations in to four categories, namely those which are connected 
to political parties, autonomous apolitical women's groups, rural and urban grassroots women's organisations, and 
women's research, development and documentation organisations. She notes that grassroots organisations have been 
particularly effective. 
28 The women's movement itself has organised on diverse issues from dowry, arrack, violence (including rape), 
equal economic and employment opportunities, and anti-development protests. In the last two decades, the ffindutva 
movement has also become a site of women's right-wing political mobilisation although with dubious potential for 
the empowerment of women, and has become particularly militant around communal issues (Basu, 1993). 17he latter 
will not be considered here as part of the feminist women's movement. 
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Akerkar's perspective in that rather than the prospect of a unified women's interest, 'the different 
fragmented contexts of struggle suggest ... that there can be no ... one way of understanding or 
locating women's oppression (Akerkar, 1995: WS-13). 
The literature is also extensive on the more formal political participation of women, on Indian 
women's quotas (or 'reservations' in India) at the panchayat (local council) level and the 
ongoing debates over the proposed 8e Amendment Bill for reserving a third of seats for women 
in Parliament (Randall, 2006; Rai and Sharma, 2000; Rai, 1999). Women are engaged in 
electoral politics with similar overall turnouts for men and women at Assembly and Lok Sabha 
elections, with some regional variance, but there is far less descriptive representation of women 
by women in politics. 29 While the panchayat reservations legislation passed in the was hailed as a 
progressive development for women, many have questioned whether panchayats offer real 
opportunities for women's political participation given what were early signs of the dominance 
of women elected panchayat representatives by their family members (see Kudva, 2003 for a 
discussion on ! pradhan patis' or proxy participation). It is also questionable as to whether formal 
political participation is an effective institutional route for feminist organizations for lobbying. 
Rai (2002) suggests that the women's wings of political parties have few links with organizations 
from the women's movement or their feminist agendas. 
Therefore, questions remain as to how the women's movement can generate new and better 
strategies for building networks of advocacy with transnational feminist organisations and for 
engaging in effective influential dialogue with policy-makers, outside of the formal channels of 
electoral participation. 
1.2.4 Summary 
The literature on Indian development policy is vast and represents a complex array of factors that 
go beyond those factors studied here. Some broad conclusions can be drawn at this point. Classic 
studies of Indian development policy lack a systematic detailed analysis of its gendered 
character. Few of these studies have considered how development institutions are gendered, and 
29 For example, the Lok Sabha elections in May 2004 elected just over 8% of female candidates to the Lok Sabha, 
with proportions of contesting and elected women candidates varying considerably among political parties. 
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few engage with feminist critiques of development discourse. of the Indian institution of 'N Fý4 
pl. a. -imi-ig. Studies oil pollifi, cal lleadersll-Oip 'have yet to encompass an analysis of the role and 
potential of political leaders as advocates for gender and development policy, beyond issues of 
their own gendered rhetorical appeals to women as voters. The women's movement has in the 
past proved to be an effective advocate for change but how is can this relationship be sustained 
and improved? What are the options available to the women's movement for influencing 
development policy towards the goal of transformative change? 
1.3 Gender Mainstreaming 
How have feminists interested in explicitly gendering development policies and i nstitutional 
practices theorised this process of reform? What do studies of gender mainstreaming, as a 
strategy to mainstream a transformative gender equality perspective into development policies, 
say about institutions, discourses, and agency? In this section, I explore the gender 
mainstreaming literature and I briefly outline relevant concepts and definitions before focusing 
specifically on gender mainstreaming in the context of development policy. This section includes 
a discussion of the institutional structures and contexts that are linked to gender mainstreaming 
strategies, and the role of policy entrepreneurs and transnational. feminist advocacy and activism. 
Key questions include: from where does the impetus for mainstrearning emerge and how can 
individuals or groups affect its adoption? How do the goals of development and gender- 
mainstreaming coincide and how do they differ? What kind of institutional structures and 
cultures are conducive to gender mainstreaming? 
1.3.1 Concepts, Derinitions and Debates 
Gender mainstrearning is a relatively new strategy to be applied to the goals of addressing gender 
equality but has already established a considerable space in a policy context and in academic 
scholarship. Mieke Verloo provides one definition of gender mainstreaming in an increasingly 
crowded conceptual space: 
"[g]ender mainstreaming addresses the problem of gender inequality at a more 
structural level [than targeted gender equality policies], identifying gender biases in 
current policies, and addressing the impact of these gender biases in the reproduction of 
gender policy. By reorganising policy processes so that the regular policy makers will 
be obliged and capable to incorporate a perspective of gender equality in their policies, 
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this strategy aims at a fundamental transformation, eliminating gender biases, and 
redirecting policies so that they can contribute towards the goal of gender equality" 
(2001: 3). 
For Judith Squires (2005), Verloo's definition would equate to a transformative approach to 
mainstreaming, which is identified as the most desirable in terms of transformative change. It is 
based on a diversity perspective and follows a strategy of displacement through the 
destabilisation of hegemonic norms. But Squires also includes integrationist and agenda-setting 
strategies in her definition of mainstreaming. Squires (2005) sets out a three-by-three matrix of 
mainstrearning approaches and associated gender perspectives and policy forms. According to 
this matrix, a strategy of inclusion is represented by an equality perspective, an equal opportunity 
approach to equality policy, and an integrationist approach. A strategy of reversal is represented 
by a gender perspective based on difference, a positive action approach to equality policy and an 
agenda-setting approach to mainstrearning. Lastly, a strategy of displacement represents a gender 
perspective based on diversity, an equality policy of gender mainstreaming and a transformative 
approach to mainstreaming in general. Yet these conceptual distinctions do not prevent the 
adoption of one or more of these approaches in mainstreaming practices (Squires, 2005a: 2). 
Similarly, Rounaq Jahan (1995) differentiates between two approaches to mainstreaming; that of 
integrationist and agenda-setting. Jacqui True takes an even more encompassing definition; she 
asserts that gender mainstreaming "can be understood as an umbrella term that includes gender- 
differentiated policy analysis as well as the whole range of contemporary innovations designed 
to achieve more gender-equitable outcomes... " (2003: 369). There is some value in recognising 
the diversity of techniques and approaches adopted. However, it is useful for analytical purposes 
to adopt a more narrow conception of gender mainstrearning in line with Verloo's transformative 
definition above. 
A universal acknowledgement among gender mainstrearning proponents is that engagement with 
the state is a necessary strategy for change (Razavi and Miller, 1998). The level of inquiry for 
gender mainstrearning analyses is at the institutional level and strategies advocated for 
mainstreaming are usually underpinned by an institutionalist perspective, concerned with norms, 
processes, and informal structures (Goetz, 1997). In general, the literature is dominated more by 
combined empirical analyses than theoretical discussion (although the latter has grown 
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considerably in the last four years) and this reflects the policy orientation of the field. Several 
stud; es of gender mainstreaming, and related studies of state feminism or feminist comparative 
policy adopt a comparative perspective or are collaborated in a comparative venture, enabling 
increased dialogue among advocates and analysts in the field (Randall and Waylen, 1998; Goetz, 
1997a; Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Mazur, 2002; Liebert, 2003; Rai, 2003b). 
Some general debates on gender mainstrearning can be identified. One is a constructivist IR 
debate which discusses the role of international institutions in the transnational diffusion of 
norms. A large European Union literature analyses gender mainstrearning in the context of the 
EU (Rees, 1998; Liebert, 2003). EU debates focus more generally on mainstreaming Equal 
Opportunity strategies, extending into all areas of policy. The EU provides a good comparative 
context in which to examine how a regional supranational body may influence policy change in 
national contexts. It also suggests important issues of pre-prescribed institutional design and 
policy adoption for newly integrating member governments under EU enlargement processes. 
Another debate is whether the introduction of gender mainstreaming strategies places the status 
of national commissions in question or whether gender mainstrearning actually increases the 
legitimacy of these organizational bodies. Lastly, a normative debate questions whether the 
institutional isation of gender mainstrearning loses the critical transformative edge of agitational 
politics. A related issue is whether gender mainstrearning strategies are elitist in that the main 
feminist actors are gender experts. Most of these debates feed into wider issues of governance 
and reform, accountability, citizenship and democratic participation, and transnational social 
movements, advocacy and activism. 
1.3.2 Gender Mainstreaming in Development Policy 
Many academic studies use the fourth United Nations conference at Beijing in 1995 as a 
focusing event for the recognition and consolidation of gender mainstreaming strategies in 
development (for example Baden and Goetz, 1998). 
As opposed to gender equality strategies set in an EU context, by and large gender 
mainstreaming strategies for development policy aim to make development policy more gender- 
sensitive. Some important early studies drawing from the WID/GAD discourse drew attention to 
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gendered hierarchies in development institutions and gendered policies (Kabeer, 1994; Goetz, 
1997). Caroline Moser suggests a link between discourses underpinning gender mainstreaming 
strategies and their attractiveness to policy-makers: 
Because it is a less 'threatening' approach, planning for Women in Development is far 
more popular. However, by its very definition it is an add-on, rather than an integrative 
issue. Gender planning, with the fundamental goal of emancipation, is by definition a 
more 'confrontational' approach. Based on the premise that the major issue is one of 
subordination and inequality, its purpose is that women through empowerment achieve 
equality and equity with men in society. 
(1993: 4) 
However, Moser questions the extent to which institutions can be gendered (1993: 109). This is 
reiterated by Standing (2004) who goes as far to question the basic assumptions underpinning 
gender mainstrearning of the policy route to transformative institutional change. 
1.3.3 The Role of Women's National Machineries 
The creation of new institutional structures to institutionalize gender planning has taken place in 
both non-state and state administrative contexts; in national and subnational governments, in 
multilateral donor agencies, and in non-governmental and civil society organisations (Moser, 
1993: 108). Departments and National Commissions have proliferated in. national governments. 
Moser traces the drive for the creation of national commissions for women to the 
recommendation of the first major conference of the UN Decade for Women (1975-85). It 
recommended 'the establishment of interdisciplinary and multisectoral machinery within 
government, such as national commissions, women's bureaux and other bodies... ' (UN 1976: 
para 34; cited in Moser, 1993: 111). 
A consistent theme on women's national machineries, usually in relation to their failure, is their 
institutional exclusion from planning processes and underfunding (Moser, 1993: 1). Several 
studies highlight not only exclusion and lack of resourcing, but resistance in the form ofa lack of 
political will and leadership, continuous dislocation within government structures, short-termisin 
of party politics and electoral cycles, and resistance to cross-party initiatives. Some internal 
difficulties include overambitious mandates, tenuous alliances with women's movements, 
confusion over objectives, the continuation of welfarist approaches, charges of elitism and co- 
optation, and dependency as a result of patronage (Beall, 1998; Rai, 2003a). Goetz notes that the 
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institutional location and role assigment of WID/GAD units can marginalise and stigmatise 
their ambitloiis iii udvunce (Goetz, 19977b: 2 Z). 'ibis raises interesting questions aibout institutional 
design and how it produces asynunetrical power relations within institutional structures. 
As Gita Sen (2000) and Miller and Razavi (1998a) argue, Finance Ministries have proven the 
hardest to penetrate in terms of mainstreaming strategies. Miller and Razavi attribute this to the 
dominance in these bodies of neo-classical economics and emphasises the importance of the 
skills and advocacy of feminist economists such as Diane Elson in scrutinising their work in their 
language. This also raises questions about inter-ministerial relationships and the lack of 
accountability or enforcement in the higher echelons of political leadership. 
A discernible component of the literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy 
emanates from international development agencies, some of which are introspective about 
developing gender mainstreaming strategies; most of their efforts are designed to institutioi4ise 
their own gender mainstreaming policy. 1his component also includes output strategies which 
are usually prescriptive, sometimes evaluative, but less often critical . 
30 This component provides 
some empirical insights on particular cases and on varying institutional discourses and practices 
of gender mainstreaming, but in general they provide little theoretical or critical discussion. 
Particular to mainstreaming in development is the presence of multiple actors besides the 
national govýrnment such as non-governmental civil society organisations, bilateral partnerships 
between national governments, and the international development agencies. More recent debates 
have focused on the rising importance of international donor discourses and the gains of 
transnational feminist networks in pushing for change. In Jahan's study of Bangladesh and 
Tanzania, two multilateral donors (World Bank and UNDP) and two bilateral donors (Norway 
and Canada), an insider-outsider alliance was important in institutionalising policy (Jahan, 1995). 
Jahan found that within bilateral agencies, a few feminist staff acted to mobilise externals. 
Multilateral agencies were influenced by powerful country members, feminist advocates, top 
leadership and outside women's lobby groups. Partner governments were more influenced by 
3OAn example of the latter is the series of handbooks produced by the Commonwealth Secretariat entitled New 
Gender Mainstreaming Series on Development Issues (see Kabeer, 2003, for the volume on gender mainstrearning 
in poverty eradication). 
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women's organisations, political leadership and donor agencies, more so than their apparently 
weak and ineffective national machineries. interestingly, partner country women's organisations 
influenced donor and international agencies more than their own governments. 
A more recent study by Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002) of four major international 
organisations (World Bank, LJNDP, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and 
the EU) similarly showed a large variation in implementing strategies with the UN most 
hospitable, which is consistent with the overall frame of the organisation. The low adoption by 
the World Bank observed by Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002) is consistent with Bergeron 
(2003) who argues that despite the World Bank's move towards a post-Washington consensus, 
which incorporates more social aspects of development, representations of women in 
development at the Bank have changed little. 
A degree of skepticism over gender mainstrearning strategies has emerged in the literature. 
Mukhopadhyay (2004) notes that after three decades of activism, advocacy is still essential for 
reminding institutions of the need to mainstream gender into policy. This suggests a lack of 
institutionalisation. Subrahmanian (2004: 89) goes as far to say that gender mainstreaming has 
become a 'hollow discourse, a generator of myths that simplifies the complexity of gender in 
ways that are counterproductive, and in many ways a constraint on political action by feminists'. 
1.4 Mainstreaming Gender in Indian Development Policy 
The literature on gender mainstrearning in development policy in India is an underdeveloped 
area, particularly in academic circles, and most analysis is situated at the level of development 
organisations, NGO practitioners and grassroots projects rather than government policy level 
(Murthy, 2001a). A possible explanation for this is that gender mainstrearning initiatives are 
relatively new in India which may mean research and analysis has not yet grown to represent a 
substantial body of literature. 
31 Another explanation may reflect the limited uptake, impact, or 
perceived importance of gender mainstrearning strategies in Indian development policy. The 
prospect of the absence of gender mainstrearning is in itself interesting and warrants study into 
31 Murthy(1991; cited in Murthy, 1998: 30-31) found that of training programmes in 108 development organizations 
in India, '700/6-75% of training programmes for development functionaries in India were found to be gender- 
blind ... [they] are 
implicitly male-biased as they do not delve into gender biases within mainstream thinking. 
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the factors which have contributed to its marginal or ineffective position. it may reflect an 
absciice of polikal will to follow gender mainstreaming strategies or an absence of external 
donor influence, pressure, or incentive to adopt such strategies. Both explanations highlight the 
need for research on this topic. The following review will be limited to a few important and 
relevant studies on gender mainstrearning in development policy in India. Firstly, it brings 
together important insights from studies on the institutional structure and policy legacy that 
constitutes the environment for gender mainstreaming initiatives in India. 
Desai (1998) and Raju (1997) have charted several of the main developments in Indian policy 
and state institutional structure and design on women's issues and gender relations (see Table I 
below and Appendix I). What this shows is the existence of the institutional development of a 
bureaucratic structure to address gender and development issues. One such development has 
been the creation of a National Commission for Women. The Commission was set up by 
parliamentary legislation in January 1992 under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990 
(Rai, 2003: 23 0). 32 The Commission is not solely constituted for the purpose of advising on 
women-specific or gendered development policy, and this reflects the wider agenda of the Indian 
women's movement. The efficacy of the National Commission for Women in India has not been 
studied extensively. Rai (2003) provides one account. According to Rai, the NCW was 
established in response to the National Perspective Plan for Women and after consulting various 
members and organisations from the women's movement (1991; cited in Murthy, 1998: 30-31) 
and feminist advocates in mainstream electoral Politics (Rai, 2003: 229). Rai asserts that support 
from women's organisation for the constitution of a national commission for women created 
legitimacy for the institutional body and identifies four reasons for their support. Firstly, the 
growth of the Indian women's movement prompted increased, confidence to make demands on 
the state. Secondly, a politics of presence was acknowledged as necessary in order for policy to 
be gender-sensitive. Thirdly, feminist activist and feminist academic capacity existed for training 
on gender issues. Fourthly, engagement with the state was acknowledged as necessary due to the 
3' The Commission's mandate is "to review the Constitutional and legal safeguards for women, recommend 
remedial legislative measures, facilitate redressal of grievances and advise the Government on all policy matters 
affecting women" (NCW, cited in Rai, 2003: p. 231). The Commission's focus is on legal safeguards, rights, 
provisions, violations and policy-related matters as well as participating in the planning process for socio-economic 
development of women and evaluates progress. 
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growing conservatism of civil society groups. Lastly, policy change from the top was deemed 
important (2003: 229). 
The lack of adequate studies on this topic means that several questions remain as to the efficacy 
of the National Commission for Women, its relationship (other than structural) to its parent 
department (the Department of Women and Child Development) and parent ministry (the 
ministry of Human Resource Development), and above all to other Ministries in government. 
Furthermore, what is the role of leadership of the Commission? Does its structural location 
preclude a serious engagement with other ministries as Goetz (1995) suggests? To what extent is 
the Commission really consulted in policy-making? Crucially, does the existence of a WID unit 
such as the National Commission, or perhaps the Department of Women and Child Development 
undermine efforts to institutionalise a mainstream approach? 
On gendered development policy, Saraswati Raju (1997) and Murli Desai (1998) provide 
analyses of how India's successive Five Year Plans (up to the Eighth Five Year Plan) have 
articulated the development approach to women and gender. Raju (1997) highlights a significant 
shift from welfare to development in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) and from development 
to empowerment in the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-1997). Some of the main developments are 
summarised in Table I below. The question remains as to whether developments in the Ninth 
(1997-2002) and Tenth Five Year Plans (2002-2007) have remained consistent with the 
empowerment approach. 
What literature does exist on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India indicates that 
a relatively small number of acadmic-activists have collaborated with the Government of India 
on this topic (Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1999a). The Gender Planning Training Project, a 
, landmark' collaboration between the Department for International Development (DFID) and the 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in the UK, and the Government of India, aimed to 
develop training modules for gender mainstrearning to train would-be trainers. The project 
included training sessions for civil servants at IDS, with sessions later transferred to the Indian 
civil service training institute, the National Academy of Administration in Mussorie, Uttar 
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Table I Approach to women and/or gender and development In Five Year Plans 1951-1997 
Yenr(s) Plan --roach to wom. en andoloar gender IA 111-1 
1951-56 First Five Year Plan Focus on welfare; development of matemal and child health and family 
planning services 
1956-60 Second Five Year Plan Focused on women workers: less organised and vulnerable to social 
prejudices and physical disabilities. Suggested protection against 
injurious work, equal pay for equal work, crýches, training facilities, 
expanding opportunities for part-time employment 
1960-66 11ird Five Year Plan Focus on expansion of girls' education 
1969-74 Fourth Five Year Plan Continued focus of previous plan. 
1974-79 Fifth Five Year Plan Shift from welfare to development; need to train women in need of 
income and protection. 
1980-85 Sixth Five Year Plan Women's development recognised as specific development sector with 
separate chapter. Three-pronged thrust on education, employment and 
health. Several schemes launched to benefit women. 
1985-90 Seventh Five Year Plan Included a separate chapter on women entitled "Socio-economic 
Programmes for Women". 
1992-1997 Eighth Five Year Plan Shift from development to empowerment. Focus on three key sectors of 
education, health and employment. Women now seen as equal partners 
and participants in development and must be empowered for this. 
bource: Acaptecl from Murli vesai (1998) and Raju (1997) 
Pradesh (Kabcer and Subrahmanian, 1999b; Subrahmanian et al., 1999). However, few studies 
have explored the effects of this training on development policy formulation and administration. 
The collections in Murthy (2001) focus mainly on gender sensitisation training by NGOs for 
societal groups at the grassroots level, but an important exception is the chapter by Stephen 
(2001) on NGO training for women in gram panchayats. Stephen highlights the ministerial 
conflicts and attitudes of high-level government functionaries of gender-sensitisation 
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programmes, in this case between the Department of Women and Child Development and the 
Panchayat Raj Department. 33 
1.5 Conclusion 
Some key themes that emerge from this review is a vast literature on development policy but one 
which has key areas of deficiency and integration in terms of analysing the gendered character of 
state-led development in India. The preceding critical analysis of the literature. has found 
accounts which present the state as an undifferentiated entity unable to address some of the 
complex relationships between and within state institutions, particularly gendered practices, 
norms, structures and processes. The Centre-State relationship is an interesting dynamic, and one 
on which the literature is beginning to grow. State level discourses need to be explored as to their 
differential impact in comparison to national level discourses of development. The synthesis of 
literature on development policy in India and gender mainstreaming in development policy 
shows limited coverage of the Indian case. This is most likely a result of a lack of uptake of 
strategies or the relatively new development of these strategies in the Indian case. In both 
instances, the process of research can only contribute'to exploring these reasons further as 
questions remain unanswered. Emerging initiatives combined with the lack of detailed study on 
the Indian case with regards to gender mainstreaming in development policy suggests room for a 
valuable and original contribution to the literature. 
33 Stephen claims that while the DWCD was in approval of the programme, the Secretary of the Panchayat Raj 
Departmerit 'fiercely resisted' the proposal on the grounds that responsibilities and funds had already been allocated 
for their training at a national institute, and that no finther training would be required or funds allocated for that 
purpose (2001: 136). Resistance also came from the Panchayat Raj Department Secretary to the gender-specific 
training needs of women gram panchayat members (2001: 136). 
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2 METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
To reiterate, the research aims are to understand (a) the politics of formulating and implementing 
gcndered development policy in an institutional context; (b) how the process and content of 
policy-making is affected by discourse; and (c) how particular agents can exert more influence 
than others on the development policy-making process. The research objectives are to discern 
how institutional context affects the efforts to mainstream gender in development policy, to 
discern how specific gcndcred discourses of development become prevalent in state institutions; 
and to discern how influential actors may potentially promote or obfuscate gender mainstreaming 
in development policy. Thus, institutions, discourse, and agency are the three key analytical 
concepts central to the research question of this thesis. The main aim of this chapter is to outline 
the methodologies which underpin these three concepts as well as the methods I will use for data 
colicction. 
I draw upon two principal methodologies: firstly, the emerging approach of feminist 
institutionalism to inform my conceptual ization of institutions, and secondly, for discourse, a 
poststructural approach to feminist discourse analysis. Lastly, a poststructural perspective 
informs how agency is conceptualized, specifically as a product of institutional norms and 
practices and of the various subject positions made available through discourses as well as the 
dcstabilizing effect arising from their conflicting and contradictory juxtaposition. Given the 
combination of feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse analysis, throughout this chapter 
I argue the case for methodological pluralism as a means to address the research problem. A key 
component of the analytical structure is the post-positivist approach to the comparative analysis 
of two case studies. The main methods of data collection employed are semi-structured 
(prcdominantly elite) intcrvicws and documentary analysis. The chapter also includes a 
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consideration of research ethics as details of the planned fieldwork period and destinations. The 
methodology is designed in order to produce synergies that take advantage of different 
methodological approaches while remaining internally consistent in order to understand the 
relationship between institutions, discourse and agency, in a comparative context. 
2.2, Feminist Institutionalism 
2.2.1 From 'old' to 'new' institutionalism 
The 'new' institutionalism(s) emerged from growing dissatisfaction with the dominance of 
behaviouralist approaches, the latter themselves emerging from dissatisfaction with the 'old' 
institutionalism. 'Old' institutionalism focused on the formal-legal political structure of a polity, 
and its subject matter consists of the f6rmal organisations, rules and procedures of government 
(Rhodes, 1997: 6). 'Old' institutionalists follow a descriptive, inductive, historical and 
comparative approach, using the tools of the historian and the lawyer (ibid: 64-5). Old 
ilistitutionalism. conceptualised government as an allocative-functional institution designed to 
inediate between competing interest groups in society rather than an actor with its own interests 
to pursue (Skocpol, 1985: 4). Behaviouralists in the 1950s criticised institutionalism for its 
overly structural-functional and macro-level account of political systems. Behaviouralists 
downplayed institutional structures and saw politics as the 'aggregate consequences of individual 
behaviour' (March itnd Olsen, 1984). Behaviouralists focused more on the informal distributions 
of power rather than the formal 
legal structures of government institutions to explain political 
behaviour (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 4). Nevertheless, behaviouralism's hegemonic position in 
political science was undermined by its tendency toward reductionism in theorising outcomes as 
the aggregated result of individual behaviour, as well as utilitarian and instrumentalist tendencies 
towards decision-making behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984,735). Renewed interest in political 
institutions was reflected in calls for "bringing the state back in" (Evans et al., 1985) and a re- 
emergence of structural explanations as opposed to the micro-level of behaviouralism (although 
a lasting behaviouralist legacy can 
be seen in elements of the "new"institutionalism(s)). 
The central distinction between old and new institutionalism derives from the shift in focus from 
formal conceptions of institutions to include a focus on the more informal or "rules of the game" 
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(North, 1990: 3). As Lowndes (2002: 103, orig. italics) states, "[by] including informal 
conventions as well as formal procedures, the new institutionalists are able to build a more fine- 
grained, and realistic, picture of what really constrains political behaviour and decision-making". 
Power is fluid rather than static and can be used by and against traditional sites of power in 
government. New institutional ists focus on a more intermediate level of institutional factors 
(Thelen and Steimno, 1992: 6). 
The three variants of new institutionalism - rational choice institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism, and historical institutionalism - largely differ on how they define institutions 
and particularly how they theorise individual behaviour in relation to institutions. Historical 
institutionalism offers a more nuanced alternative to the more reductionist sociological and 
rational choice institutional isms, which rely, respectively, on culture and a logic of 
appropriateness (sociological) or on calculus and a logi6 of instrumentality (rational choice) to 
explain the relationship between individual behaviour and institutions. Unlike. sociological 
institutionalists, historical institutional ists focus on the intermediate level of institutions and 
argue that institutions cannot be reduced simply to the wider societal culture, as they are 
significant forces in their own right (March and Olsen, 1984). They therefore avoid the tendency 
of sociological institutionalism known as 'conceptual stretching' (Sartori, 1970, cited in Daly, 
2003; Collier and Mahon Jr, 1993). Historical institutionalism also avoids reducing institutions to 
the 
, 
functionalism of rational choice approaches. It is the most adept of all three new 
institutional isms in addressing the historically embedded character of institutions. Also, it is a 
more inductive approach and is arguably geared more to complexity than parsimony (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992). 
Thelcn and Stcinmo -(1992) offer one of the first attempts to coherently sketch out and 
summarise the historical institutionalist pFoject, followed up by Thelen (1999). 34 Some key 
features of historical institutionalism are the study of institutional stasis and change, institutional 
norms, culture, processes and practices, organizational configurations conducive to innovative 
policy, the interrelationship between ideas and institutions, the concept of 'critical junctures', 
34 Thelen and Steinmo (1992) recognised two main variants of the new institutionalism, that of historical and 
rational choice institutionalism, but for the purposes of this brief review, I will employ the three variant typology put 
forward by I Tall and Taylor (1996) discussed above. 
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and perhaps above all the notion of path-dependence (Thelen and Steiruno, 1992; Hall, 1989; 
Weir, 1989; Thelen, 1999; Mahoney and Ruescherneyer, 2003). 
For historical institutionalists, the focus of inquiry is on intermediate level institutions rather than 
a broadly structural analysis of social change. Accordingly, 'institutions constrain and refract 
politics but they are never the sole "cause" of outcomes. [Historical] Institutional analyses do not 
deny the broad political forces that animate various theories of politics ... Instead, they point to 
the ways that institutions structure these battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes. " 
(Thelen and Steinmb, 1992: 3). They are concerned with the relational process of interactions 
within institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12). 
In the institutional context of policy-making, the latter's organizational configuration affects the 
power relations among actors involved (Hall, 1986: 19, cited in Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2-3). 
The definition of actors' interests rather than the mere choices with which they are faced will be 
influenced by their organizational position (ibid). In contrast to rational choice institutionalists, 
the historical institutionalist approach posits that individuals are more likely to follow routine 
behaviour than constantly calculate optimal outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 8). With 
regards to institutionalised, routine-enacting behaviour, this provides a related tension for 
institutionalising a gender perspective into development policy-making institutions. As Inhetveen 
(1999) suggests, institutionalising, routinising, or normalising behaviour is the opposite of 
rational purposive action. Therefore, strategies aimed explicitly at mainstreaming a gender. 
sensitive perspective into institutional culture may fail to institutionalize such behaviour if they 
do not attempt to routinise gender-equitable norms and practices into institutional culture. What 
is needed therefore is a clearer understanding of how particular norms and processes become 
institutionalised in certain contexts. 
Institutional arrangements affect the potential for innovative policy which is determined inter 
alia-by patterns of recruitment and procedures governing career progression (Weir, 1989: 59). 
Weir's concept of 'bounded innovation' is an important insight for the institutional context in 
which transformative gender mainstrearning strategies may be adopted. Weir argues that 'when 
recruitment is governed by rigid guidelines that emphasize conformity to established civil service 
norms, bureaucrats are more likely to display attachment to standard procedures and established 
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policy positions than a willingness to strike out in innovative policy directions' (Weir, 1989: 59). 
Therefore, state institutional culture and norms are likely to have an impact on potential 
innovations in gendered development policy. These two examples of institutionalising norms and 
bounded innovation both stress the importance of informal institutional features such as norms 
and culture in studying policy change. 
Institutional change is conceived as messy and contingent and as such contrasts with a 
functionalist approach (1999: 382). Change produces incongruent institutional configurations 
that 'yield new interweavings of the multiple social logics... ' (Orren and Skowronek, 1998: 7, 
cited in Thelen, 1999: 383). This suggests considerable potential for unintended consequences 
and knock-on effects of institutional change in different arenas. However, only some of these 
unintended consequences will prove to be consequential (Thelen, 1999: 400). 
The concept of 'critical juncture' is part of the conceptual machinery of historical institutionalists 
and can be understood as a moment or event during which the logic of institutional structure 
becomes destabilised. Thelen's notion of 'reproduction mechanisms' provides an important 
insight into the contingency of change, which to an extent addresses the disjuncture between 
explanations of institutional stability and change that have constrained several historical 
institutionalist accounts (1999). Thelen asks the question: why do particular critical junctures 
produce lasting legacies and others do not? Thelen argues against separating stability and 
change; she addresses this question by expanding on the critical junctures and policy f6edbacks 
lit erature, with reference to the notions of mechanisms of reproduction and policy feedback. 
Mechanisms of reproduction refer to the bases on and processes in which institutional 
configurations are sustained. Policy feedback mechanisms refer to how power relations are 
embedded in institutional contexts and configurations, and produce power laden distributional 
effccts which empower some and marginalise others. These two mechanisms determine the 
extent to which institutions and their configurations are vulnerable or resilient to change. Thus 
the very conditions of institutional stability may be the same conditions for institutional change. 
Feminist scholars concerned with institutional change have embraced histoýical institutionalism 
and sought to combine these insights with a feminist concern with power. 'Feminist 
institutionalism' has recently emerged as a methodological approach which seeks to combine a 
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feminist approach to political problems which are often centrally concerned with power and hold 
a normative commitment towards change and a new institutionalist, most often an historical 
institutionalist, approach to the study of institutions (Kenny, 2007). Feminist institutionalism 
draws from the new institutionalist conceptualisation of institutions as encompassing informal 
rules, norms and practices as opposed to the 'old institutionalist' focus on formal rules, 
organisations and structures. Kenny argues that 'a gendered [or feminist] approach would offer 
important insights into power relations, which are often underplayed in new institutional 
analysis' (Kenny, 2007: 91). In particular historical institutionalism benefits from the feminist 
focus on power and change, given that historical institutionalism is the most conservative of the 
three institutionalisms due to its focus on institutional stability (Paantjens, 2006). A key question 
feminist institutionalists are concerned with. is how to produce institutional change (and how to 
direct the form it takes). In other words, feminist institutionalists try to build on studies of 
institutional change by trying to understand how to change an institution towards a particular 
form. 
Thus, an appealing feature of the applicability of feminist institutionalist approaches to this 
research problem is its direct engagement with issues concerning gender mainstreaming - how to 
change institutional norms, practices, processes and outcomes to make them more responsive to 
concerns of gender-equitable development. As Paantjen argues, 'gender mainstreaming is per 
definition institutionalist' (Paantjens, 2006). However, studies of gender mainstreaming rarely 
employ an institutionalist framework (Kenny and Paantjens, 2006) - although Goetz (1997a) is 
an exception - and thus could therefore benefit from the elaboration of the methodological 
framework of feminist institutionalism. In turn, studies of gender mainstreaming may offer an 
empirical context and a particularly promising avenue for a growing feminist institutionalist 
body of work (Kenny and Paantjens, 2006). 
The methodology this thesis employs assumes a synergistic relationship between the study of 
discourse and the study of institutions from a feminist institutionalist perspective. The 
relationship between discourse and institutions is critical to understanding how to change 
institutionally embedded gender-inequitable norms and practices, underpinned by the 
sedimentation of gendered discourses within institutions. 
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The most powerful discourses in our society have firm institutional bases, in the law, for 
example, or in medicine, social welfare, education and in the organisation of the family 
and work. Yet these institutional locations are themselves sites of contest, and the 
dominant discourses governing the organisation and practices of social institutions are 
under constant challenge. 
(Weedon, 1987: 109) 
Such a synergy arises from the mutual understanding that routinised behaviour embedded within 
institutions, a key concern of gender mainstreaming, is difficult to change. As Goetz explains, 
'the project for gender-sensitive institutional change is to routinise gender-equitable forms of 
social interaction and to challenge the legitimacy of forms of social organisation which 
discriminate against women' (Goetz, 1997b: 2). 
Paying particular attention to the institutional context becomes important to understand exactly 
what are the norms and practices one is trying to change: 'context is highly important ... because 
'problems' are often constituted differently due to location-specific, institution-specific and 
history-specific factors. Attention to these specifics will provide insights into why some versions 
of a policy 'problem' appear in one place and other versions appear elsewhere' (Bacchi, 1999). 
This is all the more so if one employs a post-structural understanding of the state, as increasingly 
are both scholars of feminist engagement with state (Rai, 1996; Chappell, 2002; Waylen, 1998; 
Pringle and Watson, 1992; Mottier, 2004) and anthropologists of the developmental state 
(Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Mitchell, 1991). 
Therefore, while it is also important to examine existing discourses and the emergence of new 
ones, we also need to understand how they become or remain embedded within a particular 
institutional context. The project to identify and understand mechanisms of reproduction and the 
institutionally configured relations of power suggests a fruitful synergy with discourse analysis. 
Furthermore, these analytical devices are particularly appropriate to the study of why critical 
junctures such as constitutional affirmations of gender equality or the creation of national 
women's machineries sometimes fail to institutionalise gender equality in institutions of the 
state. 
so 
2.3 ' Feminist Discourse Analysis 
A key concern of this thesis is firstly, how particular gendered discourses of development and 
pot others become prevalent in state development policy through their sedimentation in state 
institutions; secondly, how these discourses shape what can be said, thought and done in 
development policy; and thirdly, the implications these discourses have for transforming 
development policy through gender mainstrearning strategies in order to increase its gender 
responsiveness. In Chapter 6 (and, more briefly, in Chapter 3) 1 undertake a discourse analysis of 
Indian development policy in order to identify the multiple gendered discourses of development 
embedded within policy and to deconstruct what they signify in terms of the state's commitment 
(or not) to making the state-led project of development more gender-equitable. Here I outline the 
approach to discourse analysis which underpins the analysis I present in these later chapters. 
2.3.1 Variations in discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis can be traced to the rise of dissatisfaction of positivist approaches in the 
social sciences in the 20th century, the growth of interpretativ approaches and he ene ics, e Iýe 
rm ut th 
.. subsequent 
linguistic turn in the social sciences, and the rise of linguistics in literary theory 
(Howarth, 2000). While the intellectual legacy of discourse analysis is acknowledged in the work 
of Saussure, Levi-Strauss and Derrida, among others, the work of Michel Foucault is most 
central to the conception of discourse employed in this thesis. 
Discourse analysis is more of an umbrella term rather than a single method. Within the 
overarching category of discourse analysis, there are several approaches, many of which can be 
di I stinguished by epistemological and philosophical perspectives as well as methodological 
approach. For example, while Norman Fairclough's (2005) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
explicitly adopts a critical realist epistemology or philosophical perspective, Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) post-structural, post-Marxist approach strongly rejects positivistic, 
foundationalist and essentialist perspectives. Content analysis, which is sometimes subsumed 
under the category of discourse analysis, 
is different again, and relies on a more positivistic and, 
in many cases, a quantitative approach to analysis. More positivistic approaches to discourse 
analysis such as content analysis and conversation analysis have not been considered as 
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appropriate methodologies for this thesis. Also not considered, though somewhat closer to the 
approach adopted here, are more interpretivist and social constructionist approaches to discourse 
and policy. This approach is self-proclaimed as part of the 'argumentative turn' in policy 
analysis and is more broadly situated within a 'deliberative', Habermasian literature (Fischer and 
Forrester, 1993; Fischer, 1998; Hajer, 1993; Majone, 1989). At risk of simplification, while this 
approach recognises the social construction of policy problems, it conceptualises the concept of 
discourse as mainly an argumentative, framing strategy used by actors to persuade policy-makers 
of the importance of particular policy alternatives, which is more akin to a concept of rhetoric 
than discourse, and which attributes a higher level of instrumentality to actors than that which is 
allowed here. Thus, given the ubiquity of the term 'discourse' and the consequences of 
employing particular conceptualisations, below I clarify exactly how discourse is understood 
here. 
2.3.2 Foucault and discourse 
Discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, may be understood as 'a group of statements in so far as 
they belong to the same discursive formation; ... [that Which) is made up of a limited number of 
statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. ' (1972: 117). Discourse 
is more than just language - discourses are 'practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49). In other words, discourse produces material effects. In 
contrast to CDA, but consistent with the Essex School, and also with Laffey and Weldes (2004: 
28), discourse is not reducible or equivalent to language, but consists of structures and practices. 
Discourse is more than just language - 'discourses manifest themselves in both linguistic and 
non-linguistic practices' (Laffey and Weldes, 2004: 28). As Doty argues, 'to attempt a neat 
separation between discursive and non-discursive practices, understanding the former as purely 
linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies - thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, 
word/world, subjective/objective' which should be questioned (Doty, 1996: 5). Thus, for 
Foucault, the task is not to treat 
discourses as groups of signs ... but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs: but what they do is 
more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them 
irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal 
and describe. 
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(Foucault, 1972: 49) 
Thus, it is the description of what discourses 'do, their ordering of objects and subjects and their 
1, ý -Iý legitimating effects, that is significant. But without understanding discourses as the products and 
effects of 'power/knowledge' all one is left with is a non-descript infinite multitude of competing 
discourses. Foucault's shift from his earlier archaeological form of analysis to his later concerns 
with genealogy was driven by a reconstituted conception of power as existing in a symbiotic 
relationship with knowledge. He explains that what was 'lacking' in earlier archaeological works 
was 'this problem of the "discursive regime", of the effects of power peculiar to the play of 
statements. ' (Foucault, 1980: 113). Hence, one must understand discourse as an effect of 
power/knowledge which provides the conditions of existence and ordering of subjects and 
objects under particular regimes of truth, and also determines what counts as truth, knowledge, 
and expertise: 
... truth isn't outside power, or 
lacking in power... [Truth] induces regular effects of 
power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics, of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes fimction as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which 
each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
(Foucault, 1980: 131) 
The significance of Foucault's work for this thesis arises, firstly, from his conception of 
'discourse as outlined above and its importance for identifying and understanding the effects of 
discourse on the formulation of policy and institutional practices in policy-making processes. 
Secondly, the relationship Foucault outlines between truth, power and knowledge, is important 
for the production and legitimation of discourses, institutions, and experts in the development 
industry, the organization of relationships between them, and the marginalisation and exclusion 
of other claims to knowledge. Scholars of development have embraced Foucault's 
conceptualization of discourse, albeit in varied ways and for different purposes (Escobar, 1995; 
Ferguson, 1990; Crush, 1995; Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Abrahamsen, 
2000; Rossi, 2004; Mawdsley and Rigg, 2002; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Moore and Schmitz, 
1995). However, few of these have been explicitly concerned with feminist questions. 
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2.3.3 Feminist discourse analysis 
Variations in approaches to feminist discourse analysis mirror variations in the "der practice of 
discourse analysis discussed above, v4th some focusing on conversation analysis (Tannen, 
1994), sociolinguistics (Wodak, 1997), and Critical Discourse Analysis (Lazar, 2005). Arguably 
the most useful approach to discourse analysis of gendered development policy, including the 
discursive construction of gender equality as a policy problem, and which draws upon a 
Foucauldian concept ualization of discourse, may be found in feminist poststructural approaches 
to discourse analysis. As Weedon argues 
... feminist poststructuralism, concerned as it must be with power, looks to the historically and socially specific discursive production of conflicting and competing 
meanings... In order to develop strategies to contest hegemoric assumptions and the 
social practices which they guarantee, we need to understand the intricate network of 
discourses, the sites where they are articulated and the institutionally legitimised forms 
of knowledge to which they look for their justification. 
(Weedon, 1987: 86,126) 
Motticr (2004) refers to feminist discourse analysis as the 'discursive turn in feminist analysis'. 
Discourse analysis, she argues, is particularly well suited to feminist analyses which consider the 
state not as a monolith but as a multiplicity of hetereogeneous state arenas (Mottier, 2004). 1 
draw primarily on the work of Carol Lee Bacchi (1999,2000,2004), who employs a Foucauldian 
understanding of discourse and whose aim is to deconstruct the discursive construction of policy 
'problems', specifically those concerned with gender (in)equality. 35 Bacchi's 'What's the 
Problem' approach 'starts from the premise that problematizations ought to feature as a central 
focus of analysis' (1999: 4 1). She succinctly outlines her approach as follows 
one way to understand what is at stake in policy contests is to identify what is 
represented to be the problem. This position starts from the premise that policy 
'problems' do not exist separate from their representations. it also contends that an 
examination of postulated policy 'solutions' will reveal what is, represented to be the 
problem. Representations of a 'problem' must then be closely examined to see what 
assumptions underpin different representations, what effects follow from them, and how 
subjects are constituted within them. Crucially we need to reflect upon what is left 
unproblematic, what is likely to change and what is likely to stay the same. 
(Bacchi, 2004: 13 1; cf. Bacchi, 1999) 
35 While some might argue that Bacchi is based within the field social constructionism, in that her main focus of 
enquiry is the social construction of policy problems, she criticises social constructionism on many accounts, and in 
a way which draws her closer to what she calls an 'afTin-native postmodernist' position (1999: 64). As will also be 
demonstrated, much of her approach to discourse and her rejection of the autonomous subject, including the 
positioning of individuals within discourse, demonstrates strong poststructural leanings. 
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For Bacchi, 'the idea of policy as discursive activity... promotes consideration of the ways in 
which the terms of a discourse limit what can be talked about' (Bacchi, 2000: 49). This is a 
political exercise in demystification, and enables hitherto unproblematised discourses to be 
debated and therefore challenged (Bacchi, 2000: 50). 
Analysts of gender mainstrearning and gender equality policies in Europe* have drawn to some 
extent on Bacchi's work in establishing a Critical Frame Analysis approach (Verloo and 
Lombardo, 2007). However, this approach differs slightly in that it derives from frame theory, 
having a broader background in social movement theory, and that it emphasises frames and 
strategical framing rather than discourse, and thus a higher degree of agency for actors engaged 
in the policy-making process (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007). As Bacchi argues, 'in contrast to 
studies'which emphasize a historical agent's ability to frame proposals rhetorically, I insist upon 
the need to draw attention to the constitutive power of discourse, to the difficulty of stepping 
outside of structuring discourses' (Bacchi, 1999: 45). 1 would, argue with Bacchi that the 
emphasis on strategic framing creates a tension between 'the extent to which we are "in" 
discýurises and the extent to which we "use" discourses' (Bacchi, 2004: 129). However, I also 
recognize that it is possible for subjects to 
be aware of how they are located within different 
discourses. With this approach in mind, it is important to explore further the possibilities for 
agency given that feminist analyses of gender mainstrearning are principally concerned with 
effecting change. 
2.4 ': Subjectivity and Agency 
The key research question on agency is to what extent institutional norms and practices and 
discourses make possible particular kinds of agency and to what extent these opportunities for 
agency are likely to promote or obfuscate gender mainstreaming strategies. 
If agency here is 
considered as a product of institutional norms and practices and of 
discourses, what then does 
feminist institutionalism and feminist poststructural discourse analysis say about agency? I argue 
that agency - as opposed to behavior - has been a more thoroughly debated issue among 
poststructural theorists, partly 
because the rejection of the transcendental, autonomous, subject 
hai been one of its key distinguishing features in relation to more modernist and humanist 
philosophical perspectives. For 
instance, the place for agency in Foucault's work rests with his 
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conception of the subject, which is based on the rejection of humanist accounts of the 
transccndcntat subject as wcIl as psychoanalytical models of subjectivity. 
[D]iscourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, 
speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject 
and his discontinuity with himself [sic] may be determined... [I]t is neither by recourse 
to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that the 
regulation of its enunciations should be defined. 
(1972: 55) 
Therefore, to employ a Foucauldian conceptualisation of the subject is to reject humanist theories 
of autonomy that present the individual as a preconstituted, transcendental, Cartesian subject. 
Such an approach also entails rejecting psychoanalytic explanations because they posit an 
ahistorical and undifferentiated account of the formation of the self (McNay, 1992: 9). 
We may recall Foucault's notion that discourses are 'practices that systematically forin the 
objects of which they speak' (1972: 49). Specifically, discourse creates a variety of subject 
positions through which it is (re)articulated, practiced, and reproduced. Discourse as an effect of 
power/knowlcdge provides the conditions of existence and ordering of subjects and objects under 
particular regimes of truth, and also determines what counts as truth, knowledge, and expertise. 
In this sense, discourse constructs an enunciative hierarchy of these subject positions, allowing 
particular subjects to be heard and not others, some with more power and authority than others. 
In other words, discourse determines the possibilities for agency of the subjects it constitutes. 
It is also important to recognize the contingency of discourse within institutional contexts to 
undcrstand how some actors are positioned in ways that enable agency and others in ways that 
constrain agency, and to resist more instrumental understandings of agency. According to Bacchi 
... discourses are not the direct product of intentional manipulation by a few key 
political actors, but neither are they transhistorical structures operating outside of human 
intervention' It is inadequate to suggest that some groups wield power over knowledge 
systems to the extent that they can put in place understandings which eliminate or 
contain other understandings. This description is too instrumental. It creates a vision of 
those with power imposing meanings which suit their purposes on dupes who know no 
better. Rather we need to reflect upon the extent to which we are all 'in' discourses that 
shape and limit the possibilities of 'what can be said', without suggesting that 
discourses are monolithic and that contestation is impossible. 
(Bacchi, 1999: 43) 
Foucault's work and Foucauldian. conceptions of agency are particularly frustrating for some 
feminists because of the challenges it poses to the feminist political emancipatory project on two 
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counts. Firstly, Foucault's anti-humanist approach to the subject has been met with resentment 
particularly by feminists because it challenged the basis upon which feminists could appeal to a 
shared experience of oppression among women and thus destabilized their claims to solidarity 
(Weedon, 1987: 125). Secondly, Foucault refused to elaborate on the normative basis for social 
change and thus similarly precluded a strategy for the feminist emancipatory political project 
(McNay, 1992: 8). However, his is a different political project which may be just as important: 
The essential political problem for the intellectual is ... that of ascertaining the 
possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people's 
consciousness ... but the political, economic, 
institutional regime of the production of 
truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power ... but of 
detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time. 
(Foucault, 1980: 133) 
However, he does not provide any basis upon which a new politics of truth may be constituted, 
concerned that such an elaboration would have a normalizing effect. 
Bacchi rejects claims that poststructural deconstruction cannot adequately engage in political 
projects, arguing that 'discourses as we have seen, are complex and contradictory, and 
constructions can be challenged. If we accept that our world is socially constructed, then it can 
be changed by challenging -- deconstructing - constructions which have effects we wish to 
reduce or eliminate' (Bacchi, 1999: 62). 
Another related criticism of Foucault's understanding of agency as demonstrated through his 
W- ork on discipline (elaborated 
in his accounts of incarceration and sexuality) is that it precludes 
a theory of agency, positing 
individuals as little more than 'docile bodies' (McNay, 1992). While 
Foucault's concept of 'technologies of the self' was a later attempt to overcome some of the 
limitations of his 'docile bodies' in that discourses engage individuals in the self-(re)fashioning 
of their bodies and identities, the concept 
is under-theorised and does not offer an adequate 
theory of agency (McNay, 2000: 8-_9). It fails to extend beyond the self-government of 
individuals to how agents may actively and creatively transform the very discourses that 
constitute them. 
However, agency may emerge as a result of the contingent and unstable character of discourse, 
and the inability of 
discourse to dominate the field of discursive possibilities. The contingent 
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character of discourse and the co-existence of multiple contending discourses prevents the 
ultimate fixity and domination of any one discourse over the discursive field of possibilities. As 
Howarth and Stavrakakis emphasise, 'discourses are contingent and historical constructions, 
which are always vulnerable to those, political forces excluded in their production' (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 34, orig. italics). This enables the contestation of even the most hegemonic 
of discourses. 
Because discourses are partial, contingent, relational, and a product of power/knowledge, and are 
also productive (of meaning, possibilities, identities, actions, but also silences and exclusions), 
they allow varying possibilities for agency. As Weedon explains, 'different discourses provide 
for a range of modes of subjectivity and the ways in which particular discourses constitute 
subjectivity have implications for the process of reproducing or contesting power relations' 
(Weedon, 1987: 92). Thus, the existence of multiple discourses also enables an array of 
subjectivities through which a collective or alternative subjectivity may emerge, albeit one which 
is relational to and contingent on its constitutive discourses, but one which may have the capacity 
to contest and rearticulate hegemonic subjectivities in new ways. The possibilities of contesting 
dominant subjectivities, are crucial for a feminist transformative politics that seeks new ways of 
imagining and realising a form of development or social change that is gender-equitable. 
2.4.1 Combining feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse analysis 
Combining feminist institutionalist and feminist discourse analytic approaches offers fruitful 
opportunities for understanding the complexity of the effects of institutions, discourse, and 
agency on efforts to mainstream gender in development policy. Both methodologies focus on 
power and change. Both methodologies adopt a view of the state as a heterogeneous arena of 
institutions, some offering more potential for feminist transformative strategies than others. 
Lastly, the differences between these two strategies are highly complementary for a study of 
gender mainstrcaming in development policy. Feminist institutionalism enables a detailed 
undustanding of how gender mainstreaming strategies attempt to effect change in state 
institutional norms, structures, and processes. Feminist discourse analysis of policy makes 
possible an understanding of how discourses constitute the policy problem of gender-inequitable 
development in different ways, often leading to multiple, sometimes complementary and 
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sometimes contradictory policy 'solutions, some of which offer more potential for gender- 
equitable development than others. Because discourses are institutionally embedded, it is 
important to combine an analysis of the two to understand the contingent political processes 
involved in the formation of gendered development policy - why some discourses become 
embedded in particular institutional contexts and others do not, as well as their effects - and thus 
the opportunities for gender mainstreaming. 
2.5 Methods 
In this section I outline the methods the thesis employed for data collection and the strategies I 
used for the analysis of data. Interviews, documentary. analysis, and analysis of secondary data 
were combined to produce descriptive case studies for comparative analysis according to the 
research aims and objectives. These methods were consistent with the Foucauldian and feminist 
institutionalist methodological approaches in that they focus more on contextualised complexity 
and description, rather than parsimony, abstraction and universal generalisation. However, the 
use of the comparative method provides some opportunity for explanation, after acknowledging 
certain limitations. Its use is consistent with the concern to develop the conceptual apparatus in 
order to contribute to a wider body of knowledge beyond the case-specific context. 
2.5.1 Case Studies and the Comparative Method 
This thesis adopted a small N qualitative twin case study approach to comparative analysis. The 
primary reasons for this were to study the centre-state institutional relationship, and to identify 
ý'and - compare similarities and differences in Centre and State level discourses of gender and 
development, institutional contexts, and possibilities for agency. These three features will be 
an I alysed comparatively to examine the extent to which they influence the possibilities for 
mainstreaming gender in development policy. 
The approach adopted is less conventional compared to the 'scientific' concerns of both small 
and large N approaches in comparative politics (Peters, 1998). This is in line with the 
philosophical concerns of the methodological approaches employed. More conventional or 
positivistic approaches emphasise the importance of causal relationships requiring identifiable 
independent and dependent variables, as well as systems of comparison such as 'Most-similar, 
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and 'most-different systems' for control purposes, and the importance of the need to generalise 
findings (Landman, 2003; Peters, 1998). In contrast, the methodological focus on intcrsubjective 
meaning and the importance of constitutive relationships renders concepts and processes under 
study less amenable to abstraction for purposes of generalisation and causal analysis. Despite 
this, the approach adopted here acknowledges the importance of - but does not prioritise the 
nccd to - gcneralise findings at the expense of a detailed understanding of the case. 
" It is 
sensitive to the need for developing concepts which one can apply across cases for the purposes 
of contributing to a wider body of knowledge. 37 
The adoption of a case study approach is driven by the research aims and objectives. The 
purpose of the research is more geared towards description rather than explanation. The main 
benefit of a case study approach is the potential for rich description and deeper understanding of 
concepts and relationships. Exploratory accounts are appropriate when little is known about the 
spceiric research topic prior to the research, as is in Us case here. However, this is not to 
preclude the generation of causal relationships. Description and exploration can facilitate an 
inductive approach to generating hypotheses (Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 176; Peters, 1998: 69). 
Nevertheless, at early stages of the project it is more appropriate to talk of anticipated 
obsmations of relationsMp rather than concrete hypotheses. 
The two cases studies chosen for' comparative analysis consist of two sub-national units of 
government, the Indian statcs'of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (see Figure 2 below). As a 
fedcral polity, India is particularly conducive to comparison (Jenkins, 2004a: 3-4). It is important 
to undcrstand the national policy framework, which is the focus of Chapter Three, because it 
represents the wider national context in which the states are embedded. Furthermore, similar 
institutional infrastructure allows some common grounds for comparison of one of the key 
36 Peters (1998) emphasises that quantitative statistical approaches that employ a large number of quantitative cases 
for the purpose of generalisation are fraught with as many pitfalls as are approaches adopting a small number of 
cases. Employing a large N technique carries the danger of abstracting concepts too far out of context that they are 
abstracted beyond meaningful use. V For example, see Green's (2002) proposed framework for a constructivist comparative politics in International 
Relations. Green's attempt to develop a comparative politics which incorporates a constructionist perspective 
emphasiscs 'causal andconstitutive explanation and understanding..., [seeks] compelling concepts that can be 
applied to and illuminate phenomena across cases ... [and is] ... sensitive to the possibility of more generalizable 
conclusions, beyond the specificities of case studies. " (2002: 12). 
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factors. Limiting the study to two cases allowed the project to remain operationally manageable 
within the given constraints. 38 Utilizing two cases rather than one enables a comparison of 
findings both between national and sub-national units as well as between sub-national units; 
states do not solely exist in relation to the Centre but also to each other. The potential danger of a 
single case as compared against the national policy framework, is to over-deten-nine the 
relationship between the state and the Centre. 
Figure 2 Map of the Case Study States and their Location in India 
These specific two cases have been chosen as they share several similarities in relation to their 
status vis-ý-vis New Delhi. Both States have been labelled 'reform -ori en ted' (Bajpai and Sachs, 
1999: 2; cited in Kennedy, 2004: 34n). 
'9 Both states are considered to be linguistically marginal 
from the Hindi-speaking North, and language has a political, historical and cultural 
significance. 
40 Both states are geographically marginal from New Delhi and constitute part of the 
38 Arguably there are three case studies if the national policy framework is included but here it is taken as the basis 
for comparison. 
39 At least up until May 2004, Andhra Pradesh had an explicitly reformist Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, until 
he was defeated at the state elections by Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy of the Congress (1) 
Party. 
40 Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu were among the States linguistically redrawn in the late 1950s. 
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Source: adapted from www. mapsofindia. com 
Dravidian South along with the states of Kamataka and Kerala. Both states boast regional parties 
and have experienced populist politics to some degree. 41 
2.5.2 Fieldwork Interviews and Documentary Analysis 
The period of fieldwork took place in India from November 2005 to July 2006 in the states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu with visits also to New Delhi and Mussorie (for the LBS 
National Academy of Administration). The majority of time was spent in the states, roughly four 
months in each. During this time interviews, documentary analysis and secondary data collection 
and analysis were undertaken as the primary methods of data collection for this research. 
Interviews were conducted with civil servants accountable for policy and/or engaged in the 
policy-making process, as well as non-governmental organizations and academics involved with, 
affected by, or interested in the policy-making process and the implementation of policy. The 
interviews were predominantly semi-structured rather than structured in line with the 
methodological and theoretical interest in rich description, detail and complexity. This allowed 
the interviews to be structured more around the experiences of the interviewees, while still 
remaining focused on issues central to the research. 
The interviews served four purposes. Firstly, they provided insight into the discourse influencing 
policy, especially how policy issues are perceived according to the different subject positions of 
authority. Secondly, they provided some valuable inside knowledge on the informal norms and 
codes of conduct of institutional structures, processes and practices. Thirdly, they were a vital 
source of empirical information about the people, policies and processes involved, their 
interaction, and their interpretations of experiences of successes and failures, information which 
was difficult to gather elsewhere. Lastly, they also acted as a source for further contacts and 
access to documentary material. As such, interviewees often proved pivotal to the collection of 
primary data for this research. The latter two purposes of conducting interviews are referred to 
snowballing and gate-keeping in the research methodology literature and are presented as a key 
method (Arber, 1993) and key issue (Scheyvens et al., 2003a; Scheyvens et al., 2003b) for 
" Tamil Nadu electoral politics has been dominated more by regional parties than national parties in the last four 
decades while the Congress (1) is still a key player in electoral politics in Andhra Pradesh. 
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primary research. On several occasions, access was gained to interviewees primarily through 
referral. 
With regards to governmental officials, at the central level, interviews were solicited from 
current and former personnel working in the Department of Women and Child Development, the 
Planning Commission and the LBS National Academy of Administration (the new home of the 
DFID-IDS-Government of India collaboration on the Gender Planning Training Project); and at 
the state level, from the Andhra Pradesh State Department of Women Development and Child 
Welfare (and relevant organisations therein) and the Commissionerate of Women Empowerment 
and Self Employment (within the department of Panchayat Raj and Rural Development), and the 
Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (the state-level parastatal administering the AP state 
self-help group program for women), the Tamil Nadu State Department of Social Welfare and 
Nutritious Noon Meal Programme (and its subsidiary government undertaking, the parastatal 
Tamil Nadu Corporation for Developmený of Women) and the Tamil Nadu State Planning 
Commission. I also interviewed the former and then-current Chairpersons of the AP State 
Commission for Women, and solicited an interview from the Chairperson of the TN State 
Commission for Women. Beyond these government personnel I also visited for the purpose of 
interviews the following institutions: the Centre for Women and Development Studies'(CWDS), 
UNDP Delhi, UNIFEM, and DFID India (both New Delhi and regional offices in Chennai and 
Hyderabad), and the National Institute for Rural Development (NIRD) in Hyderabad. 
Analysing documentary material served four purposes. Firstly, discourse(s) articulated in official 
policy and non-official government and non-governmental documents was identified as well as 
institutional mandates, functions, and objectives. Secondly, a wide coverage enabled a larger 
narrative of multiple, intersecting discourses, and provided insights into how discourses are 
reiterated and thus become normalised into policy prescriptions or institutional domains. Thirdly, 
documentary analysis provided some, but not extensive, insight into institutional culture, norms 
and mandates. Lastly, documentary analysis provided an evaluative perspective on progress 
against own targets (through governmental Mid Term Appraisals and independent evaluations) 
which suggested norms of organizational leaming, and also acted as supplementary and partial 
corrective to overly prescriptive policy documents. The following is a illustrative list of the 
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official policy documents that were analysed at the national level: National Five Year Plans from 
Sixth (1900-85) to Tenth (2002-2007) Five Year Plans; 42 : Nationai Perspective Plan CNPP) 
(1988); National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (2000); State Level Plans and policy 
notes; Annual Plans; Mid Term Appraisals; Department of Women and Child Development 
Annual Reports; documentation of pArastatal agencies at the subnational level and State level 
government employee service rules. Other official documentation included speeches, meeting 
minutes, reports of parliamentary and other committees, World Bank reports on India (including 
Country Assistance Strategy reports and Operations Evaluations Department reports), and UNDP 
India policy reports on India. 
Special recognition was afforded to potential asymmetric power relations in interviews with 
policy elites, although in practice I found this experience extremely varied. Limitations arose as 
to the extent to which goverm-nent officials were available and willing to talk. The quality and 
depth of interviews varied greatly. Most interviews were not recorded. In the course of the 
fieldwork and the following data analysis period, it became increasingly clear that limitations Of 
access and availability to interviewees meant that greater reliance had to be placed on 
documentary analysis, something which was itself problematic at times due to the inaccessibility 
to or lack of archived records and policy documents. The Internet became an important source of 
documentary material, and fortunately it appeared that over the course of the data collection 
period, both national and state governments were making increasing use of the Internet to deposit 
government documents. I also conducted a number of interviews over the telephone with 
officials in India who were uncontactable at the time of fieldwork. This was at the expense of the 
planned research time schedule but greatly supplemented the data collected. 
2.6 Research Ethics 
Where interviews were recorded, interviewees were provided with the option of a transcript of 
the interview for confirmation and agreement over content. However, very few interviews were 
recorded as some interviewees were generally not very comfortable and in other circumstances it 
12 Due to the timing of the thesis and the conclusion of the current Five Year Plan in 2007, details of the Eleventh 
Five Year Plan will emerge during the later stages of this thesis. Some attempt will be made to analyse 
developments although the Tenth Five Year Plan will act as a tentative cut off point. 
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was either not possible or impractical to record the interview, or at times I would have 
significantly interrupted rapport between myself and the interviewee. Consent to the interview 
was obtained from all interviewees, all were offered anonymity, and all were provided with an 
explanation for why the research was being conducted and how the data might be used in the 
future. The research process, including the interview record-keeping procedure, conformed to the 
University of Bristol's data protection requirements ensuring responsible and ethical research 
procedures. 
On a more reflexive level, throughout the period of research I was critically aware of my position 
as a Western feminist researcher. Western feminist scholarship on so-called 'third world' women 
has been accused of ethnocentrism and an 'inadequate self-consciousness about the effect of 
Western scholarship on the "third world" in the context of a world system dominated by the 
West, (Mohanty, 1984: 335). In other words, reflexivity of my position as a Western feminist 
researcher is particularly important because 'feminist scholarly practices ... are inscribed in 
rý I : 1ations of power' (Mohanty, 1984: 334). It is also important because a key concern of this 
the , sis is to understand the gendered discourses and institutions of development, which has been a 
central political project of Western, Eurocentric modernity. As Mohanty explains, 
Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and 
examining its role in such a global economic and political framework-Western 
feminist writing on women in the third world must be considered in the context of the 
global hegemony of Western scholarship- i. e., the production, publication, distribution 
and consumption of information and ideas. Marginal or not, this writing has political 
effects and implications beyond the immediate feminist or disciplinary audience. One 
such significant effect of the dominant "representations" of Western feminism is its 
conflation with imperialism in the eyes of particular third world women. Hence the 
urgent need to examine the political implications of analytic strategies and principles. 
(Mohanty, 1984: 336) 
Thus, reflexivity on my position as researcher was particularly important not just for the research 
process but also for consideration of the uses to wMch the research I conducted may be put 
(Bacchi, 1999: 62). 
2.7 Conclusions 
In order to address the research question, the methodological and conceptual framework 
innovatively combines two methodologies: feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse 
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analysis. This methodological pluralism enables the analysis of both a deconstruction of the 
meaning-i-naking occurring within policy as well as attention to the normative institutional CP 
context in which policy is made. Recognising that feminist institutionalism is an emerging 
methodology, and that methodological pluralism within feminist political science is increasingly 
being encouraged in order to combine conventional and non-convcntional methods, this thesis 
seeks to make a modest contribution to these endeavours. Choosing the case study method and 
focusing on only two case studies provides for rich description and complexity rather than 
parsimony and abstracted explanation. Yet, structuring the analysis by adopting a post-positivist 
comparative method enables the analysis to move beyond 'within-case' to 'between-case', 
allowing for a further level of analysis to be undertaken, and one which is able to better address 
the research question. Interviews and documentary analysis were chosen as the most suitable 
methods of data collection. Because of limitations of access, elite interviews required a 
snowballing technique. Care was taken to ensure that data collection procedures adhered to 
regulations on data protection and ethical considerations of informed consent. Lastly, I 
considered my situatedness as a researcher in complex relations of power, as both a feminist and 
as a researcher based in a western educational institution, for its potential ethical implications. 
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'chapter examines the impact of institutions, discourse, and agency on strategies to 
mainstream gender in national development policy in India throughout the 1990s to the present. 
The chapter explores the gendered institutional context of development policy (concentrating 
particularly on the Planning Commission, the National Machinery for Women, and the Indian 
bureaucracy), the discourses underpinning gendered development policy at the national level (in 
the"form of the Five Year Plans and the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women), and 
the agency of political leaders, individual bureaucrats and the women's movement in 
determining the success or failure of gender mainstrearning strategies. 
I put forward two related arguments. Firstly, a number of gender mainstreaming initiatives 
undertaken during the 1990s have shown a reasonable impact on the government's dominant 
discourse(s) of gendered development. This has altered the way in which women have been 
constituted as subjects and objects of development, with more recognition increasingly given to 
wOmen, s participation in development processes as a producer and not merely as a welfare 
-recipient. However, the shift towards women's empowerment was constituted through, and 
'therefore consistent with, the goverment's overarching, liberalising discourse. 
Secondly, several gender mainstreaming initiatives have succeeded in making inroads into 
p, revailing institutional practices to affect change in government development policy-making and 
planning processes. I argue that, consistently, the approach has been based on an equality 
discourse that emphasises gender difference. Feminist theorists define a difference perspective 
towards gender equality as one which 'seeks to reverse the order of things: to place at the centre 
that which is currently marginalized, to value that which is currently devalued, to privilege that 
which is currently subordinated' (Squires, 2000: 118). This strategy of reversal 'involves 
replacing male-ordered thinking with a 
discourse that privileges women's experiences and 
women's perspectives' (ibid). Being able to influence and effectively replace the male- 
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dominated agenda with a feminist standpoint based on women's experiences becomes 
imperative. However, the pursuit of a strategy of reversal has shown limits as a strategy for 
transforming mainstreaming development institutions, something which I explore in the 
conclusion. 
In order to demonstrate these arguments, the chapter is structured as follows. I begin by 
exploring the gendered institutional context for development policy through gendered norms 
within state institutions as well as discussing three key institutional developments that have taken 
place at the national level since 1990 which were designed to bring about more gender-equitable 
development policy. A brief examination of each of these initiatives demonstrates the extent to 
which the Indian state has attempted to transform its institutional structure, open up its policy- 
making process, increase its technical competency, modify its conceptual perspective, and bring 
about normative, structural, and attitudinal changes in the Indian bureaucracy with the ostensible 
objective of making the Indian state and national development policy more gender-responsive. 
After, a necessarily brief account of the historical context of gender and development planning in 
India, I then focus on gendered development discourse in Indian national development policy, 
beginning with the larger context of economic reforms in India beginning in the 1990s. The 
purpose of this prefatory discussion is not so much to provide context understood as 
'background', but to highlight the constitutive role of contexts, as providing the conditions of 
possibility (John, 1999: 102) for that which emerges in gendered development discourse in the 
1990s and after. I then go on to examine the government's discourse on women, gender and 
development priorities as articulated in the three most recent Five Year Plans. These policy 
documents were selected for analysis as they represent key sites for the articulation of the 
Government of India's approach to women, gender and 
) 
'development. The last section discusses 
the agency of particular actors in the development process, focusing in particular on women as 
subjects of development, on the political leadership, on bureaucratic actors and on the women's 
movement. 
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3.2 " The Gendered Institutional Context of National Development 
3.2.1- Gender and the bureaucracy 
As outlined already in Chapter 1, few studies exist which explicitly analyse the gendered 
institutional norms and practices of Indian state institutions, including the Indian bureaucracy. 
Potter (1986) depicted the endurance of the colonial ICS traditions in the state bureaucracy of 
---post-Independence India: the 'gentlemanly mode' which emphasised 'the virtue of public 
service,... the amateur ideal, and... the norms of courage, confidence and self-discipline' as well 
as-service-class values, namely the importance of being a loyal servant to government in 
exchange for trust from the political leadership and 'autonomy and discretion to act 
appropriately (in accordance with the law) for those they served' (Potter, 1986: 233). The Indian 
bureaucracy was referred to as the 'steel frame' of the state, which instilled in officers a sense of 
responsibility to 'the people'. This also however generated a sense of 'superiority' among 
officers, as well as depicting society as 'internally divided and potentially conflict-ridden' (Mars, 
1974: 323,344). Thus it was the administrator's duty, as a generalist, to deal swiftly and 
6ffectively, rationally and objectively, and impartially in an emotionally detached manner with a 
range of scenarios and challenges: 'in the midst of raging controversy when people are swayed 
by passions, the civil servant detaches himself from these... ' (Shrimali, 1960, quoted in Mars, 
1974: 324). 
What these studies implicitly demonstrate is the masculinist character of bureaucratic norms and 
practices, which feminist analysts of state bureaucracies have suggested make them either 
incornpatible institutional contexts with feminist goals or at, least resistant to them (Ferguson, 
1984; Staudt, 1997). However, they do not explicitly explore the gendered character of the 
bureaucracy in India and remarkably few studies exist on this subject. Sarojini Thakur's study of 
g ender in the Indian civil services stands out as the most detailed of very few major studies of the 
civil services in India that pay specific attention to the bureaucracy's gendered norms and 
practices (Thakur, c. 1997; see also Thakur, 2000)43 India's new constitution at Independence 
gave women the right to equal employment opportunities in state employment (Article 16, 
43 At the time of the study, Thakur was an IAS officer posted at the LBS National Academy of Administration in 
mussorie. 
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quoted in Thakur, c. 1997: 14). In contrast, however, the 1954 IAS Recruitment Rules stipulated 
that no married woman could be appointed to the service. Furthermore, a woman officer who 
subsequently married would be asked to resign if it was deemed that her role as wife interfered 
with her role as officer (Thakur, c. 1997: 15). VvUle this rule was deleted in 1972, Thakur argues 
that this manifests an implicit assumption that for women, 'family and domestic commitments 
are solely a woman's responsibility ... The career is viewed as an adjunct or supplementary 
activity to the responsibility of family commitments' (Thakur, c. 1997: 15). Furthermore, Thakur 
observes that 'whereas spouses of male officers are almost automatically considered to be 
extensions of their husbands, for female officers if their spouses do not share the same career 
there is often a sharp division between activities on the home front and in office. This impacts on 
the nature of informal networks', placing constraints on women officers' informal social 
interactions and opportunities to build rapport with more senior colleagues given domestic and 
other commitments (Thakur, C. 1997: 27). Combined with the tendency for male homosociability 
in informal networks in the bureaucracy, these practices are seen by some women officers to 
deny them the same career opportunities as their male colleagues (Thakur, c. 1997: 27). The 
asymmetrical 'hypervisibility' (Hawkesworth, 2003: 531) of gender for women officers also 
becomes a problem when linked to judgements about their performance. As Thakur's 
respondents noted, 'one has to be better than a man to prove that official duties are seriously 
taken', and 
'You have to keep proving yourself at every point. The slightest slip up on your part is 
immediately attributed to your being a woman, If you are successful it is because you 
have taken undue advantage of being a lady; if you are bad it was to be expected. ' 
(quoted in Thakur, c. 1997: 25) 
In addition, sexual harassment was considered more of a problem in the IAS by Thakur's women 
respondents, than men, with more than 90 per cent of the latter not seeing it as a problem. 
Although, as she points out, those women that did see it as a problem were in the minority as a 
whole, representing just over a fifth of all women respondents (Thakur, c. 1997: 21-2). 
Yhe gendered hierarchy of bureaucratic postings 
Thakur's sample study analysis suggested a gendered hierarchy of bureaucratic postings. Thakur 
found that women in the bureaucracy were concentrated in social sector postings (20.3 per cent 
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of all women officers surveyed) and men in field postings (43.9 per cent of all men officers 
survey ed) (Thakur, c. 1997: 20). This can be seen, she argues, as an effect of how postings in 
government sectors are ordered according to a gendered hierarchy which devalues social sector 
- postings: 
In terms of people's perceptions regarding what posts are typically given to women and 
men, respondents felt that posts in the Women and Child Directorate and posts related 
to Social Welfare were most often given to women. Social sector posts which have 
traditionally been labelled "soft" (especially Health, Rural Development and Education) 
were also listed as generally being given to women followed by, to a lesser extent, 
Secretariat postings such as Personnel. 
(Tbakur, c. 1997: 18) 
Analysts of the Indian bureaucracy have observed that the presence of international donors in 
social sectors have to some extent changed the way bureaucrats view posts in the social sector, 
given' the perquisites involved such as foreign travel and opportunities for postings in 
international organisations; (Das, 2005). Thakur also observes this phenomenon, and argues that 
'with increasing interest and investment in the social sectors, today posts in these areas are likely 
to attract men because they represent areas which have better perks' (Thakur, c. 1997: 21). For 
instance, one senior bureaucrat remarked in an interview 
in the normal scheme of things the Women and Child Ministry is looked down upon, 
it's viewed as a Women's Ministry, though there are very competent men who have 
worked there. Men have become more interested in working there, you know, when 
perks are available, like they'd love to work on the seat which has UNICEF, or which is 
linked with UNIFEM, and there may be foreign travel involved. They wouldn't like to 
work on programs in the field. I mean they're not really enamoured by it... 'Me 
common perception is that people who are in the economics ministries or commerce 
ministries are highly successful ... [N]o careerist man would necessarily want to be in 
Women and Child. 
(Interview, February 2007) 
However, for Thakur, to understand the extent to which gender stereotypes are being displaced, 
one, should look not at the increasing number of men posted to jobs 
in the social sector, but to 
-whether there has been an increase 
in the number of women in areas which have traditionally 
been mate preserves and also an increase in the overall proportion of women' (Thakur, c. 1997: 
2 1). Finance is one such area that has been dominated by men officers. As Thakur reports, 
One senior officer observed that "even within social sectors, posts concerned with 
deconomic and financial' principles are viewed as male preserves, as if women cannot 
master such subjects unless they are financial advisers with accounts backgrounds. If at 
all women get an opportunity to work in male preserves they are given personnel, 
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housekeeping, and co-ordination jobs and invariably asked whether they have science 
and maths qualifications. This is a question rarely put to a male. " 
(Thak-ur, c. 1997: 18) 
Therefore, the appointment (or not) of women officers to posts such as finance and economics, 
conventionally considered as a male domain, is an indicator of the bureaucracy's gendered 
institutional culture, and generates considerable interest, not least among women officers. In 
contrast, men officers in Thakur's study remarked that women officers beriefifted from 
'comfortable' and 'safe' postings whereas men officers were assigned to dangerous postings, 
suggesting that men officers felt disadvantaged by what they saw as positive discrimination in 
favour of women. The implications of this institutional culture for gender-equitable development 
policy are clear: as a result 6f institutional norms, areas such as planning, finance and economic 
affairs are constituted as domains of policy which women officers are effectively marginalized 
within or excluded from entirely because they are assumed to be incapable of administrating in 
these areas or unconcerned with such p9licy issues. Instead, they are assigned to social sector 
postings, such as Health, Nutrition, and Social Welfare, a practice which foregrounds and 
reproduces the gendered division of labour in Indian society. 
A key debate among 'new institutionalist' approaches underpinning studies of gender 
mainstrearning centres on the extent to which institutions mirror the wider societal context, or 
whether they can be seen as (re)productive of norms and practices specific to particular 
institutions. Such a debate has implications for how gender-equitable change might be brought 
about: whether to focus internally on changing both formal rules and informal norms and 
practices or to focus on societal change which will then be reflected at the institutional level; 
gender mainstreamifig strategies tend to favour the fonner. 
Thakur (c. 1997) sees the bureaucracy as reflecting as well as reproducing gender inequalities that 
can be observed in the wider societal context. She argues that 'while bureaucracies may be 
differentiated from other organisations, by the existence of a formal set of rules, they function 
within a wider societal context, and the rules and practices reflect and reproduce gender 
inequalities. They too represent, like other institutions a site where the changing nature of gender 
relations shape the organisation, and where in turn the organisation/state can structure gender 
relaflons' (Thakur, c. 1997: 32). Thakur perhaps, therefore, understates the extent to which 
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particular gendered norms and practices are embedded in, are reproduced by, specific 
institutional contexts (in this case the Indian bureaucracy), and moreover, how they might 
effectively constitute gender relations in the wider societal context. 
The capacity for change in the IAS has usually been framed in one of two ways. The first relates 
i6 how the IAS has itself endured and evaded reforms. Potter has focused on the enduring legacy 
of the ICS 'tradition' from the colonial period to the present day through deliberate processes of 
reproduction, as well as how the Indian bureaucracy has twice evaded reform. The first occasion 
wasat Independence, when Nehru reluctantly adopted almost unchanged the colonial Indian 
--civil Service. The second came 
during the 1960s when the Committee on Administrative 
-Reforms presented a series of recommendations which envisaged a transformation of the role 
and'character of the IAS (Potter, 1986,, 1996). How the IAS managed to avoid reform in this 
instance has been explained by the ability of senior IAS officers to position themselves in 
important posts dealing with implementing the recommended reforms (Potter, 1996). 
The second approach relates to how the IAS has responded to changes in the political and socio. 
economic, context of the country, including how, as a political class it accumulated power and 
'benefits under the command-and-control system before the 1990s (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; 
Weiner-9 2002). But many in the IAS have also managed to adjust to benefit from the changing 
environment since the economy liberalized 
in 1991 (Das, 2005). 
Yet, the bureaucracy has undergone a transformation of sorts, both in terms of being more 
concerned with development administration, and to 
become more representative of marginalized 
communities in India. If the 1950s and 1960s were a gestation period for the induction into the 
bureaucracY of ideas about development and planning (Mars, 1974: 337), by the 1980s the 
pment administration had become a core part of IAS training (Potter, 1996). subject of develo 
However, Weiner argues that this has had little effect on public policy and redistribution: 
... The 
incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and members of 
the scheduled castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous social and 
economic disparities that persist in India's hierarchical and inegalitarian social order. 
That raises the fundamental question: if there are now so many OBC and scheduled 
caste bureaucrats and politicians, why is this not reflected in state policies to promote 
the well-being of their communities? ... Given the very considerable increase in the 
number of individuals from the scheduled castes and tribes in the higher ranks of the 
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civil service and the role the bureaucracy has played in the distribution of public goods 
in India, one might have expected to see a significant rise in public expenditure for 
services that benefit the lower castes... 
(Weiner, 2002: 212-3) 
While efforts were made to make the IAS more representative of society, with reservations for 
the recruitment of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, even into the 1980s the majority of 
IAS officers came from an urban professional middle class background (Potter, 1986: 231)- 
Recruitment to the IAS has traditionally been, and largely remains, based on competitive 
examination, reflecting the importance placed on achievement according to merit and the 
bureaucracy's middle class orientation. The implications of this bureaucratic resistance to 
change, when it is not perceived as beneficial to the dominant institutional culture of the IAS, 
does not bode well for feminist transformative strategies, but it is within this context that 
feminist strategic clarity becomes all the more important. 
Reforming the Indian bureaucracy to make it more responsive to gender issues within its own 
institutional culture has rarely found a place on the VAder agenda of administrative reforms, 
which is usually dominated by discussions over remuneration, increasing the specialisation of 
civil servants, improving accountability, transparency and 'good governance', curbing 
corruption, and streamlining the bureaucracy to increase its administrative efficiency. For 
example, no mention was made of gender issues in the four reports so far released by the Second 
Administrative Reforms Commission, 2005.44 The report of the Committee on Civil Service 
Reforms (or the Hota Committee, after its Chairperson P. C. Hota, former Chairperson of the 
Union Public Service Commission) restricted its comments to the low numbers of women in the 
higher civil service and recommended preferential policies to enable higher levels of recruitment. 
The aim was to double the proportion of women in the higher civil service to at least 25 per cent 
in the next 15 years from its current level of 12 to 13 per cent (Gol, 2004: 80). The report 
attributed the problem of low numbers of women in the civil service to the gendered division of 
labour wWch made it difficult for women to perform official duties: 
In our country women are meritorious enough to come in larger number into the higher 
civil service but they do not feel encouraged to join the service as they have to balance 
their roles as wives and mothers with highly demanding roles as civil servants. Higher 
civil service - particularly the All India Services and some other Central Services which 
44 The reports are available on the website of the Administrative Reforms Commission 2005 (Gol, n. d. -a). 
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'have 
field duties - makes a lot of demand on the time of officers and women officers 
often find it difficult to apportion time to official work at the expense of their domestic 
responsibilities. 
(Gol, 2004: 79) 
Significantly, the report suggested that reservation was not a favoured strategy for increasing 
recruitment of women into the higher levels of the civil service among women officers 
themselves: 
Women officers of the higher civil service have pointed out that they do not want either 
any reservation of posts for them or any other concessions to join the civil service in 
larger number. 
(Gol, 2004: 79) 
Instead, ' -responding to the perceived 
demands from women officers, the Hota Committee 
recornmended preferential policies which would increase their entitlements to paid leave from 
the current entitlement of 135 days paid maternity leave, which the Committee deemed 'not at all 
ectively as mothers adequate to enable women in the higher civil service to play their roles eff 
and wives' (GoI, 2004: 79). The Committee recommended 
increasing this four years of paid 
leave over and above that already provided under service rules to 'enable them to balance their 
roles as officers with their roles as mothers/housewives' 
(GoI, 2004: 104). 
The - All India Services is one state institution for which reservation for women has not been a 
favoured policy, perhaps because the strength of its institutional norm of merit. As a senior 
fernale bureaucrat explained 
there's a lot of resistance. I'll tell you, in fact it's quite interesting, women who are just 
got into the civil service resist tremendously. And the reason they resist, which is 
understandable, see I've been in the civil service so long, and it's come to me at a later 
stage, but people who have just come in on their merit, it's like doing an exam, [an 
individual] gets into the civil service because she's a bright student... So she doesn't 
like to hear [about quotas] 
(Interview, February 2007) 
ý However, a key question this prompts is why the All India Services have been able to defend the 
institutional norm of merit against recruitment policies underpinned by special treatment on the 
grounds of gender but not caste. 
In other words, why have reservations based on caste criteria 
becoýrne an institutional norm but not reservations based on gendered exclusioh? Why is the civil 
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service norm of merit upheld in the case of gender but not caste? 45 One possibility is the class 
and caste composition of women whu enter the service - to what extent are women able to 
(willing to? ) avail of caste reservations in the absence of reservations for women? 
Even in central government service, reservation has not been adopted as a strategy to increase 
numbers of women in government service. In a response to a questioh in the Rajya Sabha in 
August 2005, the Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Suresh 
Pachouri, rejected the possibility of the reason for low numbers of women in government service 
to be a direct result of discrimination against women. The Minister referred to the constitutional 
provision of equal opportunities for women and men in government employment, suggesting that 
this provision was adequate. Pachouri attributed the low number of women in government 
employment to 'various social, economic and cultural factors' (RaJya Sabha, 2005b) without 
specifying exactly what these factors were or the reason why they might result in low numbers of 
women in government employment. Instead, it has been the decision of several state 
governments to reserve government jobs for women although these have been restricted to lower 
levels of the public sector; as an All India Service, state governments have no authority to 
implement a reservation policy for women (I discuss state reservation policy further in Chapter 
5). 
3.2.2 State feminist initiatives in the 1990s and Beyond 
Three distinguishable but complementary strategies have been employed to transform the 
institutional context of national development with the aim of making it more gender-responsive. 
The first has been to reorient existing state institutional structures and build new ones in order to 
create a national institutional machinery for women to improve the responsiveness of the state to 
woments empowerment and gender equality and to increase the recognition of women within 
government structures. The second has been to target specific institutions within the mainstream 
governmental structure to make them more responsive to gender, including the Planning 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance. The third strategy has been to try to transform the 
45 It should be acknowledged here that SC, ST, and OBC candidates enter as direct recruits to the All India Services 
through two streams: in the general category (based on competition and merit) and the reserved category (for which 




red institutional norms and practices of the bureaucracy and inculcate a more gender- 
responsive institutional culture, a strategy more representative of gender mainstrearning. 
One dev 
I 
elopment in the national machinery was the establishment of a National Commission for 
Women in 1992 'to review the Constitutional and legal safeguards for women, recommend 
remedial legislative measures, facilitate redressal of grievances and advise the Government on all 
policy matters affecting women' (NCW, cited in Rai, 2003c: 23 1). 
46 The National Commission 
for Women was subsumed under the nodal department for the national machinery for women in 
India,, the Department of Women and Child Development. Prior to 1985, the Ministry of Social 
Welfare was charged to deal with 'women's issues', until in that year the Department for Women 
and' I Child Development was established and subsumed under the Ministry of Human Resource 
Development. The Department's position within the government structure remained this way 
until'only recently, when in January 2006, it was promoted to Ministry status. As a nodal agency 
'rather than just a department, the Ministry has to some extent managed to transcend its narrow 
mandate, which is dominated by the national ICDS scheme for child development within 
government, and various more welfarist schemes for women, to further the cause of gendered 
policy concerns across government. This new role has proved important to the three other 
mainstrearning initiatives which took place in the 1990s and after. 
The second initiative represented a consultative dialogue with non-governmental activists and 
scholars to bring about a more gender-sensitive development planning process. In August 1995, 
pre-Beiji 
* 
ng, UNIFEM initiated the establishment of a Think Tank to work with the Planning 
Commission to 'engender' the Ninth Five Year Plan. The initiative involved different agencies 
I within the Union government (such as the Department of Women and Child Development and 
the Planning Commission), international development organisations (UNIFEM and UNDP), and 
a number of Indian scholars and activists including members of a national non-governmental 
organisation representing women's 
NGOs from different regions of India (National Alliance for 
46 Prior to the establishment of the National Commission for Women in 1992, the other main government interface 
with women, besides the Department of Women and Child Welfare was the Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB), 
established in 1953, which co-ordinated programmes for women's welfare through a number of voluntary 
organisations (Mazurndar et al., 
2001: 33). See Rai (2003c) for a discussion of the efficacy of the Commission - 
here I will largely concentrate on the Department for Women and Child Development as a central co-ordinating 
department for the initiatives discussed below. 
77 
Women's Organisations, or NAWO). UNIFEM described the planning process for the Ninth 
Five Year Plan as providing 'a necessary entry point for articulating gender concerns in policies 
and programmes in India' (UNIFEM, 2000: 3). Similarly, the Think Tank identified the, 
importance of their efforts to engender the development planning process in India: 
[The Five Year Plan is] ... the most critical policyinaking instrument. It is the Five-Year Plan, which sets the development agenda, gives broad directions and defines priority 
areas. Therefore, it is essential th 
, 
at the policy documents and plans reflect the voices, 
concerns and perspectives of both women and men. Hence, engendering plans is 
critical.... Engendering the nation's development plan and processes means recognising 
that women and men are socialised differently. And, as gender is a macroeconomic 
variable, it needs to be incorporated into the growth model. 
(Think Tank, 2006: 1) 
The Think Tank originally consisted of seven women members with activist and academic 
backgrounds many of whom were nationally renowned for their part in the women's movement 
and represented a wide regional base. 47 Through NAWO's regional network, the Think Tank 
members were able to organise regional consultations to consult women's organisations from 
around the country on issues of concern to women regarding the national development process 
and their lived realities. As part of the engendering initiative for each Plan, a number of regional 
48 consultations and a national consultation in Delhi were organised. 
Some of the main issues that emerged were listed by a UNIFEM publication on the initiative as: 
guaranteeing women's right to information; deepening democracy through decentralisation; 
ensuring the right to work by introducing employment guarantee schemes throughout the 
country; gender sensitisation of all functionaries of government; increased resource allocation for 
the social sectors; the inclusion of women's issues and perspectives in every sectoral plan and 
programme, not limited to the Department of Women and Child 'Development (gender 
mainstreaming); gender analysis and audit of plans, programmes and policies; and elimination of 
violence against women and girls (UNIFEM, 2000: 9). The issues were subsequently presented 
47 When the Think Tank set about engendering the Eleventh Plan in 2006, the size of the Think Tank had increased 
to sixteen members from the original seven, including all of the original members. It represented a similar mix of 
feminist scholars and activists as well as two former secretaries of the Department of Women and Child 
Development. 
48 For the Ninth Plan, the regional consultations took place in 1997 in Calcutta (West Bengal, for eastern states, 
January), Pune (Maharastra, for western states, February), Bangalore (Kamataka, for southern states, February), 
Chandigarh (for northern states, February), and Umiam (Meghalaya, for north eastern states, December). The 
national consultation took place in Delhi in March 1997. 
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to the Planning Commission for consideration when formulating the Plan document. The 
initiative was subsequently repeated for the Tenth and Eleventh Five Year Plans. Arguably, the 
initiative has become an institutionalized exercise which allows for feminist scrutiny of national 
development plans and planning processes. However, the extent to which the initiative has 
successfully transformed the state's development discourse by mainstreaming a gender 
perspective in development policy is questionable. Later in the chapter, I return to this issue after 
having examined the shifting gendered discourses of development in the Five Year Plans. 
Ge'nder training in the institutional bureaucratic context represents a significant development 
given_ that, for several reasons, in India the femocrat strategy has not represented a significant or 
straightforward option for feminists in India for at least three reasons, all of which have to do 
with the institutional norms and practices of the Indian bureaucracy. The 'bureaucratic- 
individual', ferninist bureaucrat or 'femocrat' strategy as an ent? y strategy for feminists to work 
within the state, as discussed in Chapter 1, is one possible intervention for feminists engaging 
with'the state. The term 'femocrat' refers to 'those women appointed to work in "women's 
affairs" and women's units in the state apparatus, ... now expanding to include feminist 
bureaucrats who seek to work on behalf of women whatever their position' (Franzway et al., 
1989: 133-4). This term has been associated most closely with the feminist strategies in Australia 
and New Zealand (Franzway et al., 1989: 133). It is a strategy which is not without its own 
problems: a key dilemma is 'do female staff and clients of state bureaucracies ... transform the 
masculinism of the bureaucracy or reiterate it, becoming servants disciplined and produced by 
it? (Brown, 2006: 191). Notwithstanding this and other problematic features, the femocrat 
strat 
I qgy remains one of the few strategies open to feminists engaging directly with the state. Its 
potential, however, is determined largely by the institutional context in which it is employed, and 
three features that determined its success in Australia and New Zealand need to be examined to 
understand its potential as a strategy in the Indian context. 
IIn India, many of the conventional features of a fernocrat strategy are precluded by state 
institutional norms of the bureaucracy. Firstly, fernocrats are conventionally recruited by virtue 
of their specialist expertise in order to design public policy to address issues of gender equality. 
However, in India, recruitment and training processes in the Indian Administrative Service have 
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traditionally conditioned officers as generalists. As discussed above, they are expected to deal 
with a wide variety or situations and they are put through a rigorous selection procedure which 
requires them to be knowledgeable in a wide range of subjects. While there has been some 
debate around the increasing need for specialists within public administration (as part of the 
Administrative Reforms discussed earlier), the generalist ethic of IAS recruitment remains 
standard practice. Even specialisation is somewhat gendered, however, as it is more common for 
bureaucrats posted in areas of finance and commerce (typically male according to Thakur's 
study) to have specialist training and to be posted on deputation to international development 
agencies such as the World Bank, although this is increasingly being recognised as important in 
the social sectors of development policy where policy on women, gender and development is 
typically located. 
Secondly, the femocrat strategy has been largely characterised by lateral entry into the 
bureaucracy from outside public service, usually from tertiary education. Appointment of 
femocrats is usually made at a level of seniority in order to have influence and visibility, 
sometimes as high as advisor to the Prime Minister (Franzway et al., 1989: 138-9). However, in 
the IAS, lateral entry is uncommon. Recruits join as trainee officers and work their Way UP 
through promotion in the bureaucratic structure, or, far less commonly, senior employees of the 
State Civil Services are promoted into the IAS. Furthermore, this pattern is often gendered, 
where although on average around three quarters of recruitment to the IAS takes place through 
the regular recruitment method (the national competitive Civil Service Examination) nearly all 
women officers are recruited through this method (Goyal, 1989: 427). in other words, nearly a 
quarter of men IAS recruits do not enter via the competitive examination, while nearly all 
women do. 49 
Thirdly, the norms and practices that determine promotion are not encouraging for a femocrat 
strategy. Despite the premium placed on merit by IAS recruitment practices, promotion is often 
also determined by the number of years the officer has served. Thus, seniority in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy is determined not as much-by performance as it is by years of service. As a result, two 
49 Here I am assuming that femocrats will most frequently be women, but recognise that this is a problematic 
assumption, as suggested later in the chapter. The point being made refers to the effects of gendered institutional 
norms which may in turn affect the possibilities for feminist bureaucrats. 
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of the features characteristic of a femocrat strategy - lateral entry and seniority - are not made 
available by the norms and practices operating in the Indian bureaucratic context. 
Finally, the implications of this last point are related to another feature of IAS recruitment and 
concerri-Ahe opportunities for changing the 'rule of the game' once in service, which is 
considered central to a feminist strategy of transformation. If seniority is determined by the 
number of years in service, it makes it all the more difficult for femocrats to sustain such a 
strategy of resistance over time in the face of a routinisation and institutionalisation of gendered 
bureaucratic norms and practices. As CK Gariyali, a senior woman IAS o icer from Tamil Nadu ff 
states, 'I lost my gender consciousness long ago. But I have been able to help many women who 
are deprived and oppressed through my job' (quoted in Santhanam, 2005). 
ýVh-e n combined, these institutional norms and practices of the Indian bureaucracy provide little 
opportunity to feminists for working in the state as bureaucrats to further an agenda of gender 
equality within state practices and policies. However, it has to be acknowledged that lateral 
fernocrat appointments, in the Australian context at least, were made in view of the 
- acknowledgement that 'the Australian Public Service is a complex hierarchical system 
dominated by men'. An institutional context resistant to feminist bureaucrats also does not 
discount the possibility that through exposure to issues of gender equality and women's 
empowerment in service posts or ad hoc career training that individual officers will become 
interested in these issues (explored further in Chapter 7). But the opportunities for 
institutionalising this organisational learning need to be further understood. To some extent 
__,, 
therefore, the existence of state-bureaucratic institutional norms which are not conducive to a 
emocrat strategy (as conventionally defined) means that a training policy which aims to f 
sensitise recruits to the importance of gender-equitable development issues appears as a positive 
development. 
Th. e third initiative sought to institutionalise civil service training on gender and development as 
ap re'cursor to a larger capacity-building project of the 
Department of Personnel and Training 
(Government of India) and UNDP aimed at administrative reform of the civil services. In 1993, a 
three-year collaborative civil service training project was set in motion as a concerted attempt to 
6 
'establish 
gender issues as a priority concern in development initiatives' (GOI and British 
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Council, 1996: 1). A key outcome of the project was the development of a 'national gender 
training resource'. 
The Gender Planning Training Project was an international collaboration bctween the 
Governments of India and the UK, involving the Department of Personnel and Training 
(Government of India), the British Council Division in New Delhi (on behalf of DFID, at that 
time still the Overseas Development Administration), the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
in Sussex, UK, the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (India's premier 
civil service training institute), and five participating states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Karanataka, and Rajasthan). The project adopted the analytical framework of a 
course on women, men and development from IDS, Sussex (UK) and adapted it for the Indian 
context (GoI and British Council, 1996: 1). This framework underpinned the development of ten 
gender training modules and their application for gender training in policy analysis and the 
planning process. 50 Evaluation feedback suggested there had been some successes. 
Institutional isation of the project was a key issue for sustainability (Gol and British Council, 
1996: 5). There were signs of early success in this regard in terms of application and coverage 
among the participating states involved, and individual thematic modules had been adapted and 
delivered as stand alone modules. As the designated lead training institute, LBSNAA established 
a National Centre for Gender Training, Planning and Research within the academy in 1998. 
By 2003, however, LBSNAA had proposed a change in their approach to delivering gender 
training to civil service officers, placing an emphasis on mainstreaming gender issues in 
development policy and planning. They recognised that 'in order to give gender issues the 
necessary attention there is a felt need to shift the focus from running "stand alone modules" on 
gender-specific topics, to integration of gender issues into the existing syllabi and curriculum of 
the Academy, which is developed for the Officer Trainees. ' (LBSNAA, 2003: 1-2). The proposal 
for the new format retained the analytical gender relations framework from the GPTP phase, but 
also reiterated the need for a 'focus on gender rather than women..., [which] implies not looking 
50 The topics of these modules included a general module on gender and development, violence against women, 
gender and forestry, women and panchayati raj, gender and access to health care, gender and literacy, girls' 
education, gender and co-operatives, gender issues in anti-poverty programmes, and gender and entrepreneurship 
development. 
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at 'women' and 'women's issues' in isolation. ' (LBSNAA, 2003: 3). This shift in focus required 
a consideration of both women's and mefi's concerns and experiences, and that this emphasis 
should 'recognize the different needs of women and men' (LBSNAA, 2003: 3). It was also 
proposed that mainstreaming gender in the training curriculum would contribute towards 'good 
g oveinance'. Other key objectives included gender sensitisation of officers and officer trainees, 
familiarity with the rights based approach to development, and training on the recently adopted 
strategy of gender budgeting as part of gender-sensitive planning. 
As a result of this initiative, gender training has become formally institutionalized into state 
bureaucratic structures in India at the level of the All India Services. However, it is less clear as 
to whether it has had the desired effect. Three questions remain. Firstly, to what extent is the 
presumed new awareness of the need for gender-responsiveness in development policy actually 
translated into gender-equitable development policy (and is it a naYve assumption that it would)?; 
Secondly, to what extent has the impetus for gender training been sustained beyond the National 
Academy at Mussorie in government departments and state-level training institutes, some of 
which were involved in the original training project? In other words, has gender training become 
embedded within bureaucratic institutional norms and practice? Has it become substantively 
st -utionalized? Thirdly, what are the limits to gender sensitization in the Indian context? I n 
explore these issues in more detail later on in the chapter in the discussion on the agency of 
bur , eaucratic actors. 
Linkd to the initiative aimed at engendering the planning process has been the most recent 
initiative - the Government of India's experiment with gender budgeting from the year 2000 
onwards. Gender budgeting as a strategy to mainstream a gender perspective 
into national 
, 
budgets is based on the recognition that the. conventional state institutional processes and 
practices of formulating budgets are gender-blind. 
The gender budgeting initiative in India again 
represented a collaborative effort which engaged a number of government, non-governmental, 
, and international actors. The 
Department of Women and Child Development and the Finance 
N4iniStry were the key governmental agencies involved in the gender budgeting initiative, the 
latter. playing an unfamiliar role in championing gender mainstreaming. Following the adoption 
01f the initiative beyond its preliminary 
development phase, it was decided to locate the hub of 
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gender budgeting in the Finance Ministry rather than the Department of Women and Child 
Development. " Nevertheless, the Department of Women and Child Development still retained a 
key co-ordinating role. 
UNIFEM also played a significant role in promoting and facilitating the adoption, training, and 
implementation of gender budgeting in India. The National Institute for Public Policy and 
Finance (NIPFP), the government's foremost think tank on public finance and policy, was 
commissioned to develop conceptual and methodological tools for the implementation of gender 
budgeting in India as well as to undertake a gender analysis of Union budgets. Leading the 
project for NIPFP was the then-Director Ashok K. Lahiri, who later became the Chief Economic 
Advisor to the government, supported by Lekha Chakraborty, a senior economist at NIPFP, and 
PN Bhattacharyya, a former budget finance officer for the Government of India and a consultant 
at NIPFP. 
The introduction of gender budgeting was legitimised by reference to calls for engendering 
macro-economic policy-making in both international contexts such as Beijing and other UN and 
international fora, and initiatives in other national contexts such as Australia (1984), South 
Africa (1995), and 35 other countries including members of the Commonwealth (Gol, 2002a: 
para 11.1.3). At the same time, several government policy references to gender, budgeting 
claimed that many of the principles of gender budgeting were not alien to the Indian context. A 
link was made between the concept of gender budgeting and schemes which existed previous to 
the introduction of the term 'gender budgeting', arguing that the same or similar ideas have 
surfaced in different ways in the past, such as the Women's Component Plan (extract from the 
Seventh Five Year Plan, cited in Gol, 2005b). In this way, the rationale for gender budgeting was 
presented to an extent not as the introduction of gender budgeting as a completely new concept 
or tool, but as a rearticulation and continuity of the policies which had preceded it. 
Even so, it is only in the last seven years since 2000, that the terminology and practice of. gender 
budgeting' has taken off in India. According to government documents, the initiation of gender 
11 Not only does the Finance Ministry have responsibility for budgets, but it also contains the highest concentration 
of IFS officers in the Central government whose technical competency and familiarity with budgeting and finance 
procedures outweigh the majority of senior personnel in the Ministry of Women and Child Development. 
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'budgeting was identified with a workshop held in New Delhi in July 2000 in collaboration with 
uNIFEM on 'Engendering National Budgets in the South Asian Region' (Gol, 2002a: para 
11.2.4). In the same year, the first of NIPFP's commissioned studies formed the basis of a new 
section on gender inequality in the social sector chapter of the Government of India's 'Economic 
Survey 2000-2001', an annual survey produced by the Finance Ministry (Gol, 2002a). The 
second study by the NIPFP was a gender budget analysis of the Union Budget for 2001-02, the 
findings of which were discussed in two follow-up workshops in October and December 200 1. 
-, Gender budgeting was also included in the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women 
(2001) as part of the strategies recommended for resource management in implementing the 
policy. The 2001-2002 Annual Report of the Department of Women and Child Development 
included for the first time a chapter on gender budgeting (Gol, 2002a). It defined gender 
budgeting and outlined its main objectives: 
Gender Budgeting is not a separate budget for women; rather it is a dissection of the 
government budget to establish its gender-differential impacts and to translate gender 
commitments into budgetary commitments. The main objective of a gender-sensitive 
budget is to improve the analysis of incidence of budgets, attain more effective targeting 
of public expenditure and offset any undesirable gender-specific consequences of 
previous budgetary measures. 
(Gol, 2002a: para 11.1.1) 
Two more chapters on gender budgeting followed in the Department's Annual Reports for 2004- 
05- and 2005-06. Meanwhile, the Department undertook gender budget analyses of the Union 
BI udgets for the years 2002-03 and 2003-04. At the same time, institutional mechanisms for 
gender' budgeting were established in several Central government departments in the form of 
Gender Focal Points. Ministries and Departments were directed by the Cabinet Secretary to 
include in their Annual Reports a chapter identifying gender issues, initiatives, and allocations 
for each department. 
LI ate 
I r, in 2004, gender budgeting was mentioned in the Union Budget Speech for the first time, 
when the new Finance Minister, P Chidambaram, made his first Union Budget Speech. He 
acknowledged the concerns of women's groups regarding gender 
budgeting and promised to 
-review 
the recommendations of an expert group set up to develop procedural methods for this 
purpose (Chidambaram, 2004). 
Gender budgeting again received a mention the following year in 
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2005, recognising that the progress that had been made was important but only the beginning, 
and coniniunicated to cAlier departments that tney would also be required to undertake gender 
budget exercises (Chidambaram, 2005). 
By tl-ýs time, the concept of gender budgeting had extended beyond the identification of 
budgetary allocations in Union and State Budgets for women in a few so-called women-specific 
and women-rclated sectors to encompass a wider range of public and fiscal policy instruments 
and sectors (Gol, 2005b: para 6.3). This approach was underpinned by a commitment to gender 
mainstreaming which extended beyond the social sector. The Department of Women and Child 
Development's Annual Report 2004-05 stated: 
... there is a perceived need for a broader perspective under the concept of gender budgeting - Gender Mainstreaming. The gender perspective on Public Expenditure and 
Policy is no longer restricted to the realm of social sector departments like Education, 
Health, Rural Development etc. All areas of public expenditure, Revenue and Policy 
need to be viewed with a gender perspective... [I]t is not adequate to analyze in detail, 
allocation of resources for a few sectors of the economy which are traditionally 
considered as women related The analysis has to cover every rupee of public 
expenditure. It has to cover the way schemes are conceptualized and haw women 
friendly they are in implementation and targeting of bene cia es. It has to embrace a . 
fi ri 
gender sensitive analysis of monetary policies, covering impact of indicators like 
inflation, interest rates etc and fiscal policies covering taxation, excise etc. Thus gender 
budgeting analysis has to go hand in hand with gender mainstrearning. 
(GoI, 2005b: para 6.5a, my emphasis) 
Yet the Department was not naYve as to the implications of this new approach - it represented a 
'mammoth task' (ibid). 
Two features of the gender budgeting initiative may help to explain the high profile and activity 
that surrounded gender budgeting in India: the role of the Finance Ministry and the twin 
concerns of efficiency and equity in the rationale for its adoption. The engagement of the 
Finance Ministry with the gender budgeting initiative in India prima facie represents a 
considerable coup for feminist economists and feminist organizations interested in the gendered 
dimensions of macroeconomic policy in India more generally for several reasons. Firstly, as Gita 
Sen explains, 'Ministries of Finance appear largely to have escaped careful scrutiny in attempts 
to sensitize different divisions of government to gender concerns... There are not many Finance 
Ministries that have taken much action toward engendering what they do' (Sen, 2000: 1379). 
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Secondly, with the exception of feminist economists, the two disciplines of macroeconomics and 
feminist theory rarely come into contact with one another. Thus on the one hand, 
inacroeconomics, even at its simplest, can be quite incomprehensible for noneconomists 
or those who are not specialists in finance ... Those who work in Finance Ministries 
often come to feel themselves more powerful on the basis of superior knowledge and 
skills that few others can penetrate, and hence are less open to challenge by those 
outside the discipline. 
(Sen, 2000: 1380) 
On the other hand, Tinance Ministry officials who are used to thinking in terms of macro- 
financial variables, are likely to be somewhat at a loss when asked to engender their work' (Sen, 
2000). As one former official of the Ministry of Women and child Development pointed out, 
seven, when talking about gender budgets they take a very technicist kind of view rather than 
empowerment kind of view, and that makes a huge difference' (Interview, February 2007). 
Perhaps most significantly, however, Gita Sen argues that it is particularly important to locate 
gender mainstreaming initiatives within Finance Ministries 'because of the central and powerful 
role of the Finance Ministry in current structural reform processes. 
' and because of their higher 
relative status in relation to other government 
departments, their expertise, their macroeconomic 
focus, and the support they can then provide to less powerful ministries (Sen, 2000: 1388). This 
may explain why the gender 
budgeting initiative in India managed to achieve as much as it did in 
seven years. The Department of 
Women and Child Development acknowledged that 'the lead 
taken by the Ministry of Finance has also lent strength to the Department's efforts' (GoI, 2005b: 
para 6.13). They also acknowledged 
that the response from other Departments had been positive 
(ibid). Similarly, gender budgeting received the support and endorsement of the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Human Resource Developmept when they reported on the gender 
budgeting initiative in 2004 and 2005 (Rajya Sabha, 2004: para 3.5). 
However, the involvement of the Finance Ministry has not been without tradeoffs. With regards 
to I the efficiency/equity rationale, the 
language involved in the strategic framing of initiatives 
pla 
, 
ys a key part in how the 
initiative is perceived and whether it is taken on board. Both 
co ncerns of equity and efficiency were 
deployed as the rationale to persuade the government to 
adopt gender budgeting practices. 
In attempting to develop a gender-sensitive budget, gender 
budgeting embraced equity as a central concern. Yet the rationale for gender 
budgeting was also 
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articulated in a way that made economic sense to policy-makers who may otherwise, be II 
unconcerned with equity issues, which has elsewhere been referred to the 'business case', "for 
gender budgeting. 
On this basis, the efficiency rationale asserts that gender-blind policies and budgets will be badly 
targeted and thus wasteful; on the contrary, gender-sensitive budgets and policies would be better 
targeted and more efficient. Therefore, gender budgeting was appealing as it would not 
necessarily require more budgetary allocation, but a more efficient distribution, or ,a 
'reprioritisation rather than an increase in overall public expenditure and, in particular, the 
reorientation of programmes within sectors rather than changes in the overall amounts allocated 
to particular sectors' (Lahiri et al., 2005). This was consistent with the government's ongoing 
fiscal reforms. 
Himmelweit presents a similar scenario for gender budgeting initiatives in the UK, in that they 
are often draw on both an equity and efficiency rationale (Himmelweit, 2002). She argues that an 
efficiency rationale is more likely to appeal to policy makers than an equity rationale. However, 
gender budgeting highlights the risks gender mainstreaming- advocates may take and the 
compromises they make in order to bring their concerns onto the mainstream agenda. On one 
level, the foregrounding of efficiency concerns to the marginalization of equity concerns 
represents an instance of 'rhetorical entrapment' whereby feminist agendas become diluted as 
they become mainstreamed. As Verloo argues, 'rhetorical entrapment will always remain a risk 
in strategies that involve strategic framing' (Verloo, 200 1: 10). 
Two further shortcomings of gender budgeting approaches are the underlying rational choice 
understanding of individual behavior and the overemphasis on gender difference at the expense 
of differences between men and between women. Gender budgeting approaches present men and 
women as two sets of economic actors, with different' preferences and affected by different 
incentives by virtue of their different socio-economic roles and structural locations in both paid 
and unpaid economies. As a result, men and women are affected by and respond to budgetary 
policies differently (Lahiri et al., 2005: 2). This approach tends to fall back upon a rational 
choice explanation of economic behavior which is problematic because it assumes that men and 
women will always try to maximize the utility of their responses to public policy, on the basis 
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that they are fully informed about the range of choices available. Clearly, this understates the 
differential access to resources in state and market institutions but perhaps more importantly, the 
focus on gender difference between women and men tends to marginalize the differences 
between men and between women, by other stratifiers: of caste and class which to some extent 
become lost in the focus on gender difference. 
However, the gender budgeting initiative has given impetus to a potentially more radical 
development - the reform of how women and men's paid and unpaid labour, including the care 
economy, is measured and recorded in the system of national accounts. This has implications for 
the ways in which women are seen to contribute to the national economy, including a potential 
reValorisation of their unpaid labour. For example, with regards to the gender budgeting 
initiative, the Department of Women and Child Development asserted 
It is necessary to recognize that women are equal players in the economy whether they 
participate directly as workers or indirectly as members of the care economy. To that 
extent, every policy of the Government fiscal, monetary or trade, has a direct impact on 
the well being of women. 
'VV 
In"the next section, I examine the gendered development discourse of the Indian state as 
articulated in the Five Year Plans. I conclude by assessing whether the initiatives outlined in*the 
previous section have made an impact in transforming mainstream development discourse. It 
becomes apparent that some of the language from Beijing has since become part of the discourse 
ar 
- ticulated in the Five Year Plans, but it also appears that this has not largely affected the larger 
, model of macroeconomic growth. 
3.3 Gendered Development Discourse in the Post-1990 Period 
3.3.1 Gender and development in pre-1990s post-independence planning 
Ap - art from a pre-Independence Report of the National Planning Committee on Women's Role in 
the Planned Economy, a relatively progressive document which was conspicuous by its absence 
in I post-Independence planning (Chaudhuri, 1996), women and gender was not considered a 
significant aspect of development until the 
1970s. P rior to 1990, there were two landmark 
government reports on women, gender and 
development in the post-Independence phase. The 
first was the report of the government-commissioned. study on the status of women in India, 
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Towards Equality (CSWI, 1974). The report was written by a committee especially constituted 
for the purpose, the Committee on the Status of Women in India. The terms of reference for the 
committee were to examine the status of women in relation to constitutional, legal and 
administrative provision; education and employment; the 'changing social pattern'; population 
policy and family planning programmes; and with regards to enabling women 'to play their full 
and proper role in building up the nation. ' Towards Equality highlighted the continuing low 
status of women in India, despite constitutional guarantees for equality and nearly thirty years of 
post-independence development planning. 
The second was a government-commissioned report on the status of self-employed women 
workers and women working in the informal sector, Shramshakti (NCSEWWIS, 1988)- 
Similarly, the report was written by a commission constituted for the purposes of carrying out the 
study, the National Commission on Self Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector, 
and chaired by Ela Bhatt (of SEWA). Shramshakii outlined the precarious status and working 
conditions of self-employed women and women working in the informal sector. Both reports are 
widely acknowledged within narratives of both the government and the women's movement as 
constituting key milestones in the treatment of women, gender and development issues in India 
in the pre- I 990s period. 
The third key milestone in the historical narrative of government action on women, gender and 
development was the Sixth Plan (1980-85), which for the first time included a separate chapter 
on women. Yet at the same time, intentions to mainstream the -concerns of women can be found 
as early as 1978, in the papers and minutes of a National Committee formed out of the National 
Plan of Action. Mazumdar el al described the sentiment at the time: 
Women were no longer the responsibility or the constituency of one Department or 
Bureau, nor confined to the 'soft' social sectors. It was accepted that the plans and 
policies of all departments and sectors affected women... It was realised that all 
Government agencies should take into account the effect of their policies and 
programmes on women and should specifically mention the special steps taken by them 
for improving the condition of women... 
(Mazurndar et al., 2001: 63) 
Attempts were also made to improve the status of the national machinery for women in central 
government structures, as were similar efforts during the 1990s (Mazurndar et aL, 2001: 65). 
90 
3.3.2 Economic Reform Discourse 
The Eighth Plan (1992-1997) was released shortly after an important turning point in Indian 
policy, precipitated by a balance of payments crisis in 1991 and subsequent high inflation. To 
address the crisis, the Government of India agreed to an INV loan to stabilise the deficit, and also 
subscribed to a number of structural adjustment measures. 
The economic reforms undertaken at the start of the 1990s represented a consolidation of 
previous attempts at liberalisation rather than any radical break with the immediate past 
(Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). A number of studies have discussed whether the Indian 
government have been able to implement the economic reforms to the full extent intended 
(Jenkins, 1999; Nayar, 200 1; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1993; Chhibber, 2003). Yet at the time, it 
appeared as a final, symbolic defeat of the Nehruvian socialist strategy of heavy industrialisation 
and, 'redistribution with growth' upon which development planning in the newly independent 
state of India had been established and which had been in a state of demise since the 1960s. The 
1991 crisis provided a backdrop to, and justification for, the immediate corrective measures 
taken, and longer term changes including fiscal reforms, changes to macroeconomic policy 
designed to bring about higher growth, and a reduced role for the institution of planning in the 
newly liberalised economy (Frankel, 2005). 
These longer term changes involved a new approach to what the Plan identified as the inefficient, 
uncompetitive, and dependency-creating public sector to make it 'efficient and surplus 
generating' (Gol, 1992: para 1.1.4). The manufacturing sector was identif, ed as the crucial sector 
for high growth, and efforts were to be focused on creating an environment for 'industrial 
growth, modernisation, and productivity improvements' (ibid: 1.2.4). All of these reform 
strategies had consequences for the perspective on women, gender and development in the 
government's development discourse. 
Furthermore, the Eighth Plan firmly outlined the reduced role of planning, which was to become 
largely 'indicative' rather than directive, now advising on the 'optimal utilisation' of limited 
resources (ibid: para 1.1.5). At the same time, it went to great lengths to justify the continued 
importance of planning. The Plan acknowledged the shortcomings of economic growth as a 
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redistributive measure and prescribed compensatory measures to those excluded from. the 
benefits of growth, preferring to leave the growth model unchanged rather than alter its structure. 
Thus, the continued role of the Planning Commission was to provide infrastructure, but also to 
compensate the 'poor', 'backward', and the 'weaker sections' of society excluded from the full 
benefits of the growth process: 
The backward regions and the weaker sections of the society, if not protected fully, are 
more likely to be left behind in the natural process of growth. Adequate protection will 
have to be continued to be provided to the poor and the weaker sections of the society. 
(ibid: para 1.4.22, my emphasis) 
Planning in our country still has a large role to play. Planning is needed for creating 
social infrastructure and for human development... [71he private sector, as yet, is not 
capable of taking care of the entire needs of the society, particularly of the poor and the 
weak, in remote and the rural areas ... Planning is necessary to take care of the poor and the downtrodden who have little asset endowments to benefit from the natural growth of 
economic activities. 
(ibid: paras 1.5.5-6) 
Planning therefore remained important to women, as a category constitutive of the 'weaker 
sections': 
Although development brings economic gains to society in general, specific measures 
become necessary to ensure that they reach the disadvantaged and the weaker sections 
of the population such as women, children, the disabled, the elderly, and the destitute. 
The welfare and development of these weaker sections of the society largely depend 
upon suitable policy directions executed through appropriate programmes and 
strategies. 
(GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 15.1.1) 
The NEP was not well received by the women's movement in India. Many scholars and activists 
contested the shift in government policy, drawing upon years of feminist critiques of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes from around the world, made accessible through the transnational 
woments movement (John, 1996). Indian feminist critiques forewarned that the deleterious 
effects of structural adjustment programmes, particularly on women, that had been the concern 
of other feminist studies around the world, would be reproduced in India, should the government 
proceed with the IMF-advocated measures. In particular, they condemned the possibility of state 
withdrawal from the social sector and warned that globalisation would bring new gender 
inequalities to the Indian informal sector, as a result of the lack of regulatory labour protection 
for workers in this sector and increased competition from foreign companies. 
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These concerns were voiced at the United Nation's Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing in September 1995. The gendered outcomes of processes of liberalisation and structural 
adjustment constituted one of twelve key concerns that formed the Beijing Platform for Action. 
The lack of voice for women in national development planning processes was also a concern and 
addressing this formed part of the commitment towards improving institutional mechanisms for 
the advancement of women. As a result, a collaborative attempt to engender the Government of 
India's Ninth Five Year Plan was initiated after the Beijing conference (discussed earlier). 
Many- of the macroeconomic policy'changes outlined in the Eighth Plan remained central to the 
Ninth Plan, despite a subsequent period of unstable government 
iormation at the centre after the 
1998 national election and a change in government which saw the Hindu nationalist BJP-lcd 
coalition finally establishing a stable majority government in 1999. The Ninth Plan was even 
more aggressively in favour of liberalisation, combined with a more nationalist discourse, and 
pushed for further reforms, both at the Central and State level. 
There should be no doubt that the process of reforms ... which has yielded many good 
results, must be continued and strengthened... Me remaining controls [on the industrial 
sector] at the Central Government level need to be reviewed for further 
liberalisation ... [T]he major effort 
in the future has to be to extend liberalisation to the 
level of State Government. 
(Gol, 1997: Vol 1, para 1.10-12) 
The government's discourse on liberalisation as a development strategy presented the reforms in 
a positive light but also attempted to close down the alternatives to opening up the economy to 
foreign competition. The Ninth Plan, for example, stressed that the process of globalisation was 
undeniable, and should not be avoided 
but managed, with much to gain from being involved. 
Liberalisation was the 'necessary' strategy to reap maximum rewards, including the development 
. of an 
internationally competitive export-oriented Indian industry: 
... [P]olicies 
in the Ninth Plan must be tailored to the objective of accelerating growth in 
an environment in which the world is becoming increasing integrated and globalised. 
The process ofglobalisation is a reality which cannot be denied and also should not be 
avoided However, it needs to be managed so that we can derive the maximum 
advantage from world markets ... [I]t is necessary to continue the process of opening up 
of the economy to international competition ... while making parallel efforts to 
strengthen the potential of Indian industry to compete effectively in world markets. 
(Gol, 1997, my emphasis) 
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Dependence on the government by 'socially disadvantaged groups' was to be heavily 
discouraged. It was for this reason that those income-generating schemes that were assessed and 0 
found to be unproductive would be phased out wherever possible. Instead, self-reliance was the 
new goal, which also carried nationalist undertones. Both the emphasis on productivity and self- 
reliance were also to be found in the government's new 'empowerment' discourse on women's 
development. 
Much. like the Eighth Plan set out, in the Tenth Plan the role of government in development 
continued to retain importance in infrastructure development and the social sectors. Government 
would also play a facilitative rble for private sector investment. The Tenth Plan also continued to 
recognise the shortcomings of economic growth as a redistributive measure and continued to 
envision the need for special programmes for those excluded from the benefits of growth as Part 
of a three-Pronged strategy to achieve equity and social justice alongside high rates of growth. 
But there was also an evident re-imagining of the poor, their role in development processes, and 
the importance of human development objectives in the Tenth Plan. 
Firstly, self-reliance remained important as in the Ninth Plan, but a new emphasis was placed on 
encouraging individual entrepreneurship and self-employment. This was reflected in calls for 
more democratised development and increased participation of the poor in shaping their own 
destinies (Gol, 1997: Vol 1, para 1.1), as opposed to merely being more involved in the 
implementation of development activities as the Eighth Plan proposed (GoI, 1992: preface). Self- 
reliance was also part of the strategy to deal with one of the most significant challenges for the 
Tenth Plan, the creation of sufficient employment opportunities. The importance of providing 
employment was two-fold - to encourage individuals to fulfil their full potential, and to prevent 
social unrest and disorder (GoI, 1997). The Plan forecast that the growth process alone would not 
be able to fulfil the demand for employment without some kind of intervention, or improvements 
in vocational education in this case. 
Secondly, the rationale for investing in human development became linked more closely to 
growth objectives. As before, improvement in human development was seen as both socially 
desirable' and as a 'valuable input' for ensuring sustained development in the long term, but the 
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Tenth ýPlan stressed new targets for improvements in human development indicators such as 
literacy and health.: 
It is important to re-emphasise that the equity related objectives of the Plan, which are 
extremely important, are intimately linked to the growth objective, and attainment Of 
one may not be possible without the attainment of the other ... [II]igh growth rates may 
not be sustainable if they are not accompanied by a dispersion of purchasing power 
which can provide the demand needed to support the increase in output without having 
to rely excessively on external markets. 
(GoI, 2002d: Vol 1, para 1.33) 
Th - US, the Tenth Plan recognised the central role of the 'poor and the disadvantaged" as 
consumers m the achievement of high rates of growth. 
3.3.3, Gendered development discourse in the Five Year Plans 
lall - 
Constituting women as a category of development 
The I location in the Plans of 'women' as a category of development signified how gender issues 
were perceived in the government's development discourse. While this changed over the three 
Plans', the subject of women's welfare, development, or empowerment was consistently located 
in the social sector. As stated above, in the Eighth Plan, women were identified as belonging to 
the -, weaker sections' of society. Given that the development of the 'weaker sections' in the Plan 
came. under the ambit of the Social' Welfare chapter, it was perhaps not surprising that the 
approach to women continued to be largely welfarist, despite claims to the contrary. In the Ninth 
plan, the language and location had changed from Social Welfare and women's development 
came under the ambit of Human and Social Development. Examples of other chapters in this 
sector include 'Health', 'Family Welfare', several chapters on education, 'Youth and Sports, 
and 'Art and Culture', women were situated within the 'sector' of 
human and social 
development'. 
Furthermore, women as a category of development were consistently segregated into a separate 
chapter or section for all three Plans. Of the whole Eighth Plan, the Social Welfare chapter 
represented the government's most explicit and, systematic articulation of 
its perspective on 
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women, gender and development in the Eighth Plan. 52 But there was also some indication that 
I le. qreTT-9 II,, A. HIM IU III ILI. xorn. c. n.. being talaxn - considera"or, and Integrated on a sectoral level. 
. 
53 dy References to women appeared in thirteen of nineteen sectoral chapters However, these main 
related to 'special schemes' and 'special measures' within general schemes that were designed 
for women often as a result of their 'disadvantaged' or 'weak' status, or 'special provisions' such 
, as separate training institutes for women and support services such as housing schemes for 
working women. Similarly, in the Ninth and Tenth Plans women were located in a separate 
chapter with children. 
Women's role in the national development project as articulated in the Plans effectively 
constituted a hierarchy of gendered developmental subjectivities by virtue of their relative 
inclusion in the development process. The Eighth Plan proposed a more substantive and 
participatory role for women in the development process than the beneficiary-oriented role it had 
identified under previous Plans. It maintained that 'women must be enabled to ftinction as equal 
partners and participants in development and not merely as beneficiaries of various schemes' 
(Gol, 1992: para 15-5.1, my emphasis). In the Ninth Plan, the goal entailed 'empowering women 
as the agents of social change and development' (Gol, 1997: Vol 2, para 3.8.27). The Tenth Plan 
continued with the role for women as agents of development envisioned in the Ninth Plan. It also 
explicitly stated that the aim of empowerment strategies in the Tenth Plan was for 4women and 
girls to act as catalysts, participants and recipients in the country's development process' (Gol, 
2002d: Vol 2, para 2.11.60). 
52 Despite references to the disabled, the elderly, and the destitute as well as women and children, the contents of the 
Social Welfare chapter is divided into only two sections, one on the 'development of women' and one on 'child 
development'. The chapter did refer to projects for assisting destitute women to become 'economically self- 
sufficient' and the 'economic rehabilitation of socially disadvantaged groups of women like devadasis and 
prostitutes' (Gol, 1992: Vol 2, para 15.5.25). Otherwise, the disabled, the elderly and the destitute have been largely 
excluded from consideration. According to this hierarchy of exclusion, women and children remained albeit 
marginally included in the development vision by virtue of their perceived current and future contributions. 53 These chapters include Agricultural and Allied Activities, Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation, 
Environment and Forests, Village and Small Industries and Food Processing Industries, Labour and Labour Welfare, 
Education, Culture and Sports, Health and Family Welfare, Urban Development, Housing, Water Supply and 
Sanitation, Social Welfare, Welfare and Development of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Special Area 
Development Programmes, Science and Technology. There are no references to women in the remaining six 
chapters of Irrigation, Command Area Development and Flood Control, Industry and Minerals, Energy, Transpom 
Communication, Information and Broadcasting, and Plan Implementation and Evaluation. 
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In - the ^- Eighth Plan, concerns of women's developmental status overwhelmingly related to 
womens role as producers, a role for which, the Plan claimed, they were still not fully 
recognised. This included agricultural production, construction work, and other informal sector 
work, including home-based activities. The Plan stated that women as workers in these sectors 
suffered fr om lack of protection from labour laws, lack. of access to credit, training and 
-technology, wage discrimination, 
insecurity and poor working conditions. They also faced 
increasing competition from new technologies. The lack of recognition of women as producers 
was - also extended 
to subsistence activities and the unpaid care economy and identified 
conventional measures of women's contribution to the economy as gender biased: 
The contribution of women to the economy continues to remain grossly under-reported 
due to certain conceptual, methodological and perception problems, reflecting a gender 
bias since economic value is not assigned to unpaid household work and various kinds 
of subsistence activities. Home-bascd production activities and unpaid family work also 
tend to be grossly under-reported. 
(Gol, 1992: para 15.4.6) 
The Ninth and Tenth Plans were largely based on the draft and final draft of the National Policy 
fo r the Empowerment of Women. As the title suggests, the gendered development discourse 
shifted towards empowerment. 
The Ninth Plan defined empowerment as creating an enabling 
environment where women can 
freely exercise their rights both within and outside home, as 
equal partners along with men' 
(GoI, 1997: 3.8.27). Both Plans presented a more coherent 
strategy for social and economic empowerment and gender 
justice. Strategies for social 
empowerment included affirmative 
developmental policies and programmes for the development 
of women and access to all the 
basic minimum services. Economic empowerment included 
provision of training, employment and 
income-generation activities with the objective of making 
all potential women economically 
independent and self reliant. The strategy to achieve gender 
justice 
, 
aimed to eliminate all forms of gender discrimination so women enjoy de facto as well as 
de jure rights and fundamental freedoms on par with men in all 
. 
spheres' (GoI, 2002d: Vol 2, 
para 2.11.57). 
13 1 Ut 
I the empowerment discourse was largely articulated as an approach to empowerment in 
which self-maximisation of 
the individual was prominent, and consistent with the government's 
liberal discourse. Strategies for women's development were not always pursued in the name of 
97 
gender equality per se but as a means for development. The creation an enabling environment 
was frequently justified to enable women to become agents of development. 
Policiesfor women's development 
Affirmative action was the most consistent policy instrument proposed for women's 
development, and increasingly so after the Eighth Plan which also stressed remedial measures for 
discriminatory societal attitudes. Legal provisions in the Constitution were used to justify the use 
of affirmative action: 
Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits any discrimination on grounds of religion, race, 
caste, sex, etc. Article 15(3), however, clarifies that this provision will not prevent the 
State from making any special provisions for women and children. 
(Gol, 1992: para 15.2.2) 
All three Plans justified special treatment based on women's difference in the pursuit of equality. 
Nowhere clearer was the importance of affirmative action as a strategy for empowerment 
foreseen than in participation, in decision-making. An important omission in the Eighth Plan 
which the Ninth Plan did include was a consideration of women's political participation. 
The status-quo ... can only change when women's concerns gain political prominence 
and a fairly representative number of women are in a position not only at grass-roots 
level, but also at the state and national levels to convert them into a political Will. 
(Gol, 1997: para 3.8.24) 
For women to be empowered, not only did they have to be represented in decision-making but 
that this required their direct participation: 
. 
As the representation dwomen in the decision-making levels has a direct bearing on all 
the affirmative actions directed towards their well-being and empowerment, every effort 
will be made to ensure that women are in adequate numbers at the decision-making 
levels. 
(ibid: para 3.8.49) 
Affirmative action was also the core element of several other schemes. A 'special strategY' 
named the 'Women's Component Plan' directed that 'not less than 30 per cent of funds/benefits 
are earmarked in all the women-related sectors ... [and] through an effective mechanism... ensure 
that the [WCP] brings forth a holistic approach towards empowering women' (ibid: para 3.8.28). 
Yet by placing an emphasis on gender mainstrearning across all sectors the Tenth Plan appeared 
to be setting a new trend against the segregation of women's issues. But this was still a strategy 
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that was premised on gender difference, and based on the interpretation of gender mainstreaming 
in the NPEW. One of several goals of the policy was 'mainstreaming a gender perspective in the 
development process' which was interpreted thus: 
Policies, programmes and systems will be established to ensure mainstreaming of 
women's perspectives in all developmental processes, as catalysts, participants and 
recipients. Wherever there are gaps in policies and programmes, women specific 
interventions would be undertaken to bridge these. Coordinating and monitoring 
mechanisms will also be devised to assess from time to time the progress of such 
mainstrearning mechanisms. Women's issues and concerns as a result will specially be 
addressed and reflected in all concerned laws, sectoral policies, plans and programmes 
of action' 
(Gol, 2005c: article 4.1, my emphasis) 
Evidently, mainstrearning gender was interpreted as mainstrearning women's perspectives, and 
not necessarily gender. Furthermore, it was not clear as to what constituted women's 
perspectives which not only served to homogenise diversity among women but also did not 
explicitly associate women's perspectives as synonymous with a gender equality, or gender- 
sensitive perspective. 
Heteroglossia in the Plans 
At times, the Plans were not always consistent and a number of significant contradictions can be 
identified. As stated above, the Eighth Plan proposed a more substantive and participatory role 
6-r-women in the development process than the beneficiary-oriented role it had identified under 
previous Plans. It maintained that 'women must , 
be enabled to function as equal partners and 
partic I ipants in development and not merely as beneficiaries of various schemes' (ibid: para 
15.5.1). Yet this vision was accompanied by a more beneficiary-oriented commitment to 
ensure that the benefits of development from different sectors do not bypass women and 
special programmes are implemented to complement the general development 
programmes 
(ibid: para 15.5.1) 
This -strategy represented a continuation of the segregation of women's development from 
mainstream development, despite a commitment earlier that 'the issues relating to women will be 
integrated in the total development endeavours' (ibid: para 15.5.2). Similarly, while the stated 
goal, of the Ninth Plan was to empower women as the agents of social change and development, 
women as a group were identified as 'the most important target groups in the context of the 
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present day developmental planning' (Gol, 1997; Vol 2, para. 3.8.1, my emphasis). Moreover, a 
five fold category was used to identify the different developmental needs of women and gir I 
children: girl children (0-14), adolescent girls (15-18/19), women of reproductive age (15-44), 
women of economically active age (15-59), and elderly women (60+). Elderly women appeared 
as a residual category with only 'limited needs mainly relating to health, emotional and financial 
support' (ibid: para 3.8.2). Women in the reproductive age group needed 'special care and 
attention' and economically active women had 'different demands' including for education, 
training, and income generation. This had the effect of objectifying women as categories of 
development. 
Silences and exclusions 
Notably missing from the chapter on women's development in the Eighth Plan was any detailed 
consideration of how caste and other identity markers interacted with gender; this is touched 
upon but not in any great depth in another chapter that identifles the increased 'poverty and 
deprivation' faced by Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women by virtue of the intersections 
of their caste or tribal status and gender. 
Also, men were also frequently made invisible in the Plans, whereas women frequently appeared 
as a category of development. Women appeared as 'women' in the Plan document courtesy of 
their 'special' status. Men rarely appeared as 'men', but instead were defined by other categories 
relating to their'status as workers (farmers, agricultural labourers, fishermen, etc) and the general 
invisibility of men within the Plan documents was seldom interrupted. 54 In contrast, women 
appeared in spite of their status as workers which demonstrated the foregrounding of women as a 
category of development: 
Animal husbandry is one of the important sub sector[s] of agricultural economy and 
plays a significant role in the rural economy by providing gainful employment 
particularly to the small/marginal farmers, women and agricultural landless labourers. 
(GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 1.8.1, my emphasis) 
54 An important exception includes the reference to men's migration from hill areas and the effects this has on 
women as heads of households (Gol, 1992: Vol 2, para 17.4.5). Another includes a family planning initiative to 
regulate men's as well as women's fertility, but the reader is told this is a 'new thrust' but is given little detail and it 
appears as largely supplementary to the core strategies (GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 12.5.3 xix). 
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Moreover, often when men did appear in the Plans, they were provided as a normative 
benchmark to compare the magnitude of women's lagging status (literacy rates, the sex ratio, 
work participation rates). 'Men as men' faded into the subtext as a norm that was rarely 
questioned. In contrast, 'women as women' as a category became inscribed as an object of the 
develo pment vision, a deviant category along with others such as SCs, STs, the elderly, the 
de's, titu, te, the disabled and others. While, of course, the elderly can also'be disabled, and SCs can 
also be- destitute, and more importantly men can also be identified by using all of these identity 
categories, it is also the invisibility of 'men as men' as a category that demonstrated the ways in 
which the development vision of the Government of India was gendered. 
The impact of engendering initiatives 
Having reviewed the three most recent Five Year Plans, it is difficult to assess whether the 
engendering initiative discussed earlier has been successful in transforming the government's 
gendcred development discourse. In assessing the impact of the Think Tank initiative, UNIFEM 
claimed several successes. UNIFEM described it as 'an orchestrated gender sensitisation of the 
planning process' (2000: 18). Several policy documents make reference to Beijing and the 
subsequent National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (a commitment made at Beijing) is 
seen as an important milestone in the explicit engendering of development planning and policy in 
India. 
However, to date, a plan of action for the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women 
(NPEW) has still to be drafted. Furthermore, the most recent initiative, of engendering the 
Eleventh Plan, has fallen far short of expectations. In August 2006, members of the 
UNIFENL/LJNDP Think Tank presented their recommendations for engendering the Eleventh 
Five, Year Plan to the Planning Commission. Subsequently, the Planning Commission released 
the Approach Paper to the Plan, entitled 'Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth'. The 
Approach Paper is usually considered as a good indicator of the flavour of the Final Plan, but in 
, this case 
it fell short of the expectations of Think Tank members and a working group on 
'Empowerment of Women' constituted by the Planning Commission in 2006 and chaired by the 
secretary of the MWCD (GoI, 2006). Indira Hirway, a Think Tank member, criticised the 
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Eleventh Plan Approach Paper for failing to address gender concerns and for overlooking the 
dynamic processes which excluded many from the development process (Hirway, 2006). 
However, Hirway opened her critique with the acknowledgement that 'India definitely needs 
faster and more inclusive growth' and only questioned as to whether the proposed strategy in the 
Approach Paper would ensure inclusive growth (Hirway, 2006: 3464). Similarly, a report 
produced by the MWCD-led Working Group commented that 
Though for the first time, a separate section on 'Gender Equity' was included in the 
Draft Approach Paper to the II th Five Year Plan, the paper has not given enough focus 
on women's empowerment issues in the country. The strategy for women is confined to 
three areas - violence against women, economic empowerment and women's' health. 
There has been no attempt to understand that empowerment of women has to be 
visualized as a holistic integrated approach and not in a piece meal manner or as water 
tight compartments. 
(Gol, 2006: 11) 
The strategy forwarded by the Ministry of Women and Child Development for the Eleventh Plan 
was that of 'inclusive and integrated policy and strategy for economic, social and political 
empowerment of women', and consistently emphasised. the importance of integrated, holistic, 
and inclusive policy for the empowerment of women from different sections of society (GoI, 
2006). Thus, both critiques did not fundamentally dislodge the logic of faster growth as essential 
for development, as contained in the I I' Plan Approach Paper ('sustained and rapid growth rates 
are the most effective route to poverty reduction') but did question whether the government's 
approach would be inclusive, re-emphasising that such growth needed to be pro-poor and pro- 
women'(Gol, 2006: 20). 
3.4 Agents of national development 
The preceding discussion of gendered development discourse in the Five Year Plans 
demonstrates that women were positioned within a spectrum of possibilities for agency ranging 
from passive recipients to catalytic agents of development. To summarise the observations made 
above, the goverrument's development discourse changed over time which also shifted how 
women were constituted as a category of development. Women were articulated as a category of 
development in various ways: constituted as welfare recipients, as workers and producers, as 
agents, catalysts, participants and equal partners of development; as weak, special, 
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disadvantaged, vulnerable, lagging, and nurturing; located outside of different sectoral concerns, 
deserving'of a separate chapter; as a constituency needing protection, recognition, special 
treatment, justice and empowerment; and sometimes as an homogenous category devoid of caste, 
class, and religious identity. Women constituted a category sometimes by virtue of their visibility 
in the Plans, compared to the frequent invisibility of men. While a shift towards empowerment 
was visible, it was also consistent with the government' liberal discourse. Furthermore, the shift 
did not always occur in ways that were consistent, and a welfarist approach continued, 
particularly within the overall development discourse, The Plans tended to foreground an 
analysis of women rather than gender. An equality discourse based on gender difference both 
underpinned the construction of women's poor development status as well as prescribe 
affirmative action strategies. 
-,. yet, the interpellation of women into subject position of enhanced agency does not appear to be 
uniformly positive for enabling gender-equitable development or participative-democratic modes 
of gender mainstreaming. As we have seen in the 
foregoing analysis, over the course of the 
199os-, and beyond, the government's gendered development discourse has placed increasing 
emphasis on productivity, entrepreneurship, self-reliance, and individual choice. Poor women are 
now seen as 'harder working, easier to mobilise, 
better credit risks, more selfless because they 
are concerned with their entire 
families and communities, more loyal voters, the best anti- 
corruption vigilantes, and the best agents to uplift their 
families and communities... ' (Batliwala 
and' Dhanraj, 2004: 12-13). 
Women's role as mother is rearticulated in the new social 
-_empowerment discourse. 
Targeted improvements in women's education are linked to and 
justified as an instrument of fertility control to restrict population growth, a key objective of 
i- iati . onal planning. Thus, women as mothers retain a 
key role in development discourse, but in a 
W ay ýyhich fits uneasily with the notion of empowerment. 
on the other hand, the heteroglossic articulation of women as subjects or categories of 
Icant possibilities for agency, given that it demonstrates that the development does suggest signif 
state's - attempt to 
hegemonise the field of discursive possibilities has been unsuccessful. 
or agency may be realized are perhaps more likely o However, the extent to which possibilities ft 
occur at the local level and will 
be contingent on context-specific factors. 
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A key concern of support for gender-equitable development policies is the support of the 
political lcadersWp. However, the extent of support and the form it takes is often dependent on 
the political party or coalition in government. As one feminist observer explained, 
Government has many faces, the government has many forms, and whether we like it or 
not, it depends a lot on who is in power. For instance, when the right-wing BJP-kind of 
parties in power, you find that there is almost no space for women at all. There is a kind 
of.. maybe that's the nature of their politics. Similarly when you look at the extreme 
Left parties like CPIM in West Bengal, even there they don't like to talk about women's 
issues as women's issues. As you know that when you look back at the whole tradition 
of communist parties across the world, this has been a big issue... [T]here is a lot of 
resistance in some political parties to be able to engage with women. On the other hand 
most of the centrist kind of groups which have come to power at different points of 
time, seem to be wanting to use the women's constituency a lot more than maybe people 
who are on the extreme right or extreme left. So I think... in India it depends a lot on 
who is in power, and what the equations are, and how we are able to pressurise or 
mediate at any given point in time. 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007) 
Thus, feminists have often viewed the opportunities for articulating concerns about gender in 
state arenas as limited, depending on which party is in power. Ramachandran suggests this was 
particularly the case for the right-wing Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, which led the NDA 
coalition government from 1999-2004. Yet, as a former official of the Ministry of Women and 
Child Development explained, perhaps in spite of particular ideological considerations of the 
political parties in power, this did not preclude policy developments in the area of women, 
gender and development. She argued that in relation to the National Policy for the Empowerment 
of Women: '... we had a pushing minister who wanted to get it through, we got it through even 
though he was from the BJP, [there was] a lot of support from him and a lot of resistance at 
various levels from other ministries but yes we did get that through (interview with former 
MWCD official, February 2007). 
It is clear from the analysis of mainstreaming initiatives that specialisation and gender- 
sensitisation of bureaucrats have become important issues. Where successive administrative 
reforms committees have recommended efforts to increase the specialisation of bureaucrats, this 
presents both opportunities and concerns for mainstrearning gender in development policy. This 
is assuming of course that the specialisation includes all sectors. According to Ramachandran, 
slowly the need for specialists in the area of women's development to work within the 
government is being recognised but that it needs to be done a lot more (interview, December 
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2007) She also suggests that this is a sector-specific problem and that the movement between 
govemment and non-government specialists in other government ministries such as Finance has 
been a lot more fluid in the past: 
For instance, if you look at the economic advisors that the government has had, very 
senior economic advisors, most of them are people that have been in and out of 
universities, research institutions, World Bank, and things like that. But when it came to 
social sector programmes, this was not a practice, because somehow there was a feeling 
that you don't need somebody with any kind of specialisation to work on these issues, 
anyone, any woman with sensitivity can do it. And then suddenly there was a realisation 
that 'No I think it's important to get people who maybe from the university who can 
actually do this kind of work'. And once there was a recognition, then it became easy, 
because there are systems in India to do that. For instance, as I said, in the Finance 
Ministry there have been systems like this for a long time, and they have used these 
systems, they have in fact worked with them. But when it came to women's 
development, for instance women's empowerment, these systems were not being used 
to the same extent. 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007) 
-, On the one hand, increasing the specialisation of bureaucrats may mean that bureaucrats can opt 
to become 'gender experts' which may strengthen the efforts of bureaucrats to convince policy- 
makers of the benefits of making development policy more gender-equitable, where policy on 
wornen9- gender and development becomes increasingly dependent on expertise and knowledge in 
order to 'prove' the case for gender-equitable development. On the other hand, this may lead to a 
situation whereby gender expertise in government- become increasingly concentrated, which 
suggests the opposite of the 'democratisation of expertise' (Squires, 2007a).. ' 
However, gender sensitisation training may enable bureaucrats to develop new administrative 
subjectivities in relation to gender-equitable development, in particular enabling male 
bureaucrats to become engaged in gendered policy issues in an institutional context where they 
have long been considered 'women's issues'. Particular cases have also challenged the notion 
th - at feminist bureaucrats can only be women, or that women bureaucrats are more sensitive to 
gender policy concerns than men 
bureaucrats: 'we have such fantastic men who have done such 
fantastic work on gender, they become role models' (interview with senior bureaucrat, February 
-20 
1 07). one male bureaucrat she highlighted in particular was V. K. Chaturvedi, who was 
secretary of MWCD (then having only Department 
Status) but who later went on to become 
Chief Secretary. 
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Though he had always worked in economics ministries, he was a dynamo. He pushed 
things which had bccn lingering for years and you know it was really actually good 
having, I think it did the Women and Child Ministry a lot of good, shook it up and got it 
moving, got lots of stuff through, he initiated a lot of stuff. But as I said, I don't think he 
would have, I mean five years in Women and Child would have been too much. I think 
he moved on... And now of course he's Cabinet Secretary 
(interview with former MWCD official, February 2007) 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate the extent to which gender training and gender 
sensitisation can bring about transformative change, as the same official remarked: 'to a large 
extent it is a long haul, and I don't think one should actually pretend or fool oneself to think that 
you get a massive attitudinal. change at the end, you know things are so deeply embedded' 
(interview with author, February 2007). 
Contrary to expectations however, the success or failure of mainstrearning initiatives often hinge 
on whether individual bureaucrats occupying senior positions are supportive or not to such 
initiatives. The commitment of individual actors to pursue progressive policies is perhaps just as 
important as their discursive and institutional context, and includes the extent to which some 
bureaucratic actors are able to bargain and negotiate with others in the policy process. As the 
former MWCD official points out, however, passing of the NPEW was not without compromise, 
which she sees as a common occurrence with particularly progressive policy. 
I don't think the final product was the ideal empowerment policy but you know 
sometimes to get something through you have to compromise, and it is actually a lot of 
compromise on this and that and so on, but we were very pleased that we could get the 
policy through. 
(Interview, former official of MWCD, February 2007) 
The National Policy for the Empowerment of Women explicitly provided for the inclusion of 
organizations from the women's movement as non-government representatives on national and 
state councils envisaged to monitor the operationalisation of the policy (GoI, 200 1). International 
fora also provided a significant space for feminist mobilization among the women's movement 
in India. The importance of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 for 
providing a space for the women's movement to renew old demands on the Indian state and 
make new ones, cannot be underestimated. Nearly all the initiatives undertaken in the 1990S 
drew on the Beijing framework of 1995, or made reference to it for purposes of legitimizing new 
policy. For example, several members of the Think Tank involved in the Engendering Five Year 
Plans initiative were members of a nascent organisation called National Alliance of Women's 
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organisations (NAWO), the establishment of which was a direct outcome of the mobilisation of 
the women's movement for the Beijing conference in 1995 (NAWO, 2000: iii). NAWO fully 
endorsed the goals and language of the Platform for Action. One of its objectives explicitly 
included -working towards and monitoring the Beijing Platform for Action (NAWO, n. d. ). In its 
Beijing+5 report, NAWO described the Beijing Platform for Action as a 'powerful framework 
and reference point' for different actors to 'advance the goals of equality, development and peace 
(2000: i). UN committees which review state government action under the Convention on the 
Elirnination of Discrimination Against Woman (CEDAW) have also provided an important 
forurn-'for co-ordinated efforts of the women's movement to hold the Indian government 
accountable (although these have not been exclusively concerned with gender-equitable 
development). International agencies such as DFID, UNIFEM, and UNDP have played important 
f'a'cilitating roles in several of the mainstrearning initiatives. 
Feminists that have sought to work within the state have also played important roles on the few 
occasions that these opportunities have become available. Vimala Ramachandran was one of a 
sniall number of individuals that came from outside of the government, from a university on a 
secondment and was invited with another colleague, Srilatha Batliwala, as specialists to work 
within government. Their task was to design a programme for women s adult education which 
would implement part of the new education policy aimed at education for women's equality. The 
me they designed became known as the Mahild Samakhya programme. She strongly program, 
believes, that feminist must engage with the state in order to bring about change, that 'women 
have to come into these [government] spaces and drive them from within' (interview, December 
, 2007). 
But for people like Vimala to be brought into the government space, the will from within 
government also needs to be there, as she explains. 
I think somewhere there is a sort of a realisation within the government that -maybe 
certain things are better done by civil society organisations. But very ofien people in 
government do not know how to go about it. ... So it depends a lot on who is actually 
driving this within the government. You need a sensitive civil servant or you need a 
group of civil servants who are willing to drive this from within, and when that happens 
then it9s possible to get people from outside to come into the government and work and 
go out again. 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007) 
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However, her experience in working from within and outside of government has led her to 
believe that working Nvithin government alone is not sufficient, and that it is important 'to have 
people with different skills who can leverage what they can do from different spaces, whether it 
be from within the government or outside. She suggests that it is the coming together of four 
groups - social activists, people within government, bilateral and multilateral donors, and the 
research and academic community - and of them working from their respective spaces that will 
bring about systemic change (interview, December 2007). 
Part of the reluctance to engage with non-govenunent specialists on gender and development 
issues has been the hostile relationship or 'inherent suspicion' between the state and the women's 
movement dating back to the 1970s when the feminist movement 'was essentially directed 
against the government' (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007. The state has 
been resistant to highly progressive civil society organisations: 'there's no doubt that the state 
always pulls back when civil society is very progressive and starts challenging the state too much 
and the state does tend to pull back' (interview with former MWCD official, February 2007). 
Despite this reluctance from the state, it is therefore encouraging that observers believe that civil 
society has had a 'huge impact ... and still does' in the area of women, gender and development 
policy (ibid). 
Ramachandran is quick to point out that the Women's Studies establishment in India has 
provided important resources to feminists engaging with the goverrunent (interview, December 
2007). However, she is also concerned that the Women's Studies departments face a dilemma 
regarding their research agenda, a dilemma which derives mostly from funding constraints. The 
picture that emerges from the institutional politics of research is not encouraging for critical 
analyscs of gcndered dcvelopment in India: 
the quality of research has come down in India .. partly because over the last at least ten 
years, there is more commissioned research than independent research-A lot of the 
research is purely driven by the projects that they [organisations including bilateral and 
multilateral donors] are funding. So the whole world of commissioned research has 
actually squeezed institutions and there is very little money. 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007) 
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In an environment where gender-responsive development policy increasingly relies on gender 
expertise, " this raises the crucial question of how the women's movement will be able to sustain 
effwts to engage the state to address feminist demands. 
, 3.5 
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to outline the national context of state policy on women, gender and 
development. Gendered development discourses, as articulated through recent national planning 
discourse and gender mainstrearning initiatives that have taken place in India over the 1990s and 
beyond, have sought to foreground women's development, while recognising the different 
experiences of women to men, and have prescribed affirmative action strategies for women's 
development and empowerment based on their special category status and a 'Politics of 
presence'. 
" However, this has ensured the continued segregation and compartmentalisation of 
women's issues. The emphasis on difference between women and men has also effectively 
hom ogenised the different experiences among women and among men. Ultimately, this has 
implications for the extent to which gender mainstrearning strategies can transform gendered 
norms'within development discourse or whether they serve to entrench them. Furthermore, as a 
liberal model of redistribution might suggest, remnants of a welfarist approach to women are still 
evident, and deemed necessary as part of the government's recognition of the failure of growth 
proýce sses to benefit 'special' (read excluded) groups. This allows the main growth model to 
remain unaltered, continuing the need for a welfarist approach to women. Yet ironically, 
simultaneously women are being made 
increasingly responsible for the nation's development. 
The 'state, in its varied forms, has resisted substantial change although the extent of this 
resistance and the form it has taken 
is complex. Also complex is the extent to which diversely 
positioned subjects and agents 
have been afforded agency as a resu t of the specificities of 
I institutional norms and practices, and at times the oppornmities for agency appear as highly 
contingent. 
55 'rbis last aspect, that women need to be present in, and part of, governmental structures in order to change them, is 
consistent with Rai's (2003c) study of the 
National Commission for Women in India. 
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TWO INDIAN STATES 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed gendered development policy and gender mainstrearning 
initiatives at the national level. From this chapter onwards, the focus shifts to the sub-national 
level. This chapter is the first of four case study chapters which focus on two states in south 
India: Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. As a precursor to the following three chapters, the aim 
of this chapter is to introduce the two case study states and provide a comparative analysis of 
their broader social context, by exploring two related themes. Firstly, what does official data tell 
us about gender inequalities in the socio-economic development of each state, and how have 
independent analyses explained, supplemented, and/or contested these findings? In what ways 
are the implications for gender-equitable development policy concerns comparatively similar or 
different for the two states? Secondly, how have wider socio-political, movements in each state in 
the post-Independence period treated the issue of gender (equality)? How has this treatment 
framed the possibilities for the articulation of feminist policy goals of gender equitable 
development? To what extent are these possibilities comparatively similar or different in each 
state? Underpiming these questions is'the theoretical assumption that, through a logic of 
interdiscursivity, the broader social context partially determines the conditions of possibility for 
acceptable strategies for mainstreaming gender in development policy. 
I argue that significant gendered. development inequalities exist within and across the two case 
study states which dispels a more common perception that Andhra Pradesh is universally less 
'developed' than Tamil Nadu, despite its lower status in many national indices of state level 
development, and also that Tamil Nadu's higher achievement in many development indicators do 
not necessarily also suggest a greater degree of gender equality and female autonomy as 
indicated by data on the sex ratio and falling fertility rates. I also argue that socio-political 
movements and debates in Andhra Pradesh offered more opp ortunities for the articulation of 
feminist demands compared to the more conservative context of neighbouring Tamil Nadu, 
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pýicula rly because in the latter women were positioned more symbolically and in the former 
they 'were interpellated with more agency in movement discourse. However, opportunities in 
Andhra Pradesh were not realised, largely due to the manoeuvring of both statist and non-statist 
forces beyond the control of the women involved in these movements. Concerns of gender 
equalitY_did not find prominence in the dominant post-Independent socio-political debates in 
thcse_ Jwo, states, or were transformed by their articulation in conservative or paternalist 
discourses. Furthermore, the ways in which women have been positioned as objects and subjects 
in the socio-political debates examined here are already familiar, and represent some commonly 
observed discursive limits on women's participation in cultural nationalist (TN) and left-based 
movements (AP), as well as the paternalist, co-optive, and politico-economic compulsions of the 
state (in both TN and AP). 
In order, to demonstrate these arguments, in the first half of the chapter I focus on indicators of 
gender inequality in areas of employment, literacy, population control, and the sex ratio. These 
issues, and the academic debates which accompany them, are highly complex and nuanced. The 
analysis presented in the first half of the chapter has to be understood against the backdrop of a 
n-jore commonly perceived higher status 
forý women in south India (and which also surfaced in 
several of the interviews I conducted, 
both in the case study states and in Delhi). One explanation 
for the commonly held view that women's status in south India56 , measured through indicators 
such as education, health, and female autonomy and mobility, is higher than in other regions of 
India, has been provided by Dyson, and Moore's classic study. Their study drew upon 
-anthropological studies to argue that endogamous kinship patterns (marrying within one's 
kinship group and place of birth) more common to south India accorded more status to women 
and I enabled them to remain closer to their natal 
family, in contrast to exogamous marriage 
P: rac tices (marrying outside one's 
kinship group and place of birth) more common in north India 
(Dyson - and Moore, 1983: 43-45). Patrilocality, a practice whereby women would relocate to 
their husband's/in-laws place of domicile after marriage, was therefore more significant under 
exogarnous kinship patterns, as marrying outside of one's 
kin generally meant relocating further 
from a -1 woman's natal village and her blood relatives, resulting in a higher dependence on her 
-56 our southern States of Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. - 
Defined as the f 
affinal family (ibid). The control of women's sexuality, including through practices of seclusion 
Qmrtlult), were also understood to be more common in the north than the south. 
In contrast, the political economist Pranab Bardhan (1974, cited in Das, 1976: 140) offered 
-- 
an 
explanation based more on the gendered characteristics of regional differences in agrarian 
systems. He drew on observation's from South East Asia to suggest that women's higher status in 
the south was related to the prevalence of female labour-intensive wet-rice cultivation as the 
dominant form of agriculture, compared to dry cereal agriculture fývouring male ploughing 
labour in the north. The relatively higher importance in south India of labour typically assigned 
to women, such as weeding and transplanting, accorded a higher status to women in the south 
(Das, 1976: 138-140). 
Yet, as Dyson and Moore themselves acknowledged, considerable differences exist within each 
region. Thus, this chapter begins from the premise that the north-south dichotomy, influential 
though it has been in explaining north/south regional differences in gender inequality, is not 
necessarily a helpful distinction for comparisons between southern States. I attempt to Ico- 
construct' (Sunderland, 2004) a complex and dynamic picture of gendered development 
inequalities in both states from conventional development indicators, supplementing official data 
with secondary research on gendered development in these two states. Given that my limited 
purpose is to provide a broad overview of these issues in the case study states, my discussion is 
necessarily brief and more general, but hopefully demonstrates some of the complexity and 
cross-cutting diverse interplay of how other inequalities intersect with gender inequality in 
important ways. 
Observable changes brought about in the processes of economic development and growth 
suggest it is important to sustain efforts to understand how such processes are mutually 
constitutive of gender relations and the effects these changes might have on the latter. This is 
particularly relevant for the two states analysed here, given that both have been characterised as 
'reform states' (Bajpai and Sachs, 1999; cited in Kennedy, 2004: 34, n. 12). As will be discussed 
below, several contributions in the volume by Kapadia (2002b) suggest that economic 
development, and its wider corollary, modernity, have evinced deleterious consequences 
for 
women and girls, exacerbating rather than eradicating gender inequalities in India. The second 
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half of the chapter explores how gender relations have been conceived in the dominant socio- 
historical trajectories of the two states. I examine (again, selectively) some important post- 
Independence socio-political debates in order to understand the historically contingent 
construction of gender relations and their implications for the articulation of gendered 
development discourse in AP and TN in the 1990s and beyond. In'Tamil Nadu, I discuss the 
reconstituted articulation of gender in Tamil cultural nationalist discourse in the political 
discourse of one of the main political parties in the state, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagharn 
(DMK), as well as gendered characteristics of competing styles of populism in the DMK and its 
main rival political party the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagharn (AIADMIK) from the 
1980s onwards. In AP, I focus on the participation of women in left-wing class-oriented 
struggles primarily in Telangana but also elsewhere in the state, as well as the well-documented 
women-led prohibition movement in the early 1990s. 
The first half of this chapter draws extensively on government sources of statistical data, and I 
use this data cautiously bearing in mind the sensitivities which surround its production. Firstly, 
Foucauldian perspectives on biopolitics within liberal democracies in particular have sought to 
highlight how the production of knowledge about populations is a central function of modem 
gover, riment and acts as a governmental technology which serves as a tool to produce, shape, and 
il 
control, populations as objects of knowledge (Rose and Nfiller, 1992). Secondly, in India, 
processes of enumeration have assumed a particular postcolonial and 
historiographical 
significance in light of their emergence 
(or rather acceleration) under the British colonial state in 
. 
the' late-19 th century (Kalpagam, 2000). The colonial census has been linked to contemporary 
communal divisions as a result-of the sedimentation of religious 
identity through census 
enumeration categories (Appadurai, 
1993). 57 Thirdly, increasing recognition has been given to 
how categories of measurement are themselves a reflection of the construction of policy issues as 
well'as the imperfect and power-laden processes of 
data collection. 
Despite these concerns, Indian feminists, like elsewhere, have been positioned in tension with 
both of these debates, in that many have demanded more not less statistical data, at the same time 
57 See Dudley-Jenkins (2003, especially Chapter 5) for a comparative discussion of census enumeration categories in 
the, colonial and postcolonial periods and in relation to reservation policies. See Guha (2003) 
for a critique of census 
enumeration in colonial India. 113 
questioning the assumptions which underpin conventional categories and the methods used for 
data analysis. " To some extent government statistical officers and census officials have 
attempted to address these issues; several initiatives took place from the mid-1990s to produce 
more gender-sensitive and gender-disaggregated categories and processes of enumeration 
including the sensitisation of census enumerators (GoI, 1995,1999). As a result, the increase in 
female work participation rates in 2001 has been partially attributed to the 'better capture of 
59 women's work' during the 2001 Census (Gol, 2002b, 1996). 
Furthermore, analysing official data on gender and development remains important because it 
performs a descriptive function in the symbolic self-representation of the Indian state. Firstly, as 
Sunder Rajan argues, statistical data pertaining to the 'status of women' or 'gender equality' has 
served to construct the state's own self-representation in its relationship -*kith women: 
a... 64women" have served to describe the state, primarily via the index of their status. 
The "status of women" has served as a crucial signifier in different contexts... If in the 
early years the Indian state had deployed its role on behalf of women primarily to 
initiate "social reforms" in continuation of the colonial state's perceived mission of 
establishing civilisational modernity, or otherwise to rescue, reclaim, and rehabilitate 
them in the fervour of a nationalist identity politics, it is now called on to attend to the 
status of women as a matter of its accountability as a state, in the international arena. 
(Sunder Rajan, 2003: 3, my emphasis) 
Sunder-Rajan argues that the pervasive adoption of international indices of human development 
promoted by agencies such as the UN, combined with demands of the Indian women's 
movement and the national machinery for women, has persuaded the Indian state to recognise 
women's status as an issue on the state's agenda. Thus, in the postcolonial context, the pressure 
on the Indian state for accountability in both national and international arenas has 6shaped its 
58 Feminist economists in India have endeavoured to highlight not only the lack of sex-disaggregated data, which 
serves to make both women and gender inequality invisible, but they have also drawn attention to the assumptions 
made in the process of data collection and analysis such as the lack of consultation of women in the census data 
collection process leading to their invisibility in such data, as well as what counts as 'work' or 'economic activity' 
and the subsequent undervaluing of women's subsistence and domestic activities when measuring the contribution 
of women to the economy (see for instance Jain, 1996; Prabhu et al., 1996; Kulshreshtha and Singh, 1996; Mehta, 
1996, Mukherjee, 1996). 7bis latter point is particularly important given the highly gendered division of labour in 
India. 
'9 Prabhu et al (1996) also made this observation for the 1991 Census. 
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responsiveness and thereby shaped its setf-representation in noticeable ways' (Sunder Rajan, 
2003: 3, my emphasis). 60 
-Secondl I 
y, the self-representation of the state has become more important at the subnational level 
in recent years, where policy changes at the centre since 1991 have created a competitive 
dynamic, between states, so much that the self-representation of states becomes important. As 
Kennedy, argues, 'it has become increasingly apparent that regional [state-level] political leaders 
are responding differently to the new policy space that the central government's liberalization 
programme has created' (Kennedy, 2004: 29). This 'new policy space' has 'created opportunities 
for states to assert greater autonomy in the formulation and implementation of their economic 
policies ... [which 
has led] to increasingly overt inter-state competition' (Kennedy, 2004: 33). As a 
result'of this competitive dynamic, state 
level governments have been pressed to demonstrate to 
private investors how they are investing 
in 'human infrastructure' in order to attract private 
investment, and the presence of an educated, skilled, and healthy workforce. The perceived 
widening of inter-state level disparities 
in conventional indicators of human development have 
enabled some states to benefit more than others. 
Yet, intra-state inequalities pose a problem for 
states concerned with their overall status and competitive position vis-A-vis other states, and 
policy discourse and policy 
instruments have ostensibly sought to target the 'most backward' 
districts of the state or the 'weaker sections' and concentrate development resources towards 
these regions and groups, in order to raise the state's aggregate indicators. 
Thirdly, as discussed in the previous chapter, since the Government of India's Eighth Five Year 
plan (1992-97) there has been a reorientation of the Indian state, at least at the national level in 
terms of its role in planning, requiring more effective targeting of polices to 
increase the 
60 The UNDP-far-ilitated initiative on developing State-level Human Development Reports (SHDR) in India whirh' 
began in the mid 1990s has seen sixteen Indian states and the 
National Capital Territory of Delhi release their own 
SHDR (UNDP India, n. d. ). These states are Madhya Pradesh 
(published in 1995,1998,2002), Karnataka (1999), 
Sikki (2001), Himachal Pradesh (2002), Maharashtra (2002), 
Rajasthan (2002), Tamil Nadu (2003), Assam 
(2004), Gujarat (2004), Nagaland (2004), 
Punjab (2004), West Bengal (2004), Arunachal Pradesh (2005), 
Chhattisgarh (2005), Kerala (2005) and 
Orissa (2005). Delhi released its SHDR in 2006. As of 2007, Andhra 
Pradesh has yet to release a SHDFL 
SHDRs are just one example of the increasing demand for data on human 
development indicators. These reports 
include gender-disaggregated state-level data on human development 
indicators such as education, employment, and 
health; some have compiled gender development indices and gender 
empowerment 
indices, and some have a separate chapter on gender equality and empowerment. LTNDP India claim 
that these reports serve as platforms 
for public accountability and action' (ibid). 
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efficiency of its interventions. This impetus impliýs the need for increased knowledge of target 
populations, paiticularly as the social sectors remain a key focus of the state's continued role in 
planning. Intra-state inequality is again important and becomes the object of more efficient 
policy interventions. Indeed, one of the main recommendations of the GoIN Human 
Development Report 2003 was in fact to suggest that 'fi]ntra-state disparities in human 
development can be mitigated to a large extent only if resources are allocated keeping in view 
the extent of deprivation. In the future, allocation of resources to social sectors should be higher 
in districts which have low HDI and GDI values' (GoTN, 2003b: 137). 
Informed by these important discussions, in the next section I proceed to co-construct -a, 
comparative profile of gendered development inequalities in TN and AP, and conclude with a 
discussion of the implications for gender equitable development policy. 
4.2 Gendered inequalities in socio-economic development in two States 
4.2.1 Gender equality and development: policy debates 
Gender and employment 
Debates on gender and employment in India, with regard to gender equality concerns for 
development policy, often revolve around three main themes. The first concerns the extent to 
which women's increased employment serves a primary purpose as a mean for women's equality 
and empowerment, and a secondary purpose of increased and more beneficial income 
expenditure on the household (an assumption which is often used as a justification for increasing 
employment opportunities for women and the chance to earn an independent income). According 
to a VVID perspective, women's participation in the labour market is understood as having mostly 
positive and empowering effects (Swaininathan, 2002). These include increased women's agency 
through augmenting her social standing and increasing her voice within the family, as a result of 
her ability to provide economically for the family and her reduced dependence on the household 
(Dr6zc and Sen, 2002: 246). Thus, statistics showing increases in work participation rates among 
women are sometimes interpreted as an indicator of higher female autonomy. This contrasts 
sharply with the position that women's entry into the labour force is as a result of economic 
necessity and thus an upward trend in work participation rates among women signifies a more 
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- negative phenomenon of a reduced capacity 
to meet consumption needs. The assumption of 
positive secondary effects arising as a result of women's increased labour force participation, 
include increased household expenditure on child nutrition and health care. These assumptions 
h- ave, some empirical grounding, but are often based on the problematic concept of 'maternal 
altruism',, in economic discourse (Kabeer, 1994) which exacerbates the already embedded 
expectation that domestic management of the household is largely the responsibility of women. 
Again, 
_, 
in contrast, women's entry into the labour force might instead take place as a result of a 
reduction in household income. 
The second debate concerns the way in which women's work is made invisible, is insufficiently 
captured in statistical measurement exercises, and is undervalued by these exercises through the 
cate ries they use to determine what counts as work. The Census of India definition of work 90 
-includes -'any 
economically productive activity with or without compensation, wages or 
profit ... 
including part time help or, unpaid work on farm, family enterprise or in any other 
economic activity' (GoI, 2005a). Since 1981, the Census of India has further classified workers 
using two categories, main and marginal. The defmition of a main worker is having undertaken 
no less than six months' work in the twelve months preceding the census survey period; a 
marginal worker is defined as having undertaken less than six months work in the preceding 
twelve months. However, 'persons engaged in daily household chores like cooking, cleaning 
utensils, looking after children, fetching water etc' are classified as non-workers (ibid)., 
Thus, ''the intermittent character of women's paid employment combined with their domestic 
subsistence-based responsibilities mean that women oscillate between the status of worker and 
non-worker. The result is that women are overwhelmingly classif ied as marginal workers. This is 
despite the fact that they often work longer hours than their male counterparts, as Time Use 
studies have shown, which suggest inter alia that women's unpaid domestic work constitutes a 
shadow'subsidy to the household economy. 
61 1 have already noted above that significant efforts 
11ave''taken place in the Indian context to address this second debate by sensitising census 
616ther non-workers include students, dependents such as infants and the elderly, not included as workers, 
pensioners, 'beggars, vagrants 
[and prostitutes', prisoners, those officially seeking work, and others deemed as not 
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enumerators and that small successes have been achieved on this front, but much still remains to 
be done. 
The third debate concerns whether economic growth and development processes provide 
beneficial employment opportunities for women, as well as whether these opportunities are 
accompanied by a corresponding investment for women's education and vocational 
e and 
professional training. While some argue that economic development in India has brought new 
employment opportunities for women, and despite evidence that suggests employment growth 
has been low in the first decade since the economic reforms were undertaken, research has 
shown that new opportunities have not always been straightforwardly liberating (see for instance 
the collection by Mukhopadhyay and Sudarshan, 2003). 
The consolidated move towards liberalisation in the early 1990s was met with some trepidation 
from many left-leaning Indian feminist economists. Marxist writers and socialist feminists 
highlighted the most harmful effects of women's participation concerning the concentration of 
women in the informal sector and the increasing 'feminisation' of employment in both traditional 
(agricultural) sectors, where male agricultural labour seek out non-agricultural forms Of 
employment and employers favour the lower wages and more disciplined labour of women (Da 
Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999), and more modem (and modemising) sectors such as factory 
work which favours the more docile temperament and 'nimble fingers' of women workers 
(Chakravarty, 2004; Elson and Pearson, 1981). Research has sought to document the 
concentration of women in low paid, low skilled employment, with high levels of employment 
insecurity and casualisation of work contracts, and poor working conditions, to suggest that 
gendered labour market inequalities have not receded in the process of economic development 
and modernisation in India, with some forms remaining persistent or becoming reconfigured 
while new forms emerge. Particularly worrying for some are the observed increases in female 
child and adolescent labour in India associated with new employment opportunities, with 
implications for educational achievement (Majumdar, 2001: cited in Swaminathan, 2002: 119). 
Thus, more understanding is needed of the form and quality of the new employment 
opportunities open to women emerging through processes of economic development, their 




nal and vocational training for women and provide support services such as occupational 
health and child care (which is largely designated as the responsibility of women) to enable 
women to take advantage of these new opportunities if, when, and where they exist. 62 
Gender and education 
I--;. -I 
Gender inequality in demand for school education is most simply explained as a result of 
gendered social role expectations and the perceived comparative worth of educating boys and 
girls. Firstly, where girls are expected to grow to become housewives and mothers, social 
-- expectations ensure that a girl's education is undervalued (Dr6ze and Sen, 2002: 161-2). 
Secondly, the practice of patrilocality in much of north India also means that the investment in a 
daughter's education will be transferred to the affinal family upon marriage. Thirdly, social 
practices, commonly dictate a bride should be of equal or lower educational background than 
their groom; thus 'female education can turn into a liability... "over-educating" a daughter may 
make her more difficult- and expensive - to marry' (Dr-6ze and Sen, 2002: 162). Thus, the 
pre t valence of such social practices and beliefs mean that education for girls is less desirable than 
for boys, particularly if this involves making a decision about whether to educate sons or 
daughters. As a result, females generally record lower literacy rates, lower levels of educational 
attainment, lower enrolment ratios and higher 
drop out rates, particularly for educational levels 
beyond primary school. 
GI ender inequalities also 
intersect significantly with other educational inequalities. Poverty is also 
an important factor. Among 
lower income groups, lower literacy rates, lower levels of 
eI ducational attainment, and poor attendance and 
higher drop-out rates of girls is explained by 
poverty - that by sending a 
daughter to school is denying the income or unpaid labour (such as 
Caring for elderly members or younger siblings) she could 
be contributing to the household. 
Thui, elder daughters in particular may receive a lower level of schooling th 
. 
an their younger 
siblings, (Dreze and 
Sen, 2002: 157). The social status of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
often limit access to educational opportunities as a result of social 
discrimination as well as 
poverty. Rural areas also suffer 
from lower educational'achievement due to poorer educational 
62 , elevant to this study are the implications of assumptions regarding poor women's time elasticity and their 
involvement with government poverty alleviation programmes which are often time-intensive. 119 
infrastructure, proximity to schools, and higher teacher absenteeism in rural areas, which 
exacerbates the lower demaj)d ror education. 
Supply-side factors which affect the demand for school education include affordability, 
accessibility, and quality of schooling (Dr6ze and Sen, 2002: 159). Supply-side failures In 
educational infrastructure impact female children more than male children because parents are 
less likely to forego the additional expenditure for private education for their daughters or to 
send their daughters to school outside of the village (Dr6ze and Sen, 2002: 161). Measures to 
increase the participation of girls in school education include subsidising girls schooling, 
reducing the distance to schools, providing a mid day meal, and installing toilets for-girls, 
particularly in rural areas where they are often absent (Basu, 1999: 151). Furthermore, an 
important demand from the women's movement has been for educational authorities to address 
gender stereotypes in school curriculum textbooks and teaching practices (Patel, 1998). 
Policy initiatives to increase the educational development of women and girls are driven by both 
intrinsic and instrumental motives; intrinsic for valuing the importance of women and girls 
education for its own sake, and instrumental for the perceived link female education has to lower 
fertility rates, lower child mortality rates, and higher child nutrition (Dreze and Sen, 2002: 39). 
The prevalence of conservative attitudes on gender inequalities in educational achievement as 
well as demographic obsession of population growth ensures that the fertility argument is a far 
more influential argument for women's education than, say, women's technical education and 
training for employment in the modernising economy (Swaminathan, 2002). 
Gender inequality and the sex ratio 
In India, the sex ratio, calculated as the number of females per 1,000 males, has been used in 
official and non-official statistical studies as a key indicator of the status of women vis-a-vis 
men. For many, the unfavourable sex ratio'of proportionately fewer females to males, has served 
as an indicator of discriminatory societal practices which favour boys over girls, and men over 
women, including a widespread preference for sons rather than daughters, a favourable allocation 
of nutrition, education, and attention to the health of males often to the neglect of females, and 
even deliberate strategies of female deprivation commonly termed female infanticide and female 
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foeticide (often as a result of sex-selective abortion made possible by amniocentesis tests). These 
practices have resulted in the phenomenon of 'missing'women' (Dr6ze and Sen, 2002; Das 
Gupta and Bhat, 1997). 
The significance of low sex ratios lies partly in its appearance in areas of South India, a region 
where it had hitherto not been prevalent. Discriminatory practices attributed as causes of the 
unfavourable sex ratio were thought by some to be 'traditional practices' which would wither 
away during processes of modemisation. More recent research and theorising on the decline in 
the child sex ratio in a direction unfavourable to females even in high income states has 
suggested that such a decline must be seen as an integral part of economic development 
(Kapadia, 2002a; Swarninathan, 2002; Harriss-White, 2001). Studies have sought to delink the 
notion that discriminatory practices are in some way determined in a linear pattern by levels of 
economic deprivation and poverty, noting that some of the more economically 'developed' states 
such as Haryana and Punjab have some of the lowest sex ratios (in 2001,861 and 876 
respeFtively), whereas conversely, the State of Kerala has a low per capita income (relative to 
other states) but has the highest sex ratio among major states (1058 in 2001). Increasingly 
consumerist-oriented dowry practices which serve as a means for capital accumulation and 
economic upward mobility have intensified discrimination towards the girl child. 
63 Kapadia's 
argument exemplifies this perspective: 
In relation to the new market economy, [dowry] emerges as an adaptive socio- 
economic strategy, intended to access a new source of capital and to assist class 
mobility in an increasingly mobile and competitive economy.... In relation to the 
processes of the making of modem selves, "dowry" emerges as a central diacritic of the 
recent, radical appreciation in the social value of men and the corresponding radical 
devaluation of women. 
(Kapadia, 2002a: 170) 
Thus, Kapadia emphasises the importance of rethinking the practice of dowry not. as a 
, traditional' practice, but as an intrinsic part of modernity and modernisation, and therefore not 
something which is likely to 
be eradicated easily. 
613 
'Caplan 
(1985) emphasizes the distinction between consumer-oriented dowry (gifts such as cash, white goods, or 
even a car or moped) and the 
traditional 'stridhanam' (such as gold bangles), the latter of which served as a pre- 
mortern inheritance given 
by the parents to the bride which was kept by the bride and only converted into cash in 
dire need. it is the former, and not stridhanam, that 
has been commonly denounced as 'the social evil of dowry,, but 
is still widely practiced (Caplan, 
1985: 45-8). 
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11is is why policy makers and social reformers cannot expect that "dowry" is going to 
disappear as India "modemises". This is a forlorn hope, because in the popular 
ima , inary, "dowry" is modemity. It is the quintessential modernity because it provides 
the fast track to class mobility. The capital transfer embodied in "dowry" is the single 
largest sum of money that most men will receive in their entire lives. In a nation-state 
that is hurtling towards high capitalism as fast as it can, "dowry" is "necessary" to every 
man, because those men who don't receive it are left behind. 
(Kapadia, 2002a: 164) 
4.2.2 Tamil Nadu 
Background 
Tamil Nadu is one of two southernmost states in India, with the other, Kerala, to the west, and 
two other southern states, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, to the north and northwest 
respectively (see Figure 3 below). During the pre-Independence period, parts of what is now 
known as Tamil Nadu State formed the Madras Presidency, a province of British India. Af ler 
Independence, the Madras Presidency became Madras State, and incorporated areas of former 
princely states while ceding some districts to other newly forming States, with a''final 
reorganization of state boundaries in 1956 according to linguistic criteria (co-terminous with 
Tamil speaking areas in the case of TN). Madras State was later renamed Tamil Nadu (meaning 
'Tamil country') in 1968. 
Tamil Nadu recorded a population ofjust over 62 million in the most recent Census in 2001. It is 
the sixth most populous state in India. Tamil's Nadu's success in limiting population growth 
rates and fertility rates in' the 1980s and 1990s and increasing rates of acceptance for 
contraceptive methods such as intrauterine devices (IUDs), has been lauded by government 
officials and some demographers, and praised for its non-coercive and co-operative character- 
Yet a number of studies have sought to contest the notion that the success in reducing fertility 
rates has been as co-operative as suggested by these evaluations (Van Hollen, 1998; 
Swarninathan, 2002). Van Hollen's research suggested that in urban-based government hospitals, 
contraceptive targets were achieved through practices such as routine IUD insertion, which was 
frequently non-conscnsual and without the knowledge of patients (estimated as high as 65 per 
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control programmes in the past has also been facilitated by the high proportion of institutional 
64 delivery in Tamil Nadu (Van hollen, 1998). 
As of 2007, the State is made up of thirty districts, including Chermai, the State capital, which is 
the only district classified as 100 per cent urban in the State. Tamil Nadu is the most urbanized 
among the major States in India, with an urban population of 44 per cent . 
65 The population 
density of the State is above the national average. Scheduled Caste members make up nearly one 
fifth of the population, a higher proportion than at the all-India level. The government identifies 
76 different Scheduled Caste groups in the state, with the five most numerically large SC groups 
making up nearly 94 per cent of the state's SC population: Adi Dravidas (46 per cent), Pallan (19, 
per cent), Paraiyan (16 per cent), Chakkiliyan (7 per cent) and Arunthathiyar (7 per cent). 
Thiruvarur district has the highest proportion of Scheduled Caste members to the total population 
(32.4 per cent), while Kanyakumari district has the lowest (4 per cent). More than two thirds of 
Scheduled Caste members live in rural areas, with variations between different Scheduled Caste 
groups. In contrast, Scheduled Tribes are a much smaller minority, particularly compared to the 
all-India level, at only I per cent of the population. The Census of India identified 36 different 
Scheduled Tribes in Tamil Nadu, with the five most numerical making up more than 85 per cent 
of the state's ST population: these are Malayali (48 per cent), Irular (24 per cent), Kattunayakan 
(7 per cent), Kurumans (4 per cent) and Kondareddis (3 per cent). STs are concentrated in six 
districts of the state, Salem, Tiruvannamalai, Villupuram, Vellore, Dharmapuri, and Namakkal. 
The rural-urban ratio differs markedly among different groups: for the most part STs reside in 
rural areas with the exception of Kattunayakans, of whom nearly two thirds reside in urban areas. 
I lindus form the majority religious group in the State (88.1 per cent), followed by Christians (6.1 
66 per cent) and Muslims (5.6 per cent). Tamil is the predominant language spoken in the State 
(87 per cent of the population), followed by Telugu (7.1 per cent) and Kannada (2.2 per cent) 
(figures from Census of India, 1991). 
64 Tamil Nadu has the second highest proportion of institutional deliveries among major states after Kerala, 
including more than 90 per cent of urban deliveries (National Family Health Survey data for 1998-99 cited in Gol, 
2002c: 248). 
65 This large increase from 34 per cent in 1991 is mostly a result of a reclassification of rural areas as urban areas 
LýoTN, 2003b: 5,0). 
There are also small minority religious groups of Jains (0.130/o), Buddhists (0.01*/o), and Sikhs (0.02%). 
124 
Economic Development, Human Development, and Poverty 
The Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy ranks Tamil Nadu second in the country for 
qmlity, of infrastructure facilities and third for Foreign Direct Investment approval (GoTN, 
2003b: 7). TN is also one of the most industrialized states in India, second only to Maharashtra 
in terms of manufacturing contribution to Net State Domestic Product (GoTN, '2003b: 6). Tamil 
Nadu ranks sixth in the country in per capita income (Rs. 23,358) after Haryana, Maharashtra, 
67 
Punjab, Gujarat and Kerala (GoI, 2007b: Table 18). Prior to the 1990s, per capita income was 
below the national average, until 1991-92, and has remained above the national average since 
(GoTN, 2003b: 8). The service sector in TN is the largest contributor to Net State Domestic 
Product, followed by the manufacturing and agricultural (and allied) sectors. Manufacturing and 
service sectors each contribute more to Net State Domestic Product than agriculture, with the 
latter's share of the economy declining over a number of decades. However, nearly two thirds of 
the state's population still depend on agriculture for their livelihood (GoIN, 2003b). 
Following a sharp decline in the last two decades, the average percentage of people below the 
I poverty line in Tamil Nadu is now lower than the all-India average (2 1% compared to 26% all 
India). Yet considerable intra-state inequalities remain. Poverty is higher among Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe households, and higher in urban compared to rural areas (GoTN, 2003b: 
Gender and employment68 
The* data for TN follows some trends at the national level: more men are recorded as workers 
than , women; proportionately more women are classified as marginal workers than men; and 
work participation rates are 
higher in rural areas than urban areas. On the other hand, some 
important differences in gender and employment patterns between TN and the national level can 
67 This is based on a comparison among major States defined as those with a population over 10 million. According 
'to the Tamil Nadu Human Development Report, published in 2003 and which based its per capita income data on 
, 2000-01 
figures, Tamil Nadu was ranked fourth among major States and first among southern States. More recent 
figures for 2003-04 show that both Gujarat and Kerala have surpassed Tamil Nadu in per capita income, although 
the position of both these states relative to 
Tamil Nadu in terms of per capita income has fluctuated during the 1990s 
and 2000s. 
68 Data on gender and employment in TN compared to all-India is presented in Table 8, Table 9 and 
Table 10. All data for this chapter unless otherwise stated is presented in Appendix II - Tables for Gendered 
Development Indicators (Supplementary to Chapter 4). 
125 
be observed. Work participation rates in TN for both males and females are higher than the 
national average (particularly for urban males). As well as higher work participation rates, the 
higher proportion of women workers classified as main as opposed to marginal workers suggests 
women9s employment particularly in urban areas in Tamil Nadu is more often regular rath erthan 
casual compared to the national level (a similar pattern can be observed for males but is not so 
marked). 
Trends during the 1990s suggest that the regularity of employment for workers is shifting from 
main to marginal status. During the period 1991 to 200 1, the proportion of both male and female 
main workers actually declined, and this decline was more marked among male main workers. 
The category of urban female workers was the only main worker category to witness an increase 
in employment. This decline in main workers was offset by employment growth for marginal 
workers, seen by the increase in women's (and men's) marginal employment. Thus, census data 
on work participation suggests a general trend towards a casualisation of employment during the 
period 1991-2001. 
Female workers are generally more occupationally concentrated than their male counterparts. 
While the proportion of workers classified as agricultural labourers in IN is higher than tI he 
national average for both male and female workers, this is particularly no . ticeable for female rural 
workers. Female rural agricultural labourers are not merely a noticeably larger majority of all 
female workers in rural areas (more than half) compared to their male counterparts oust over a 
third); remarkably, given that the ratio of female to male workers overall is roughly 40: 60, 
female rural agricultural labourers actually outnumber male rural agricultural labourers, with an 
inverse ratio of 60: 40. Female workers also make up a larger proportion of household industry 
workers. Where opportunities exist, research suggests that women prefer work in factories as it is 
regular and accords them higher status than agricultural work or household industry work. 
Studies have documented significant gendered inequalities in wage rates in TN, even where such 
work demands a similar level of skill (Harriss-White, 2004a). The poor implementation of the 
Equal Remuneration Act of 1976 combines with its inadequate attention to the highly segregated 
gcndered division of labour activities in its conception of equal pay for equal work and ensures 
the persistence of gendered wage inequalities. Geetha's study of women workers in the 
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construction industry and Dietrich's study of women workers in the fishing industry in TN 
suggests that hard-won industry-specific legislation at the State. level to protect informal sector 
,, workers 
does not adequately address the causes of poor working conditions and low wages of 
informal workers, particularly for women (Geetha, 1990; Dietrich, 1995). 
Gehder and education69 
Literacy rates in TN are above the national average and the State compares favourably with other 
states in India on literacy rates, ranked third among major states after Kerala and Maharashtra. 
Following national trends, higher literacy rates can be observed in urban as opposed to rural 
areas, among males as opposed to females, and among the overall population as compared to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
--The State has witnessed 
impressive increases in literacy over the last two decades, particularly in 
rural areas and for females, closing the differential between rural and urban areas and male and 
female literacy, although despite the former, a higher reduction in the male-female disparity in 
literacy can be witnessed in urban areas, despite lower increases in literacy. Female rural 
Aiteracy, levels remain low and the male-female disparity in literacy is highest in rural areas. 
Female literacy levels still vary more between rural and urban areas than do male literacy levels. 
Cornparing gender inequalities in literacy across districts of the State also suggests large 
variations in gender inequality. Kannyakumari and Dharmapuri districts record the highest and 
lowest literacy rates for both males and females overall. However, female literacy rates have a 
far'l-higher variance across districts (from 85% in 511/6) than male literacy rates (which range 
. from 
90% to 72%). The disparity between male and female literacy rates is highest in Ariyalur 
district and lowest in Kannyakumari district. 
Notwithstanding TN's overall high literacy levels, literacy among Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe communities is much lower, particularly for females. Increases in literacy over 
the pI eriod 1991-2001 have been lower for these groups than for the overall population, although 
the: 'differential between male and female SC literacy is comparable to the same for all males and 
fernales, and slightly lower for STs. 
69 Data on gender and education in TN and all-India are presented in Table 11, Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14. 127 
Beyond achievements in literacy, gender inequalities in education can also be observed in levels 
of educational participation and achievement (measured by enrolment ratios, dropout ratios, and 
completed stages of formal education; see Table 13 and Table 14). Census data for Tamil Nadu 
suggests that fewer females compared to males complete higher stages of education from the 
Secondary stage onwards. The implications for female skilled employment in Tamil Nadu are 
significant; as Swaminathan suggests, 'literacy and the completion of some basic education no 
longer guarantees a place in the labour force... [E]mployers begin to require higher levels of 
attainment for the same jobs' (Swarninathan, 1994: 73). The lower level of educa tional 
attainment of women may exacerbate existing gender-based discrimination in the labour market 
as educational standards of recruitment increase. 
The much lauded Chief Minister's Noon Meal Scheme, first launched under the government of 
the former Chief Minister MG Ramachandran in July 1982, aimed to 'increase enrolment , 
in 
schools and reduce dropouts' by providing a nutritious meal for all children at lunchtime (GOTN, 
2002-03, cited in Swaminathan et al., 2004: 4811). Studies of the scheme present evidence of the 
dubious quality and quantity of the food provided as part of the meal, questionable practices as 
regarding implementation and reporting, and wide variations in beneficiary experience of the 
scheme (Harriss-White, 2004b; Swaminathan et al., 2004). However, they do suggest that the 
scheme has encouraged enrolment and reduced dropouts even though this is by no means 
universal across all categories. 
Gender inequalify and the sex ratio7o 
The sex ratio for TN is above the national average, for all ages (987) and 0-6 years of age (942) 
among the overall population, and for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. For these latter 
two groups, compared to the State average, the sex ratio is more favourable for females among 
Scheduled Castes (999) than Scheduled Tribes (980). Both have improved since the Census of 
199 1. Census data shows the SC child sex ratio (959) is higher than both the state child sex ratio 
for the overall population and the national child sex ratio for SCs. The SC child sex ratio in TN 
also shows considerable diversity among different SC groups, with the lowest among 
70 Data on the sex ratio in TN and all-India are presented in Table 15. 
128 
Arunthathiyars (928), who are relatively more urbanised compared to other SC groups. Among 
ST's, the child sex ratio in Tamil Nadu at 945 is markedly lower than the national average for STs 
of 945, but is slightly higher than the state child sex ratio for the overall population (942). This 
differs markedly among the major ST groups with the Irulars having the highest child sex ratio at 
984 and the Kondareddis having a considerably lower at 859. Sex ratios are lower in urban areas, 
compared to rural areas. Census data suggests that since 1901 the sex ratio in TN has seen a 
long-term decline in a direction unfavourable to females, decreasing sharply until the 1970s, with 
a more moderate decline thereafter until 1991. The State has subsequently recorded an increase 
in 200 1, suggesting a significant change in a long-term trend. 
The - child sex ratio is far below the state average for all ages, and is prominently lower than its 
own state average 'in a contiguous belt of districts running south to north along a western 
corridor of the state' (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4345). Salem district, in Tamil Nadu has the 
most, unfavourable sex ratio in the State for the 0-6 age group, at 811 (for rural areas). 
Disturbingly, Salem district has the second lowest district child sex ratio for rural areas in the 
country (Gol, 2003: 4). 
71 Moreover, it is the only district in a State other than from Haryana or 
punjab to feature in the bottom ten districts in the country for low child sex ratios. Both the 
Government of India and census data analysts have drawn attention to the alarming decline in the 
0-6 child sex ratio in both urban and rural areas, but noting especially the larger decline in urban 
areas (Gol, 2003: 3). A number of ground level studies have noted the increasing acceptance of 
female infanticide and female foeticide in TN (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000; Harriss-White, 
2o'01; Kapadia, 2002a). Specifically on the growing practice of female foeticide in urban TN, 
Athr eya and Chunkath explain, 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence of the spread of the practice of female 
foeticide to several medium and large towns in Tamil Nadu. Increasingly female 
foeticide is coming to be perceived as a viable option in semi-rural areas around the 
urban periphery, and in the urban areas proper. 
(Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4348) 
Significantly they attribute this phenomenon in part to the government propagation of a small 
, family norm in TN, which combines with the 'prevailing socio-cultural ethos of strong son 
71 Ibis ranking, presented in GoI (2003), was based on provisional population totals from the Census of India 200 1, 
and Salem's rural sex ratio was estimated at only 
763. A revised ranking based on final population totals has not 
bcen published by the Government of India. 
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preference', to threaten the survival of females of higher birth orders (Athreya and ChunkadL 
2000: 4348). 
Figure 4 Spatial concentration of below state average child sex ratios in Tamil Nadu, 2001 
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The Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) funded project implemented bý 
the Government of Tamil Nadu during the late 1990s focused on practices of female infanticide 
using a strategy of'social mobilisation. Athreya and Chunkath's study of primary health centrC 
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records suggests that the DANIDA project did help to reduce incidences of female infanticide in 
Dharmapuri. (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4347). However, they warn that 'there is no room for 
complacency ... [T]he one-shot mobilisation. effort needs to 
be followed up by [the] creation and 
sustenance of grass roots structures that would be constantly active in the struggle against female 
infanticide', in which proactive government involvement is critical (Athreya and Chunkath, 
2000: 4348). 
4.2.3 Andhra Pradesh 
Background 
The State of Andhra Pradesh is another of the four southern States of India, bordered by the 
States of Tamil Nadu to the South, Karnataka to the west, Maharashtra to the north, and 
Chhattisgarh and Orissa to the northeast (see Figure 5 below). in 2001, the State recorded a 
population of over 76.1 million (Census 2001 figures). It is the fifth most populous state in India, 
after Uttar Pradesh (166 million), Maharashtra (97 million), Bihar (83 million), and West Bengal 
(80 million). The decennial population growth rate was lower than the national average, and 
special mention of AP's 'remarkable fall in fertility and decadal growth rate during the 1990s' 
was made in the Government of India's Tenth Five Year Plan (Gol, 2002d: Vol. 2 Ch. 2: 167). 
At Independence, the Nizam. of Hyderabad ceded his Princely state of Hyderabad, which was 
formerly under the partial rule of the British (through the system of Paramountcy), to the newly 
formed Union Goverranent of India. Telugu-speaking districts of northern Madras State seceded 
in 1953 to form Andhra State. Andhra Pradesh State came into being later in 1956, when the 
majority Telugu-speaking area of Hyderabad State was combined with Andhra State, as part of 
the linguistic reorganisation of States in India (mentioned above). 
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Analysts often divide the state into three distinct regions: coastal Andhra, Rayalseema, and 
Telangana, to reflect the different historical trajectories of these areas, their agro-climatic 
characteristics and levels of development. 72 AP is administratively divided into twenty three 
districts, with its capital of Hyderabad, classified as a district which is 100 per cent urban. The 
state'average population density of AP is below the national average. 
The proportion of Scheduled Caste members to the total population is the same as at the national 
level (16.2%). Members of the Scheduled Castes are most numerous in East Godavari district in 
coastal Andhra, but are most concentrated in Nellore district in the south of AP. Scheduled Tribe 
me . mbers make up nearly 7% of the population of AP, slightly below the national average. The 
Census of India 2001 identified 59 Scheduled Caste groups among whom four were most 
numerically dominant making up nearly 94 per cent of the SC population: Madiga (49 per cent), 
Mala (42 per cent), Adi Dravida (2 per cent) and Adi Andhra (I per cent). Members of the 
Scheduled Tribes are more geographically concentrated than Scheduled Castes, and are found 
most in Yhammam district, constituting more than a quarter of that district's population (Census 
2001 data). Visakhapatnam, Warangal, Adilabad, and Nalgonda districts are also home to large 
numbers of STs. The Census of 2001 registered 33 different Scheduled Tribes, with the five most 
numerical making up 76 per cent of the Scheduled Tribe population: Sugalis (41 per cent), Koya 
(I I per cent), Yenadis (9 per cent), Yerukulas (9 per cent), and Gond (5 per cent). While the 
majority of Scheduled Tribes in AP live in rural areas (more than 92 per cent) this differs among 
different groups. 
Hindus are the largest religious group in AP (with a majority above the national average), 
followed by Muslims and Christians. Nearly a quarter of AP's Muslim population live in the 
State's capital Hyderabad, where they constitute more than two fifths of Hyderabad residents. 
72'The three regional demarcations encompass the following districts: coastal Andhra consists of Srikakulam, 
Vizianagaram, Vishakapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Prakasam, and Nellore; Telangana 
consists of Hyderabad, Rangareddy, 
Mahabubnagar, Medak, Nalgonda, Nizarnabad, Adilabad, Karimnagar, 
Warangal and Kharnmam; and Rayalseema consists of Chittoor, Cuddapah, Anantapur, and Kurnool. Occasionally, 
analysts have further divided coastal 
Andhra and Telangana into northern and southern areas of each region, and 
considered Hyderabad separately, 
demarcating six distinct regions of AP in total, and for similar purposes - to 
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Telu, (,, u is the predominant language of AP, followed by Urdu and then Hindi (figures ýfrom. 
Census of India 1991). Telugu is the third most commonly spoken language in the country (8% 
of India's population), after Hindi (40%) and Bengali (80/o), reflecting the fact that Telugu is also 
among the major languages spoken in Karnataka (7.4%), Tamil Nadu (7.1 %), and Orissa (1.6%) 
(Census of India, 1991). 
Economic Development, Human Development and Poverty 73 
In 2003-04, Andhra Pradesh ranked fourth among major States for Net State Domestic Product, 
just in front of TN, but seventh among major. States in per capita income, just behind TN. (, Gol, 
2007b). Growth in Gross State Domestic Product in AP for 2005-06 to 2006-07 was lower than 
the national average, due to negative growth rates in agriculture (GoAP, 2007b). 
The tertiary sector contributes the largest share of Gross State Domestic Product, followed by 
primary and secondary sectors. The primary sector in AP has a larger share than the secondary 
sector, unlike at the national level. Since 1999-2000, the share of the tertiary sector has 
increased, with the primary sector's share declining, and the secondary sector staying constant 
(GoAP, 2007b). The primary sector registered negative growth in 2006-07, mostly due to 
negative growth rates in agriculture. 
IIý 
In 1991, the State ranked eleventh among major States on human development (Gol, 200,2c)l. 
Poverty in AP is lower than the national average and declined at a much faster rate than at, the 
national level, over the period 1983 to 1999-2000 (GoI, 2002c). This was largely a result of the 
sharp decline in rural poverty; urban poverty actually increased slightly during the period 1983 to 
1993-94. 
Gender and employment" 
Like at the national level, male work participation rates are higher than those for women, but 
both in AP are higher than the national average, particularly for male urban workers. Women in 
73 Data on economic development, human development, and poverty in AP and all-India are presented in Table 17 
and Table 18. 
74 Data on gender and employment in AP is presented in Table 19 and Table 20. 
134 
AP have some of the highest female WPRs in the country. District variations in female WPRs 
are significant, particularly in rural areas rising from 24 per cent in rural East Godavari district to 
51 per cent in rural Vizianagram district. 
I Agricultural labourers in AP constitute 40 per cent of all workers, and nearly one half of all 
workers in rural areas. More than half of all female workers in AP are agricultural labourers 
(rising to more than 60 per cent in rural areas). Furthermore, women make up more than half of 
all household industry workers, representing a far higher presence in this sector compared with 
their proportion as workers overall. In addition to their concentration in agricultural labour, 
female employment is far more occupationally concentrated than male employment. 
"le male workers are overwhelmingly classified as main workers, female employment in AP 
is characterised by ma-ginal worker status. In some cases, female marginal workers outnumber 
male marginal workers. This is particularly marked in rural areas and in sectors such as 
household industries (75% female and 25% male marginal workers) and factory work 
(manufacturing non-household industry; 53% female and 47% male). 
Gender inequalities are also manifest in indicators of child labour in AP; the rural 5-14 years age 
category is the only category of main workers in which females outnumber males (GoAP, 2006: 
47). There are more females than males in marginal worker category for all age groups in both 
rural and urban areas. 
Research on female work participation rates in AP suggests that women constitute a reserve 
army of labour, with a 'rise in the rates of work participation of females during bad weather 
years to supplement family incomes and their withdrawal from the labour market when the crops 
are good' (Parthasarathy and Anand, 1995: 811). In contrast, in a study of women and 
agricultural labour in AP, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) suggest that 
those women performing agricultural labour worked more days annually than men, that 
is, not merely working at seasonal peaks (as was the norm for women) but on a 
continual basis... Indeed, we found that, on average, women perform 2.7 times as much 
outside agricultural labour as men. 
(Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 97) 
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They also suggest three important explanations for women's increasing employment, in 
agricultural work, the first of which has to do with the gendered division of labour and the 
classification of agricultural activities designated as exclusively female (such as weeding and 
transplanting), joint work (such as seed preparation), and exclusively male (such as ploughing 
with bulls), and the differential wage rates attached to male and female tasks (ibid: 97). Changes 
in the gendered division of labour mean that activities previously designated as exclusiveli - 
male 
are becoming designated as joint work, as well as some joint work becoming exclusively female. 
Because of the increasing entry of women into joint work, these activities are increasingly being 
seen as women's work, resulting in downward pressures in wage rates. Men are thus being 
deterred from low wage joint work, thus further increasing the feminisation of this category of 
agricultural labour (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 102). 
Secondly, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu suggest that the lower wage rates forjoint work in farm ,, 1-ý' 
work are only one- reason driving male agricultural labourers to look to opportunities for work in' 
the growing off-farin sector, which offers higher wages, meaning that women are taking over 
. -0 
some of the labour that men were performing previously (ibid: 103). Thus, women's 
employment in agricultural labour is increasing as a result of the exit of male workers from this, 
category of employment. 
Thirdly, and perhaps more substantially, Da Corta and Vcnkateshwarlu suggest that women 
agricultural labourers are becoming increasingly responsible for household income through 
increasingly 'unfree' labour relations with their employers. This shift is taking place against the 
backdrop of the breakdown of traditional agrarian patronage relationships between higher 
landowning and lower labouring castes, as a result of the increasing assertion of male 
agricultural labourers against tied labour, in favour of 
-better 
working conditions and wage rates 
in agricultural labour. Male labourers 'refuse offers of agricultural wage work in attempt to 
express their contempt for employers who attempt to impose on them the same onerous 
conditions associated with traditional bondage, such as low/unpaid wages, insults and physical 
abuse while working in the fields... ' (ibid: 105). However, the same male labourers have not 
prevented their wives from taking up the same work, they refuse. Furthermore, particularly in 
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cases where they refuse work but do not find any alternative, they increasingly rely on the 
income of their wives to support the family (ibid: 108). As a result, 
... women's greater responsibility 
for feeding the family [means that] they feel 
compelled to take up all offers of wage work, no matter how humiliating, which 
increases their unfreedorn, reduces their actual wages received, increases real male 
female wage differentials and increases hours worked per day. 
(Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 108) 
In addition to these deteriorating labour conditions for women, women's increased responsibility 
for household consumption expenditure has increased their demands for small loans, and to re- 
establish the credit ties broken between employers, (who also acted as creditors) and male 
labourers, women increasingly entered into tied labour arrangements (exchanging labour for 
credit) (Da Corta. and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 110). Thus, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlul s study 
suggests that changes -in the gendered division of labour in agriculture have 
"benefited male 
labourers at the expense of female labourers, and that gender relations cut across class interests 
in this instance. 
In the manufacturing sector in AP, research similarly demonstrates evidence of gender 
inequalities in employment practices. A study of garment manufacturing firms in Hyderabad and 
its environs found that, similar to landowners' preference for obedient and disciplined female 
labour (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 109-110), gendered recruiting preferences mean 
women are hired for their 'characteristic docility' and the lower likelihood of trade union 
organising (Chakravarty, 2004: 4912). Gendered inequalities in wage remuneration are also 
evident in manufacturing in Andhra Pradesh (Parthasarathy and Anand, 1995: 816). 
However, the different requirements of manufacturing work compared to agricultural labour 
reflect a different dimension of gender inequality in employment. Labour laws which prevent 
women from working during the night if the company cannot provide dedicated transport 
facilities for women to ensure their safety, mean that male workers often benefit from additional 
wages from piece rate work in export manufacturing firms, which characteristically demands 
overtime (Chakravarty, 2004: 4913). Both these examples challenge the wider assumption 
outlined earlier that the increased Work participation of women in paid employment is beneficial 
and empowering for women. 137 
Gcy7der and education's 
Census data for 2001 show that, overall, literacy rates in AP are below the national average, and 
the State ranks a low thirteenth among major States in India (but twelfth for female literacy) 
Literacy in AP follows some all-India trends. Higher literacy rates are observed for males 
compared to females. Females are more likely to have attained lower levels of schooling. 
Enrolment ratios beyond primary classes are generally lower for girls, and dropout ratios are 
higher for girls across all class levels. Gender inequalities in literacy are also intersected, by 
district variations, lower literacy levels in rural compared to urban areas, and lower literacy 
levels among SCs and STs compared to the rest of the population. After the state capital of 
Hyderabad, the coastal district of West Godavari has the highest literacy overall and surpasses 
Hyderabad for female literacy, including SC and ST females. Mahbubnagar district registers the 
lowest literacy for the same groups. The largest gender differential in literacy rates is recorded in 
Cuddapah district (76% males and 50% females); the smallest differential is in coastal East 
Godavari district, (70% for males and 61% for females). District variations combine with 
intersectional variations within districts, exacerbating inequalities in literacy levels: compare, for 
instance, overall male literacy in Hyderabad (84%) to female Scheduled Tribe literacy in 
Mahbubnagar district (I I%). However, increases in literacy rates in AP over the period 1991 - 
2001 in both rural and urban areas and for males and females have been impressive (more so in 
the rural areýs and for females). Higher increases in literacy for females have resulted ina 
marginal reduction in the differential between male and female literacy. 
Gender inequality and the sex ratio 
In 200 1, the state-level sex ratio in AP, stood at 97 8 females per 1000 males, above the national 
average but still unfavourable to females. AP's sex ratio recorded an increase over the period 
1991-200 1, one which was also above the national average. Like that seen in Tamil Nadu and at 
the national level, the child sex ratio, at 961 is lower than that for all ages, except in rural areas- 
Interestingly it is higher than that in TN. The sex ratio for all ages among all districts in AP is 
75 Data on literacy rates for AP compared to all-India are presented in Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25. 
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lowest in Hyderabad and highest in Nizamabad. The sex ratio for Scheduled Castes is slightly 
higher than the state average at 981, but lower than the state average for Scheduled Tribes, at 
972, and both have increased in a direction favouiable to females since 1991. Like the average 
sex ratio for the state, the SC sex ratio has increased since 1991. Hyderabad and Nizamabad are 
again the districts with the lowest and highest sex ratios for SCs and STs. Scheduled Castes in 
AP have higher sex ratios than the national average for Scheduled Castes, and this is also true for 
all the major SC groups in AP, although sex ratios still vary between SC groups. Apart from 
Madigas, the child sex ratio is lower than that for all ages. The child sex ratio for STs in AP at 
972 is almost the same as the national average for STs, but higher than the state level but this 
varies quite strongly among different ST groups, with Sugalis having the lowest child sex ratio at 
944 and the Koyas having the highest child sex ratio at an equal 1000. The sex ratio also varies 
among STs geographically with the ratio for all ages varying between 921 in Nalgonda district 
and 1009 in Srikakulam- 
4.2.4 Comparative discussion 
The analysis I have presented suggests that Tamil Nadu is considered more 'developed' than 
Andhra Pradesh according to many conventional development indicators, but that gender 
inequalities are discernible in both states and not always less so in Tamil Nadu. 
Gender and employment 
Gendered patterns of work participation in TN and AP follow some more general all-India 
trends. Generally, male workers make up a larger proportion of the total workforce than female 
workers, more men are recorded as 'working' than women, and far more 
female workers are 
classified as marginal than male workers, according to Census 
definitions. However, some 
important difference can be observed both in relation to all-India patterns and between the two 
States. Historically, work participation rates of women and their proportion- of the overall labour 
force in south India have been higher than the average for all-India (Da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 73). Furthermore, south India has seen a marked rise in the proportion of 
female workers, particularly female agricultural labourers, since the 1960s (Da Corta and 
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Venkateshwarlu, 1999)(Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Census data shows that both AP 
and TN have higher overall work participation rates (WPRs) than the all-India average (see 
Figure 6 below). Significantly, both these States have some of the highest female WPRs in the 
country, with AP having the highest female rural WPR in the country among major states. In 
urban areas, on the other hand, the female WPR at the all-India level is a fifth of the male WPR, 
while in AP it represents just over a quarter, and in TN, nearly a third. In other words, there are 
noticeably morefemale workers to male workers in urban areas in both these States compared to 
the all-India average, and slightly more so in TN than AP. 
A noticeably larger proportion of female workers are classified as main workers in AP and TN 
compared to the all-India average (see Figure 7 below), despite trends to suggest increasing 
casualisation of work participation in both these states. Furthermore, generally data suggests that 
female workers are more occupationally concentrated than male workers, with a far smaller 
proportion of women workers in AP classified as 'other workers', in both rural and urban areas. 
Furthermore, female worker concentration is also more evident in AP than at the national level, 
and particularly compared to TN, where the proportion of female worker's classified as 'other 
workers' is above the national average. Low employment growth in the two States is consistent 
with trends at the national level, as is the decline in the proportion of main workers, particularly 
among males. 
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Gender and education 
Comparatively speaking, literacy rates are above the national average in TN, but 
below the national average in AP. However, increases in literacy for the period 199 1- 
2001 have been higher in AP, and higher than the national average. Increases in 
literacy in TN have been lower than the national average, although this might be 
explained by TN's higher initial literacy levels (see Figure below). The same pattern 
can be observed for increases in female literacy compared to male literacy when 
comparing AP to TN. The larger increase in both male and female literacy in AP has 
thus narrowed the gap between the two states. However, the gap between male and 
female literacy remains larger in AP than TN and this gap has narrowed faster in TN 
during the period 1981-2001, despite initially higher literacy levels for both males and 
females in the latter. Interesting, literacy rates are similar for the two state capitals, 
Chermai and Hyderabad both generally (overall 80% and 79% respectively) and for 
males (85% and 84% respectively) and females (75% and 74% respectively). 
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Gender inequality, development, and diversity 
Significant intra-State variations according to caste, class, religion, age, and locality 
(by rural/urban areas, and between and w1thin districts) have complicated any 
straightforward comparison, and highlighted the importance of intersectionality when 
considering gendered development inequalities. For example, as Dunn observes, 
6relative to minority men, minority women in India have far more limited access to 
both educational and employment resources' (Dunn, 1993). 
Similarly, Swaminathan notes in relation to female work participation rates, that these 
are 
noticeably higher among scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population 
than among the rest of the female population. Further, scheduled caste and 
tribal women account for nearly half of all the female agricultural 
labourers, although they make up only about a quarter of India's rural 
female population. 
(Swaminathan, 1994: 69) 
While my point about intersectionality may be uncontroversial, given the already well 
rehearsed debates on gender and difference among women in standpoint, black, and 
postmodern feminisms, the implications it has for an analysis of gender 
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Gender inequality and the sex ratio 
Both TN and AP have sex ratios unfavourable to females although they both stand above the all- 
India average. TN's sex ratio has been consistently above that of all-India and of Andhra Pradesh 
since records from 1901. But similar to the trend seen at the all-India level, both States have seen 
a dccl ine in the sex ratio since 190 1, with a more recent increase between 1991-200 1. 
In both states, the child sex ratio (0-6 years age group) is lower than the sex ratio for all ages, and 
decreased between 1991 and 2001, even despite the overall increase in the sex ratio in the 
direction favourable to females. Significantly, this disparity is more notable in TN than AP. 
While the overall sex ratiofor AP is lower than thatfor TX the reverse is truefor the 0-6 years' 
age category. In other words, AP has a morejavourahle (although still unfavourable) absolute 
sex ratio for girl children than does YX Furthermore, the differential in AP between the child 
sex ratio and the sex ratio for all ages is smaller than the differential for the same in TN. Inter- 
district variations, which are significant in both states, also bear out this observation. District 
variations are also evident in AP but not to the same degree. 
There is also a notable difference between rural and urban areas for these two states. The child 
sex ratio is more favourable to girl children in AP in rural areas, which is consistent with all- 
India, and with the higher rural sex ratios for all ages in both Tlý and all-India. However, in 
Tamil Nadu the child sex ratio is more favourable in urban areas. 
However, there are important differences between the two states. As the analysis suggests, if 
discrimination against the girl child is measured through the sex ratio, it would seem to suggest 
that this is more of a problem in TN than AP. A decline on the same scale as TN or all-India has 
not been seen in the sex ratio for AP over the same period, although it did also witness an overall 
decline (despite periods where it increased), and then an increase during the period from 1991 to 
2001. However, its variance and decline has been a lot smaller (see Figure 9 below). The pattern 
for TN appears to follow more closely that of all-India, compared to AP. 
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feminisms, the implications it has for an analysis of gender mainstreaming policy in India are notý 
insignificant. The Indian women's movement had for many years been criticised as elitist and 
dominated by urban, middle class women, and in the 1980s and early 1990s, differences among 
women based on caste identity posed a formidable challenge to the coherence of the movement. 
The emerging dalit women's movement in the 1990s reflected these concerns and serves as an 
indicator of just how recently it is that the issue of diversity has become an important aspect Of 
demands for gender equality in particular. 76 The issue of diversity poses some significant 
challenges to, and raises important questions for, nascent gender mainstrearning strategies in 
India, as has been the case in other contexts where gender mainstrearning has been superseded by 
strategies to mainstream more than just gender equality, otherwise known as 'diversity 
mainstreaming' (Squires, 2005b). However, given the prevalence of accommodative strategies in 
the arena of identity politics in India, the potential for diversity mainstrearning (as opposed to 
affirmative action strategies) may be overstated. 
4.3 Socio-political constructions of gender in State politics 
The remainder of the chapter explores socio-political constructions of gender in State politics in, 
each State during the post-Independence period. Their significance is premised on the following 
theoretical assumptions: firstly, that party political and movement-based discourses in the - 
State 
are partially constitutive of particular constructions of gendered identity; secondly, that, these 
discourses may in part form the conditions of possibility for what can be articulated in 
development policy, and, thirdly, that these discourses may partially determine the extent to 
which women might mobilise collectively (particularly at the State level) for gender equality. In 
other words, the following discussion assumes that particularly dominant socio-political 
discourses in each State will have some bearing on how the state's vision of a desirable 
configuration of gender relations is discursively articulated in State-level development policy 
(discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6), as well as the extent to which this vision is 
contested by socio-political movements in each State (discussed further in Chapter 7). 
76 See for instance the recent edited collection by Anupama Rao on gender and caste (Rao, 2003). 
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Given constraints of space, the discussion is necessarily selective. For Tamil Nadu, I discuss the 
rise of Tamil cultural nationalist discourse and the politico-cultural project of its movement 
protagonists and party political conduit, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (hereafter DMK) and 
the 'paternalist populism' (Subramanian, 1999) of the AlADMK. I also draw on analyses of 
more recent developments in Tamil politics, to explore whether the emergence of a number of 
smaller movements and related political parties have offered alternative opportunities for 
conceptualising and articulating demands for gender equality beyond the dominant socio- 
political discourses in the State. For AP, I focus on analyses of women's participation in leftist 
agrarian movements in the State in the 1940s and 1970s, as well as the gendered populist style of 
leadership of NT Rama Rao (the leader of the regional Telugu Desam Party), and the much 
documented women's anti-arrack movement in the early 1990s. 
4.3.1 Gendered discourses of populism and cultural nationalism in Tamil Nadu 
A history of 
' 
late 20'h century Tamil politics shows the declining influence of the national 
Congress party in the State, the transformation of the anti-Brahmin Self Respect Movement into 
a political party, the Dravida Kazagham, and its later consolidation as the DMK, appealing to a 
Dravidian cultural nationalism, and the subsequent emergence of a similarly regional but rival 
political party, the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK). 
77 Since 1967, when, under the 
leadership of CN Annadurai, the DMK was elected to the Tamil Nadu State Legislative 
Assembly, the State of Tamil Nadu has been governed by either the DMK (1967-1977,1989- 
1991,1996-2001,2006- present) or the AIADMK (1977-1989,1991-1996,2001-2006). Since 
Annadurai's death, M. Karunanidhi has been leader of the DMK party. MG Ramachandran 
(hereafter MGR), a popular film actor turned politician and prominent DMK leader left the party 
in 1972 to form the ADMK, (later renamed the All India ADMK). Upon MGR's death, a 
leadership struggled ensued through two factions; the first was lead by his vvidow, Janaki, and 
the second by his former co-star and AIADMK party propaganda secretary, J. Jayalalithaa. The 
latter subsequently won the leadership battle to succeed MGR as head of the party, and since 
then has retained its leadership. 
77 The ADMK later changed their party name to All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagarn in 1972. For 
consistency, I will refer to them from here onwards as the AIADMK, even where referring to the party in the period 
prior to its change of name. 
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Discursive articulations of the concept of gender equality have emerged in various forms: from 
the radical social reform agenda of the Self-Respect Movement in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century with its progressive ideas on gender relations to -its premature demise in the 
mid 20th century, the subsequent interpretations of gender relations in cultural nationalist 
discourses of the DMK party, and the contrasting gendered discourses and politics of social 
welfare in the competitive populisms of the two main rival political parties emerging in the 
1980s and beyond. Some have lamented the demise of the more progressive discourse on gender 
equality in the Self-Respect movement, such as inter-caste marriage, arguing that it represented a 
radical vision towards more equitable gender relations in the areas of marriage, work - and 
community relatiops (see the work of S. Anandhi, MSS Pandian, S. V. Rajadurai and V. Geetha, 
cited in Harriss, 2002). These authors have sought to deconstruct the gendered cultural 
nationalist discourses of the DMK, which gradually pushed out those of the self-Respect 
movement, and rearticulated gender relations through notions of Tamil honour based on 
women's chastity. Rajadurai and Geetha (1996) discuss how the Dravida Munnetra Kazagharn 
(DMK) party attempted to recast Tamil history through the reinterpretation of classic Tamil 
literary works in order to generate popular support for a cultural nationalist Tamil identity. 
Representations of women and Tamil identity were positioned through notions of 'maan=9 
(honour) which, inter alia, equated a woman's purity with the purity of the Tamil nation (ibid: 
554). Anandhi argues that 
(a]s in the case of Indian nationalism, control over women and their sexuality has been 
central to the construction of Tamil identity and Tamil nationalism ... Tamil nationalism 
was thus a masculine dream. Women, as markers of Tamil national identity, had to 
reaffirm the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct; and their gender 
interests could only be articulated within these parameters, set by the cultural 
nationalists. 
(Anandhi, 2005: 4876) 
Thus women were largely positioned in Tamil nationalist discourse as the cultural repositorylpf 
the nation. This was nowhere more evident than the gendered sub ectification in Tamil 
nationalist discourse of woman as mother, in both the imaginary of Tamilttay (meaning Tamil 
mother) and in the thai-kulam (community of mothers) as cultural reproducers of the Tamil 
nation. Arguably, the mother icon is one of the most enduring images of Tamil cultural discourse 
throughout the twentieth century. 
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Firstly, Tamilttay, a previously elite literary concept in classic Tamil literature epitomized as the 
, guardian deity of the Tamil-speaking community', and the personification of the Tamil 
language, was popularized and re-imagined as a 'frail and endangered mother to be protected by 
her "children", the loyal speakers of Tamil' (Ramaswamy, 2001: 19). Thus; the protection of 
Tarnilttay featured prominently in protests against the domination of Hindi language in the newly 
independent Indian nation-state, and interestingly, sat uncomfortably beside the Hindi Indian 
nationalist imaginary of Bharat Mata (Mother India') (Ramaswamy, 2001: 2 1). 
Secondly, the importance given to women as mother of the Tamil nation, and specifically as a 
mother of Tamil sons as opposed to daughters, reified the role of motherhood in upholding the 
honour of the Tamil nation. The birth of a daughter instead of a son is considered to be a 
symptom of dysfimction. As CS Lakshmi explains, 
the Tamil mothers in classical Tamil literature have bodies which motherhood has tuned 
into sites of divinity, sanctity and purity. Their bodies are also sites where all societal 
notions of life and living seem to converge, endowing their bodies with some mystical 
qualities which make them 'naturally' produce what is termed 'the milk of valour' for 
their sons to infuse in their blood bravery and courage to make them warriors... 
(Lakshmi, 1990: WS-80) 
The protection of Tamil mothers becomes central to Tamil masculinity. Women's identity 
becomes co-terminous with motherhood, and women as subjects of a gendered nationalist 
discourse are positioned as a supportive rather than a transforming element. 
This supportive role of Tamil women has been reflected in the limited participation of women in 
Tamil political party organisations and associated forms of political organisational activity. 
Lakshmi (1990) comments on this phenomenon in terms of the DMK as a party political 
organisation and argues, 
the DMK party functioned in a way that put women in specific roles where they did not 
play a prominent role in making decisions or generating debates. Women's support for 
the party was expressed in ways considered 'womanly'... in 1975, the secretary of the 
women's wing of the head office of the party, could only list opening of orphanages and 
building of marriage choultries as active programmes for women... The DMK was 
familial in structure and women in the party occupied the same [subservient] position 
they did in families 
(Lakshmi, 1990: WS-81) 
outside of main party structures, similarly, women have often been excluded from a significant 
form of party political organisational activity in the form of cinema fan clubs, including those of 
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the AIADMK and the DMK (Dickey, 1993,2003). The powerful symbiotic relationship between 
cinema and politics in Tamil Nadu has meant that cinema has been used as 'a, political 
springboard' for aspiring politicians (with many leading politicians originally entering politics 
from the film industry) and has become one of the most effective ways for political leaders to 
communicate with the electorate (Dickey, 1993: 340). 78 In particular, cinema fan clubs are highly 
useful to politicians as they 'provide a pre-existing network of supporters, often -highly 
organised, that can easily be transformed into apolitical cadre' (Dickey,. 1 993: 342). However, as 
Dickey explains, fan clubs 
are male institutions: virtually all members are [young] men... Women-rarely join, 
mindful that involvement in activities so public and unrestrained as those of fan clubs 
would harm their reputation and thus their chances of marriage. After marriage, most 
women are too busy with household work to be involved in outside organised activities. 
The vaguely licentious reputation of cinema also keeps them away-Unlike women, 
young men tend to have the time, the lack of family responsibilities, and the freedom of 
movement to permit participation in fan club work. 
(Dickey, 2003: 214,216-7; see also Dickey, 1993) 
The implications of these restrictions on women's participation in film fan clubs, inter alia, "are 
the limited opportunities for women's induction into mainstream political parties, given that fan 
clubs have served as important training grounds for politicians (Dickey, 2003: 361)(Dickey, 
). 79 1993: 361 
WUle women were restricted access to fan association activities, the same could not be said of 
their access to MGR's films. The popularity that MGR gleaned through his films which was 
strategically beneficial for his consequent political career, as well as the AIADmK's to appeal to 
women, should not be underestimated. The narratives of social struggle against inequality, the 
representation of women in his films, and the treatment of female characters by the characters 
MGR played, had a direct bearing on his political persona, and reflected how, as an immensely 
popular figure in Tamil politics, he was able to shape debates about gender relations in Tamil 
society. 
78 A large literature exists on this relationship between cinema and party politics in Tamil Nadu. See especially 
Dickey (1993,2003), Hardgrave (1973), and Pandian (1992). 79 Although Dickey (1993: 357, note 7) does acknowledge that film clubs have occasionally involved women 
in, 
their social service activities. 
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Pandian (1996) outlines several ways in which MGR's films appealed to women; firstly, through 
the anticipated subversion of conventional power structures in determining marriage choices 
such as parental authority and class and caste norms; secondly, by presenting MGR's character 
as a guardian and protector in contrast to an environment rife with physical and sexual violence 
towards women; thirdly, through the adoration of the mother-figure by MGR's character; and 
fourthly, by positioning MGR as the object of female desire (Pandian, 1996: 536-9). What may 
be overestimated, however, is the transformative potential of MGR's films with regards to 
prevailing gendered inequities in Tamil society. As Pandian argues, 
instead of developing a subversive critique of the iniquitous system which [MGRIs 
films] portray, these films tend to iron out the contradictions and offer a neat solution 
for the injustice within the moral economy of the system' vindicating and reaffirming 
the system in the process 
(Pandian, 1996: 535) 
Thus, with regards to their potential for articulation of gender-based oppression, MGR's films do 
not, 'lead to even an open-ended critique of the all-pervasive male domination in Tamil 
society .... Monogamy, chastity, and all 
the symbols associated with these institutions of male 
domination are carefully elaborated and defended as embodying the foremost "womanly 
virtues... (Pandian, 1996: 540). Ultimately, then, 'the resolution of the women's question goes 
hand in hand with reaffirming the existing order of male domination. There is no attempt 
whatsoever to transcend the existing order' (Pandian, 1996). Thus, MGR's films did little to 
envision or articulate the prospects for a more gender egalitarian order. 
The paternalist approach to women evident in MGR's films also became prominent in State 
politics, as part of a competitive populist dynamic, made possible by the emergence of a rival 
party to the DMK, the AIADMK, during the early 70s, after MG Ramachandran left the DMK to 
form his own party in 1972 (Swamy, 1998). Issues of social inequality, welfare, justice, and 
development have been constituted through two competing styles of populism in the 1990s and 
beyond. Several authors suggest that, at least at the time when the ADMK emerged as a break- 
away faction of the DMK party in 1972, the two parties remained virtually identical in ideology; 
Dickey for instance suggests the split was more of a personality clash between Karunanidhi and 
MGR (Dickey, 1993). In contrast, Swamy argues that 1MGR's accession to power marked a 
shift in the politics of Tamil Nadu from one characteristically associated with issues relating to 
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upward mobility to one in which social welfare policies became the 
hallmark 
of the state' (1998: 
119). 
Both Swamy (1998) and Subramanian (1999) have attempted to define and analyse the two 
parties' distinct styles. of populism. Swamy (1998) distinguishes between the 'empowerment 
populism' of the DMK and the 'protection populism' of the AIADMK. Similarly, Subramanian 
(1999) refers to the 'assertive populism' of the DMK' and the 'paternalistic populism' of the 
AIADMK. Both authors adopt a similar understanding of populism, which Swamy defines as 'a 
style of political rhetoric that describes society as a conflict between 'the common people' and a 
narrow elite, demanding greater privileges for, out-groups on behalf of 'the people" (Swamy, 
1998: 110). The DMK's empowerment populism is based upon notions of upward mobility. 
Along with a cultural nationalist appeal to Dravidian, and later Tamil, identity, poverty was a 
significant mobilisational issue for the DMK, and formed an important part of the DMK's 
delegitimation of Congress as a representative of the poor in the 1967 election (Swamy, 1998: 
117). But the DMK had problems appealing to the lower caste groups and the very poor which 
was exacerbated by the death of the popular DMK leader, C. N. Annadurai, in 1969, and the 
accession of M. K. Karunanidhi, who enjoyed more popularity with the backward classes but did 
not have mass appeal (Swamy, 1998). 
In contrast to the 'empowerment populism' of the DMK, Swamy defines protection populism, 
associated with the AIADMK as 'a rhethoric that emphasises themes of vulnerability, offering to 
protect "the weak" and "truly needyl"(Swamy, 1998: 110). This correlateg with Subrainaniam's 
dpatemalist' populism variant (Subramanian, 1999). This variety of populism articulates the state 
as a paternalist and benevolent protector of the poor and vulnerable. Studies of both the popular 
appeal of the AIADMK and of their social welfare policies often emphasise how MGR's popular 
image in politics and the orientation of his policies drew on the roles he played throughout his 
film career (Pandian, 1992; Dickey, 1993). Swamy summarises some of the literature, 
identifying three recurring themes in MGR's film role, firstly, that of a crusader against tyranny; 
secondly, a champion of the poor; and thirdly, a protector of women (Swamy, 1998: 135). 
Similarly, MGR's policies focused, in a much more limited sense, on the poorest, rather than the 
backward classes or intermediate social groups and he specifically directed certainsocial policies 
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--such as prohibition towards women (ibid: 119). MGR came from a high caste background but 
had a poor childhood due to the early death of his father and often referred to his 'mother 's 
plight, to justify his concern for widows and abandoned women (ibid). In part due to the appeal 
of MGR, his rhetorical style of 'protection populism', and his consistent appeal to women, the 
AIADMK opened up a gender and class gap in voting (ibid: 112). Women and the poorest 
groups made up the electoral base more significantly than that of the DMK; opinion polls cited 
by Swamy show that women and illiterate voters supported MGR in larger numbers than men 
and college educated voters, and opposition to Karunanidhi was more marked among women 
voters (ibid: 121). After MGR's death in 1987, his political heir and former co-star J. 
Jayalalithaa, continued his paternalist or protection populist legacy, after a brief factional dispute 
within the party. 
: The relevance of this 
discussion concerns how gender relations are articulated through the 
populist discoursd of powerful political parties, and how the proximity of party politics at the 
State level to government, policy-making and the bureaucracy, and the development of an 
identity-based politics often prevents a more comprehensive policy of redistribution at the state 
level. The contrasting empowerment and protection populisms invoke a relative tension 'as 
visions of social justice... ' which accordingly '... allows them to be championed by rival parties 
under competitive conditions' (Swamy, 1998: 110). Two important questions arise as a result of 
t- his discussion: firstly, to what extent does party politics and paternalist or empowerment 
populist styles of rhetoric affect the discursive character of gendered development policy; and 
secondly, to what extent 
does party politics impinge on the institutionalisation of a commitment 
I 
to more gender-equitable government policy on development. Following the populism models, 
on the first issue, we might expect to 
find that the DMK have tried to forward the notion of 
gnpowering women but not necessarily the poorest women, and in a way which 
fits with cultural e 
nationalist discourses. 
On the other hand, we might expect to see the AIADMK claim to be 
concerned with women's welfare 
but in a way that perpetuates their dependence on a 
paternalistic state, and one which sees 
its pursuit of gender equality only as a benevolent act 
rather than a constitutional obligation to 
its citizens. On the second issue, either way, one might 
expect that given the'close 
identification of party politics with social policies, that party politics 
will have a profound 
impact on state-level discursive constructions of gender inequality as a 
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developmental problem; on the other hand, it is also possible that the state bureaucracy and 
administration may act with relative continuity and autonomy from the party political arena. In 
the latter case, it may be seen that party political actors will be more concerned with positioning 
and rearticulating state policy on gender equitable development according to their populist 
rhetorical styles, which nevertheless will have its own discursive implications for policy. These 
issues are examined later in Chapter 6, which analyses discourses of gender and development ,M 
State level policy. 
While the above discussion of competing style of populist politics serves as a backdrop for the 
ensuing analysis of policy in Chapter 6, it is also important to mention a more recent 
development in Tamil politics. Authors such as Harriss (2002), Wyatt (2004), and Gorringe 
(2005) identify one new development as the increasing political mobilisation of dalits in Tamil 
Nadu and the rise of smaller caste-based parties in the State such as the Dalit Panthers of India 
(DPI), and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), a party appealing to the 'backward' cast, e 
community of Varmiyar concentrated in northern Tamil Nadu 
What is particularly interesting about . this development however is its impact on the complex 
position of the dalit movement in Tamil Nadu in relation to gender, or more specifically,, in 
relation to Tamil identity and Tamil nationalist constructions of gender relations discussed 
above, to the dalit movement's transformation into a party political organisation, and to the dalit 
movement's caste-based solidarity with dalit women. Anandhi argues that in the case of the 
DPI, its transition 'from a political movement to a party seems to have led to a dramatic dilution 
of its radicalism' (Anandhi, 2005: 4877). Previously, the movement had invoked the radical and 
progressive values of Periyar and the Self-Respect Movement, including the rejection of notions 
of the violent masculine imposition of women's chastity (ibid). Yet, more recent events such as 
the establishment of the Tamil Protection Movement by the DPI and the PMK demonstrate 
attempts of a revival of a pan-Tamil identity, in an attempt to 'expand their support base beyon 
their respective caste constituencies' (Anandhi, 2005: 4876). The apparent resilience, 
-of, 
conservative attitudes to gender relations and women's sexuality, through invoking a cultural 
nationalist Tamil identity came to the fore during an e isode in September 2005. Kushboo; a- ,P 
popular film actress in Tamil films, during an* interview with a Tamil magazine on women's 
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sexuality spoke openly about cultural taboos on women's virginity and sexuality. The'source'of 
the ensuing controversy was Kushbools argument that, contrary to cultural expectations, the 
occurrence of pre-marital sex meant that many women were not virgins at the time of marriage. 
The subsequent protests by the DPI and PMK claimed that the actress had insulted the morality 
and dignity of Tamil women and interestingly it was the women's wing of the PMK that then 
filed defamation cases against Kushboo in court. As Anandhi concludes, 'the past of the DMK 
has become the present of the DPI and the PMK' (2005: 4876). Moreover, the new position of 
the DPI as protector of an 'homogenised, hegemonic, collective identity of the "Tamil women"' 
serves to undermine the gains made by dalit women's organisations in the State to gain 
recognition both for a dalit women's identity, which differentiates both against that of upper 
caste women and of dalit men, and the multiple oppression suffered by dalit women (Anandhi, 
2005: 4877). While the sentiments of the DPI and PMK were not necessarily those of the 
majority - with one editorial of an English daily newspaper likening the episode to a form of 
'incipient Talibanism' (The Hindu, 2005b) - what these events demonstrate is the resilience of 
the DMK's early conservative cultural nationalist discourse which likened the dignity of the 
Tamil nation to the chastity of its women. 
In summary, the DMK's early conservative cultural Tamil nationalist discourse rearticulated 
much of the more gender egalitarian ethos of the earlier Dravidian Self-Respect Movement, and 
positioned women as cultural repositories of the nation, foregrounding their role as mothers of 
Tamil sons. With the rise of the leadership of M. G. Ramachandran, the leader of the breakaway 
party the All-India Anna Munnetra Dravida Kazagham, women became one group among a 
number of favoured beneficiaries of his paternalist style of leadership, demonstrating a gendered 
and class-based style of populism. 
Yet, neither the conservative cultural nationalist discourse of the DMK or the paternalist populist 
style of the AIADMK offered much potential for gender egalitarian relations in Tamil Nadu. 
Furthermore, both party political organisations present few opportunities for women's leadership 
and decision-making more generally in a way which challenges dominant norms of behaviour of 
women in Indian society, even when considering Jayalalithaa's leadership of the AIADMK 
subsequent to MGR's death in 1987. The emergence of a number of smaller movements and 
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related political parties have not offered much potential for a transformation towards more 
egalitarian gender tellat; ons, and 'have in some way rearticulated the dominant socio-political 
discourses in the State. 
4.3.2 Left-wing agrarian movements, populism, and state co-optation in Andhra Pradesh 
Since the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh along linguistic lines in 1956, the Congress 
Party dominated govenurient and party politics in the state, until the 1980s, when a, regional- 
based party, the Telugu Desam Party, was elected to the State Assembly in 1983.80 The leader of 
the TDP, NT Rama Rao, was a populist leader and former film actor, who had rapidly 
established the party and come to power astonishingly within less than a year. The Congress 
regained political office in 1989 but were elected out of office later in 1994. The TDP thereafter 
held two terms of office, from 1994-1999 and 1999-2004, both largely under the leadership of 
Chandrababu Naidu, NTR's son-in law, after Naidu deposed NTR in a party leadership coup in 
1995. Most recently, the TDP were voted out of office in the 2004 State Assembly elections, 
when the Congress Party returned to goverment. 
The Telangana, struggle was an anti-feudal struggle by rural lower castes which mobilised 
against forced labour (veth) and exploitation by upper caste landlords in the Telangana region 
between 1946 to 1951. The movement operated through the Communist-dominated Andhra 
Maha Sabha, forming sanghams (movement groups) at the grassroots levels. 
The Telangana movement differed significantly from the character of the women's movement I 
at 
the time, because it attracted rural as opposed to urban women, and low caste as opposed to 
middle and upper caste women. Party support for women's symbolic participation in the 
movement remained on the margins, positioning women as largely 'supportive', despite 
acknowledging that their. actual participation was extensive. One CPI party leader, Ch. 
Rajeshwar Rao, said. of the Party, 'We praised women when they came, but we did not -do 
anything to encourage them to come... They fought boldly, organised shelters, brought food etc. 
[Yet] the party made no special efforts to attract them. ' (quoted in Lalita et al., 1989: 17) 
go Prior to 1956, Brahmins dominated post-Independence State politics, and were replaced by the Reddys, a 
dominant peasant caste. Ile latter came to prominence in the state, benefitting from land reforms implemented as an 
outcome of the Telangana struggle which took place in the late 1940s. 
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The Party's reluctance to encourage women's participation was partly because of how the 
movement's struggle was conceptualised and partly because their participation went against 
societal norms. A CPI party document directly expressed this first limitation of the movement: 
, We always viewed ... [womens] problems as a separate issue. Due to this attitude, we only 
succeeded in making them sympathetic to the movement, but could not involve them as a direct 
force in the fight' (cited in Lalita et al., 1989: 17) (cited in Lalita et al., 1? 89: 17). The second 
limitation was that women's participation in the movement went against conventional norms in 
society; 'women had to fight against traditional beliefs and a feudal outlook even to become a 
part of the political struggle' (Lalita et al., 1989: 263). This posed a problem for the party's 
encouragement of women ... because their protection was a problenf " (Ch. Raj eswar Rao, quoted 
in Lalita et al., 1989: 17), and thus they were seen as 'separate, embarrassing and burdensome' 
(Lalita et al., 1989: 263). Women's oral narratives of their experience in the Telangana 
rnovement suggest that 'women often felt used and then cast aside', and that within the 
movement there was a 'brooding, pervasive sense that women were "problems"', which would 
be articulated not necessarily explicitly but in 'everyday moments of dismissive encounter' 
(Lalita et al., 1989: 25). 
Despite their symbolic marginal status in the Telangana, movement, Lalita et al's analysis of 
women's oral narratives suggest that their participation was seen as liberating and empowering: 
&moving into the struggle did mean a tremendous liberation for these women - they believed it 
was possible to break with custom - to travel alone, travel at night, carry guns, act as couriers, 
fight in squads - all of which they did' (Lalita et al., 1989: 26 1). They further note that women's 
... involvement with the 
Party provided a significant growth in consciousness for the 
women. Reading, writing, discussing political questions, attending classes, addressing 
public meetings and organising women gave them a very positive sense of their role ... It 
was as if the Party gave them a chance to make practical sense of whatever learning 
they had. It gave them the tools to understand their social reality and was a source of 
enor7nous. strength and clarity. They felt that the struggle brought them wisdom, 
knowledge, clarity and enormous physical stamina. 
(Lalita et al., 1989: 26 1). 
yet this positive sense of the movement's contribution to women's subjective agency is 
accompanied by a frustration at 'what happened to women as a result, and how little, despite the 
enormous effort recorded in these autobiographical accounts, things have changed. ' (Lalita et al., 
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1989: 25). That women were asked to return to their families when the movement was called off 
COUld '0 De no less than frustrating, as the orai narrative of Brij Rani attests: *what do you think it 
means, to wield weapons in the struggle and sit before sewing machines now? ' (quoted in Lalita 
et al., 1989: 18). 
According to Suri, 'the emergence of the TDP heralded a new era in AP politics' as a result of 
increased inter-party competition and electoral choice (Suri, 2006: 283). Suri offers five differ , 
ent 
explanations for the formation and rise in popularity of the TDP party, which centre on firstly, 
intra-caste rivalry between the two dominant peasant castes , the Reddy's (which 
dominated the 
Congress Party) and the Karnmas (who formed the TDP); secondly, the importance of the 
backward caste vote after their alienation from the Congress Party; thirdly, the issue of Telugu 
self-respect in protest at Indira Gandhi's centralising tendencies during the late 1970s and early 
1980s and her encouragement of factionalism within the Congress party in AP; fourthly, 
increasing demands for state-level autonomy as a result of a conflict between an emerging 
regional bourgeoisie and their national counterpart; and lastly, the ability of the TDP to attract 
the vote of non-Congress political parties (Suri, 2006: 284-7). Suri concludes that all of the_s ,e 
explanations have some merit, although each on their own are not sufficient to explain the rise of 
the TDP. 
NTR's charismatic leadership and populist appeals also played an important part in the rise - 
of 
the TDP. Kannabiran's study (1997) is one of the very few studies on the Telugu Desam Party to 
pay particular attention to the charismatic appeal of NT Rama Rao's paternalist and benev 
, 
olent 
persona to women voters. A9 Kannabiran argues, 'women have always been central to the 
rhetoric of the Telugu Desam Party, since its inception. NT Rama Rao entered politics appealing 
to Telugu mothers and sisters to use their political will to bring his party into power, since his 
party was the only one that held the promise of a 'better life for women' (1997: 1 237). In some 
ways similar to MG Ramachandran in Tamil Nadu, he drew on the patron-protector and 
benevolent elder brother roles he played as an actor in film (although NTRIs characters were 
rarely depicted as common heroes, playing instead more mythological characters or kings) (ibid). 
NTR was particularly appealing to women because his rhetoric stood in stark contrast to the 
inability of the Congress government to stem to rising tide of violence against women in the state 
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(Kannabiran, 1997: 1236). Thus, 'when NTR came with his offerings of equal property rights 
and a safe and clean environment free of violence, women were more than eager to give him a 
chance... ' (Kannabiran, 1997: ibid). His populist scheme of rice for Rs 2a kilo was also popular 
among women. However, as the experience of women in campaigning for prohibition in AP 
shows however, NTR's willingness to address the demands of women voters was limited. 
The struggles discussed so far were not specifically or solely 'women's struggles' but part of a 
larger struggle, and show the participation of women in more radical but still mainstream 
movements. In contrast, the anti-arrack movement of women in AP in the early 1990s was a 
specifically women-led movement against the sale of arrack (or 'saara' in Telugu, meaning 
country liquor). The movement, crystallising in Nellore District in the early 1990s, and which led 
to the (albeit temporary) prohibition of arrack in the State, is now well documented (see for 
instance Anveshi, 1993; Pande, 2002; Reddy and Patnaik, 1993; Rao and Parthasarathy, 1997). 
The large scale mobilisation of poor lower caste women resulted from a State-directed literacy 
program which, beyond imparting literacy, sought to use literacy as a means for development 
and empowerment, and the materials used in these programmes deliberately sought to provoke 
debate on social issues. Through this program, women became increasingly agitated around what 
they came to see as the underlying reasons for domestic violence and poverty: the consumption 
of alcohol by male members of their households and the presence of arrack shops in their 
villages. 
The political economy of arrack is significant to the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Arrack is a 
source of excise revenue deriving from liquor sales and from the licensing fees from liquor 
contractors. In 1991-92, arrack was the largest source of revenue from liquor sales (R]s. 630.27 
crore, nearly E79 million approximately), and excise taxes constituted 8 per cent of state taxes 
(Anveshi, 1993: 87). Arrack sales were also linked to the village labour economy in that 
landlords would often pay labourers in arrack tokens rather than cash or other goods. 
Furthermore, arrack sales had risen rapidly over the past decade (1981-91) as a result of a 
deliberate state-led marketing strategy known as 'varun vahini' ('the flood of liquor') which 
packeted liquor in individual sachets, in part to facilitate more convenient consumption practices 
beyond conventional public drinking spaces (ibid). Thus, the Congress government in power at 
159 
the height of the movement's expansion was reluctant to concede to the demands of the women's 
movemeni because arrack constituted an important source of revenue as well as a source of 
power from the patronage of liquor contracts. 
The women's anti-arrack movement in AP made significant gains in closing liquor sho s, P 
protesting 'against and preventing the state-sponsored sale and marketing of arrack, 'and 
eventually achieving their goal of prohibition in October 1993. The movement also achieved 
considerable changes in the lives of the lower caste, rural (but later also urban) women who 
participated in the movement, raising awareness among women, spreading the message of the 
movement, and encouraging other women to mobilise and protest against arrack as a means to 
combat domestic violence and poverty. 
However, the anti-arrack movement in AP is an example of the state's willingness and abiliýty. to 
co-opt the demands of the women's movement, motivated by electoral compulsions to capture 
the women's vote (Kannabiran, 1997: 1237). Consequently, in AP, support for the movement 
began to evaporate as soon as it became a partisan issue because it was supported by the TDP 
opposition. As Rekha Pande observes (Pande, 2002: 360), '[m]any left wing groups and other 
political parties distanced themselves from this movement because now it was no longer , 
an 
achievement of women but part of a party political platform'. The TDP were able to effectively 
convert its support of the prohibition movement into votes from women in the 1994 election; 
women s support was significant for the TDP's election victory in that year, and the newly 
elected TDP implemented prohibition soon after. 
Prohibition was, however, lifted from November 1995, when the new leader of the TD P, 
Chandrababu Naidu, faced opposition to the increases in taxation which were intended as -an, 
alternative source of revenue in place of liquor excise duties (Pande, 2002: 360). Thus, it seemed 
that the influence of the women's vote was not enough to enable the continued support of 
prohibition. The reneged promises of the AP government on prohibition is just one example of - 
the reluctance of the Indian state to uphold the demands for change generated through their very 
own programmes of social mobilisation and empowerment. 81 As Pande suggests, Gmore telling 
81 Another example is that of the Women's Development Programme in Rajasthan, in which the State government's 
'goal was to empower women and undo gender hierarchies, [but which] actually ended up repressing women and 
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than these policy changes [on prohibition] was the fact that the stories of the anti-arrack 
rnovement were no longer part of the texts used for [State-led] literacy [programmes]' (Pande, 
2002: 360). 
4.3.3 Comparative discussion 
Comparing the socio-political and historical trajectories of the two states, we can observe that 
there are important similarities and differences both within and between the two states. This 
demonstrates the diversity of the broader social context at the subnational level. Both states have 
experienced their own regionally concentrated and historically contingent social movements 
which, while providing some consideration of the question of gender inequality in some cases, as 
well as the participation of women, they have ultimately provided limited substantial 
opportunities for changes in gender relations in these two states. Both states have also witnessed 
the emergence of regional parties, two of which have appealed specifically to women voters 
(AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and TDP in Andhra Pradesh), albeit problematically in a way which 
reinforces conservative gender norms of female subservience, sacrifice, and chastity. These 
regional parties have become politically institutionalised at the level of state government (and at 
the national level in more recent years) and therefore have become important actors in the 
institutional context of state-led development. 
I-lowever, significant differences remain between the two states. As Suri (2006: 28 1) points out, 
unlike the regional party of the DMK (and later AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, 'the TDP did not 
ernerge a's a result of any antecedent struggle or sustained social movement ... [Furthermore, ] 
attempts to institutionalise another state party by splitting the TDP, a la Tamil Nadu, were not 
successful in AP'. Also, the presence Congress has survived political competition with the TDP 
in AP, but began to decline in influence in Tamil Nadu from the 1960s onwards, becoming only 
a marginal player in state level politics from the 1980s with the rise of the AIADMK. This 
suggests an interesting development in the increasingly complex relationship between state and 
national level development policy: the varied position of the Congress party in the two states 
reconstituting patriarchy [in the 
face of women's collective mobilisation as a result of the programme] by such 
actions as ordering men to control their wives or else' (Sharma, 2001 a: 1-2; see also WDP 
Fact Finding Team, 1992, 
cited in Sharma, 2001). 161 
may result in different levels of influence of national level development policy on state level 
development, and this becomes even more complex when coalition politics is taken into account. 
Notwithstanding the early feminist debates of the self-respect movement in Tamil Nadu, the 
women's movement appears to be stronger and more mobilised in AP, and this may be attributed 
to the stronger presence of left-wing politics in the state compared to TN. However, it is not clear 
what role women have played in the'dalit movements emerging in AP from the 1980s oný`ardýs, 
since there are few detailed studies on the role of women in these movements, or whether these 
movements incorporated an understanding of the intersectionality of dalit women's oppression 
within the movements' discourse. 
4.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the diversity of the broader social context is 
important for understanding processes and outcomes of gendered development at the subnational 
level. I have attempted to show that gendered development is a highly complex and nuanced 
phenomenon based on unequal relations of caste and class, as well as gender, and that it is ha. rd 
to make blanket statements about the level of development at the subnational level. This suggeýsts 
that not only is it too straightforward to assume on the basis of development indicators that 
woments status is higher and gender relations are more egalitarian in the southern states of India 
compared to the north, but also to assume that this is moreso, the case in Tamil Nadu compared. to 
Andhra Pradesh. In other words, the possibilities for articulating feminist strategies of gender- 
equitable development may be enabled or constrained by broader socio-historical and political 
developments. This insight cautions us against simplistic analyses of state level policies'of 
development which do not pay particular attention to their embeddedness in state-specific socio- 
economic and historical contexts and the conditions of possibility these contexts constitute. )With 
these discussions in mind, in the next chapter the analysis moves to a more narrow focus on the 
gendered institutional context of state. development policy in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. 
162 
5 THE GENDERED INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF STATE-LED 
DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
in . Chapter Three, I discussed the gendered character of national development policy as well as a 
number of initiatives to mainstream gender at the national level. In particular, I paid attention to 
, certain gendered 
discourses produced by, and embedded within, state institutions, such as the 
planning Commission, as well as institutional structures and mechanisms that were created for 
the purposes of making the state more responsive to women, such as the National Commission 
for Women and the Mnistry of Women and Child Development. This chapter seeks both to 
expand on that discussion and reposition the focus towards institutions at the subnational level, 
looking at the states of AP and TN. Little attention has been paid to 'state feminist' institutional 
strategies at the subriational rather than national level in India, or their link with state level 
policy. The aim here is to specifically explore the institutional context for gender mainstreaming 
-in development policy at 
the state level. This chapter is concerned with the 'institutional politics 
of pursuing feminist policy ambitions' (Goetz, 1997b: 3). As such, this chapter combines, on the 
one hand, the concern of gender mainstreaming strategies in transforming institutional norms 
and practices, as well as on the other, the state's role in formulating (gender-equitable) 
development policy. It directly engages with one of the central questions of this thesis in that it 
concerns how the state becomes an institutional site of struggle for the constitution of gender- 
responsive development policy. This chapter also serves to present the 
institutional context for 
the state's discourse on gender-equitable development, which is explored ftuther in theý next 
chapter. 
A rnajor underlying premise of the chapter, and one which has been contentious in the literature, 
is that feminists need to engage with the state in order to bring about change, but that this 
engagement should proceed with caution. 
In the first half of the chapter, I explore how the state 
is an ensemble of gendered organisational. and institutional norms and practices and how these 
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embedded norms and practices reproduce the state' as a gendered institution (Brown, 2006; 
Pringle and 'w"atson, 1992). By endorsing the view held by feminist theorists of the state more Cý - 
generally, I argue that gendered norms and practices embedded within state institutions in India 
create an institutional context which is not conducive to feminist policy goals and strategies, 
including some tokenistic and accommodationist efforts to increase the descriptive representation 
of women within these institutions. This does not rule out the possibility of change, however, as 
the institutional sites within which dominant gendered discourses of development are embedded 
are themselves open to contestability and challenge (Weedon, 1987: 109). 
With this potential for change in mind, in the second half of the chapter, I discuss how these 
institutional norms and practices have to some extent determined the possibilities for feminist 
efforts at institutional transformation. I argue that both feminist-initiated and state-initiated, , 
or 
'state-feminist' (Stetson and Mazur, 1995), strategies for transforming state institutions towards 
more gender-equitable goals in the two case study States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Prades ,h 
represent a complex assortment of opportunities and limitations, some offering more potential 
for feminist intervention and transformative change than others, and with notable differences 
both between and within the States' institutional contexts. More generally what this demonstrates 
is the insight of feminist poststructural approaches to the state - that the 'state' is understood not 
as a monolith or as a unitary force of government but as an ensemble of various organisational 
and institutional structures, norms, and practices, which do not always act in unison, sometimes 
even contradictorily (Pringle and Watson, 1992; Rai, 1996; Waylen, 1996). 
More specifically it demonstrates that the institutional contexts for women, gender and 
development policy have developed in ways that can be considered distinctive to individual, 
states at the subnational level in India. This clearly has implications for the study of both national 
and suýnational policy and emphasises the need to recognise the historical specificity of, the 
institutional context from which policy emerges. Such a recognition is important both 
to 
understand the conditions of possibility for gendered development policy as much as the', 
strategies required to transform it, given the presupposition that feminist interests 'do not pre- 
exist, fully formed, to be simply 'represented' in the state, but have to be actively forged and, 
arguably, it is in the domain of the state that they are formally constituted' (Watson, 1992: 186- 
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7). This chapter draws on my own analysis of policy documents, fieldwork interviews, and other 
primary data, as well as the most relevant secondary literature. 
5.2 The Gendered Institutions of the State 
Goetz (I 997b: 10) suggests that 'in deconstructing institutions by gender, it is easiest to begin by 
identifying their gendered effects, or their "gendering" outcomes, and move from there to 
understanding how they are actually constituted by gender difference'. Therefore'. to understand 
how the state reproduces itself as a gendered organisation, this chapter begins by looking at how 
the State is both descriptively and substantively gendered; 'descriptively' (the gendered effects 
or outcomes) in the sense of the disproportionate representation of men and women in State 
government employment and women's underrepresentation in state structures (both as political 
representatives in electoral democracy but also as part of the bureaucracy; and 'substantively' 
(constitutively gendered) in the sense of how the reiteration of gendered institutional norms and 
practices constantly reproduce the state in complex ways as an ensemble of gendered institutions. 
To demonstrate the substantive component, I focus on gendered bureaucratic norms and 
practices and also how the distribution and concentration of men and women in different sectors 
and departments of government suggest that their employment and positioning represents and 
reproduces gendered hierarchies within state institutions. In turn, this demonstrates where policy 
issues concerning women, gender and development, are located in, and how they are constituted 
by, the gendered hierarchy of bureaucratic government. 
5.2.1 The descriptive representation of women 
Tamil Nadu 
GoTN directly employs more than 350,000 women, representing almost a third of government 
employees out of a total of just over 1.1 million employees (figures for 2004-05 in GoTN, 
2006b). This figure includes State government employment, and employment in State public 
undertakings and local bodies. Women are more numerous at the local level, outnumbering men 
(around 42 per cent men and 58 per cent women). This is reversed at the State level (around 63 
per cent men and 37 per cent women). More noticeably, men far outnumber women in State 
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public undertakings (approximately 91 per cent men and 9 per cent women) (ibid). This may 
represent the more autonomous, private-sector orientation of many state public undertakings, 
which is often seen as a more hostile employment environment towards women. 82As Sheela Rani 
Chunkath, a senior woman IAS officer from Tamil Nadu cadre, was reported as saying, 
'government service, in general, is more accepting of women and more gender friendly than the 
private sector' (Santhanam, 2005). 
In terms of senior levels of the state bureaucracy, according to the Civil List, 38 out of 293 IAS 
officers posted in Tamil Nadu as of the start of 2007 were women officers, representing 
approximately 13 per cent of the senior levels of the bureaucracy in the State (GoI, 2007a). This 
has not changed much from the proportion in 1985, when women IAS officers made up 11.4 per 
cent of all IAS officers in Tamil Nadu, or 32 officers (Goyal, 1989). Currently, the most senior 
women IAS officer in Tamil Nadu, as determined by year of induction into the IAS, is C-K. 
Gariyali, who holds the post of Principal Secretary to the Governor (GoI, 2007a). In December 
2002, the State government appointed Lakshmi Pranesh as its first woman Chief Secretary, the 
highest bureaucrat in the State government (she later retired in 2005). Despite these two 
examples of senior appointments, women still only occupy a handful of senior posts in the State 
level bureaucracy. 
Women's participation in formal electoral politics at the State level, both as contesting 
candidates in State Assembly elections and as Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAS) in 
TN, has increased over the last two decades. However, in terms of numbers, men still dominate; 
women represented only 6 per cent of election candidates and only 9 per cent of candidates 
elected in the most recent elections in 2006 (see Table 2). 
Similarly, the number of women ministers in the cabinet, or Council of Ministers, has been 
consistently low. Under the current DMK government elected in 2006, three out of thirty one 
Ministers which make up the Council of Ministers are women (or just under 10 per cent), one of 
82 More detailed sex-disaggregated data on levels ofseniority or by identity groups such as SC, ST, OBC and so on, 
are not published. 
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Table 2 Women in Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections (1984-2006) 
1984 1989 1991 1996 2001 2006 
Women No. of candidates 46 78 102 158 112 156 
candidates % of total candidates 3 3 4 3 6 6 
No. of elected 8 9 32 11 25 22 
Women 
elected 
% of total elected 
(Total no. = 234) 3 4 13 5 11 9 
Vote share of women candidates (116) 4 3ý 91 5 10 101 0 
Source: Election Commission of India (www. eci. Rov. in) 
whom, Dr Poongothai, holds the portfolio of Minister for Social Welfare (GoTN, c. 2006). The 
'other two Ministers, Geetha Jeevan and Tamilarasi, hold the portfolios of Minister for Animal 
14us bandry and Minister for Adi Dravidar Welfare, Hill Tribes and Bonded Labour, respectively. 
tinder the previous AIADMK government (2001-2006), three of the twenty four Ministers were 
fwornen (or over 12 per cent), one of whom included the Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa (GoTN, 
nId. -a). Again, a woman Minister was appointed the portfolio of Social Welfare (P Vijaylakshmi 
Palanisamy). The'other Minister, B Valarmathi, was appointed as Minister for Rural Industries. 
These low numbers of women in the Cabinet are despite the fact that twenty women MLAs 
belonging to the AIADMK were elected to office. Similarly again, under the DMK government 
elected in 1996, only two out of twenty five ministers were women, one of whom, S. P. Sarkuna 
pandian, was appointed as Minister for Social Welfare, and the other, S. Jenefer Chandran, as 
Nfinister for Fisheries (GoTN, n. d. -b). 
ndhra Pradesh 
According to its official Employee Census 2006, the State Government of Andhra Pradesh 
eInploys nearly 1.3 million people, the majority of which work for the State Government 
(46.65%), more than a quarter for Local Bodies (26.070/o), and nearly a fifth for Public Sector 
Undertakings (19.47%). 83 
113 Ibc Government of Andhra Pradesh publishes two reports, 'Manpower Profile' and 'Andhra Pradesh At a Glance, 
which include scx-disaggregated 
data on public sector employees, drawn from the government's periodical 
employee census. However, these publications were not available for sale at the time of my visit in Andhra Pradesh 
and they are not published outside of 
India. Employee census data that is available is highly disaggregated by 
department and is not available in a readily comparable format to the data on Tamil Nadu. 
167 
In 1985, in AP the proportion of women IAS officers was only 5 per cent, or 15 women IAS 
officers (Goyal, 1989: 428). Since then, this figure has almost trebled. In Andhra Pradesh, there 
are currently forty one women IAS officers as of 2007, some of which were on deputation to 
other organisations (Gol, 2007a). Out of a total of 307 IAS officers in AP, women IAS officers 
therefore represent just over 13 per cent of IAS officers in the State, a proportion similar to that 
of Tamil Nadu. In 2002, Sathi Nair was appointed the first woman Chief Secretary of Andhra 
Pradesh, at the age of 59, and six months before her official superannuation date. 
In AP, during the last two decades, women's participation in electoral politics as candidates and 
elected representatives at the State level has increased both in absolute numbers and as a 
proportion of total candidates (see Table 3). The number of women contestants almost trebled 
from 1985 to 2004, as did the percentage of women as a proportion of total candidates contesting 
in Assembly elections. Similarly, both the number of women elected and the proportion of 
women among elected MLAs almost trebled between these dates. Despite this increase, however, 
women still only embody less than 10 per cent of contesting candidates and elected 
representatives. 
Table 3 Women in Andhra Pradesh Assembly Elections (1985-2004) 
1985 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Women No. of candidates 66 70 127 157 161 
canifidates % of total candidates 3 4 4 7 8 





O/o of total elected 
(Total no. = 234) 1 






Vote share W women candidates (010 1 
-3 
4 31 10 1 12 j 
Source: Election Commission of India (www. eci. govjn) 
Political parties in AP have shown varying inclination to increase their own numbers of women 
candidates in Assembly elections. In terms of absolute numbers, the Telugu Desam Part Y 
(hereafter TDP) and the Congress (I) Party (hereafter "Congress" or "INC'% as the two largest 
parties in the state, regularly nominate large numbers of women (compared to other parties). For 
the TDP, the number of women contesting on a party ticket in the five elections since 1985 has 
Not included in this figure is Christine Lazarus, the Anglo-Indian MLA nominated in 2004, and from 1990-1994., 
Another woman MLA, Delia Godfrey, was the Anglo-Indian nominated MLA under the previous TDP government 
168 
increased, albeit at times inconsistently, from 12 in 1985 to 50 in 2004 (but only 7 in 1994). The 
Congress party have not shown a similar trend; it has fluctuated in nominating between 16 and 
30 women over the period 1985-2004. A similar trend is the increasing proportion of women 
contestants to the total for each party, although this is far more marked for the TDP 6gain with 
the exception of 1994) than Congress; while the proportion of women contesting for the TDP has 
risen from 5 per cent in 1985 to 19 per cent in 2004, the same for the Congress Party has not 
shown such a sizeable increase, from 7 per cent in 1985 to 9 per cent in 2004. 
In AP, under the current Congress (I) State government, four out of forty one ministers in the 
Cabinet are women (AP Online, n. d. ). One of the four, Rajyalakshmi Nedurumalli, holds the post 
of Minister for Women Development and Child Welfare, Disabled Welfare and Juvenile 
Welfare. 85, Under the previous TDP government (1999-2004), there were only three women 
ministers (and all were new to electoral politics). The first, S. Saraswati, held the portfolio of 
Minister for Women Development and Child Welfare. The second, Alimineti Uma Madhava 
Reddy, another newcomer, was elected in 2000 in a bye-election, brought about by the death of 
her husband and former Home Minister A. Madhava Reddy (The Hindu, 2004d). She was 
subsequently appointed Minister of Social Welfare. Th 'e 
third woman minister, K. Pushpa Leela, 
also newly inducted into politics, was elected in 1999 and given the portfolio of Social Welfare 
Minister. 86 In contrast to these relative newcomers, in 1999, Pratibba Bharathi became the first 
women speaker of the AP Legislative Assembly. Her appointment was unopposed. Bharathi, a 
TDP MLA, has been elected consistently from the same constituency since 1983. She also served 
as Social Welfare Minister in 1983,1985, and 1994, under the former Chief Minister NT Rama 
Rao, and served under former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu as Minister for Higher 
Education in 1998 (Indian Express, 1999). Bharathi was not reelected, however, in 2004, 
Another experienced woman MLA, Gummadi Kuthuhalamma, was appointed Deputy Speaker of 
the State Legislature Assembly in 2007. Kuthuhalamma has served four terms as a Congress 
MLA, elected from the same constituency in 1985,1989,1999, and 2004. In 1994 she contested 
95 The remaining three are P Sabita Reddy, Minister for Mines and Geology, Handlooms and Textiles, and Spinning 
Mills; Aruna Kumari Galla, Minister for Medical Education and Health insurance; and Dr Geetha Reddy, Minister 
for Major Industries, Sugar, Commerce and Export Promotion. 
86More detailed information on past Council of Ministers is not accessible. GoAP does not include this information 
on its websites. Grover and Arora (1998) provide detailed information of government ministers only up until 1984, 
and thereafter only include the names of the Governor and the Chief Minister for each successive year until 1997. 
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as an Independent and lost the election to a TDP candidate, the overall winning party,, coming 
third after a female Congress candidate. 
5.2.2 Strategies to increase women's descriptive representation 
Tamil Nadu 
The State Government of Tamil Nadu is one of a number of State governments which have 
sought to increase the presence of women in government employment by adopting affirmative 
action policies. 87 Reservation for women in government employment first came in March 1989 
when the government amended the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules (the State 
an es or Government's personnel policy) to reserve 30 per cent of all direct recruitment vac ci 'f 
women, within the existing categories for reservation (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, 
Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes, as well as the 'General Turn') (GoTN, 2007d: 33). 
Women were also entitled to compete alongside men for the remaining 70 per cent unreserved 
posts. A reservation within the reservation also applied to 'destitute widows', ringfencing 10 per, 
cent of the posts reserved for women (ibid). Significantly, the State policy also stipulated that 
&women alone shall be appointed to post in any institution or establishment specially provided 
for them', and men would only be appointed to such posts when 'suitable and qualified' women 
were not available (GoTN, 2007d: 33). However, data on recruitment against reservations is not 
available and so it is difficult to analyse the extent to which reservations in recruitment policy 
have made a discernible impact on the number of women in government employment. A 
different, and somewhat uncharacteristic, strategy to increase numbers of women in government 
institutions was observed when, in 2001, under the AIADMK government the Finance Minister 
announced plans to start 'exclusive coaching programmes' for women it centres to be set up in 
Chennai and Madurai, to 'encourage women to join the All India Services and Central Service s' 
(Ponnaiyan, 2001: 17, para 69). 
17 It should be acknowledge that this is not a standard practice across all states within India. In 2005, in answer to a 
question posed by a member of the RaJya Sabha, a Government of India Minister of State for Human Resource 
Development listed ten State governments as having State-level reservation for women in government posts (Andhra 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Sikkim and Tamil 
Nadu) with the State government of Bihar providing reservations for women belonging to the backward caste 
category only (RaJya Sabha, 2005a). In contrast, there are no reservations for women in government posts at the 
central level. 
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In the same year, the State announced affirmative action to bring more women into State level 
government committees. A policy note for 2001-02 announced thirty per cent reservation for 
women in all statutory and non-statutory committees, '[c]onsidering the imperative need to 
involve women in decision-making as a step towards empowerment' (GoTN, 2001a: section 
3.7). This development was also mentioned in the Budget Speech of the State Minister for 
Finance in 2001 (Ponnaiyan, 2001: 24, para 97). Again, however, a lack of accessible data 
inhibits an understanding of whether this affirmative action policy is being implemented, 
regardless of whether it is actually achieving its aim of empowering women through 
participation in decision-making. A quick glance at the composition of the thirty eight steering 
committees constituted for formulating the Eleventh Five Year Plan suggests that this is uneven 
and that women's participation depends on the position they hold in governi-nent (GoTN, 2006a). 
As a result, the sectorally divided structure of women's participation in the committees is 
determined by, and reproduces, the tendency for women to be appointed to the so-called 'soft' 
sectors of government like Social Welfare and Health and Family Welfare (discussed further 
below). 
In terms of women political representatives, both the DMK and AIADMK have frequently 
expressed their support for the Women's Reservation Bill which would reserve a third of seats 
for women in both National and State Assemblies. At the party level, the AIADMK has fared 
slightly better in this regard and has committed to 33 per cent reservation in the party 
organization recognizing 'the demand for recognition of women and according them equal status 
as men in public life' (AIADMK website, n. d. ). As a result, the AIADMK has been 
acknowledged as one of the only parties in India to make a 'conscious move to bring many more 
women into decision-making levels and posts within the party' (Ghosh, 1999). The party has also 
put forward a higher proportion of women candidates at State level. elections (as seen above). 
Whether this translates to a more substantively meaningful participation of women is debated 
however, given the heavily centralized character of the AIADMK party (e. g. Palshikar, 2004). 
Andhra Pradesh 
Like GoTN, the GoAP has also utilized affinnative action policies for recruiting more women 
into government employment. GoAP first introduced 30 per cent reservation for women in 
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government jobs in 1984. The Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC) currently 
states that 33.3 per cent of State and sub-State vacancies are reserved for women, the highest 
percentage of all reserved categories in AP government employment (GoAP APPSC, n. d. ). 
8,81-, The 
APPSC also provides for relaxations on the maximum age requirement in recruitment rules 
which is otherwise set at either 26 or 28 years of age (depending on the post applied for). Age 
constraints vary for different categories of reservation: it is extended to 40 years of age for 
widows, divorced women and separated women not remarried applying for SC and ST reserved 
posts and 35 years for all other posts (ibid). 
In terms of women in party politics, there is relative consensus among the major political parties 
in Andhra Pradesh that the Women's Reservation Bill should be passed at the national level, to 
reserve 33.3 per cent of seats in national and state level assemblies. Furthermore, both the'TDP 
and the Congress party have committed to increasing the number of women in important party 
organization posts through reservation. The TDP's policy states that 
At least 50% of the executive committee positions, right from the primary level to the 
State level, shall be reserved for the Women, Dalits, Girijans, Backward classes and the 
minorities. Care shall be taken to see that women are given proper representation in all 
levels of Party positions, and in the people's representatives [sic] for various 
[government] bodies. 
(relugu Desarn Party, n. d. ) 
Similarly, a third of all party organisation posts in the Congress Party have been reserved for 
women since the All India Congress Committee voted in the resolution in December, 1998, - 
(Indian Express, 1998b). Before this, the party operated a 15 per cent ýquota for women 
(Wolkowitz, 1987). In terms of State Level Committees, the current composition of State 
Legislative Assembly Committees under the Congress government elected in 2004 suggests an 
inconsistent approach to the inclusion of women MLAs. In many committees, women are, the 
minority; in others there are no women; and one, the Women's Welfare Committee consists of 
only women. 
89 
88 25 per cent are reserved for Backward Classes, 15 per cent for Scheduled Castes, 6 per cent for Scheduled Tribes, 
3 per cent for the physically disabled, and I per cent for Ex Servicemen. 89 A lack of historical data on committees under previous governments prohibits a comparison between parties and 
over time. 
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5.2.3 Comparative conclusions on the descriptively gendered state 
As the analysis here shows, while there has been a visible increase in the numbers of women in 
government, over the last two decades., women are descriptively under-represented in 
government and do not form a significantly large presence (in terms of numbers) in electoral 
politics, state government employment, or public office, with the exception of a few notably 
experienced women bureaucrats, and current and former MLAs and Ministers. Strategies for 
increasing descriptive representation have employed, or have indicated intentions of employing, 
mostly positive discrimination strategies through reserving vacancies and positions for women 
but this has not been uniform. Reservation has been implemented at the panchayat level in both 
States, but the Women's Reservation Bill which would reserve seats for women in State 
Assemblies (and the National Parliament) is still to be passed, even though political parties in 
both States have expressed their support for the Bill. Political parties in both states have 
meanwhile made (at least rhetorical) commitments to reserving positions in their party 
organizations and on State-level committees, although admittedly with the nomination of women 
political representatives, in some cases this can effectively increase their obligation to the 
political leadership when in public office and therefore diminish the impetus for change. 
Reservation for women in government jobs occurs at the State Subordinate Services level in both 
AP and TN (though not all States), yet reservation is not an instrument of increasing women's 
descriptive representation in the higher levels of bureaucracy, such as the IAS. Yet where a 
reservation policy does exist, it is difficult to link the increased numbers of women in state 
institutional structures to affirmative action strategies given the lack of data linking recruitment 
to reservation policies. 
I 
Highlighting the descriptive underrepresentation of women in state institutions is not enough to 
argue convincingly that the state is a gendered institution. Instead it can be seen more as a 
manifestation of how the complex configuration of institutional norms and practices are 
gendered in ways which constitute women - as gendered subjects - as incompatible with such 
norms and practices and therefore exclude them from participating in the same institutions. In 
other words, the descriptive underrepresentation of women may be seen as an effect of the 
substantively gendered norms and practices in state institutions. As Brown argues, 'the elements 
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of the state identifiable as masculinist correspond not to some property contained within me n but 
to the conventions of power and privilege constitutive of gender within an order of male 
dominance' (Brown, 2006: 188). To some extent, the presence of more women in government 
may disrupt institutionally embedded assumptions of organizational culture -' that the'public 
sector is dominated by men - regardless of whether they themselves bring about a change 
in 
institutional norms and practices. As such, it is understood that increasing the participation of 
women in state institutions will necessarily involve a substantive change in these institutions 
themselves. 
5.2.4 The substantively gendered state 
Tamil Nadu 
Can we observe at the State level in TN and AP the same patterns that Thakur observed at the 
national level in terms of gendered distributional patterns of men and women in terms, of 
postings? A survey of IAS officers in AP and TN verifies Thakur's observation to some extent. 
9,0 
In TN, women have tended to hold posts in the Department of Social Welfare (responsible for 
Women and Child Welfare). Interestingly, however, at the level of Secretary the pattern'pf 
appointment is more representative of the service as a whole, where many of whom have been 
men officers, indicating that seniority is also a factor. In planning and finance, Thakur's 
observations can also be confirmed - these departments have indeed been dominated by men 
with the exception of a few women officers. The post of Principal Secretary, Finance Department 
for example has been held by only four male bureaucrats since 1989. One senior women IAS 
officer from TN cadre is quoted as saying: 'We are waiting now for a woman to be posted 
"as 
Finance Secretary ... When that happens, the last bastion of the male officer would have 
fallen'. '. ". 
(Santhanam, 2005). 
90 Data for this comparison has been sourced ftom various reports of IAS transfers reported periodically in the press 
and confirmed by records on the Ministry of Personnel website detailing the career history of individual IAS officers 
(GoI, n. d. -b). Data is limited to those IAS officers still active in government service at the time of access (but not 
those who have left since), as well as officers on leave or on deputation to foreign assignments. These limitations on 
data prevent a more thorough historical analysis for which the availability of continuous data is more limited and 
less accessible. 
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A number of state service conduct rules, some of which apply only to the lower levels of 
govenunent employment, suggest that the state government has attempted to institutionalize 
some of its more progressive anti-discrimination legislation in state government employment 
codes of conduct. For example, rule 3A of the Government of Tamil Nadu's Government 
Servants Conduct Rules prohibits any government servant from giving, receiving, demanding, or 
abetting the giving and receiving of dowry as defined by the Government of India's Dowry 
Prohibition Act 1961 (GoTN, 2005c: 4). Rule 19 also prohibits government servants from 
entering into bigamous marriages (GoTN, 2005c: 21). Sexual harassment of women, or more 
specifically 'working women' or 'any woman at the work place' (harassment of men is not 
referred to) is also prohibited under Rule 20A (GoTN, 2005c: 22). Government servants in a 
position of authority are also expected to take steps to prevent sexual harassment (ibid). 
However, several other government employment rules and norms suggest instead that 
g, overnment service is deeply imbued with gendered norms which discipline women employees 
by restricting their autonomy and by interpellating them as marginal subjects in the gendered 
imaginary of the typical government employee. One example is how the small family norm and 
family planning is tied to entitlements of female government employees to matemity leave. 
Firstly, implicit in GoTN rules on entitlements to maternity leave is that only married women are 
eligible. Secondly, the 90 day maternity leave on full pay entitlement available to permanent 
(and some non-permanent) female government employees is restricted to women with less than 
-two surviving children' (GoTN, 2007c: 136). This was reduced in 1993, where previously the 
rules for entitlement stated that 'maternity leave will not be admissible to married women 
Government servants with more than three children' (GoTN, 2007c: 136). Furthermore, the state 
makes explicit reference to special leave entitlements for women and men undergoing operations 
for sterilization and for women for operations to insert contraceptive devices (GoTN, 2007c: 
266). Thus, through government employment rules and entitlements, the State government is 
encouraging women and men employees to adopt a small family norm and the use of family 
planning technologies. 
Another example is how numerous official manuals on government personnel service rules 
demonstrate that the dominant gendered interpellation of the government servant is as a male 
17S 
subject, indicated by almost ubiquitous references to 'he, and 'his' and hardly ever accompanied 
by a 'she' and 'her'. This is particularly evident in one rule pertaining to the posting of 
government personnel under or near relatives or in relation to their links with private 
employment in the interest of preventing corruption: 
'Every member of a State Service... other shall inform his immediate official superior 
of any reason that there may be why it is undesirable in the public interest that he should 
be employed in a particular district or division such as the near relationship of himsel( 
or his wife to any person or persons residing in that district or division. ' 
(GoTN, 2005c: 20, my emphasis) 
This strongly suggests that the state's imaginary of the government employee subject is male. 
Andhra Pradesh 
Data available on gendered patterns of postings of male and female bureaucrats confirms some 
of Thakur's observations at the national level. Women have rarely occupied the most senior 
posts in the state. As noted earlier, Sathi Nair was the first woman officer to be appointed Chief 
Secretary in the State. Out of the twelve IAS officers posted as chief secretary to the government 
since 1991, the top bureacratic post at the state level, only one has been a woman. The sectoral 
location of bureaucrat postings also shows some gendered trends. Judging by data available since 
2000, equal numbers of men and women have served in the Department of Women's 
Development and Child Welfare, GoAP, including at the senior secretary level (see Table -4' 
below). While this appears prima facie to suggest that there is no outright association of women 
with this post, if one looks at the relative proportion of women officers to men officers in the. - 
IAS in AP this would suggest that women are more likely to be posted in this department than. 
men. 
Data on officers appointed to the top post of Principal Secretary in the Finance Department 
throughout the 1990s shows that this post has been dominated by male officers, although some 
female IAS officers, such as Veena Ish and Vasudhra Mishra, have served in lower Secretary 
posts in the department. 
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Table 4 Women and Men Officers Posted to Department of Women Development and Child Welfare since the 
year 2000 
Name Sex (M/F) Date appointed to post 
Vasuda Mishra F May 2006 
Prabhakar D Thomas M August 2004 -May 2006 
Dr Prasanta Mahapatra M October 2003-October 20041 
Minnie Matthews F June. 2002-October 2003 
Dr. S. Chellappa M October 2001 - June 2002 
S. P. Singh M June 2001 -October 2001 
Comal R Gayathri (aka Gayathri Ramachandran) F November 1999-March 2001 
Source: (GoI, 2007a,, n. d. -b) 
Notes: 'Overlap with successor due to awaiting posting 
State civil service norms in AP mirror much of those already discussed for TN: a contradictory 
rnix of gender-responsive and coercive rules for government employment on issues such as 
dowry, sexual harassment, maternity leave policies, and small family norms. An even more 
illustrative example of the gendered embodiment of the civil servant as male is articulated in 
relation to regulations on bigamous marriage. The same service rule demonstrates that, in AP 
rnore so than TN, recognition of minority communities and personal laws appears to be more 
embedded. 
No Government employee who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without 
first obtaining the permission of the Government, notwithstanding that such subsequent 
marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him ... No female Government Servant, whether unmarried or widow or divorced, as the case may 
be, shall marry any person who has a wife living without first obtaining the permission 
of the Government, though the parties are governed by the personal law which 
otherwise permits contracting more than one marriage while the prior marriage is 
subsisting. 
(GoAP, n. d.: 36-7, my emphasis) 
As this demonstrates, government employees are inherently imagined as male, and female 
government employees are therefore marked as Other. 
What the foregoing analysis of the substantive gendered norms of state-level administration 
suggests is two things. Firstly, at risk of simplification, despite variations in the specific 
institutional context, bureaucratic norms are fairly similar in terms of the aggregate institutional 
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location - in other words, between States. However, the analysis also suggests that, secondly, 
within states this is not so much the case. State institutional norms vary according to specific 
institutional locations within states such as in Finance or Planning compared to Health or, Social 
Welfare. Thus, while bureaucratic norms seem to remain stable despite institution4l differences 
between states, within states bureaucratic are internally varied. 
Despite this observation, there still remains a perception that the civil services within the 
southern states are generally more gender egalitarian. Thakur's respondents observed that the 
prevalence of gender stereotyping in the bureaucracy reflected the regional variation of gender 
relations in India more generally. She notes, with specific reference to TN and AP, 
Of the women who replied that they did not feel there was gender stereotyping in the 
nature of posts held, several specifically added that this view only applied to their state 
governments - Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh - and that stereotyping 
was possibly more likely in the case of the Central Government ... From this data, it 
emerges that the nature of gender stereotyping of posts tends to correspond with the 
overall situation of gender disparities within a particular state. This correspondence 
underscores the fact that the IAS and the way it functions is part of a wider societal 
context, and thus cannot be viewed in isolation. 
Crbakur, c. 1997: 18-19). 
The regional difference in gender relations was an observation made frequently in several 
interviews for this thesis research, suggesting that the southern states were considered both more 
gender egalitarian (and thus potentially more conducive to gender-equitable development Policy) 
and also better administered states. On the first point, CK Gariyali, the seniormost women IAS 
officer in TN has stated elsewhere, that 'Tamil Nadu is a great State to serve in, as cultural, ly, 
women are held in high regard here compared to other States' (quoted in Santhanam, 2005). 
Does this mean then that IAS training procedures which attempt to endeavour to inculcate into 
officers an all-India espirit de corps, in order to transcend regional differences in officers'l 
backgrounds, and to cultivate a sense of belonging to a larger entity, are not effective? Potter and 
others have shown that despite attempts to cultivate an all-India sense of identity, regional 
differences in bureaucratic norms and practices between States were evident (Potter, 1986: 211). 
These arguments raise a series of important inter-related questions and implications for adopting , 
gender mainstreaming strategies as part of bureaucratic reforms in AP and TN, which hinge on 
this assumption that the perception of the southern states as more gender egalitarian may have an 
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--efflect on the possibilities 
for presenting gender-equitable development policy as consistent with 
bureaucratic norms and practices in these two states. To what extent does this discourse of 
southern state comparative egaliatarianism reproduce itself and actually constitute the gendered 
norms embedded in bureaucratic formation of development policy? Conversely, does this 
discourse close off investigative efforts to scrutinise less egalitarian norms and practices in these 
states? And to what extent does it lead to an underestimation of the need for change in the 
Southern States towards more gerider-equitable bureaucratic norms and practices? These 
questions are important but beyond the scope of this thesis as it would require further 
comparative analyses of states other than those under study here. Continuing in the following 
section, I consider the extent of institutional development of state-level machineries for women 
in each state in order to explore the institutional openings for feminist transformative strategies. 
5.3 Feminist bureaucratic spaces? The State-level machinery for women 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a feminist bureaucratic-structural intervention is defined as an 
intervention where 'women [and men] create new structures within government or university 
administrations specifically designed to benefit women (such as women's policy units, women's 
studies programmes, or ministries for women's affairs)'... ' (Eisenstein, 1989,1991, cited in Witz 
and Savage, 1992: 39). In Chapter 3,1 briefly explored the development of the national 
rnachinery for women in India, including the Ministry of Women and Child Development and 
the National Commission for Women, and argued that the bureaucratic-structural strategy has 
been a prominent strategy in the Indian national context, particularly more so than a 
bureaucratic-individual or 'femocrat' strategy, but that it has not been without problems. 
Nevertheless, as Weedon argues, 'in order to have a social effect, a discourse must at least be in 
circulation'. Feminist bureaucratic-structural strategies are, at least, a way of 'getting your foot in 
the door' and creating some space, albeit limited, for feminist negotiation with the state and are a 
complem entary strategy to a more transformative and destabilising gender mainstreaming 
strategy. 
It is a central argument of this thesis that, given the federalist model of government in India, the 
institutional context for gendered development policy at the subnational level is important, and 
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increasingly so since the early 1990s. Therefore, it is not sufficient to consider only those 
institutional developments and feminist strategies which are aimed at the national level, but to 
look also at the level of state governments. Here I focus on the development of the state level 
machinery for women, including government departments responsible for 'women's welfare', 
State Commissions for Women, and parastatal agencies administering government programmes 
for women, gender, and development. The analysis that follows serves to explore comparatively 
the different trajectories of State level initiatives both within and between Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu, and the variations in institutional context. In the conclusion I consider the resulting 
implications these institutional developments have for strategies to mainstream gender, in 
development policy. 
TamilNadu 
No separate government ministry or department for women or gender equality exists at the stýte 
level in GoTN. Policy and programmes specifically targeting women and charged with women's 
welfare and development have been located mostly within two State government departments - 
the Department of Social Welfare and the Department of Rural Development. Until the DMK 
government came to power in the 1967, the Women's Welfare Unit was located in the Home 
Department of the State government. Subsequently, it was removed and upgraded to the status of 
a full department, and named the Social Welfare Department, and included welfare of the 
disabled and welfare of children among its list of broadened activities (Rao, 2003: 359). 
ihe 
Social Welfare Department has since been one of the main departments involved in policy issues 
and programmes for women (with some inter-departmental co-ordination for schemes from other 
departments). Not surprisingly given their departmental location, many of these schemes are 
welfare oriented and include assistance to 'women in difficult circumstances', working women's 
hostels, incentives and assistance schemes for inter-caste marriage, widow remarriage, and 
marriage of the daughters of poor widows, and most famously the Nutritious Meal Programme, a 
nutritional intervention which provides a daily meal in schools for children (discussed ftalher in 
Chapter Six) 
The Social Welfare Department has also been the administrative parent department of the serni- 
autonomous government undertaking, the Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of 
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Women (TNCDW, discussed below), since the Corporation's inception in 1983. The Secretary 
of the Department of Social Welfare, an IAS officer, has also acted as Chairman of the 
Corporation at times. This institutional arrangement persisted until as recently as July 2006 when 
administrative control of the Corporation was. transferred to the Department of Rural 
Development and Panchayati Rai. 
Until the late 1990s, the Department for Rural Development administered a UNICEF-funded 
(until 1996) Central Government scheme called the Integrated Rural Development Programme 
'and its subcomponent, the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA). 
'This sub-component specifically targeted women and mobilised them to form self-help groups of 
around twenty women for the purposes of thrift and credit, as well as other social and 
educational activities (in some ways similar to the scheme that GoTN would set up a few years 
later). Government funding was split in a 75: 25 ratio between the Central government and State 
governments. DWCRA had varying results, most notably its lack of coverage of poor women. In 
,l 999, DWCRA, 
its parent scheme, the IRDP, and several other rural development and 
ernployment-generatirig schemes were merged under a new Central government scheme with the 
ain, of converging the services of the erstwhile schemes into one holistic programme. The new 
scheme, Swarnajayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), continued to emphasise the 
in1portance of self-employment through the SHG model, and thought it important to target poor 
women as key beneficiaries. 
During the 1990s, both state governments of TN and AP established State Commissions for 
Women. The impetus for this came from the national level, with the introduction of the National 
Commission for Women's Act in 1990 and the provision it made for individual States to form 
their own State-level Commissions for Women. 
The State Commission for Women in TN was constituted in 1993. It is currently located in the 
building which houses the TNCDW, in Guindy, Chennai. The mandate of the Tamil Nadu State 
Commission for Women (TNSCW) is to 'protect the rights and to safeguard the welfare of 
women' (GoTN, 2005a: 26). This largely entails-taking up legal cases on behalf of women and 
raising awareness about women's rights through legal literacy programmes. The Cqmmission has 
also in the past conducted gender sensitization training for members of the police force, the 
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judiciary, and Government Revenue officers. The Commission includes a Chairperson and nine 
part time members. In 2007, these nine members were specified as including the following: the 
Secretary to Government of the Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, 
two women MLAs, one 1AS officer and one Police officer, two reputed public women, one 
lawyer, and the Director of Social Welfare (to act as member-secretary) (GoTN, 2007b: 10). 
The position of chairperson of the Commission was first held by Justice Padmini Jesudurai, 
notable for being the first woman judge of the Madras High Court. In March 2002, Vasanthi 
Devi, a prominent social activist and a former University Vice Chancellor, took over the position 
of chairperson. Arguably, Vasanthi Devi had perhaps the most visible impact of the three women 
to hold the post of chairperson of the State Commission for Women and she continues to speak 
out on women's rights since leaving the Commission. After Vasanthi Devi's tenure came to an 
end in March 2005, the post became vacant and the commission lapsed. Shortly after the DMK 
was elected to government in 2006, the National Commission for Women representative member 
for the Southern States, Nirmala Venkatesh, called on the new Chief Minister Karunanidhi to 
reconstitute the commission and appoint a chairperson. Subsequently, the current chairperson', of 
the Commission, K. M Ramathal, was appointed in 2007. 
As the Commission was established by a government order, with only provisions for the State to 
constitute a Commission rather than a statutory obligation, it does not have statutory powers like 
the National Commission for Women and most other State Commissions (with the exception of 
the Haryana State Commission for Women). Furthermore, its continued operation relies on the 
good will of the government to reconstitute the Commission, appoint its Chairperson, and 
provide adequate funds and powers. At an AIDWA conference in 2005, forrner Chairperson 
Vasanthi Devi reiterated her previous call in 2003 that the Commission lacked power and status. 
She called for the Commission to be granted more funds, infrastructure, and powers (The Hindu, 
2005a), supporting Poomima Advani's (Chairperson of the National Commission for Women) 
appeal to the GoTN Chief Minister (J. Jayalalithaa) two years earlier (The Hindu, 2003d). In a 
separate statement, the Chairperson of the National Commission for Women, Poornima Advani, 
praised the TN Commission for its achievements despite the constraints it faced (The Hindu, 
2005c). 
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The lack of status of the Commission can also be seen in the relationship of the Commission 
with the Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission, compared to the national level. The State's 
Human Rights Commission based in Chennai was constituted in 1997, maldng Tamil Nadu the 
fifth State to constitute such a commission. At the federal level, the Chairperson of the National 
Commission for Women sits on the National Commission for Human Rights as one of its 
rnembers. This is not the case with the State Human Rights Commission in TN. While the State 
Commission for Women is more narrowly focused on legal redressal of atrocities against women 
t'han women's wider economic and social development, the lack of support for the commission 
from the State Government is perhaps indicative of the latter's limited commitment to gender 
equality. 
The 1990s in Tamil Nadu saw the progressive expansion of a government program aimed at 
women's development, first through the International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD)-funded 
Women's Development Project from 1989 to 1998, and subsequently, the continuation of the 
former program in Mahalir Thittam (Women's Scheme), funded by GoTN. Both projects have 
been implemented by a semi-autonomous government undertaking, the Tamil Nadu Corporation 
for Women's Development, which was until recently under the administrative control of the 
Department of Social Welfare. 
The TNCDW was established in December 1983 and registered under the Companies Act 
(1956). IFAD's involvement in the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project officially ended 
on 31" December 1998, after a one year extension. A year before the MAD funded project 
ended, the government launched its own project called Mahalir Thittam as an extension and 
large scale replication of the TNWDP. The new scheme envisioned enrolling 10 IakhS (I million) 
women onto the scheme and, like the previous scheme, forming groups of no more than twenty 
women into self-help groups. By 2004-05, the target was increased to cover another 15 lakhs (1.5 
million) women over the following three years (GoTN, 2004: section 4.2). 
91 
91 Most of the analysis which follows is based on Mahali'r Ilittarn rather than the IFAD-funded TNWDP. This is 
because firstly, much of the available program documentation relates to Mahalir Thittam; secondly, because Mahalir 
Jbittam, as a much larger scale project, has generated important dynamics of its own; thirdly, it has claimed to have 
incorporated lessons learrit from various evaluations of the MAD project (which I also draw upon in my analysis); 
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From its initial beginnings in one district (Dharmapuri), the programme grew to cover all thirty 
districts of the State. Thus, from its initial origins from one pilot district, over the course of 
th. irteen years, the program witnessed a significant upscaling, extending to cover all districts of 
92 the State, including both rural and urban areas. 
The Corporation and Mahalir Thittarn involve a diverse range of different actors, including both 
governmental and non-governmental, at various levels of a vertical and spatial hierarchy. Indeed, 
for the TNCDW, a 'unique' feature of the project was the TNCDW's 'onerous' task of c, 0- 
ordinating a number of different agencies to work towards the goals of the project (TNCD)ý', 
2000a: 9). The key institutional actors included Banks (solely the Indian Bank under the IFAD- 
funded TNWDP), NGOs, the Government, and the women's groups. 
The Corporation operates at the state, district and block (local) level. The project management 
unit (PMU) is based at TNCDW headquarters in Chennai; project implementation units (Plbs) 
are based in the project districts; and a number of committees are based at the State, district, and 
93 local levels (TNCDW, 2000b). The PMU is headed by a Chairperson who on occasion might 
also hold the post of Managing Director, assisted by an Executive Director. The first appointed 
Chair under the IFAD-funded TNWDP, Valarnarthi Jebaraj (Chairperson TNCDW, 1991-1996), 
fourthly, an analysis of Mahalir Thittarn, as the later programme of the two, also enables a more current 
understanding of the program; and lastly, of course space limits the extent to which I can analyse both programs. 92 Under the IFAD-funded phase, the project initially began in 1990 in Dharmapuri district, with plans to extend it to 
another two districts (Salem and the erstwhile district of South Arcot, which was later split into Cuddalore and Villupuram districts in 1993). These three districts were selected by the project as the 'most backward districts in the 
State with respect to the status of women' (IFAD, 1989.7-8). The program was later extended to another two districts (Madurai and Ramanathapuram) to cover five districts in total, by the end of the IFAD phase. With the 
launch of Mahalir Thittam in 1997-98, in the first phase of expansion the project included the same TNWDP 
distriCtS92 , as well as eight further districts . 
92 In the second phase of expansion in 1998-99, the project was extended 
to cover a further seven distriCtS92 and then another seven districts in phase three, 1999-2000.92 its focus was rural-, based until in 2000-01, the scheme was extended to all Town Panchayats and Municipalities in the 28 districts 
covered by the project (INCDW, 2000a: 5). In 2002-03, it was announced that the scheme would be expanded to include Chennai, eventually covering all thirty districts of Tamil Nadu. 92 9' At the district level, the PIU is headed by a Project Officer with a number of Assistant Project Officers. Given the 
large scale replication of Mahalir Thittam, the project required significant co-ordination between the Project 
Management Unit in Chennai and the District Project Units. At the District level, the District Project Co-ordination 
Committee is headed by the District Collector, with the District Project Officer for TNCDW as the Member- 
Secretary, and the remaining members are composed of district government line department heads, bank, NGO, and 
NABARD representatives, two elected representative women SHG members, 'two women with proven commitment 
to women's issues', and secretaries of the local Block Level Co-ordination Committees. The latter is made up of 
NGO representatives, bankers, the Assistant Project Officer from the District PIU, and one representative from each 
SHG in the Block (TNCDW, 2000b: 23-25) 
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who was a political appointee, former MLA, and, according to the media, a loyal supporter of the 
Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa (The Hindu, 2001) was an exception. All other Chairpersons and 
, 
Managing Directors, as well as Executive Directors, have been IAS officers from the State level 
bureaucracy. The Chairperson is usually a senior bureaucrat of at least Joint Secretary rank, 
requiring around sixteen years of service, although higher and lower ranked officers have also 
occupied this post. IAS officers appointed to the post of Chairperson of the Corporation have 
almost invariably been women, but other senior posts have often been staffed by male officers. 
Yet, there does not seem to be a preferred pattern of career service for appointing the 
Chairperson - previous appointees had prior experience in a rahge of sectors from agriculture, 
and health and family welfare, to energy, planning, and finance. 
The Corporation also worked closely with the State Department of Rural Development, and 
helped to administer a Central government scheme: IRDP, its subcomponent targeting women 
called DWCRA, and its subsequent forms as discussed above. The Department of Rural 
Development represents an important participating line department as it has access to extensive 
funding from the central government as well as close links with the District Rural Development 
Administration (DRDA) at the sub-State level. Recently, in July 2006, the Government of Tamil 
Nadu, under the new DMK government, decided to move the TNCDW from under the 
administrative control of the Department of Social Welfare to the Department of Rural 
Development. According to the Rural Development Department, the rationale for this move was 
Ito bring about greater synergy and better coordination in implementing various schemes for Self 
Help Groups' (GoTN, 2007a: 30). The move also coincided with a new role for the TNCDW vis- 
, i-vis the recently approved 
World Bank project, the Tamil Nadu Empowerment and Poverty 
Reduction Project (rNEPRP; also known as Vazhndhu Kaatuvom). The TNCDW's role is no 
less diminished in the new project structure but rather changed in orientation. 94 Key personnel 
involved with MaThi will continue to be involved in the new project 
94 -Ibe post of Project Director of TNEPRP is held by the Executive Director of TNCDW. The Project Director 
(TNEpRP)/Executive Director (TNCDW) as well as the Managing Director of TNCDW sit on two State-level 
committees for the project - the Governing body and the Executive Committee. Me Governing Body, the higher 
level committee of the two, is chaired by the Finance Secretary with the Social Welfare Secretary as Vice Chair. It 
consists of fifteen members including secretaries of various State level departments and other officials, the convenor 
of the State Level Bankers Committee (SLBC), and representatives from NGO and community organizations, 
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The lauded autonomous status of the Corporation is also somewhat debatable given that its most 
senior staff members are IAS officers, and at least two Chairpersons have in the past also held 
the position of Secretary for Social Welfare. At the State Level, the two committees responsible 
for directing policy are also headed by senior government bureaucrats; the Central Project Co- 
ordination Committee (CPCC) headed by the Chief Secretary of the Government of Tamil Nadu, 
as well as a TNCDW review committee headed by the Development Commissioner (who is also 
the Finance secretary). But day-to-day autonomy exists, the PMU undertakes monthly reviews of 
the project and manages operations, and the Board of Directors take decisions over operational, 
and sometimes policy, issues. The IFAD Completion Evaluation Report looked positively on t he 
TNCDW's position in government and its semi-autonomous status as a government undertaking 
as a factor contributing to the success of the project: 
The positioning of the DEW in the Government structure contributed to the success of 
project implementation in that it was able to benefit from the support of government 
authorities and line departments while minimizing undue political or bureaucratic 
interference due to its close association with MAD and knowledge of the latter's 
implementing procedures and loan agreement clauses. 
(EFAD, 2000) 
But in acknowledging this autonomy, it neglected to consider that it was also more sheltered 
from public scrutiny at the State level. 
The TNCDW's cordial relationship with bank agencies involved in the project was celebrated by 
the Corporation. Banks were considered the 'most important partners', an 'excellent working 
relationship' had been built with the State Level Bankers Committee, and NABARD was 
deemed 'an important ally' (TNCDW, 2000a: 5). But. the Corporation also recognized the need 
for delivering gender sensitization training to banking partners. The Corporation, with som e 
assistance from NABARD, delivered training and orientation programs to bank employees 
involved with MaThi in order to sensitise them to the core principles of the project and also in 
the delivery of microcredit loans to SHG members. The TNCDW reported that training and 
orientation had generated interest among bankers in linking SHGs with credit and has enabled 
SHGs to open accounts with ease (TNCDW, 2000a: 8). It had also positively influenced bankers' 
academia, and industry. The Executive Committee is chaired by the Social Welfare Secretary, and has a similar 
constitution of members but is slightly smaller with ten members. The Project Director also heads the Management 
Team. 
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perceptions about the potential of women SHGs as 'a promising business segment' with high 
repayment rates (ibid). Such positive evaluations, however, glossed over a more complex picture. 
The need for banker orientation was clearly necessary - according to the MAD completion 
evaluation in 2000, 'a significant proportion of the women interviewed stated that bankers' 
attitudes had not changed towards poor women' (IFAD, 2000). Furthermore, external dynamics 
beyond the control of the Corporation also frustrated the institutionalization of sensitization and 
orientation training. The TNCDW reported that movement of Bank staff from one district to 
another required repeated rounds of orientation training (TNCDW, 2000a: 8). 
As for the involvement of NGOs in the project, a diverse range from welfare and charity-oriented 
voluntary organizations such as the Women's Indian Association to more professionally oriented 
NGOS such as MYRADA participated. NGOs represented a key partner in the delivery of 
training and support to SHGs. But their transformative potential was somewhat diminished by 
the competitive dynamic among NGOs - high levels of competition with each other to get 
government funding for setting up groups, which at times involved 'poaching' some SHG 
rnernbers from existing groups to form new ones (personal communication, NGO in Salem 
district, 6th June 2007). 
part of the mission of Mahalir Thittarn was 'to advocate changes in government policies and 
programmes in favor of disadvantaged women' (TNCDW, 2000b: 17). Like many microcredit 
programmes for women, the Corporation's program design aimed to inculcate a 'highly 
disciplinary institutional culture' in program participants (Rankin, 2004: 189; discussed further 
in Chapter 7) but it said less about the Corporation's own institutional culture. It was not clear 
whether the Corporation had a self-reflexive organizational gender policy of its own, or 
considered one necessary. Yet, on a positive note, the Completion Evaluation Report suggested 
that the project had made a complementary and 'unmistakable' impact on the organization: 
major increases in funds and influence have resulted from project activities and new, 
purpose-built premises have been built. This effect can be observed in various aspects of 
DEW's activities, with better-trained and more motivated staff, more confident 
management and greater bargaining power vis-A-vis the state authorities. DEW has 
matured into a solid institution, capable of implementing poverty eradication 
programmes efficiently and of providing invaluable advice to GOTN and others on 




In Andhra Pradesh, policy issues and administration relating to women, gender and development 
are concentrated in just a few government departments, the two most prominent being the 
Department of Women Development and Child Welfare, and the Department of Rural 
Development. 
The Department of Women Development and Child Welfare (DWD&CW) was established in its 
original form in 1952 as the Women's Welfare Department in what was then Madras State. It 
became the Department of Women and Child Welfare in 1973, and was later renamed as the 
Department of Women Development and Child Welfare in 1989 (GoAP DWD&CW website). 
DWD&CW classifies its activities into two categories: i) implementation of the part-World 
Bank-funded Central Government's Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and ii) 
welfare-oriented schemes for women, children, and the elderly, such as working women 9s 
hostels, Swadhar (a Central government sponsored scheme for 'women in difficult 
circumstances), schemes to compensate for discrimination against girl children, and state homes 
for the elderly (GoAP DWD&CW, n. d. ). DWD&CW has also been involved in measures to 
investigate cases of domestic violence and dowry practices and compensate women victims, as 
well as efforts to combat trafficking of women in Andhra Pradesh. The dominant scheme of the 
Department is the ICDS programme, which is implemented through a network of more than, 
66,000 local anganwadi centres, largely dominated by women anganwadi workers, reaching 
nearly 2 million women, nearly 7 million children, and nearly 4 million adolescent girls (figures 
for 2004-05; GoAP DWD&CW, n. d. ). 
In contrast, the Department of Rural Development (DRD) has been more closely involved with 
anti-poverty and development programmes for women. DRD is the implementing agency of the 
Central Government scheme, the IRDP, discussed above, since it was introduced in a number of 
states including Andhra Pradesh in 1982. During the 1990s and beyond, the programmatic set-up 
has undergone several changes specific to Andhra Pradesh. In 1999, when the Central 
Government merged the components of the IRDP in to the new scheme, SGSY, women's self- 
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help groups remained a separate component (and continued to be popularly known as DWCRA). 
These groups existed alongside self-help groups formed under a World Bank-funded project 
specific to Andhra Pradesh called Velugu (meaning 'light' in Telugu). Then, when the new 
Congress government came to power in the State Assembly elections in 2004, the programmatic 
organisation again changed. In 2005, Mugu was merged with SGSY and renamed Indira 
Kranthi Pratham. 
With these programmatic changes came symbolically significant but practically minor changes 
in their administrative set-up. Previously, in 2001, the Department for Rural Development had 
established the Commissionerate for Women's Empowerment and Self-Employment. Before 
that, one of two wings in the Department for Rural Development was referred to as DWCRA 
after the name of the scheme. Mooij (2002: 37) argues that the creation of this new 
corninissionerate reflected the importance political leaders assigned to this programme, as part 
of the government's focus on women. The emphasis on women was rescinded however when, in 
january 2005, as part of a larger departmental reorganisation parallel to the programmatic 
convergence mentioned above, the Commissionerate for Women's Empoweripent and Self- 
Fmployment was merged with the Commissionerate for Rural Development, creating instead an 
SHG (self-help group) wing in the Department for Panchayati Raj and Rural Development. 
In Andhra Pradesh, the State Commission for Women was first constituted in 1999 - later than its 
counterpart in Tamil Nadu - after the Andhra Pradesh Women's Commission Act was passed in 
N4arch 1998 with Presidential approval. The Act provided for a Commission consisting of a 
Chairperson and six other members from AP, including one each from the Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, and Minorities Communities (GoAP, 1998: article 5: 1). 
N4embers were to hold office for five years. The Act stated that the Chairperson 'shall be an 
erninent women [sic] committed to the cause of [the] welfare of women with sufficient 
knowledge and experience in dealing with women's problems' (ibid: article 5: 2). It also stated 
that members of the Commission should be 
women of ability, integrity and standing who have served the cause of women or have 
had sufficient knowledge and experience in law or legislation, administration of matters 
concerning the advancement of women for protection or leadership of any trade union 
or voluntary organization for women for protection, upliftment and promotion of 
common interests of women 
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Both Chairpersons of the Commission to date have been political appointees, though this applies 
less to the first Chairperson, Susheela Devi, appointed in 1999, than to the Chairperson taking 
over in 2004, Mary Ravindranath. Susheela Devi's background was in legal advocacy and she 
had worked as the State's Public Prosecutor prior to her appointment (interview, May 2006). It is 
likely that her background influenced the emphasis she placed on raising women's awareness of 
their legal rights in her role as Chairperson of the Commission. Mary Ravindranath-, was 
appointed to the Commission in 2005, after unsuccessfully contesting in the State Assembly 
Elections in 2004 on a Congress Party ticket in Secundarabad constituency. She had previously 
been elected to the same constituency in 1989, but was not subsequently re-elected in 1994 and 
lost again in 1999, both being elections which saw the rival party, the TDP, elected to office. In 
2006, Ravindranth had called on the Chief Minister to demonstrate support for her authority in 
relation to what she perceived as disrespect towards her leadership among Commission members 
(The Hindu, 2007a). In contrast, members accused the chairperson of poor leadership and bad 
administration of the Commission. In July 2007, Ravindranath was asked by the Chief Minister 
to resign as Chairperson after a very public dispute with another member of the Commission 
(who was also asked to resign) (The Hindu, 2007b). Media reports quoted the Chief Minister of 
accusing Ravindranath of damaging the reputation of the Commission as a result of the media 
coverage of the dispute . 
Importantly, unlike the Tamil Nadu Commission for Women, the Andhra Pradesh Commission 
for Women was granted statutory powers, including its own budget allocated by government and 
the same powers as a Civil Court to try legal cases. The Commission's wide mandate as outlined 
in the Act includes examining legal provisions and state recruitment practices affecting women, 
inspecting state institutions such as jails, police stations, and state-owned women's hostels; 
submitting an annual report to government on the Commission's activities and their 
recommendations; and conducting or commissioning research and maintaining data on the 
condition of women in the State (GoAP, 1998: article 15: 1). Notably, the commission's 
mandate also includes participating in, and advising on, the 'planning process of socio-economic 
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development of women' (GoAP, 1998: article 15: 1: xi) and to 'undertake promotional and 
, educational research so as 
to suggest ways of ensuring due representation of women in all 
splýeres and identify factors responsible for impeding their advancement' (GoAP, 1998: article 
-, 15: 1: xiv). Despite this wide mandate, the Commission focused on legal and educational 
aspects, including raising awareness about HIV/AIDS, improving women's legal literacy and 
,, awareness, setting up a civil court dedicated to women's issues (the Mahila Lok Adalat), 
inspecting a State prison, and trying to bring together a women's university consortium. It did 
not involve itself much with the planning process nor did it have much to do with independently 
monitoring and evaluating the growing women's self-help group programme in the State. Indeed, 
when a member of the National Commission for Women visited a number of villages 
surrounding Vijayawada in June 2006 regarding allegations of harassment of women by micro- 
finance organisations in the state, the State Commission for Women was not a central presence 
(author's fieldnotes, June 2006). 
In Andhra Pradesh, the goal of gender-equitable development has formed part of a more 
inainstream program (not segregated for women) at the parastatal level to address rural poverty, 
cornpared to its counterpart in Tamil Nadu. The Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty 
(SERP) was established as an independent, autonomous society registered under the Public 
-Societies Act to serve as the main implementing agency for Velugu, the World Bank-funded 
project in Andhra Pradesh, commencing in June 2000. Velugu comprised of two phases. 
95Both 
these phases have been continued under the name of Indira Kranthi Pratham (IKP) under the new 
Congress government. 96 
Velugu's model was largely based on the UNDPIs South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme 
(SAPAP) which was implemented in three districts in the State from 1996-200o and was deemed 
to be successful in building community based institutions for and by the rural poor to address 
rural poverty. Velugu/IKP operates on the self-help group model, with primarily women-only 
95 The first was the Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives Project (ADPIP) in 180 selected 'backward' mandals 
of six districts of the state, 
95 from 2000-2005, and with funding of Rs. 600 crores (approximately L73.5 millioný5. 
The second phase of Velugu was the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project (APRPRP), in selected 
'backward' mandals of the remaining 16 districts, from 2003-2008, with funding of nearly Rs. 1500 crores 
(approximately L 184 million)". 
96 As mentioned earlier, IKP also includes the Central government SGSY programme after the latter was merged 
with Velugu in 2005, and which SERP also administers. 
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groups of around 15-20 members. NEcro-finance activities are seen as a cohering force for the 
groups and provide an entry point for the program's social mobilisation and social change 
objectives. Self-help groups are then clustered into Village Organisations (Vos) and further 
federated to form Mandal Samakhyas. VOs are involved in monitoring and strengthening, 
1their SHGs as well as village level development activities. Mandal Samkhya leaders are given training 
by SERP and other contracted agencies to implement components of the project; they also take 
up larger scale activities compared to SHGs and VOs and help to strengthen VOs. By December 
2004, more than 440,000 SHGs, more than 27,000 VOs, and nearly 750 Mandal Samakhyas 
were involved vvith the program (GoAP, 2005b: 7; GoAP Dept of Rural Development, 2005: 7). 
The Gender Strategy involved five interventions, four of which required that mainstream 
institutional processes and activities took into consideration gender issues: these were 
smainstreaming gender in OF activities', 'promoting gender awareness among project 
stakeholders', 'introducing engendered project management', and 'implementing gender 
disaggregated [Monitoring and Evaluation]' (World Bank, 2003: 25). Gender is one of a number 
of cross-cutting issues in the program for which SERP has appointed functional specialists at the 
State level as State Project Directors (a few examples include marketing, micro-finance, 
disability, and institution building) and at the district level. While Velugu/IKP is a mainstream 
program designed to reduce rural poverty, gender is seen as a key component of the program, not 
least because women form a majority of SHG members, but also because it adopts a 
complementary and potentially harmonious view of gender relations. Specifically, the program 
endorses the view that 'poor communities are able to achieve poverty alleviation through self- 
managed grassroots institutions by harmonising the concerns of men and women' (SERPI. 
c. 2002: 37). Thus, the project seeks to expand beyond women-only groups to form men's groups, 
and youth groups, based on the recognition that the 'organization of women's groups alone 
would not help in either eliminating poverty or empowering women; the process can be triggered 
and made sustainable when all members of the family are organized' (SERP, c. 2002). To some 
extent, operationalising this strategy has not been as clear cut, however (discussed finther in 
Chapter 6). 
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)WWle SERP is considered independent and autonomous of government, it has considerable links 
with government and many of its most senior staff are government personnel . 
97 Notwithstanding 
sorrie intermittent periods,. one IAS officer, T. ViJaya Kumar, has held the post of CEO of SERP 
for the longest period since it was established; prior to 2002 the founding CEO was K. Mu, who 
more recently became the Commissioner for Rural Development, GoAP. 
Despite this strong government presence, an interesting institutional feature of SERP is its mix of 
personnel; non-government personnel form a significant part of SERP, as the discussion above 
about the prograin's approach to gender indicates. P. Jamuna, the current State Project Director 
for Gender, joined SERP in 2003, and has a background in the women's movement. Likewise, 
-rnany of the State Project Directors do not have a background in government service. 
Additionally, subject experts appointed from the NGO sector sit on the General Body Council. 
Rural development professionals are recruited as community co-ordinators at the mandal level as 
&change agents': 'key functionaries who facilitate social transformation in direct participation 
with the people' (SERP, c. 2002: 13). Furthermore, SERP has often approached State-based 
NGOs and educational institutions to compile training material or evaluate policies and 
strategies. For example, the Centre for Women's Development at the National Institute of Rural 
Development in Hyderabad was consulted to provide inputs into the program's gender strategy. 
-Another example is APMAS, a Hyderabad-based, professional development sector NGO, part- 
4flinded by the UK's 
Department for International Development, which has been a significant 
influence on the evolution of assessment techniques of micro-finance activities in the programs 
that SERP administers. 
SERP is also notable for the extent to which program participants are involved in the functioning 
of the programme. Participatory identification and assessment approaches have been a lauded 
feature of the program. Ten Mandal Samkhya leaders (all of them women) are selected by the 
97 SERP falls under the administrative control of the Department of Rural Development. The Chief Minister of 
Andhra Pradesh acts as Chairperson of SERP, and the Minister for Rural Development is Vice Chairperson. The 
lattef is also President of SERP's Executive Council. IAS officers also hold important senior posts in SERP. The 
Principal Secretary for the Department of Rural Development at the State level is Vice President of the Executive 
Council and also sits on the General Body Council of SERP. The Chief Executive Officer of SERP is an IAS officer 
who heads the State Project Management Unit in Hyderabad. He is also member-convenor of the Executive Council, 
and secretary of the General Body. 193 
government to sit on the General Body of SERP. Furthermore, program participants become part 
of the program's administration through its federated structures. t -"" 
Under the TDP government, the significant presence of non-government personnel emerged as a 
source of political controversy, with the Congress Party, then in opposition, accusing the TDP 
government of ensuring that Velugu, and by implication SERP, lacked transparency and 
ac6ountability, and that it bypassed democratically elected institutions of government at the sub- 
state level (The Hindu, 2003a). Manor has noted that the TDP Chief Minister Chandrababu 
Naidu, suspicious of the possibility of Congress control in local bodies, preferred to operate 
through non-elected committees and user associations 'which he is able to pack with his own 
party loyalists' (Manor, 2004: 273). He also notes however that Congress was also guilty of 
undermining panchayat authority for the same reason. It is clear from a programmatic 
comparison of Velugu (prominent under the TDP government) and IKP (under the Congress 
government) structure that the District Administration, for example, did not have a major role to 
play in the former, and by merging the SGSY scheme (administrated by the DRDA) with 
Velugu, this repositioned their role within the State's anti-poverty programme. Yet Congress 
have not radically altered the role of SERP; in fact most recently as June 2007 the government 
have awarded SERP a leading role in setting up a new agency along similar lines to deal with 
urban as opposed to rural poverty (GoAP, 2007c). Although it appears at first sight that 
government personnel will play a larger role in the new agency, provisions for non-government 
functional specialists remain part of the institutional design and SERP have been given a key 
technical role in its establishment (GoAP, 2007a,, 2007c). 
Conclusions on bureaucratic structural strategies and comparative discussion 
i 
To what extent do the institutional structures discussed above represent opportunities for feminist 
transformative strategies? The two State-level government . departments most visibly identifiable 
with women were not originally designed to be 'women's policy units', with the purposes of 
acting as a nodal agency to influence government policy in other departments. Instead they were 
largely designed for the purposes of delivering welfare-oriented schemes to women, seen as a 
more vulnerable, disadvantaged and weaker section of society, ghettoizing women as 
beneficiaries of state welfare assistance into one department. Significantly, neither have 
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feminists been able, nor have state governments been inclined, to convert these departments in 
AP or TN into such a nodal agency at the state level, despite their relative success at the national 
level with the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Furthermore, the presence of a 
department to which women's issues are consigned, has also encouraged most other departments, 
with the exception of a few departments such as Education, and Health and Family Welfare, to 
disregard what they see as 'women's issues', or to refuse to consider how their portfolios relate 
to gender equity. 
Instead, state governments have established State Commissions for Women, but with varying 
efficacy, and have sought to staff these Commissions with their own loyal party affiliates. Both 
State Commissions for Women have provided some room for questioning the political 
marginalization of women and issues of gender equity. However, they tend to be focused largely 
on legal issues and are more a protective arm of government, trying to prevent future, and 
investigating current, atrocities against women. Often, a lack of resources and political status 
means they are reduced to a mechanism of redressal for past injustices, and even then, with a 
reduced mandate they are often overstretched. 
While the State Commission for Women in Andhra Pradesh was established with more powers 
than its counterpart in Tamil Nadu, it was not always able to use them as effectively, partly due 
to the capacity of the Commission's leadership and commitment. The Commission in Tamil 
Nadu had fewer powers -but did manage to be a vocal lobbying instrument, even if this was 
centred mostly around an appointed leader. 
As semi-autonomous agencies, Parastatal agencies engaged in women, gender, and development 
offer a more complex set of opportunities than government departments or State commissions for 
women. They have both involved a larger range of actors from different backgrounds, offering 
potentially more opportunities 'for involvement of non-government personnel and feminist- 
oriented NGOs, although the quality of involvement has not been consistent, due to variations in 
access, strategic input, and impact on social and institutional transformation, with SERP 
seemingly offering more potential than the TNCDW. 
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Significantly, Velugu/IKP is largely a mainstream program with gender as a cross-cutting 
concern and intervention for social change in the project; Mahalir T1111tani focuses largely on 
women rather than gender, and appears to be more integrationist in approach. 
The respective Departments of Rural Development in AP and TN have also played significant 
parts in state-level initiatives on women, gender and development, although it is too early to 
understand the difference that TNCDW's move to the Department of Rural Development might 
have on the program's policy approach and implementation practices. 
5.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, at the same time as women are descriptively underrepresented in state government 
institutions, substantively gendered norms and practices of state government institutions limit 
how both women as potential policy-makers and how gender equity as a policy issue'is 
constituted in policy making processes. The bureaucratic-individual strategy holds less potential 
as a feminist strategy given the incommensurable norms and practices of the bureaucracy with 
such an approach. The bureaucratic-structural strategy is more complex and has provided 
varying options for feminist transformative strategies. 
Some isolated examples suggest successful efforts to challenge the gendered bureaucratic 
institutions of the state government. Nevertheless, the state machinery for women in Tamil Nadu 
and Andhra Pradesh has largely failed to overcome resistance to the institutionalization of a 
commitment to ideals of gender equality or to provide adequate support and encouragement to 
individuals that support such a project. Strategies by the state have been concerned mostly with 
increasing descriptive representation through affimnative action policies, more than attempting to 
change the gendered norms and practices of institutions itself. State structures appear outward- 
oriented, concerned more with increasing the delivery and efficiency of pre-designed 
programmes than with inward self-reflection on how they are themselves gendered organisations. 
While the government has implemented a number of initiatives, it has overall not sought to build 
a conducive institutional context in a way which ensures a comprehensive and institutionalised 
commitment to gender mainstreaming. 
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Yet, the plurality of institutions which have been established in the last two or more decades for 
women's welfare, development, and empowerment demonstrate precisely the notion that the 
state is a not a monolith but an ensemble of institutions, with some offering more scope for 
feminist intervention than others. Furthermore, recent changes suggest that this is not a static 
process, but a dynamic one, which offers cautious hope for feminist engagement with the state. 
For this reason, in the next chapter, I explore in more detail State government discourse in AP 
and 'fN on women, gender, and development to understand how gender-equitable development is 
shaped as a policy issue (or not), to what extent it forms a central concern in the State 
governments' mainstream development policy, and how feminists might better understand State 
policy through its discourse(s), in order to change it. 
I 
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DEVELOPMENT 
6.1 Introduition 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the institutional context for gender mainstreaming stratýgies 
in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, including the development of the State-level instituý 
, 
ional 
machinery for women in each State. In this chapter I look at the gendered discourses of 
development underpinning State-level development policy. The purpose of identifying ý and 
analyzing these discourses is to problematise the discursive articulations of gendered 
development and the policy strategies they constitute in order to understand exactly 'what is 
being mainstreamed when we mainstream gender' (Eveline and Bacchi, 2005). It is to 
'encourage deeper reflection on the contours of a particular policy discussion, the shape assigned 
a particular "problem... (Bacchi, 2000: 48), in this case the relationship between constructions of 
'gender' and of 'development' in State policy. Policy is therefore understood as a site of 
discursive articulation and discursive activity (Bacchi, 2000) and 'it is only by looking at a 
discourse in operation, in a specific historical context, that it is possible to see whose interests it 
serves at a particular moment' (Weedon, 1987: 111). The ultimate aim of this chapter, then, is to 
understand how discourse affects what can be said, thought, or done in policy, the particular 
meanings which arise as a result, and the possibilities these meanings create for gender 
mainstreaming strategies and the opportunities they foreclose. 
I argue that three gendered discourses of development may be identified in state policy, which I 
label 'protective-patemalist', 'competitive-capabilities', and 'structural-transformative'. I aim to 
show how these three discourses, while also internally complex, articulate gendered development 
in very different ways to each other, which helps to explain the divergent policy approaches (and 
absences) to gender-equitable development in the state. I also argue I that important similarities 
and differences are evident in terms of the relative dominance or marginalization of policy 
discourses on gender equitable development both within and between the two states, which 
makes for a highly complex but interesting comparative analysis. Furthermore, discourses of 
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gender and development often, but not always, reflect the wider development discourse in the 
state. These two observations suggest that both the wider discursive and institutional context 
matters to how some discourses become embedded within policies and others do not, and that 
this is a highly complex process. I conclude by arguing that all three discourses present limited 
opportunities for gender mainstreaming, although the third - the structural-transformative 
discourse - perhaps holds the most potential, but still has its own limitations. 
In order to demonstrate these arguments, in the first section, I provide a brief background to each 
state government's development policy since the 1990s, focusing on two identifiable discourses 
of development: that of reformist and populist discourses. I then go on to examine in more detail 
articulations in State policy of the three discourses of gendered development named above. I 
follow this with a comparative discussion, before concluding on the opportunities these 
discourses create or foreclose for mainstreaming gender in development in state level policy in 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. I draw upon a wide range of governmental and non- 
governmental documentary and non-documentary sources. Government documentary sources 
include significant government planning and policy documents, government program 
documentation such as annual reports and training manuals, government evaluative reports, and 
budget speeches. I also draw upon my own fieldwork interviews, as well as press coverage and 
secondary literature. For Tamil Nadu, I have focused specifically on discourses articulated within 
the State government's Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007), supplemented by other relevant 
planning and policy documents. For Andhra Pradesh, I have examined discourses articulated by 
, Vision 2020', a longer term comprehensive development policy released by GoAP in 1999. 
Also included is an analysis of policy discourses of the parastatal program for women's self-help 
groups as outlined in the previous chapter (that of TNWDP/Mahalir Thittarn for Tamil Nadu and 
of Velugu/IKP for Andhra Pradesh). 
6.2 State Level Development Policy: Reformist and Populist Discourses 
As already established, the States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have both been labeled as 
reform states in that, since the Central government announced liberalization reform policies in 
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1991, these two States have also embarked on a similar economic reforms agenda. As at the 
national level, (Inis refunns agenda poses significant implications for gendered development 
discourse in the State, particularly in how the role of the State is being reimagined as well as the 
State's commitment to social and human development issues and the social sector programmes 
and policies it devises and to which it allocates funding. As discussed in Chapter Four, state level 
policy in both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh has articulated a populist discourse, based upon 
the compulsions of electoral democracy. This populist discourse interacts in significant ways 
with the reformist discourse of development which has emerged during in the 1990s. Here I 
outline the main features of these two wider state level development policy discourses, as a 
backdrop to the articulation of gender-equitable development discourse in each State. 
6.2.1 Tamil Nadu 
From the mid 1990s onwards, but particularly between the years 2001-2004, the development 
policy of the State Government of Tamil Nadu articulated a reformist discourse of development, 
which in many ways resembled the Government of India's reformist discourse discussed earlier,, 
in Chapter Three. This discourse was particularly evident in the Government of Tamil Nadu' ,s 
Tenth Five Year Plan and a number of reform-oriented policies which followed thereafter. The 
reforms envisaged a restructuring of the public sector, including the downsizing of government, 
an increased role for the private sector in state development, but perhaps most prominently, fiscal 
reforms, which were prompted by the state's fiscal crisis towards the end of the 1990s. 
A re-envisioning of the role of the state was evident in the Government of Tamil Nadu's Eighth 
Five Year Plan. The re-envisioned role of the state was to create 'a conducive environment for 
building individual capabilities and encouraging private initiative' (GoTN, 2003c, MY 
emphasis). GoTN's Tenth Five Year Plan's policy statement on governance reforms defined 
governance as relating to 'the management of all such processes that, in any society, define the 
environment which permits and enables individuals to raise their capacity levels, on one hand, ' 
and provide opportunities to realize their potential and enlarge the set of available choices, on the 
other' (GoTN, 2003c: 901) 
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This Government recognises the important role played by Government employees in 
implementing development and welfare programmes of the Government. Government 
employees will have to also recognise that at a time of extreme fiscal distress, they have 
to come forward to share the distress. It is the policy of this Government to ensure the 
welfare of its employees. At a time of extreme financial stress, it has been difficult to 
entertain requests for increases in pay and allowances. 
(Pormaiyan, 2003) 
policies ensuing from this shift in the state's development discourse, for instance, the partial 
privatization of the road transport sector and closure of loss-making Public Sector Units (PSUs), 
downsizing government, and encouraging public-private partnerships in infrastructure 
development (GoTN, 2003c: 37). Government subsidies such as food subsidies under the Public 
Distribution System and power subsidies for farmers were either reduced or modified to improve 
targeting (GoTN, 2003c: 42-3). Governance reforms included streamlining administrative 
procedures, including a single window clearance for private investors as well as downsizing 
government. A New Industrial Policy was announced in 2003, reiterating a number of reforms 
outlined in the Tenth Five Year Plan reiterating aimed at increasing investment in the state. 
Reforms relating to public sector privatization, downsizing government, government employee 
entitlements and benefits were accompanied by legislation aimed at disciplining labour relations. 
In 2002, the Tamilnadu Essential Services Maintenance Act (TESMA) was brought into force 
which prohibited government employees of selected 'essential services' from going on strike. 
The following year several thousand government employees went on strike to protest reductions 
in government employee entitlements and customary benefits. In response to the strike, the 
government invoked TESMA, dismissing a large number of those on strike and also penalizing 
those who were subsequently reinstated by recognizing the strike period as a disruption in 
service without pay, adversely affecting employee entitlements. In the meantime, the government 
replaced the striking government employees with temporary casual contractees. 
Fiscal reforms were considered an essential part of the wider reforms agenda: as the Finance 
N4inister explained, 'a, stable fiscal situation is an essential pre-requisite for enabling the 
Government to implement its development agenda' (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 9). The government 
sought to establish a firm consensus on the need for fiscal reforms. The Finance Minister 
declared that 'there cannot be two opinions on the urgent need to rectify the fiscal imbalance 
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before it completely paralyses the functioning of the Government. Fiscal recovery is in the best 
interests of the State and flas to be above political duffierences, compulsions ana expediency' 
(Pormaiyan, 2003: para 29). The need to signal the commitment'to fiscal reforms were also 
positioned as central to attracting state-level investment by external agencies, which impacted on 
the government's ability to compete with other states. In 2003, the Finance Minister stated in his 
budget speech: 
external funding agencies like the World Bank had moved away from Tamil Nadu in the 
absence of any effort at fiscal reforms by the previous Government. Meanwhile, all 
neighbouring States have benefited by such assistance and have been able to go in for 
larger Plan outlays while Tamil Nadu was left behind. This Govenunent has shown the 
will to undertake the reforms necessary for restoring the fiscal health of Tamil Nadu and 
taking the State forward on a higher growth trajectory. 
(Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 10) 
As a means to institutionalize fiscal management and financial discipline at the State level, the 
Government of Tamil Nadu introduced the Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2003, which the Finan , 
ce 
Minister suggested would 'Save future governments from experiencing the serious fiscal 
problems that we have had to confront' (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 9). 
The reformist discourse emerged in state policy in spite of a history ofpopulist policies in Tamil 
Nadu embedded in political party discourse, as discussed earlier in Chapter Fou * 
r. Populist 
discourses in Tamil Nadu have been labelled as either empowerment/assertive or protective/ 
paternalist, and have been associated with DMK and AIADMK governments respectively 
(Subramanian, 1999; Swarny, 1998). However, from the 1990s onwards the discursive 
articulation of a reformist agenda within the Government of Tamil Nadu's development Policy 
discussed above, emerged as an alternative discourse of state development policy, challenging 
the hitherto populist discourse. To some extent, the reigning in of populist policies had much to 
do with the state's fiscal crisis, with the latter providing a useful entry point for the reformist 
discourse. Frequently, reformist policies were justified by the AIADNM on the basis of the hefty 
fiscal deficit, - which was partially attributed to liberal expenditure by the previous DMK 
government. Under the reformist discourse, populist policies were implicitly seen 
I- 
as 
unnecessarily expensive and wasteful; repeated reference to 'reining in' the fiscal deficit 
suggested that expenditure had been wild, uncontrollable and irresponsible. However, the 
government was quick to point out that the fiscal reforms should be considered with the people' 
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in mind, particularly the 'vulnerable sections of society', taking care not to alienate the electorate 
(ponnaiyan, 2003). Interestingly, the fiscal reforms were presented as a separate agenda to the 
wider development agenda - the Finance Nfinister declared in his budget speech in 2003 that 'this 
Government has the onerous responsibility of integrating the reform priorities with the 
development imperatives of the State. The interests of the poor and the needy have to be 
protected' (Pomaiyan, 2003). 
Significantly, while the Government's stand on the wider reform policies remained relatively 
unmoved in the turbulent few years in the state between 2001 and 2004, this period of second 
generation economic reforms in Tamil Nadu was interrupted following the national Lok Sabha 
elections in May 2004. With the AIADMK having failed to win a single seat in the elections, 
Chief Minister Jayalalithaa reversed a number of reforms undertaken in the previous three years 
and reinstated a number of populist policies. The policy reversals included inter alia a reduction 
in the electricity tariff, the restoration of free farm power supply, and relaxation of restrictions on 
eligibility for food subsidies under the Public Distribution System. Perhaps the most significant 
reversal however was the dismissal of disciplinary proceedings against striking government 
employees from the previous year, and the reinstatement of several thousand government 
employees who had been temporarily hired to cover for the striking government workers but had 
been dismissed only a few days earlier to their reinstatement. This stood in stark contrast to the 
earlier reform policies of government downsizing and disciplining labour relations. The repeal of 
TESMA, the legislation which was invoked during the strike to dismiss or penalizing striking 
government employees, was one of the DMK's manifesto promises which they later fulfilled in 
June 2006 after being elected into the state government (GoTN, 2006d). 
The media were quick to link the policy reversals to the Lok Sabha defeat, especially considering 
the upcoming State Assembly Elections in Tamil Nadu in 2006. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
however, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa publicly rejected this representation (BBC World, 2004). 
She also justified the reduced tariffs for electricity as a special protective measure to relieve 
domestic consumers particularly those affected by drought, claiming that 'no other State 
provides such relief to all families in the domestic category in order to protect them' (The Hindu, 
2004a). The World Bank were disappointed with the moves and stated that the policy reversals 
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threatened the progress made on fiscal reforms, and warned that 'Tamil Nadu has little. c4oilce 
but to return to the path of fiscal consolidation if it is to meet its development goals'_ ()Yorld 
Bank, 2005: iv). 
Thus, the reformist discourse was restricted by a discourse of populism based on an' electoral- 
democratic logic. The 2006 State Assembly elections was a strong demonstration that a populist 
discourse remains strong in Tamil Nadu. The DMK, for instance, offered major Populist 
concessions including free colour TV sets and rice subsidized as Rs 2a kilo as part of its 2.0,06 
State Assembly Election campaign. 
6.2.2 Andhra Pradesh 
Since the mid-1990s, State government commitment to the economic reforms process in Andhra 
Pradesh has been characterized by aggressive self-promotion as a reform-oriented government, 
as well as, unlike most other reform-oriented States, an extensiýre of the economic reforms 
agenda to encompass a wider transformationalist project of governance reform (Kirk, 2005; 
Kennedy, 2004; Mooij, 2003). The State government's strong pro-reform stance was clearly 
articulated at the meeting of the National Development Council in 2002, when the then Chief 
Minister of AP Chandrababu Naidu stated, 
Reforms are no longer a matter of choice but have become a matter of necessity ... In an increasingly competitive world unless we reform we will be in danger of being left 
behind. 
(Naidu, 2002) 
The strongest identifiable articulation of the TDP government's reformist discourse can be found 
in the State government's Vision 2020, an 'ambitious' vision for the achievement of economic, 
and human development and governance reforms by the year 2020. Released by the State' 
government in January 1999, Vision 2020 was compiled in consultation with a global consulting 
firm McKinsey, and was supported by the UK's Department for International Development. 
Vision 2020 proposed that the role of the state would need to shift: 'from being primarily, a 
controller of the economy, it must become a facilitator and catalyst of its growth' (GoAP, 1999: ' 
8). The policy proposed that by stimulating economic growth, it could in turn bring about 
development through increased incomes as a result of new employment opportunities. 
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Furthermore, economic growth would also increase state resources which could then be invested 
in social sectors to combat poverty, and improve education and health, and build infrastructure to 
provide services such as water supply, transport, and housing (GoAP, 1999: 1). Governance 
reforms proposed a transition to 'SMART, government administration - simple, moral, 
accoutantable, responsive, and transparent. Investments in education and health were deemed 
irnportant to increasing productivity to meet the high rates of economic growth required (GoAP, 
1999: 7). The high demand for infrastructure would require 'large-scale private investment', 
which in turn would be facilitated by a 'regulatory environment that enables private investment 
and facilitates business' (GoAP, 1999: 14) 
Vision 2020 proposed a restructuring of government expenditure according to concerns of 
efficiency. The emphasis on reduced and targeted allocation of government subsidy in the social 
sector was heavily concerned with 'leakages', and that schemes should 'provide only for those 
with a genuine need' (GoAP, 1999: 57). For example, on food subsidies the Public Distribution 
System (PDS), Vision 2020 stated 
To ensure its sustainability, it is critical to target the PDS at clearly identified groups 
who are poor, vulnerable, or risk-prone. Since food subsidies are consumption- rather 
than investment-oriented, they are inherently less efficient than public employment 
programmes. Moreover, targeting such subsidies, i. e., ensuring that most of the benefits 
go only to the poor, is difficult, making these programmes expensive. In Andhra 
Pradesh, such programmes should be used only to provide relief to genuinely vulnerable 
groups 
(GoAP, 1999: 5 8) 
The government also proposed the privatization of particular sectors such as higher education 
and healthcare, suggesting that the 'the private sector, operating in a competitive situation, is 
better able than govermnents to provide efficient, rationally priced and high quality services in 
many areas' and that 'the State's support in such areas should gradually be limited to ensuring 
access for the poor to these services' (GoAP, 1999). Privatisation would increase the quality of 
service provision and 'free Government resources and attention for higher priority 
developmental goals'. (GoAP, 1999). 
Vision 2020 proposed to build on Janmabhoomi, ostensibly a large-scale exercise in 
participatory development which had established in parallel to the local panchayats a number of 
non-state community groups at the local level such as Water Users Groups to monitor irrigation 
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schemes and Mothers Committees to oversee child education and the Integrative Child 
Development Services scheme at the local level. Self Help Groups would also be encouraged. 
In line with the governance reforms, in 2001 the AP government set up a new division'of the 
General Administration Department to oversee the administrative reforms, and in the same year, 
with a 16 million pound grant from the UK's Department for International Development, 
established the Centre for Good Governance in Hyderabad as an academic think tank- for 
advising on state level reforms. 
The World Bank has been a substantial international donor of the economic and governance 
reforms in Andhra Pradesh and the State constitutes one of a few Indian States where the World 
Bank has received agreement from the Central government to enter into subnational lending 
agreements with State governments (Kirk, 2005). The first AP-specific World Bank project, the 
Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Project, was approved in 1998, and planned 
interventions in education, health, nutrition, roads, irrigation, and governance and fiscal reforms 
(World Bank, 1998). 
The AP government's willingnesS'to avail of World Bank funding has received criticism in the 
state from various comers. Left parties criticized the state government for acquiescing to anti- 
imperialist forces and media reports suggested that the BJP central government stalled approval 
to the APERP loan in 1998 from a nationalist perspective of swadeshi (self-reliance) (Indian 
Express, 1998a). A third criticism positioned Naidu's pro-Bank reform approach as 'a "betrayal" 
of the state's autonomy -a charge that resonated with an AP political tradition of asserting 
Telugu "self-respect" after years of central government interference in its affairs' (Kirk, 2005: 
292). Despite criticism from the Congress party whilst in opposition, they have continued to 
avail of World Bank funding since they- were voted into govemment at the state elections in 
2004. 
As emphasised in Chapter 4, populism has been a characteristic feature of electoral politics in 
Andhra Pradesh since the emergence of the Telugu Desam Party under NT Rama Rao in the 
early 1980s. However, the economic reforms increasingly espoused by the new Chief Minister 
Chandrababu Naidu in the mid 1990s suggested that the TDP was beginning to reject this style of 
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politics, partly based on claims of fiscal necessity (for instance, refer to the discussion in Chapter 
4 on the political economy of prohibition). Nevertheless, on two occasions, both of which were 
highly significant for their timing, Naidu reverted to populist promises of concessions. The first 
instance occurred just three months before the State Assembly elections in October 1999, in 
-which Naidu managed to secure a second mandate. In early July 1999, Naidu launched the 
"Deeparn Scheme', wWch aimed to provide I million LPG (liquid petroleum gas) connections to 
poor women in rural areas who were members of groups formed under the DWCRA programme 
(Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas). This made Naidu very popular among 
women voters. It also did not help the opposition Congress Party when they protested against the 
scheme, pointing out that the launch of the scheme had violated the Election Code of Conduct as 
it had occurred after elections had been announced. As Murty explains, the 
TDP cleverly used this as proof to show that the Congress was opposed to this welfare 
measure... All this created a feeling among women voters that the Congress was trying 
to thwart this scheme. As such they alienated themselves from Congress (1) and 
identified with [the] TDP. 
(Murty, 2001: 222) 
Several commentators have suggested that the impact of this scheme on women voters and their 
electoral choices had a decisive impact in the following elections, securing a large vote bank for 
Naidu (Murty, 2001: 222). However, after the elections the Deepam Scheme was to come under 
criticism from DWCRA groups citing the high increases in the costs of LPG refill cylinders. 
The second instance occurred before the State Assembly election in 2004, when the opposition 
Congress party was voted into government. One of Congress' campaign promises was free 
power to farmers and continuation of the Deepam Scheme. They later extended this to all below- 
poverty-line families regardless of whether they were mem bers of self-help groups, although 
rnembers would be allocated extra points for eligibility, as Would individuals with low incomes 
and small family size, among other criteria. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the Jamnabhoomi scheme of the TDP government attracted 
strong criticism from Congress, accusing the TDP government of bypassing the panchayats, 
whilst trying to avoid acknowledging that this was because Congress had a stronghold there. 
207 
The newly elected Congress government terminated the Jamnabhoomi programme almost 
immediately when it came to governnient in 2004 (GoAP, 2004). 
6.2.3 Comparative state level discourses of development 
Both states have embarked on a reformist agenda, emphasizing a new role for government, 
including (partial) privatization, increased efficiency in public sectors, government expenditure 
and government administration, deregulation in favour of the private sector. GoAP's vision was 
more comprehensive and far-reaching than that of GoTN, although execution has perhapý been 
more extensive in Tamil Nadu. Kennedy's comparison of the two States' approachqs. to 
economic reforms suggests a significant difference in the way each State government politically 
positioned the reforms: 
Both states are pursuing reforms, but while Andhra Pradesh 'trumpets' its support for 
them ... successive goverrunents; in Tamil Nadu (representing both the DMK and the AIADMK) have acted far more discreetly, avoiding wherever possible taking a public 
stand in support of market reform, and certainly displaying no inclination to situate 
economic reform within a larger transformationalist development agenda built around a 
vision of radical citizen-oriented governance reform. 
(Kennedy, 2004: 44) 
Furthermore, both states' reform agendas have been limited by populist discursive logics, which 
are arguably more embedded in Tamil Nadu but have proven decisive in both states in stalling, 
some reforms efforts. This has been particularly evident at the time of elections. Thus the 
analysis of gendered discourses of development in the following section needs to be understood 
against a backdrop of the introduction of a reformist discourse of development in the 1990s but 
also the limitations of the latter to challenge and overcome the embedded populist discourse in 
both states. 
6.3 Discourses of gendered development 
6.3.1 Mapping dominant and marginal discourses 
Against the backdrop of the broad-based reformist and populist discourses of state development 
policies in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh mapped above, in this section I discuss discourses of 
gendered development which often are articulated strongest in policies on women, gender and 
development but which are also evident in polices which do not pay particular attention to the 
208 
status of women, their development or empowerment, or gender (in)equality. At least three 
discourses of gendered development can be identified in State government policies in Tamil 
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. I have labeled these discourses protective-paternalist, competitive- 
capability, and structural-transformative. 'Women's empowerment' as a signifier is prominently 
articulated in the latter two, but its context-specific meaning differs in important ways. Below I 
begin by outlining some of the dominant characteristics of these discourses which have been 
identified inductively in state policies, bearing in mind that identifying such ideal types in 
discursive articulations in policy is more messy given that multiple discourses are frequently 
interspersed in policy. 
protective-paternalist 
The protective-patemalist discourse depicts particular groups in society, such as women, as 
'weak' and 'vulnerable', as lacking full autonomy, and, therefore, in need of 'protection'. The 
state is characteristically depicted, often in the guise of a supreme leader, as a benevolent patron, 
or 'leader-as-donor' (Subramanian, 1999: 75). Paternalist policies focus on minimal provision 
and basic needs (Subramanian, 1999: 75). The large-scale distribution of resources among 
groups by the state is presented as a charitable and altruistic gesture, something akin to gift. 
giving (Goodell, 1985). In turn, the positioning of the state as a býnevolent leader 'encourages 
supporters to assume an attitude of reverence and gratitude' (Subramanian, 1999: 75). Because 
resource distribution by the state is depicted as altruism, this enables the state to ensure that its 
relationship with the beneficiary is non-reciprocal because 'altruism requires that nothing be 
returned' (Goodell, 1985). It also means that 'beneficiaries' have an ambiguous relationship with 
paternalist policies in that 'because these programs are granted and withdrawn at the discretion 
of the state, when they are neither designed in response to local request. nor subject to sustainable 
local pressures, they preclude any continuity that the local "beneficiaries" themselves might be 
able to affect... ' (Goodell, 1985: 253). 
A protective-paterrialist state often displays an attitude of 'benevolent sexism', or 'a set of 
interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically 
and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver)' (Glick 
and Fiske, 1996: 491). For example, the state's protection of women is presented as an 
209 
affectionate and caring gesture. As opposed to 'hostile sexism', which is defined as an overt 
antipawy towards women (Barreto and Ellemers, 2005: 634; drawing on Glick and Fiske, 1996), 
benevolent sexism 'provides a comfortable rationalization for confining women to domestic 
roles' (Glick and Fiske, 1996: 492). 
Competitive-capabilities 
iý 
The competitive-capabilities discourse draws on a liberal, integrative, equal opportunities model 
of equality in which it is assumed that, notwithstanding instances of discrimination, the rules of 
society are generally fair. Such instances of discrimination are seen as aberrations, and as 
barriers to equal competition among individuals in society. It is the task of the state to remove 
such barriers to create a level playing field and ensure equal opportunities for women to compete 
with men. Thus, the state as a facilitator implements preferential policies such as ensuring access 
to education and employment in order to develop the capabilities of those individuals. 
'Removing the barriers' initiates a process of empowerment whereby the individual will be able 
to fulfill their 'full potential', enabling them to become 'self-reliant'. It also ensures that 
development is more efficient. 
Eliminating discrimination towards women and enabling access for women to education and 
employment is often presented in utilitarian terms for the benefits that accrue to the overall 
objective of development rather than as an intrinsically beneficial process for women, or on the 
basis of rights, justice, or entitlement. As Squires suggests, 'the potential weakness of this, 
approach is that it may privilege those concerns that fit most readily with dominant policy- 
making rationalities, thereby obfuscating the normative and contested nature of gender equality 
and privileging the 'objective' knowledge of gender experts' (2007a: 148). 
Structural-transformative 
A structural-transformative discourse posits that inequality is often the result of inequitable 
power relations and power asymmetries and recognises the centrality of power to the process of 
transforming inequitable relations. It tends to focus on empowering 'vulnerable' and 
&marginalized groups' rather than individuals. It emphasizes the importance of enabling the 
participation of marginalized groups and augmenting their role in decision-making and agenda- 
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setting, often aiming to improve their access to mainstream institutional bodies Incre ed as 
participation is understood to enable the empowerment of poor and marginalized groups because 
it enables democratic deliberation and collective action. This takes place either through the 
creation of new institutions or through the transformation of existing mainstream nonns, 
structures and processes which have led to marginalization and inequality. Thus, the onus of 
transformation is not restricted to individuals themselves but to mainstream institutions. Because 
of its focus on structural inequalities and on groups rather than individuals, a structural- 
transformative discourse is the most likely of all three discourses to recognize the inter- 
sectionality of multiple structural inequalities deriving from caste, class, gender, religion, age, 
disability, and so on. However, one limitation of this discourse is the tendency to emphasise 
group differences to the point of reinforcing them at the expense of others, privileging some 
groups or some forms of inequality over others, and thus attention to intersectionality is not 
always adequately recognized or understood. 
6.3.2 Gendered development discourses in State policy 
Tamil Nadu 
The strongest articulations of the protective-paternalist discourse were found in many of the 
rnore populist and welfare-oriented schemes of the development policy of the State Government 
of Tamil Nadu, which are often presented as part of a state-provided protective social safety net 
for those excluded from the processes of national or state-led development. The Government of 
Tamil Nadu's Department of Social Welfare commonly depicts women as weak, and as one of a 
number of 'vulnerable' groups which are in need of protection by the state. Particularly 
, vulnerable' women are identified as the deserving berieficiaries of the state's 'affection': 
, among women, pregnant women, lactating mothers, the poor women living below poverty line, 
widows and destitutes deserve more affection and assistance' (GoTN, 2003a). Women are 
grouped along with children, the destitute, the elderly, street children, 'delinquent' children and 
'juveniles' and the disabled (GoTN, 2003c). Along with cl-ffldren, women are homogenized as 
, the most disadvantaged category of population' in respect of indicators on literacy, health, 
rnortality, and dependency on agricultural livelihoods (GoTN, 2003c: 319). 
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Many of the State level policies articulating a protective-paternalist discourse are concentrated 
undler the adiministrative control of the Department of Social Weifare. Two prominent schemes 
of the AIADMK government have aimed to address the practice of female infanticide. The first, 
the 'Cradle Baby Scheme', began in 1992 and was a reactive measure to address the prevalence 
of female infanticide, which it saw as a 'menace' and 'evil practice'. The scheme operated by 
enabling parents to give up their girl children for adoption at birth and transfer them into state, 
care anonymously through the provision of cradles in reception centres in state institutions such 
as government hospitals, primary care centres and children's homes. The main concern was to 
'enable the rescue of female children abandoned by their biological parents due to various social 
circumstances' (GoTN, 2003c: 332). The second was the Girl Child Protection Scheme, also 
introduced in 1992, whereby the government deposited a sum of money on behalf of a girl child, 
which she would receive on her 20th birthday and could be used, the policy suggested, to fund 
higher education studies or to 'defray marriage expenses', a euphemistic term for dowry (GoTN, 
2003c: 332). The many conditions attached to the scheme stipulated that the parents should have 
a low income, should have undergone sterilization, should not have any male children, and 
should be under 35 years of age. The girl child also had to complete her 10th standard education 
and appear for the public examination. Both these schemes were reintroduced when the 
AlADMK party came back into government in 2001, and have been continued by the, DMK 
since the party were elected into government in 2006. 
A number of other schemes of the Department of Social Welfare include assistance (cash 
payments) for marriage for various women and girls in difficult circumstances such as widows, 
'deserted wives', orphan girls, and daughters and school children of poor widows. Many of these 
come with conditions also, mostly income ceilings as well as age restrictions for the bride (but 
not the groom, 18-30 years). Sewing machines are given to destitute widows to assist them with 
a livelihood, and free textbooks are given to'school children of poor widows and free bicycles 
are given to Scheduled Caste girls as an incentive for their education. The Department, through 
the Tamil Nadu Social Welfare Board also assists a number of Family Counselling Centres run 
by voluntary organizations, for the purpose of 'preserv[ing] the basic social unit of a family' 
(GoTN, 2005b: 230). These policies position the state as a benevolent and charitable figure that 
protects vulnerable women such as the girl child and poor and destitute widows. Thus, through 
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these schemes the state becomes the paternal figure writ large. An implicit heteronormativity and 
social conservatism underpin many of these policies. 
In contrast, the Government of Tamil Nadu's competitive-capability discourse stressed the 
rernoval of barriers to gender equity (GoTN, 2003c: 328), and the 'removal of gender bias' 
(GoTN, 2002: para 2.34). The Government of Tamil Nadu's Tenth Five Year Plan explicitly 
acknowledged the failure of a constitutional guarantee of equality combined with legislation to 
bring about social change: 
... [T]he mere enactment of 
laws does not change attitudes, and ironically, these 
advances in social legislation have engendered in some measure an attitude of 
complacency whilst the views of society towards the position of women have not 
changed much over the years. 
(GoTN, 2003c: 319) 
The failure of legislation to bring about gender equality justified affirmative action, particularly 
in the areas of education and employment, and the Tenth Plan set targets for fifty per cent 
reduction in 'gender gaps' in literacy and wage rates by 2007 (GoTN, 2003c: 32). 
The stress on efficiency and consequentialist arguments of utility meant that the concern for 
women's empowerment was often articulated as a mutually supportive objective of poverty 
reduction. For example, the Government of Tamil Nadu's Tenth Five Year Plan explained that 
6prornoting micro credit with groups of women is increasingly seen as the panacea for reducing 
poverty and empowering women' (GoTN, 2003c: 328). Indeed, sometimes the objective of 
women's empowerment was subordinated in favour of poverty reduction, predicated on some 
problematic assumptions concerning women's status, family income, and the household. Policy 
often failed to distinguish gender-inequitable development and poverty as distinct problems, and 
instead collapsed the two. This , 
assumes a necessarily positive relationship between women's 
empowerment and rising household income, which, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four is 
somewhat problematic (also see especially Jackson, 1996). 
That poverty reduction is foregrounded as a rationale for women's empowerment, is only one 
way in which the latter was presented in utilitarian terms. Women's empowerment was 
commonly described as an investment in human resources, which will benefit overall economic 
development. Within this economistic discourse, women are viewed as assets, as inputs into the 
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economic development process. Human development is conceived as an input for economic 
developnien't. 'a co-untry's real weallfli-i is its 11-winai-i tesources. It buman resources develop, (JIen 
the country's economy will also develop' (GoTN, 2002: 1). Like with the subordination of 
women's empowerment to poverty reduction, women again become highly responsible for the 
'' I, nation's economic and human development: 'the economic development of a country depends 
largely upon the status of its human resource development. The index of a nation's social 
development is the status of its women '(GoTN, 2002: 1). 
I While the Tenth Five Year Plan did stress a competitive-capability discourse of gendere 
development, the strongest state level articulation of this discourse comes from the Tamil Nadu 
I 
Corporation for the Development of Women, the parastatal agency discussed in the previous 
chapter which was responsible for implementing the state-led self-help group program Mahalir 
Thittam. Empowerment objectives of the scheme emphasized the importance of dismantling 
barriers to women's empowerment: a key objective was to enable poor and disadvantaged 
women through capacity-building to 'cross all social and economic barriers and thereby facilitate 
their full dývelopment into empowered citizens'. Social empowerment entailed the dismantling 
of various barriers to women's and girls' equal development. Economic empowerment would, be 
achieved by greater access to financial resources outside the household and equal access and 
control over resources within the household, a 'significant increase' in women's incomes, 
reduced vulnerability of poor women to crisis, and financial self-reliance of women (TNCDW,, 
2000b: 18). Women's empowerment was understood to have both intrinsic and utilitarian 
rationales for women's empowerment. As the original IFAD project document stated, 'the 
principal objective of the project is the economic and social upliftment of women to enhance the 
weý(are of theirfamilies and to improve their status in the family and the community, (IFAD, 
1989). 
Mahalir Thittam emphasised that empowerment was about making choices, that only women and 
not. 'outsiders' could empower women. Consistent with the government's wider reimagining of 
the state's role in development, TNCDW policy suggested that only government and non- 
government institutions could play a supportive, facilitative role in this process (TNCDW, 
2000b: 18). In contrast to the protective-paternalist discourse, women were interpellated as 
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responsible agents: one policy statement acknowledged that 'women are aware of their own 
strengths and weaknesses, family resources and risk taking ability ... Accordingly, it is the women 
themselves who would be the best judges in respect of economic activities and levels of credit 
required' (GoTN, 2001 a: section 3.1). Women were positioned as centrally responsible for their 
own empowerment, and thus, despite the emphasis elsewhere on changing structures, the implicit 
thrust was on women who themselves had to change, 
It was also clear, however, that the self-help group program of TNCDW made a distinction 
between 'good' and 'bad' choices, and thus between good and bad SHG members. Mahalir 
Thittam, and its predecessor the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project, was a highly 
integrative project and less so a transformative one. As the original MAD project document 
stated, the aim was to 'increase [women's] income-eaming potential by integrating them into the 
regular delivery system for credit and technical support services, to raise women's level of 
awareness and, through the strength and mutual support of group interaction, to encourage self- 
reliance, both individually and communally and foster the confidence to strive for social change' 
(IFAD, 1989: 8, my emphasis). As a former TNCDW official made very clear, the explicit focus 
of the Corporation's programme, was on women rather than gender (interview, June 2007). 
Notwithstanding the affirmative emphasis on the empowerment of women and 'social change', 
the project primarily involved integrating women into the mainstream, by repositioning them as 
creditworthy and potentially capable individuals in need of an enabling environment in order to 
participate in mainstream processes and institutions. 
However, because the parallel structure of the self-help group and its associated processes and 
practices had to be created in order to empower women suggests that this was still a strategy 
which emphasized women's difference. Women's access to institutional credit was made 
possible by the operational dynamics of the self-help group model adopted which relied on 
(social capital', defined as informal networks, benefits, and norms generated by associational 
practices. Microfinance organizations, mainstream development agencies, and commercial banks 
positively associate 'social capital, with the dynamic of peer pressure, which enables higher 
repayment rates for creditors (Rankin, 2002; Mayoux, 1995). Such outcomes rely upon what 
Rankin calls a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture', nurtured within microfinance 
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programmes by a detailed and strict regime of disciplinary practices on group members. 
Accordingly, 
'it is women's responsiveness to the discipline of weekly repayment schedules - and to 
a highly disciplinary institutional culture involving wearing uniforms, chanting slogans, 
singing songs and taking oaths - that may be credited for the extraordinarily high 
repayment rates of most microfinance programmes' 
(Rankin, 2004: 189). 
Such a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture' was evident in Mahalir Thittarn, withý the 
cultivation of a number of self-regulating technologies which mould individual and group 
behaviour around programmatic norms, which included highly detailed grading and assessment 
procedures which in turn determined access to credit. The SHG model gained significant support', 
from the banking sector, which, also driven by efficiency concerns, was persuaded that the self- 
help group model is an effective and cost-efficient way to expand the demand for institutional 
credit and savings among the newly creditworthy rural poor. As one Reserve Bank of India 
circular to commercial banks emphasized 
... the linking of SHGs with the banks is a cost effective, transparent and flexible 
approach to improve the accessibility of credit from the formal banking system to the 
unreached rural poor. It is expected to offer the much needed solution to the twin 
problems being faced by the banks, viz recovery of loans in the rural areas and the high 
transaction cost in dealing with small borrowers at frequent intervals. 
(RBI, 1996) 
The advantage of self-help groups consisted of lower transaction costs because the model 
enabled the bank to deal with groups rather than individuals, high repayment rates which were 
facilitated by the institutional dynamics of peer group pressure among self-help group members, 
and the absence of a pre-requisite for individual security for collateral from debtors, which was 
instead provided by group collateral. 
It also enabled the implementing agency to govern a large number of program participants from 
afar, including encouraging them to govern themselves through federating individual groups into 
higher bodies, and thus appealed to the efficiency concerns of the wider development discourse 
of the state government. Women's self-help groups were also seen as a highly convenient and 
accessible institutional delivery entry point for other government schemes. The convergence of 
all government poverty alleviations schemes through self-help groups was listed as one of the 
main focus areas for Social Welfare under the Tenth Five Year Plan of Tamil Nadu (GoTN, 
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'2003c: 330). However, as a former TNCDW official observed, the attention from other 
government departments often increased the burden of participation on women SHG members 
(discussed further in Chapter 7). Instead of opening upwards and ushering in a process of self- 
reflection across different government departments, through a logic of 'convergence' different 
departments effectively closed down and inwards towards delivery at the local level. 
The structural-transformative discourse was perhaps the most marginal gendered development 
discourse in state policy, but it was manifest in several policies. Development policy in Tamil 
Nadu recognised the two problems of, firstly, structural gender inequalities which prevent 
women from possessing an independent economic asset base, and secondly, poverty and the low 
incomes of poor households. For example, the Tenth Five Year Plan states, 
To be asset less, unemployed, illiterate, destitute and yet over worked, tired and weak is 
the lot of most rural women in India ... Mhrough their lack of recognition in society, 
women are powerless, deprived of access to improved means of production through 
credit, technical advice, training, marketing skills etc. 
(GoT'N, 2003c: 328) 
One of the reasons for women's lower status was that 'crucial decision making powers within the 
households are still with the males'(GoTN, 2003c: 320). Furthermore, it was also acknowledged 
that women's income is often crucial in poor households. 
... [A]Ithough accorded little social status or recognition, women's earnings are frequently essential to the survival of the family. In many cases women are the actual de 
facto heads of the family by virtue of desertion, migration, illness, unemployment or the 
addictive habits of their husbands. 
(GoTN, 2003c: 328) 
This recognition and positioning of women as a member whose (at least economic) contribution 
is 'essential to the survival of the family' stands in tension with how, elsewhere, women are 
positioned as dependent subjects. For instance, contrast the previous statements with the 
following critical observation: 
Within the family, a woman is treated as a social and financial dependent, controlled by 
the family in every aspect of her life; having had little or no education, her worth is 
measured in terms of her ability to produce male children or bring in money/assets; she 
no longer belongs to her father's family whilst her position in her husband's family is 
conditional. 
(GoTN, 2003c: 320) 
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Jayalalithaa's 18 Point Programmefor Women and Child Welfare, otherwise known as Visio -n 
2010, and released when the AIADMK was elected back into off-ice in 2001, aimed to revive the 
15 Point Programme previously unveiled in 1993. The programme emphasized a number of 
4critical governance issues' which the programme sought to reform, and which indicated a 
willingness to transform the gendered practices and orientation of the state bureaucracy (GoTN, 
2001b). Significantly, the programme emphasised the need for a gender sensitive approach as the 
'hallmark' of the programme. The 'patriarchal attitude of Indian society' was identified as 'one 
of the major underlying causes for the violations and non-fulfilment of many of the rights of 
children and women ... and the low status given to women and girls' (ibid: 13). The programme 
listed the sensitization of 'management styles, techniques and work culture in government 
departments' towards issues relating to women and children, although it did not elaborate further 
on what this would entail. However, these initiatives didn't seem to have a prominent place in 
the state policy priorities. 
Mahalir Thittam. articulated a number of policy aims which articulated a structural- 
transformative discourse: one aim was to 'create or reorient' processes and institutions to enable 
women's participation and decision-making, another envisioned a co-operative and egalitarian 
relationship between men and women gas equal partners' and sought to 'inspire a new generation 
of women and men to work together for equality, sustainability, and communal harmony, and a 
further three aims sought to achieve 'equality of status of poor women as participants, decision 
makers and beneficiaries', to promote and ensure women's human rights; and to influence 
Government policy in favour of 'disadvantaged' women (TNCDW, 2000b: 17). 
Andhra Pradesh 
Notwithstanding the populist appeals of NT Rama Rao's TDP government up to the mid 1990s, 
the protective-paternalist discourse was perhaps the weakest of the three discourses in Andhra 
Pradesh State development policy. Even if at times GoAP recognised women as a vulnerable 
group, it was often followed by a policy commitment to empower women or eliminate the 
discrimination which had led to their marginalisation. In other words, their vulnerability was 
understood as an aberration and not something inherent to women as a group. Policy attention to 
vulnerable women was not justified on the basis of affection or nurture. For instance, the Girl 
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Child Protection Scheme in AP aimed to 'eliminate gender discrimination, to eradicate female 
infanticide, to improve the sex ratio and empower and protect the rights of girl children and 
women' (GoAP, 2005a) The scheme aimed to facilitate 'the emergence of a girl child to become 
a strong and assertive individual who will command equal status and respect in society' (ibid). 
'This stronger articulation of a equality and rights-based perspective stands in contrast to the 
,, benevolent charity articulated 
by the Tamil Nadu state policy (although the AP policy still 
ernployed criteria enforcing small family norms). Likewise, a number of AP government policies 
on child trafficking and adoption regulations for which the state could potentially articulate a 
protective-paternalist role, particularly in the wake of an adoption-trafficking scandal in 2001, 
have not articulated a paternalist discourse. 98 
", The competitive-capabilities discourse was by far the most dominant gendered development 
discourse articulated in development policy at the state level. Vision 2020 emphasised building 
capabilities in nutrition, education, health and employment to ensure a healthy, skilled and 
educated workforce. It emphasised removing barriers to gender equality based on policies which 
would enable equal treatment of women and men, proposing that 'a girl child born in this year 
will have as many chances as her brothers will to go to school, find a job and live a healthy and 
productive life' (GoAP, 1999: 2). The policy envisioned that through empowerment, women and 
girls would be enabled to 'fulfil their roles as equal shapers, with men of the economy and 
society' (GoAP, 1999). Women were positioned as assets to state and national development, with 
immense potential as untapped resources: 'women represent 50 per cent of the population, yet 
their productive potential remains largely untapped' (GoAP, 1999: 68). Investment in women's 
empowerment in areas such as education were often justified by the positive externalities they 
produced for families (in the 
form of increased income expenditure on the household improving 
nutritional, health, and educational levels of other household members) and on the perceived 
effect of women's education 
in lowering fertility levels. For example, Vision 2020 in AP stated 
98 Child trafficking is a particularly serious problem in Andhra Pradesh, and in 2001 it emerged that several adoption 
agencies which rehoused girl children given up 
for adoption were actually bogus agencies which were trafficking 
girl children 
including across state borders. This prompted the government to ban a scheme which allowed for the 
&relinquishment' of unwanted girl children to state institutions, in a similar manner to that of the Cradle Baby 
scheme in Tamil 
Nadu. The government also prohibited non-state agencies from carrying out adoptions. Critics of 
the ban have suggested that the 
ban will not solve the problem and may increase instances of unmonitored 
abandonments and 
female infanticide (see Nair and Sen (2005) and Sharma (200 lb) for a discussion of these events 
in AP and their wider implications). 
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Education also leads to improvement in other critical areas such as health and family 
planning. Studies have --ho-, -, -i that educated women can take better decisions about 
nutrition and heaithcare for their famiiies. They are aiso more open to famfly planning 
and have fewer children. 
(GoAP, 1999) 
Women were positioned as highly responsible for the overall development process: 'Andhra 
Pradesh's development goals cannot be achieved without harnessing the potential of its women' 
(GoAP, 1999: 84). Their empowerment was seen as 'critical to achieving the transition to 
development' (Vision 2020, p. 68). Vision 2020 saw women's increasing participation in 
employment as a positive development, and to encourage this development further, it proposed 
to 'eliminate' a number of gender inequalities such as women's 'lower pay and restricted access 
to employment opportunities and skill development'. A combination of strategies were 
prescribed including the enforcement of equal pay legislation, continuing its 'hard' affirmative 
action policy of reserving a third of government and public sector jobs for women, and softer 
affirmative action strategies of targeted schemes for providing training, self-employment, and 
institutional credit linkages (GoAP, 1999: 69). Policies in Vision 2020 to bring about equitable 
development of 'vulnerable' groups sought to combine both soft approaches to affirmative action 
and more temporary protective safety nets: 
Andhra Pradesh's long-term programme for developing its people, i. e., building their 
capabilities through healthcare and education and creating employment opportunities 
through economic growth, will sharply reduce the number of such vulnerable people in 
the State. However, until these developmental goals are achieved, the poor and other 
vulnerable groups must be protected and provided with an acceptable standard of living. 
(GoAP, 1999: 56-7) 
Alongside encouraging women into the workforce, the government also pledged to increase the 
provision of childcare, albeit leaving largely undisturbed the expectation that women and 
adolescent girls were the primary caregivers in the household. 
The strongest articulation of a structural-transformative discourse of gendered development in 
Andhra Pradesh was found in the self-help group program administered by the parastatal agencys 
the Society for the Elimination of Poverty. To recall, this agency was responsible for 
implementing the World Bank assisted Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives Project 
(APDPIP), its successor, the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project (APRPRP) - both 
of which were known collectively as Velugu, and then later under the Congress government, the 
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Indira Kranthi Pratham. scheme which had merged Velugu with a central government self-help 
group scheme, the SGSY. The project design of Velugu articulated a strong explicit commitment 
to-- social transformation; one of its guiding principles aimed to 'alter the relations of power' 
(SERP, c. 2002: 4). Also like Vision 2020, participatory development was also given high 
priority. Velugu envisioned that it was 'through decentralized, community based, people 
participatory approach alone that the poor are made equal partners in eliminating poverty and 
enable themselves to change their destinies' (SERP, c. 2002: 1). The participatory features of the 
programme were considered particularly important for enabling agency of the poor (SERP, 
C1 . 2002: 
2). The programme claimed to foreground a 'positive rights-based empowerment 
approach' (SERP, c. 2002: 2). Inequitable power relations were considered central to 
understanding the pervasiveness of poverty: 
Poverty has become deep rooted as large sections of people are denied equality in the 
control of resources and are not included in the decision making process. As such 
widespread poverty must be seen as a political process as it denotes undeniable 
violation of human rights. 
(SERP, c. 2002: 1) 
The poor were interpellated as competent and independent agents: '... the poor have tremendous 
potential to help themselves and that this potential can 
be harnessed by organizing them. The 
poor have demonstrated that when adequate skills and inputs in community organization, 
rnanagement and action are provided they can shape their 
destinies' (SERP, c. 2002) 
The programme demonstrated that it was not restricted to just micro-credit but also involved a 
powerful social-transformative component. Gender was one of a number of 'action-oriented 
strategies' for social mobilisation and social change in the program. The gender strategy of 
Velugu claimed to extend beyond targeting of women to address gender specific disparities 
(SERP and Centre for World Solidarity, 2006: 2). It also recognised differences among women; 
, women are a hetereogeneous group and that gender inequalities are linked with other 
inequalities related to caste, class and religion' (ibid). 
Emphasis was placed on training and sensitisation of both program participants and personnel. A 
Gender Resource Group was established at the State level for the purposes of consultation and 
training, comprising 'representatives from various sectors like academicians, law, research, 
education, NGOs working on gender issues, activists on women's empowerment, health, human 
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rights etc. ' (SERP, c. 2002: 32). A similar arrangement existed at the district level. Social action 
commillees are established at village level to address social issues. The project claimed that 
gender, equity concerns had been built into guidelines and criteria for funding sub-proj ects from 
the Community Investment Fund. Women were trained to act as paralegal workers in order to 
address violence against women in a number of the project districts. Internally, SERP established 
its own HR policy on sexual harassment in the organisation which has become operational 
(GoAP Dept of Rural Development, 2005: 53). 
However, there were still considerable limitations to the model adopted by SERP. One of these 
concerned the opportunities for group members to opt for non-conventional forms of livelihood. 
As a senior official involved in SERP commented 
... we have decided to focus on the existing livelihoods of the rural poor... We realized 
with a project of our scale ... even to support existing livelihoods itself is quite a 
complicated task. So rather than pick up new livelihoods, we decided to focus on 
whatever they're doing ... Whatever people are doing, it is our duty to support those livelihoods, rather than identify new livelihoods depending on our own particular 
choice. However, wherever there are new opportunities which we can tap with the 
support of some NGOs this requires a longer period of time. That also we have 
facilitated in a few cases. 
(Vijay Kumar, in World Bank, 2004: c. 30 mins 43 secs) 
Furthermore, as discussed further in the next Chapter, convergence of departmental schemes of 
the government through SERP was strongly emphasised, and this created problems for SERP for 
co-ordination and administration these schemes, but also demonstrated that the self-help groups 
were seen as a popular institutional delivery point for the government. 
6.4 Comparative discussion: discursive interaction within and between states 
While I have presented varied policy articulations of three dominant gendered discourses of 
development, it is important to acknowledge that that at least traces of each discourse could be 
found in most policies. Furthermore, because of the existence of these three competing 
discourses both within and across government departments, the policies which were then 
established to address the specific discursive construction of gendered development not 
surprisingly were varied and sometimes contradictory. 
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Important similarities between states are evident in the gendered development discourses of state 
policy. Common to both states is a commitment towards intervention to improve the status of 
women in the form of some kind of affirmative action, even if the proposed action does little to 
challenge gender inequities. Development policy in both states also embodies a strong appeal to 
a utilitarian, rather than intrinsic or rights-based perspective of gender-equitable development. 
Yet, some discourses were articulated more prominently in one state compared the other. While, 
the competitive-capabilities discourse was also observed in both states, the protective-paternalist 
discourse was strong in Tamil Nadu but not so much in Andhra Pradesh, and in contrast, the 
structural-transformative discourse was much stronger in Andhra Pradesh than Tamil Nadu. 
particular differences were evident at the parastatal level. The parastatal programmes in Tamil 
Nadu under study are characterized by a less radical, more integrative approach, whereas those in 
Andhra Pradesh envision a much more transformative project of altering power relations through 
the social mobilization and participation, of the poor. The contrast is stronger in Andhra Pradesh 
where there is a considerable emphasis on rights-based empowerment of the poor at the 
parastatal level, even though the self-help group model, popular in both States, appeals to the 
efficiency concerns of the ivider development discourse of the two state governments. 
On some level, parastatal policy was seen as a stronger articulation of the more critically 
informed elements of the wider state policy. In other words, parastatal policy in Tamil was a 
stronger articulation of the competitive-capabilities discourse of state policy, and in Andhra 
pradesh the traces of the structural-transformative discourse in state policy were augmented in 
the programs of SERP. This suggests an interesting feature of parastatal policies: that to some 
extent they are able to transcend the more conservative elements of state policy (although 
whether this creates a conducive kind of agency for gender mainstreaming will be discussed 
further in the next chapter). The interesting question that remains is why might this be the case? 
Could it be that the relative autonomy of parastatal. agencies and the increased circulation of 
gendered development discourses due to international agency funding creates openings for more 
gender-responsive policies? Nevertheless, parastatal agency discourse still resembled in many 
ways the wider state level development diýcourse. So on other hand, this suggests that the 
discursive possibilities for strategies of State-level gender-equitable development are still 
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strongly determined by, or at least have a strong inter-textual link vAth dominant state-level 
discoufses ofue-velopil-jel-It. 
Finally, analyzing policies as a product of the discourses they articulate was n, ot' a 
straightforward exercise. Policy was not always inferential from the most prominent diagnoses'of 
gendered development policy 'problems', which perhaps suggests only the superficial 
institutional sedimentation of more progressive discourses and the ability of more conservative 
or established discourses to endure in policy. For example, in Tamil Nadu structural- 
transformative constructions of gendered discrimination against the girl child and preferences for 
male children, practices of female infanticide, female foeticide and dowry, became transformed 
into the targets of protective-paternalist policies. This enabled the state to perform a protective- 
paternalist role while leaving unchallenged societal norms which sanctioned such discrimination. 
On the other hand, in AP where the protective-paternalist discourse was weak, policies which 
might have been considered protective-paternalist in Tamil Nadu enunciated a more structural- 
transformative discourse. 
6.5 Conclusions 
What then are the implications of these discursive configurations for opportunities to mainstream 
gender in development policy? The analysis of opportunities for gender mainstreaming in Tamil 
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh is often complicated by the absence of an explicit discussion in policy 
of the conceptual 'diagnosis' of policy problems. Even less evident is a specific. 
acknowledgement or commitment to 'gender mainstreaming' per se - which seems to be a 
significant characteristics of the acceptance (or not in this case) of gender mainstreaming 
strategies at the state level. One mention is made of gender mainstreaming in Jayalalithaa's 18 
Point Programme, but as outlined earlier this was largely a redundant feature of the policy. Part 
of the mission of Mahalir Thittain was 'to advocate changes in government policies and 
programmes in favor of disadvantaged women' (TNCDW, 2000b: 17). However, such 
cmainstreaming' was not designed to take place at an organizational level in the Government for 
the purposes of effecting change in wider government policy. In contrast, any prospect of 
mainstreaming gender across the State Government as a transforinative strategy was superseded 
by a discourse based on efficiency which prioritized convergence and streamlined delivery of 
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schemes and benefits to women through the institutional opening of the SHG (discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter). Involvement with and exposure to the women's empowerment 
programme was relatively limited to departments in close proximity. Given the scale of the 
programme, sensitisation of government participants to gender issues even o, n paper included 
only those directly involved with the programme, if at all. What was notable of Vision 2020 was 
that the absence of the explicit language of 'gender mainstreaming' seemed to be context- 
specific. A 'mainstreaming' strategy appears as a policy instrument in the Vision 2020 document 
with regards to disability, but not with regards to gender equality. Similarly, a rights-based 
approach to gender equality is also marginal in Vision 2020, but a rights-based discourse is 
prevalent within policy discussions of child welfare. 
For the most part, if either government has sought to address the problem of gender-inequitable 
development at all, gender and development policy in both TN and AP has adopted a 
combination of integrative and affirmative action policies. The possibility for the emergence of a 
potentially more radical, destabilizing, and transformative discourse of empowerment 
has been 
$colonized' by a more liberal, integrative discourse (even though the possibility of the latter's 
fixity is never complete, while it is still dominant). Furthermore, the policy objective of 
empowering women has an ambiguous relationship with the achievement of gender equality. 
Firstly, women's empowerment is not commonly justified by an explicit commitment to gender 
equality per se. Often, it involves a more implicit commitment to gender equality, that of raising 
women's status, which only occasionally make references to the comparative status of men. 
Furthermore, where references to gender equality or gender equity are made, these are often 
highly ambiguous. If nothing else, this demonstrates that, in the context studied here, the term 
, women's empowerment' is polysemic, and thus malleable and highly contingent, and often 
connotes more than it is able to deliver. No doubt this justifies the scrutiny surrounding its 
appropriation by governments, mainstream development agencies, and professional and 
technocratic NGOs in contrast to its more radical beginnings. 
Squires argues that 'as long as gender equality is framed by dominant considerations of utility 
with respect to other existing policy priorities, mainstreaming will remain an integrationist rather 
than a transformative practice, manifesting a strategy of inclusion rather than displacement' 
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(Squires, 2007a: 150). Thus, as long as development policy in both states articulate gendered 
development in terms of efficiency and the positive externalities investing in 'women's 0 
development' and 'women's empowerment' can have on wider development processes, 
processes of development are less likely to be scrutinized for gender-inequitable processes and 
outcomes. Furthermore, given the importance of income-generating schemes and the 
prominence of rural development departments, gender-equitable development will continue to be 
associated with poverty reduction, and the wider impact of processes of development will 
continue to evade policy attention. Thus, the possibilities for a transformative approach to gender 
mainstreaming at the state level, at present at least, are highly questionable. In the next chapter, I 
examine the kinds of agency constituted by the institutional and discursive. contexts already 
discussed, in order to understand whether these kinds of agency offer opportunities for more 
transformative gender mainstreaming strategies for state level policy. 
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7 GENDERED DEVELOPMENTAL SUBJECTMTIES AND THE 
IMPORTANC 'E OF AGENCY 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I mapped the various, competing discourses of gendered development in 
State-level and parastatal policy in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. I paid particular attention 
to how these discourses interpellated particular actors such as the state and women as subjects 
and objects of development, whether weak and dependent or agents of and participants in 
development processes. I argued that these discourses differed across different institutional and 
policy contexts according to the relative dominance of a particular discourse. In this chapter, the 
aim is to explore the possibilities for, and limitations on, agency as a result of these discursive 
and institutional practices. By examining the gendered developmental subjectivities which 
ernerge as a result, it is possible to understand not only the extent to which there exists 
possibilities for agency, but also what kind of agency this might be, and most importantly, the 
possibilities that this agency creates for particular individuals and groups to promote or obfuscate 
efforts to mainstream gender into development policy. 
To recall from Chapter 2, the concept of 'agency' employed in this thesis is based on the 
theoretical premise that agency comes from, firstly, the authority accorded to each subject as 
positioned within a particular discourse, and secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the 
simultaneous existence of different subject positions and the ensuing dislocatory effect of 
competing discourses, which creates momentary openings for creative capacity and agency. Thus 
we may define two possibilities of agency - agency within discourse, and agency as a result of 
dislocation. The focus on the discursive articulation of gendered developmental subjects in the 
previous chapter thus enables an understanding of 'how it becomes possible for subjects to act as 
agents -- .' (Doty, 
1997: 3 84). Thus the focus should be not only how some subjects are accorded 
Inore agency than others within a particular discourse, but also the possibilities that arise for 
agency due to the existence of the complex interaction of multiple, unstable, open, and 
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competing discourses, and the potential these dislocatory moments offer for transformative 
change. The more hegemonic a discourse, the least likely it is that alternative subject positions 00 
which emerge, and the fewer opportunities for dislocatory agency. 
I argue that the possibilities which emerge as a product of the institutional and discursive 
positioning of subjects and agents of development are highly complex and differentiated both 
between and among different sets of actors, and between and within different institutional and 
discursive contexts. I conclude that while the extent of agency is in some cases quite substantial, 
it is not always the right kind of agency to enable mainstreaming strategies. 
In order to demonstrate this argument, the analysis presented in this chapter encompasses a non- 
exhaustive array of actors including the women SHG members of the respective parastatal 
programs in each State, bureaucrats and parastatal agency personnel, political leaders, and the 
women's movement within (and, where relevant, beyond) each State. I also briefly acknowledge 
in the conclusion a number of important actors, which were originally beyond the remit of this 
study, but for whom the process of data collection and analysis revealed to be important - these 
include the role of NGOs, banking institutions, and international organisations. As discussed in 
Chapter One, without political will and commitment from political leaders it is likely that gender 
mainstrearning initiatives will fail, as will they if bureaucrats formulating and implementing 
development policies are unsupportive or if supportive bureaucrats have little control over policy 
content and processes. The agency of women SHG members and of members of the women's 
movement is perhaps the mostIMportant to understand in terms of enabling a more deliberative 
democratic model of gender mainstrearning. As Squires argues, 'state feminist' policy agencies 
'can facilitate the influence of feminist arguments for womeds political representation, and the 
inclusion of women in decision-making processes, but only where the women! s movement is 
cohesive on this issue and the policy environment is receptive' (Squires, 2007b: 176). In other 
words, without a strong women's movement making political demands on the state, and on 
which is also representative of the poor rural women that are numerically dominant in SHGs, 
5tate policy agencies supportive of feminist arguments will find it difficult to promote such 
arguments and feminist participation within state policy-making processes. 
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Given the wide range of actors in different institutional settings, the comparative analysis for 
-Tamil 
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh is not presented separately, as has been the case in previous 
chapters, but rather is presented in passim. 
7.2 The Women of the Self-Help Groups 
I-low does the discursive positioning of women as subjects in the State's gendered development 
discourse create possibilities for, or constraints on, women's agency? In this section I argue that, 
because the competitive-capability discourse and the structural-transformative discourse both 
interpellated women as responsible agents, these discourses increased women's potential for 
agency relative to their interpellation as weak, vulnerable, and dependent subjects of a paternalist 
protectionist discourse. However, I also argue that it was in the production of this new gendered 
developmental subjectivity that presented potentially more detrimental implications for women. 
The agency accorded to women SHG members had in many cases a number of empowering 
effects in each State, as suggested by program evaluations. A major trend has been the large 
proportion of SHG members contesting elections at the panchayat level - one study estimated 
that nearly one third of SHGs in AP have at least one member that has contested elections and 
riearly a quarter of SHGs have members that have been elected to the panchayats (EDA/APMAS, 
2006). 99 
policy instruments which aimed to empower women were substantially (although not wholly) 
directed towards women and their setf-improvement, suggesting that the problem of their 
disempowered status remained with women alone, and that it was women who had to build their 
own capacities in order to participate in mainstream development processes. In part, this was 
suggested by the focus of State policies articulating a competitive-capability discourse, 
obligating women to take advantage of the preferential policies designed for them. This was 
rioticeable in both States' policies. 
99 Although as the study also notes, 'in the southern states, nearly all the women SHO members who stood for 
election came from families active 
in local mainstream politics'. suggesting that 'selection as a candidate for the 
panchayat, therefore, 
is typically a question of money, contacts, and political networks outside an SHG' 
(EDA/APMAS, 2006: 59). 
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However, the emphasis on women's self-improvement was far more noticeable in Tamil Nadu, 
at the parastatal level in TNCDW. Nothing exemplified this more than when, during a visit to the 
TNCDW headquarters in December 2005, an official in TNCDW passed to me the most recent 
copy of Mutram ('courtyard'), the Corporation's monthly newsletter for SHGs (see Figure 10). It 
had on the front cover a picture of a potter's wheel which, the official explained to me, signified 
4a woman moulding herself', through a process of self-development. In other words, women 
were expected to mould themselves into newly empowered women. While this may be seen as 
increased agency for women to act on themselves in a refashioning project of the self, it suggests 
limits on the reasons why women were perceived to be initially disempowered. Thus a key 
narrative in evaluations of project success focused on the extent to which the women participants 
of the programme the transformation had taken place. 
Program literature suggests a tendency to overstate the program's success, which is consistent 
with the logic inherent in development programs to produce narratives of success (Mosse, 2005: 
8; Jakimow and Kilby, 2006). This was phenomenon was more observable in Tamil Nadu than in 
Andhra Pradesh, a possible explanation for which partly concerned the more vocal scrutiny of 
women9s organizations in AP, discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
In the more critically informed microfinance literature, there is a strong recognition that 
microcredit programs serve to discipline rather than empower women participants. As discussed 
above, the popularity of microfinance programmes for women among banking and credit 
agencies rests on the perceived twin advantages of low transaction costs and high repayment 
rates. Such outcomes rely upon what Rankin calls a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture', 
nurtured within microfmance programmes by a detailed and strict regime of disciplinary 
practices on group members. Accordingly, 
'it is women's responsiveness to the discipline of weekly repayment schedules - and to 
a highly disciplinary institutional culture involving wearing uniforms, chanting slogans, 
singing songs and taking oaths - that may be credited for the extraordinarily high 
repayment rates of most microfinance programmes' 
(Rankin, 2004: 189). 
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Figure 10 Nlutram, a potter's wheel, and the self-regulating technologies of empowerment 
discourse 
Such a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture', I argue, can be observed in both 
Mahalir Thittam and Velugu/IKP. The effect is the cultivation of a number of self- 
regulating technologies which moulds individual and group behaviour around 
programmatic norms, which also enables the implementing agency to govern a large 
number of program participants from afar. In part, this works through a neoliberal 
discourse which transfers the responsibility for development from the state onto non- 
state actors, including individuals and communities (Rankin, 2002: 10). However, I 
argue that while this develops a new managerial subjectivity for women, it is not 
necessarily empowering in ways that might challenge gender inequalities. 
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Embedded in the program design of both AP and TN parastatal programs is a detailed and strict 
regime of practices which every group must adhere to and will be graded upon, determining their 
creditworthiness for formal lending. The grading process involves a detailed list of criteria for 
evaluating SHG performance including frequency of meetings, attendance at meetings, member 
participation in meetings, frequency of savings, average savings per month, criteria relating to 
internal loans and rotation of savings, repayment of internal and formal loans, book-keeping, 
group accounts auditing, and group regulatory mechanisms. Group members are responsible for 
maintaining and updating on a regular basis seven different books and registers. Groups that 
meet weekly are marked higher than those that rneet less frequently, as are groups that save more 
regularly (the most marks for weekly savings), have higher attendance (above eighty percent is 
deemed high) and higher participation ('high' is again above eighty percent). Groups that score 
highly overall in the grading process, normally undertaken by their facilitating NGO, then 
become eligible for applying for formal credit. As a result, while individual members join a 
group based on entitlement criteria, determined by poverty line estimates, the group's access to 
formal credit, a key component of the scheme and marker of group success, is based on 
performance-related criteria, and criteria which are largely unrelated to social empowerment 
objectives. 100 
As in many SHG-based microfinance programs, the SHG model adopted in both Mahalir 
ýhittarn and Velugu/IKP relied on group pressure to enforce the repayment of loans, both 
internally and to the formal lending agency. The willingness of group members to exert peer 
pressure on other group members is frequently cited both as an effective means of loan recovery 
and an attractive prospect for lending agencies in terms of reducing transaction costs by reducing 
the level of external intervention in groups. In part, this group compliance is enforced by a 
collective oath-taking ritual at the start of every meeting. 101 
However, while these discursive practices discipline and regulate the behavior and norms Of 
program participants, such disciplinary technologies are never fully successful and complete, and 
100 Although it has to be noted that these scheme somewhat crudely award 'bonus points' to groups for preventing 
dowry payments and occurrences of female infanticide 101 The MaThi pledge was designed by MYRADA, an NGO working withTNCDW. At the time of research, it was- 
not clear whether there was a scheme-wide oath for groups in Velugu/IKP. 
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that. 'what we have, instead, are partial and contradictory subjects of development who occupy 
certain identity slots that development discourse creates for them while contesting others' 
(Shanna, 2001 a: 8). 
In the case of Mahalir Thittam in Tamil Nadu, the role envisioned for SHGs was extensive, 
proposing that SHGs would become a key institutional component in the delivery of government 
programmes. The programme envisioned 'massive and intensive involvement and participation 
of SHGs' in government schemes which, it was expected, would lead to 'greater transparency, 
outreach and impact of economic development programmes' (TNCDW, 2000b: 47). This 
ernphasis on convergence placed an undue burden on self-help group members as a former 
TNCDW official explained: 
... in some ways, there were some negative 
implications also, because other government 
departments... basically everyone started eyeing these groups. The Health Department 
thought it was just easier to piggyback on the regularity of these institutions ... For 
example, health schemes, family planning, education department started wanting to go 
through them for promoting family school enrolment. ... The nutrition scheme for 
women and children, nutrition, the importance of regular AlDs monitoring ... Everything 
started being piggybacked onto these groups which in some ways was good up to a 
point but in some ways, it became, it could have become a burden... [O]thers thought it 
was efficient to work through these groups ...... things started working better through the 
groups. There were also concerns that there was too much being expected of these 
groups. We had to make that as part of the training, including training of trainers, 
[saying to theml. 'you know it has to make sense for you, don't just take on every social 
service without building your capacity to do so. And it's ok to say yes to certain things 
and find other ways to do other things'... Basically we wanted the women to do what 
they wanted out of their choice, rather than dictating, being pressured by other 
departments... It was just more efficient to have all services converged... it was 
efficient, and everybody was tempted to do that... 
(Interview with former TNCDW official) 
Furthermore, governmental and non-governmental. agencies were urged to 'use the 
organizational capabilities of SHGs to improve local governance' (ibid). SHGs became involved 
in running fair price shops of the Public Distribution System, government sanitation programs, 
and in a case reported by the media in October 2006, the lKP Mahila Mandal Samakhya had 
contracted with the state's public sector power utility to act as an intermediary to supply power, 
guard against power theft, and administer billing and revenue collection (The Hindu, 2006). 
The participation of programme beneficiaries in State empowerment programs at a level which 
establishes some level of decision-making regarding the direction of the program is understood 
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to be an enabling factor for women's agency, even if alone it is not a sufficient condition for 
women's empowerment (Jakimow and Kilby, 2006). As outlined earlier in Chapter 5, 
opportunities for women SHG member's participation in the SHG programs varied between 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and was more institutionalized in the AP program than in TN. 
A potential opportunity for agency arises in the programmatic thrust to federate SHGs into 
higher level institutions, as it aims to create an institutional mechanism for the collective 
organization of SHGs and increase their bargaining power and collective voice (Nair, 2005). It 
also provides a mandated space for SHG members to come together and articulate and discuss 
their own experiences of the program and to raise issues for debate (Jakimow and Kilby, 2006: 
383). 
Both SERP and TNCDW have adopted the objective of federating SHGs into larger units. In 
Tamil Nadu, this objective slowly evolved over time; in AP it was built in to the program model 
from the beginning; but given that the Velugu program in AP was designed several years later, 
the thrust towards federating occurred around a similar time. 102 These federated institutions art as 
apex organizations for SHG members, providing services such as book-keeping and training. 
They also act as onlenders to SHGs, and in turn are sustained by the interest they charge SHGs 
for loans, as well as the marginal interest earned on the savings they hold. 
SHG federations have been viewed positively by both parastatal. agencies in AP and TN. For 
example, a TNCDW report suggested that 'federations can be very successful when the decision- 
making process and the operations at the group level are truly democratic, efficient and based on 
sound operational principles in the overall interest of group members' (TNCDW, 2000a). A 
senior TNCDW official suggested that the quality of those federations formed had varied, but 
was optimistic about their potential (interview, TNCDW official, January 2006). One evaluation 
of federations in the AP program observed that 'federations of SHGs are fast becoming powerful 
voices expressing the social and economic needs of the poor' (Deslunukh-Ranadive, 2004: 1). 
Furthermore, to some extent, federating SHGs may reduce the burden placed on individual SHGs 
102 In Tamil Nadu, SHGs are federated into block level federations (BLFs) and then into cluster level federations 
(CLFs). SHG Federations in Tamil Nadu are are sometimes referred to as kalanjiams (following the Dhan 
Foundation approach). In Andhra Pradesh, SHGs are federated into Village Level Organisations and then into 
Mandal Mahila Samakhyas, the latter being located at the mandal (sub-district administrative area) headquarters. 
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as the government shifts its focus to federations as implementing agencies. HoweVer, a study by 
APMAS, an NGO closely associated with the AP parastatal, suggested that federations are 
highly dependent on the promoting organization and the staff that the latter transfer to support 
the federation (Reddy and Prakash, 2003). 
Providing a structural mechanism for collective voice, identity, and increased bargaining power 
is only one of a number of concerns driving parastatal. efforts to federate SHGs. One of the most 
I prominent is to enable the sustainability of SHGs. Perhaps more significant however, are three 
other key commonly cited concerns identified by Nair (2005: 15-18) : that of reducing 
transaction costs (of agencies dealing with SHGs), reducing the incidence of default among SHG 
lenders, and reducing the cost of SHG formation. Key questions remain as to what extent does 
the purpose behind federating SHGs and the activities in which the federations are engaged 
produce an effect which disciplines rather than enables? To what extent does this disciplining 
dynamic restrict the potential of federations to provide individual and collective agency to 
sHGs? 
7.3 Bureaucratic actors 
I)iscursive and institutional practices of development policy and programs demonstrated a 
number of ways in which the agency of bureaucratic actors was both enabled and constrained. 
Narratives of gender-sensitised bureaucrats constitute a potential new developmental subjectivity 
for bureaucratic actors. Potential opportunities for gender-sensitisation existed in either of two 
ways: gender training, and exposure to gender-equitable development concepts and practices 
through postings to parastatal programs. On the first option, there did not appear to be a state 
level policy in either state on gender training. The respective state departments of personnel were 
responsible for training at the State level, and operated training programs on the basis of 
nominations from other State government departments. As a result, training at the IAS level is 
often only voluntary, based on individuals identifying their own training needs and putting 
themselves forward, as well as demand driven, based on the identification by individuals, 
through their department heads (which also have the ability to control training requirements). In 
terms of gender training in particular, given the time at which it was introduced at the LBS 
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National Academy of Administration, most IAS officers now in senior positions would not have 
received gender training as part oftheir induction period in Mussorie. However, most have the 
opportunity to attend gender training during their mid-career training. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that it is not always initially well received: one IAS officer recalled a situation to me in 
which participating IAS officers raised several hostile questions towards the gender trainer at the 
beginning of a two-day session, and which made the participating officer uncomf6rtable. 
Fortunately, the trainer was able to overcome these hostile questions and participants were more 
compliant throughout the remainder of the session as a result (interview, IAS officer, June 2007). 
But it is less clear as to how this might differ among individual bureaucrats, across the two 
states, and across different government departments and parastatal agencies within' states, 
particularly given the gendered pattern of postings outlined earlier in Chapter Five. 
The other option, exposure through postings, seems also to have varying potential. In Tamil 
Nadu, the IFAD Completion Evaluation report of the Tamil Nadu Women's Development 
Project (the precursor to Mahalir Thittam) claimed that officials associated with the prograrný had 
undergone a change in mindset. The report stated: 'the skepticism of the officials has given way 
to appreciation for the efforts of the SHG members. They now appreciate the SHGs for their 
pfforts in saving regularly, selecting proper beneficiaries for different enterprises, the excellent 
recovery made by them, the regular conduct of meetings, etc' (TNCDW, c. 1998: 10). One 
former official of TNCDW expressed to me when interviewed that they had derived _a 
'tremendous amount of personal satisfaction' from being involved in the project and that it had 
been 'personally enriching' (interview, March 2006). The same official stated that many 
involved in the project were relatively more sensitive to the concept of gender inequality when 
they were posted on, but acknowledged that the challenge was to institutionalise these changes 
(ibid). Another official suggested that after having been posted to the TNCDW for a period of 
time, she became associated with posts which had a similar empowerment orientation (interview, 
June 2007). She also suggested that the extent to which gender sensitization remained at the level 
of the bureaucratic subjectivity and did not transfer into the personal lives of bureaucrats 
demonstrated that gender sensitization had its limits. 
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The emphasis on convergence in both states' reformist discourse created varying possibilities for 
agency for senior parastatal personnel. One the one hand, the importance given to the parastatal 
agency relative to other government departments particularly social sector departments had'the 
effect of increasing the agency of senior personnel by positioning them as gatekeepers to a large 
number of potential beneficiaries of government programmes as well as an existing institutional 
structure through which delivery could be managed. However, this was also potentially 
constraining as parastatal personnel became partially responsible for implementing the agendas 
of other government departments in addition to the programs their own agency was promoting. 
For instance, SERP personnel felt the pressure of the government's emphasis on converging 
departmental schemes through SERP and the self-help groups. 
The expectations from the government were very high. And we were struggling to meet 
the competing demands of the variety of departments. The Health department wanted us 
to do this work, the AIDS Controller wanted us to do this work, the Agriculture 
department wanted our collaboration. So we became victims of our own success. So we 
had all departments wanting to ride on the institutional arrangements... So we've now 
learned to say no... quite forcefully also. Unless institutions are strong they really can't 
cope with the various competing demands. So this was a very important challenge that 
we faced. 
(Vijay Kumar of SERP in World Bank, 2004: circa I hr 20 mins 30 sees) 
Furthermore, parastatal. personnel often had to negotiate with other agencies which sometimes 
required articulating project goals in a language that would be more acceptable to the different 
actors the agency had to interact with, but in a way which had the potential to dilute more 
transformative goals. As one former official of TNCDW expressed, when negotiating with 
different agencies it was necessary to 'bridge' the discourse of the program with their own 
institutionally embedded discourse in order to convince them of the merit of the Corporations 
proposals. Finance Ministry officials had to be convinced of the programme's worth on 
efficiency grounds (often using a cost-benefit framework). Politicians in contrast had to be 
convinced that not only was there a popular demand for the programme, but that the programme 
would be a 'vote winner'. The task of the TNCDW official was to demonstrate the benefits of the 
program in these respective terms. Once convinced, however, the operational autonomy of the 
program was largely secure (interview with former TNCDW official, June 2007). In contrast, P. 
Jamuna, the State Project Director for gender in SERP suggested that she worked relatively 
autonomously from both the World Bank and senior personnel at SERP (interview, June 2006). 
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Reformist discourse which sought to ensure the stability of tenure among bureaucrats offered 
pI he autonomy o" ureaLicrats from increased Wential for agency to the extent of improving t' 10 
interference by political leaders. Political leaders may transfer bureaucrats as a means to exert 
control over policy and over powerful bureaucrats and to ensure important sectoral postings are 
staffed by supportive bureaucrats (which contests the notion of impartial government service). 
For instance, in both states, there was evidence of bureaucratic transfers immediately after 
elections. In this sense, the relative continuity -of senior civil service personnel SERP in AP 
demonstrated considerably more autonomy at the parastatal level than that which was 
demonstrated by more frequent transfers in the TNCDW in Tamil Nadu. 
7.4 The Political Leadership 
Two factors enabled a high degree of agency among the most senior party political leaders in the 
two states when in government as Chief Mnisters. The first relates to the centralization of party 
political leadership. Three out of four political parties (AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu and 
the TDP in Andhra Pradesh) in power in the two States during the case study period were 
regional political parties, known for their high degree of centralized leadership (Palshikar, 2004; 
Suri, 2002). The centralization of party political leadership in AP is far more notable for the TDP 
than the Congress Party , and not surprisingly given that the latter is a national party and 
because 
the Congress Party leaders in AP are accountable to the national party leadership. Centralised 
leadership has been the case for both the TDP's founder leader, NT Rama Rao, and for his 
successor Chandrababu Naidu. Srinivasulu argues that the TDP 
is a highly personalised party therefore there has been an overt and excessive focus on 
the persona of Naidu. In fact, he has assumed an iconic status with regard to the State- 
level economic reforms in the international and national press and in the eyes of 
international donors and captains of domestic big business. 
Suri (2002: 71) argues that the impact of centralization in the TDP in Andhra Pradesh was 
demonstrated when the party experienced losses in the panchayat elections in 200 1. 
Chandrababu Naidu, as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh from 1995 until 2004, came to 
personify the State's reform enthusiasm, and was dubbed 'the CEO of Andhra Pradesh' for his 
business-like style and pro-technology reforms. Naidu's pro-reform persona and commitment. to 
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reforms was central to the State government's relationship with the World Bank; as Kirk 
suggests, 'despite AP's weaker track record, Naidu impressed the Bank as a dynamic market 
advocate who was prepared to take tough measures and inject greater professionalism into 
govemance' (Kirk, 2005: 293). Kennedy suggests that Naidu's exaggerated overt reform 
enthusiasm was a conscious strategy to send strong signals to potential investors that the State 
government was commitment to substantial economic and governance reforms (Kennedy, 2004: 
5 1). Moreso than the Tamil Nadu State Government, the Government of Andhra Pradesh needed 
to adopt this signalling strategy because of the State's comparatively lower indicators on 
economic growth, human development, and infrastructure (Kennedy, 2004: 5 1). 
The second factor, discussed in the previous chapter, was the paternalist discourse articulated in 
government policy, and the effects of a paternalistic discourse which through personalization and 
association of development and welfare schemes by the party restricted the capacity for less 
senior political leaders to champion policy issues. This dynamic appeared more dominant in 
Tamil Nadu. 
It is clear from the previous chapter that political leaders are subjects positioned differently 
within competing reformist and populist discourses and are thus subject to competing logics. As 
Subramanian notes, 'populist regimes face pressure to deliver in some way on their promises to 
increase the entitlements of emergent groups, and retain support only if they do so' 
(Subramanian, 1999). The way in which political leaders have resorted to populist politics in AP 
suggests that populism in Andhra Pradesh is of a qualitatively different character to populism in 
Tamil Nadu. 
In Chapter 41 raised the issue of whether gendered development policy in Tamil Nadu might be 
more closely associated with either the 'assertive/empowerment' populist style of the DMK or 
the 'paternalist/protective' populist style of the AIADMK (Subramanian, 1999; Swamy, 1998). It 
is possible to argue that the DNM were often also paternalist towards women, even though they 
have been more closely associated with assertive or empowerment populism. 
Not surprisingly given the populist orientation of politics in Tamil Nadu discussed in earlier 
chapters, social welfare schemes were often closely associated with, and officially credited to, 
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party political leaders. As Harriss-White observes, the introduction under MGR's ADMK 
government of a nutritional intervention which provided a daily meal in schools for children , 
(the 
Nutritious Meal Scheme) was closely associated with him. But this close association also meant 
that it became 'heavily politically persomlized, and when the DMK came to power, they were 
keen to associate the scheme with the party and did so by adding one fortnightly egg to the meal 
provision (Harriss-)Wte, 2004b: 53). Similar 'embellishments' were made when the AIADMK 
party came back to power in the 1990s (ibid). 
Protective-paternalist discourses articulated in state policy in Tamil Nadu expressed reverence to, 
the Chief Minister for, his or her leadership for the welfare and development of society. While 
this was more common in policy documents of the Social Welfare department, they were also 
found in more public arenas such as the Budget Speech with regards to the then Chief Minister J. 
Jayalalithaa's leadership. These reverential expressions were often in reverence to their able' or 
'skillful' leadership or their personal commitment to ensuring the welfare of the poor: 'our 
Hon'ble Chief Minister... is striving hard to see that no stone is untumed in realizing the goal of 
making the disadvantaged sections to get the fruits of development' (Government of Tarnil 
Nadu, 2007: 1). 
The same political personalization of social welfare in Tamil Nadu can be seen with State 
government programmes for women's development, the Tamil Nadu Women's Development 
Project and its successor, Mahalir Thittam. Both the DMK and the AIADMK parties and their 
respective leaders have sought to be closely affiliated with the programme in various, and 
usually unsubtle, ways. Firstly, like a number of government schemes, Mahalir Thittam was also 
politically personalized through being identified with a late political leader and popular figure in 
Tamil Nadu. On International Women's Day in March 2000, M. Karunanidhi, then Chief 
Minister, renamed Mahalir Thittam. as 'Annai Bangaru Ammaiyar Ninaivu Mahalir 7-hittam, in 
memory of the mother of a former Chief Minister and founder of the DMK party, the late C. N. 
Annadurai. To some extent this presented the government programme as an act of benevolence. 
Secondly, different governments led by the two rival political parties have sought to identify the 
growth of women's self-help groups in the State and the perceived success of the scheme with 
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their term in office. For example, while the IFAD-funded phase of the programme began in 
1989, under the DMK government, some r)olicv statements released durine the latter years of the 
more recent AIADMK government (20ul-MU6) have, erroneously traced the start of the program 
to 1991-92 (GoTN, 2004: 47). 103 
Thirdly, Chief Ministers have closely. associated., themselves with -the-, program through visual 
literature related to the program. Images of Jayalalithaa has appeared on promotional literature of 
Chennai-based branded SHG produclts"a'sý W*ýell-, 
'a`s the' `government', ý pýqrnotional, brochure on 
104 Du"ing. 'a', yisit to the District SHG success stories in Tamil Nadu (see Figure l'F below)., r 
project Implementation Unit in Chennai, I ago noticcý a picture of-Jayalalithaa, the then current 
Chief Minister, on the wall close to the ceiling next to tfie'clock. While it is not an uncommon 
v"' 
practice to have a picture of the current ChiefMinktei'disolayed , 
in go 
,v, 
6mMent buildings, it 
represents the important part charismatic leadership and 
peFý6MUý&`pol"itics plays in Tamil 
Nadu, including within government programmes for women s development., 
The monthly newsletter of TNCDW, -Mutra-M',. disfributed to SHG members in theStaie, has also 
served as a means of deliveringý'the Chief Minister, s miýsage to a large number of, ' omen and 
their families. Events and features involving political leaders in'the DMK and AIADMK appear 
relatively frequently in the magazine, sugg6stifig, that! iýarty-" political leaders are keen to R 
communicate with women SHG members is beneficiarie's of, a"g6vemment program. ' This also 
generates a different level of e x1postire to goverrini'entand party politics for the members as well 
as an association of the program with different political 1;: ýaders rather than the bureaucraev- 
There is also evidence to sudgest'. 'tfidt. -p6liii6al'leadeiý'i'hav-e iri6d', 'to 'mobili&-w6men SHG 
members as potential vote banks. _The,., 
AIADMK, in, Tamil Nadu has been accused in the past of 
trying to encourage SHG wom'q'n'to ýampaign onthe party's behalf. In 2004, during the Lok 
113 in 2001-02,2002-03, and 2003-04, `ý the'policy staterrient had previously expressed this as the programme 
receiving its first growth thrust in 1991-92', 
'ývbich would be more accurate', but omitted the start date of the 
program as 1989. 
104 Two things need to be noted here. F, irýtly; ihý examýles of literature given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are in English 
I I- I, but were also available in Tamil. Second y, -It is not uncommon to find graphics used as a supplementary means of 
communication in order to make such! Iiieratur accessible to non-literate members. However, the latter point does 
not diminish the claim that the literatureis- peirýonaliseid by political leadý 















Sabha election campaign period both the rival DN4K, the left-wing CPI(M) and AIDWA 
appealed to the Election Commission protesting at the alleged AIADMK's coercion of SHG 
rnembers (The Hindu, 2004b,, 2004c; cf Kalpana, 2005). In AP also, SHGs have become 
somewhat politicized, as one study reports: 
Apart from being a possible source of women candidates for panchayati raj, SHGs are 
perhaps more obviously emerging as a factor in local politics as potential vote banks. 
This was most evident in the South, especially in AP where, apart from the fact that the 
majority of groups are government-promoted, the substantial numbers of SHGs in 
practically every village represent an obvious rallying point for all political parties. 
Local supporters of political parties interact closely with SHG members and leaders. 
SHG members are brought in large numbers to political meetings and to meetings 
organized by the government. During any election, different parties distribute money to 
SHGs, and SHGs have in turn begun to demand funds and benefits. 
(EDA/APMAS, 2006: 67) 
Kennedy also explains the different extent of signaling in the two States in terms of 'internal 
political constituencies', for which she identifies two significant determinants: firstly, the level of 
political party fragmentation in the State (which increases electoral competition), and secondly, 
the degree of 'political mobilization of Dalits and other traditionally low status groups (Kennedy, 
2004: 52). She concludes that Tamil Nadu's greater fragmentation and higher mobilization helps 
to explain why the State government chose to pursue economic reforms with less fanfare than 
that observed in AP, where her two determinants were relatively absent (Kennedy, 2004: 52). 
14owever, can the same be said when we shift our focus to the women's movement in each state, 
and consider their level of political mobilization particularly in relation to the Dalit movement? 
Perhaps not, in at least two senses. Firstly, as was suggested in Chapter 4, authors such as 
Anandhi (2005) have questioned the extent to which the Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu iias been 
willing to consider the discrimination faced by Dalit women and their political demands as core 
issues of the Dalit movement, and this too without reducing issues such as the rape of Dalit 
women in episodes of caste-based violence to acts which symbolise of the oppression of Dalit 
men. Secondly, despite the bipolarity of the party political system in Andhra Pradesh, women's 
groups associated with the Left parties are quite vocal in the State, something which I return to 
later. Therefore, the significance of Kennedy's argument for the agency of political leaders in 
promoting reforms in the face of the fragmentation and mobilization of political constituencies 
shifts somewhat when applied to the context of State government welfare and development 
schemes for women. 
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Furthermore, many political observers have attributed the TDP's election defeat in 2004 in part 
to Naidu's overt reform stance (see for instance Sridhar, 2004). As explained in Chapter, 4, 
populist politics in Andhra Pradesh is driven in part by the compulsions of electoral democracy, 
and the women's vote has for long been considered important in the State. Women have been 
perceived by the TDP as an important constituency, at least in terms of electoral votes, and 
proved crucial in voting in the TDP to government in 1994 and keeping them in office in 1999. 
But Ayyangar suggests that in the 2004 elections 'the vote against Chandrababu Naidu and the 
TDP was not a mandate against the World Bank programmes espoused by the incumbent butfor 
it [sicl and more of it [sic]' (Ayyangar, 2004: 1993). 
To an extent, then, the political leaders of both State governments have witnessed (actual or 
anticipated) challenges to their reform agendas, which have forced them to revert to populist 
politics. The implications of populist politics as a means to soften (or contradict) economic 
reforms is not confined to each State. Srinivasulu (2004: 6, n. 3) suggests that the Congress 
Party's election victory in Andhra Pradesh in 2004, which came about partly as a result of their 
promise of free power to the agricultural sector, persuaded the AIADMK State Government in 
Tamil Nadu to implement the same. 
7.5 The role of the women's movement at the State level 
Perhaps one of the most surprising findings of examining the engagement of different actors has 
been the near absence of critical feminist engagement in issues related to self-help groups, more 
widely in India, but particularly in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh where such schemes are 
more extensively developed. The extent of engagement by the women's movement in AP and 
TN with state policies and programmes has not been uniform across different sectors. While the 
women's movement have been more engaged in campaigning in favour of or against particular 
legislation on such issues as rape, dowry, and coercive population policies, it appears that the 
movement has been less directly involved with state-led development policies and programmes. 
This is particularly marked in relation to state-led SHG programmes for women on two counts; 
firstly, and perhaps not surprisingly, few ferninist-oriented women's movement organizations are 
involved as SHG promoting organizations working in collaboration with government 
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prc)grammes; secondly, few women's movement organizations have really engaged critically 
with state-led SHG programs in order to scrutinize and monitor them from the sidelines for the 
irnpact they have on women SHG members. As an experienced feminist consultant observed, 
We really need to look at self help groups a little more critically and see what's 
happening, because unfortunately ... if you look at it, none of the organisations with a 
strong feminist orientation are running self help groups... maybe it's because ... it's 
within the nature of the feminist movement, I don't know, but we really need to look at 
it more carefully. 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007) 
A far more significant presence is that of development NGOs which do not always have an 
explicit feminist agenda. This may be due to the largely rural character of the SHG movement. 
Advocacy is more common among urban women's movement organizations than the NGOs in 
the rural areas implementing poverty alleviation programmes (IDS Bridge, 1995: 59). 
Not surprisingly because of their partisan association, women's wings of political parties appear 
to be far more critical of the government when their own party is not in government. In both 
-ramil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, women's organizations affiliated to the Left parties have been 
-the most vocal among various women's movement groups in their scrutiny of the respective 
State government's schemes for women's empowerment. 
14owever, Soma KP suggests that there has been little interaction between government and civi'l 
society organizations more generally with regard to SHG programs. 
Despite their burgeoning numbers in the development landscape of the country, there 
has been little dialogue on experiences with SHGs and their potential for empowerment 
or poverty reduction between civil society actors and policy makers regarding the 
expectations from SHGs, the ground level realities as well as possible ways of 
strengthening SHGs in order that they may serve better the interests of poor women. 
(Parthasarathy, 2006) 
Anandhi and Swarninathan argue, the institutionalization of women's studies in higher education 
institutions in Tamil Nadu has affected the capacity for feminist research and scholarship which 
, night purposefully engage with and influence State policy towards gender-equitable 
development (Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006). As they explain, the institutionalization of 
Women's Studies in Indian institutions of higher education from the 1970s onwards was a 
purposeful exercise in 'the generation and analysis of data with a view to uncovering significant 
trends in patterns of social and economic organization which affect women's position in the long 
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run' (ICSSR Advisory Committee on Women's Studies 1977, cited in Anandhi and 
Swarninathan, 2006: 4444). It was hoped that women's studies would serve as a means to 
challenge 'the marginalization. and misrepresentation of women in social science disciplines and 
scholarship' as well as playing a critical interventionist role in the production of knowledge 
about women's role in, and the impact upon gender relations, of the processes of modernity and 
development (ibid: 4444-5). Yet, it was the way in which women's studies were institutionalized 
in Indian higher education that affected the possibilities of the newly established discipline to 
contribute to the production of knowledge concerning these processes: 'the disproportionate 
stress on extension activity as an important component in carrying out women's studies 
substantially diluted the earlier conceptualisation of women's studies as a "critique of knowledge 
production"' (Anandhi and Swarninathan, 2006). 
They conclude that despite a high profile for women's studies in the State, 
Academic enquiry into women's experiences, exploring the interconnection between 
gender, sexuality, caste and women's studies and linkages with various disciplines has 
not formed part of the women's studies programme in Tamil Nadu. Even as these 
centres are incapable of influencing government policies related to women, the outreach 
programme has gained popularity among the government agencies since women's 
studies centres have been instrumental in uncritically carrying out the state's "women's 
empowerment" programme. 
(Anandhi and Swarninathan, 2006: 445 1) 
Therefore, the feminist academic-activist link for contesting State policy is relatively weak in 
Tamil Nadu due to the low institutional capacity of women's studies as a discipline to engage 
critically with, rather than merely implement, government policy on gender and development, 
and this has arguably reduced the potential influence such a collaboration might have on State 
policy. 
Women's groups affiliated to the Left parties in Andhra Pradesh are particularly strong. The 
Andhra Pradesh Mahila Samakhya'05, a women's organization affiliated to the National 
Federation of Indian Women (which is in turn affiliated to the Community Party of India) has 
105 In Andhra Pradesh, there are three similar sounding but quite distinct organisations; firstly, the AP Mahila 
Samakhya, as described above, secondly, the Andhra Pradesh Mahila Samatha Society 011M: //www. gpmss. or 
which is part of the Government of India's Mahila Samakhya programme on educational empowerment operating in 
selected States, and thirdly, the Mahila Mandal Samakhyas which are federated organisations part of the 
Velugu/IKP programme of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. 
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been persistently vocal. Women's groups in AP in particular are acutely aware of how political 
parties have treated them as vote banks in the past, and as a result, have been keen to hold 
political leaders to account for the pre-election promises they make to women voters. In 
December 2003, just a few months before the election, Chandrababu Naidu announced a series 
of populist measures targeted specifically at members of DWCRA groups, including cellular 
phones and increased subsidies on bank loan interest (The Hindu, 2003c). Just a few days later, a 
State-level meeting of women's SHGs criticized Naidu for exploiting them for political gain and 
dernanded he implement his promises (The Hindu, 2003b). 
140wever, it is only in the last few years that feminist, organisations have been vocal on the 
lirnited empowering effects of self-help group programmes. As Kameswari Jandhyala, former 
Ap Mahila Samakhya Director points out, 
'in Andhra Pradesh, the home as it were of the self-help strategy, even the celebrated 
Nellore example, where women moved from strength to strength through literacy, 
struggles against arrack and mobilising savings, has yet to be fully researched to 
establish the sustainability of the gains made by women. Though autonomous women's 
groups joined their rural sisters to push the prohibition agenda, there has been little 
engagement with what is happening in the lives of the self-help group members. ' 
(Jandhyala, 2001) 
A number of recent developments have generated further debate and have illustrated the extent to 
which the women's movement is critically engaged with State-led SHG programs for women. In 
2006, a collective of three women's development NGOs 'released a report suggesting that 
women's participation in SHGs has increased their access to credit but has become an extra 
burden and has had little empowerment effects otherwise (Nirantar, 2007). 
A critical juncture occurred in 2007 around the introduction of a Government of India Bill which 
proposed to regulate the microfmance sector (the Micro Financial Sector (Development and 
p, egulation) Bill, 2007). Led by the CPI-affiliated women's organization AIDWA, women's 
groups Women's groups designated the Bill as a 'black Bill', as they anticipated that if passed 
in 
its current form it would have a negative impact on poor women as consumers of micro-finance 
products and services. 
A more worrying observation. concerns the lack of critical research being conducted on the 
effects of self-help gropp schemes. According to one observer, there is a silent but strong lobby 
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in India against the kind of critically engaged research which might draw out some of the more 
disempowcring effects of self-help group schemes, and significantly many organizations which 
commonly fund research on SHGs are reluctant to fund more critically informed research 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007). She also suggests that what research 
exists SHGs in India is most often commissioned research which is driven by donors as an input 
into project planning rather than independent research and that this is having a negative impact 
on the extent to which institutions of higher education, which are often constrained financially, 
can conduct critically informed research on SHGs. As she explains, q 
... 71'he quality of research has come down in India... partly because over the last at least 
ten years, there is more commissioned research than independent research... [A] lot of 
the research is purely driven by the projects that they are funding. So the whole world of 
commissioned research has actually squeezed institutions and there is very little money. 
(interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007) 
This suggests that feminist organizations which have recently begun to critical-ly engage the state 
on issues relating to self-help groups and the state's questionable claims to women's 
empowerment, should also integrate into their demands the necessity for independent funding of 
research into the impact of state-led self-help group programs on women participants and 
gendered development inequalities in India more generally. VvUle this may create hierarchies as 
to which feminist organizations then become involved in the research process at the expense of 
others, it may offer a first step towards stimulating increased democratic deliberation to usher in 
more transformative mainstrearning strategies. 
7.6 Conclusions 
I have argued that there are two potentially constraining and two potentially enabling discursive 
effects on the agency of women SHG members. Constraining effects include the interpellation of 
women (particularly poor women) as hyper-responsible agents of development and the 
disciplinary power of SHG program practices. Enabling effects, include the potential for 
collective mobilization and articulation as a result of programmatic drives to federate SHGs, as 
well as the participation of women SHG members in decision-making structures within and 
outside of program structures. According to the program design, this is a more embedded feature 
of the AP State SHG, program, although Tamil Nadu's program has organically evolved to also 
include this. 
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'I have also argued that in relation to the agentic capacity of bureaucratic actors and parastatal. 
agency personnel to mainstream gender within State-level policies and programmes, the 
constraining institutional context of the bureaucracy which closes down the creative potential for 
ýprospective 'policy entrepreneurs' or 'femocrats' (both remarkably lacking within the State 
bureaucracy as a result) is counter-balanced by the need for co-ordinating bureaucrats and 
parastatal agency personnel to negotiate between different actors and their discursive frames. 
VAjile the relative autonomy of parastatal agency personnel appears to be significant in both 
States, the continuity of appointment and freedom from bureaucratic-institutional transfers is 
rnore evident in AP than TN. In both States, parastatal agencies provide bureaucrats with 
opportunities to work with a wider range of actors, moreso in AP than TN. The agency of 
bureaucratic actors seems to be higher in the parastatal programs, particularly in AP. Reformist 
discursive emphasis on convergence can increase their agency by enabling them to become 
important gatekeepers, but can also constrain their agency as they are expected to implement the 
agendas of other government departments. 
The agentic capacity of political leaders was discussed with reference to the competing logics of 
reformist and populist discourse which both constrain and enable agency, and compared to the 
effect of the centralization of political party leadership and paternalist discourses in augmenting 
the agency of political leaders. While political leaders exercise considerable agency, although not 
unlimited (both reformist and populist discourses have particular limiting effects), this agency is 
often not conducive to transformative gender mainstrearning strategies. This is despite the fact 
that demands of accountability to women as voters may to some extent determine their policy 
priorities and the recognition given to women in state policy. Both states have extremely 
centralized political parties with the exception of the Congress Party in AP, and moreso for the 
AIADMK than the DMK in Tamil Nadu, and this centralization allows only the most senior 
political leaders agency and also impacts on the extent to which political parties are accessible to 
the advocacy of external actors. The personalization of social welfare schemes by political 
leaders within the framework of a paternalist discourse is more evident in TN than AP. In AP, 
Chandrababu Naidu's personal association with development policy has in fact been quite the 
opposite - one of a liberalizing reformer. As reformers, political leaders were constrained by the 
populist logic which was driven by electoral considerations and, in Tamil Nadu by a party 
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political legacy of social movement discourse. As populists, they were constrained by the need to 
refonn. Constraints of populist discourse appeared to be considerably effective at stalling the 
reformist agenda in both states. The protective-paternalist discourse enhanced the agency of 
political leaders as benevolent leaders although this was more embedded in Tamil Nadu than 
Andhra Pradesh, and this may be dlegacy of the Dravidian parties' former social movement 
background and its consolidation of as political parties elected to government. The more 
centralised leadership of the TDP in AP, and the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh places limits on the structural-transformative discourse which emphasises 
deliberation. Given the emphasis on policy expertise, a competitive-capability discourse requires 
that political leaders work closely with bureaucratic actors, which both enables them as 
reformers but constrains them as populists. 
Analysis of. the possibilities for agency of the women's movement produced perhaps the most 
surprising observation, and the most worrying for feminist strategies. In both IN and AP one 
finds a relative lack of advocacy of autonomous (as opposed to party-political affiliated) 
women's movement organizations on State-led SHG programs, as well as the presence of a large 
number of non-feminist NGOs, as well as a lack of critically informed research on the effects of 
state level policies of gendered development. Opportunities for the institutional support of 
feminist activists from academic research have also been restricted. This has serious implications 
for the capacity of feminist civil society organizations to engage the state for transformative 
change. 
What conclusions can be drawn as to whether the various kinds of agency identifled in this 
chapter are enabling or constraining for transformative gender mainstrearning strategies. Studies 
of actor participation in gender mainstrearning strategies generally distinguish between two 
models: 'expert-bureaucratic' and 'participative-democratic' (Squires, 2007a). While the former 
is integrationist, the latter is agenda-setting and potentially transformative. As their labelling 
suggests, the 'expert-bureaucratic' characteristically draws upon technical gender expertise, and 
the 'participative-democratic' invites civil society organizations to participate in the process of 
policy deliberation. 
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)X7here policy attempted to address concerns of gender-equitable development, in both states the 
prominent gendered development discourse, the competitive-capabilities discourse, articulated an 
integrative approach to gender-equitable development, and reflected an expert-bureaucratic 
model of mainstreaming. This seems to be slightly more the case in Tamil Nadu than Andhra 
Pradesh, as given SERP's more institutionalized collaboration with NGOs, it appeared to offer 
prospects for a more conducive institutional context for a more participative-democratic model 
of gender mainstreaming which emphasizes participation and democratic deliberation due to the 
prominence of a structural-transformative discourse. But given that this discourse is more 
prominent at the parastatal rather than state levei, the possibilities for this model of gender 
rnainstreaming are limited. Furthermore, as Squires points out 'consultation with non- 
governmental organizations is not synonymous with the democratic participation of citizens'. 
This is particularly evident given that some of the more prominent NGOs that work with both 
SERP and the TNCDW were professional, technocratic, and consultancy type NGOs. Another 
irnpediment to a participative-democratic model is the observation that to shift to 'a 
participative-democratic model of mainstreaming would require a more extensive injection of 
state funding into civil society' (Squires, 2007a). In the context of the emphasis on fiscal 
prudence in the reformist discourse of both states, it seems that funding is not likely to come 
from government for this purpose. It is also questionable whether the participatory and 
deliberative spaces envisaged by federating SHGs provide such a space for democratic debate 
given that they are also have the potential to be disciplinary, but furthermore, they assumed that 
women members will have the resources to participate in deliberation. 
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Strategies to mainstream gender in development policy in India are an under-explored area of the 
literature on gender, development and the Indian state. In this thesis I have sought to explore 
three factors which, I argue, influence the emergence of a gender mainstrearning approach to 
development policy in India, namely, institutions, discourse and agency. I began by suggesting 
that institutional context matters, that gendered discourses of development frame policy, and that 
the successful pursuit of a mainstrearning strategy will depend on the possibilities for agency 
provided by both the complex interplay of institutional norms and practices within state 
structures and the varied discursive constitution of gendered development. I argued that a 
combination of feminist institutionalist and feminist discourse analytic approaches we re 
particular suited as a methodology for their focus on power, change, institutional contexts, and 
policies as discursive activities. 
Institutions, discourse, and agency: comparative findings 
The research findings on national policy suggested that a number of initiatives at the national 
level had attempted to transform national development institutions and state structures in order io 
bring about gender-responsive development policy, albeit with varied success, and that national 
development plans had demonstrated increasing attention to the gendered dimensions of 
development, although not unproblematically. Government policy demonstrated integrationist 
and agenda-setting models of mainstrearning, and employed affirmative action to integrate 
women into the process of national development. While gender-inequitable development was 
articulated through a discursive frame of gender difference and a policy strategy of woments 
empowerment, this empowerment was often articulated as a means to integrate women and did 
not substantially alter the overall model of development. 
The research findings from the comparative analysis of the subriational case studies 
demonstrated a highly complex assortment of institutional, discursive, and agential factors, all of 
which had a significant impact on the possibilities for mainstreaming gender in development 
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policy. On institutions, similarities were observed between the two states in terms of the 
descriptive and substantive gendering of state institutions. However, within the two states, the 
gendered institutional context of state development was significantly internally differentiated, 
and the institutional structure for gender and development policy had developed in the two states 
in different ways, suggesting that the state level institutional context mattered. The rural 
ýevelopment sector had been a considerably strong influence in both states' programs on 
women's empowerment, although this was more formally institutionalised in AP, but more 
recently has been consolidated in TN. This suggests a convergence between the. two states in 
terms of the sectoral administration of policy on women, gender and development, although in 
Tamil Nadu this recent move was also driven by party political considerations of patronage. 
The analysis of state level gendered discourses of development identified three discourses: 
protective-paternalist, competitive-capability, and structural transformative, all of which differed 
according to institutional context both within and across states. These three discourses differed in 
significant ways as to how they constituted (or not) gender-equitable development as a policy 
concern, with the protective-paternalist as the most conservative, the competitive-capabilities as 
the most liberal and integrationist, and the structural-transformative as potentially the most 
radical and participatory. Overall, the competitive-capabilities discourse appeared to be dominant 
in the more reformist-oriented state development policy in both states. The protective-paternalist 
discourse was far more prevalent in Tamil Nadu, especially in the Department of Social Welfare 
and was particularly influenced by a populist discourse in state level politics. The structural- 
transformative discourse was more prevalent in Andhra Pradesh but this was mostly limited to 
the parastatal level, although did find some articulation in the more aggregated state level policy. 
Thus, the wider development discourse appeared to affect significantly the possibilities for the 
discursive articulation of gender-equitable development. 
Finally, the research findings on agency suggested considerable variations in the possibility for 
agency, although despite these differences they reflected most frequently an expert-bureaucratic 
model of gender mainstreaming (where explicit policies on gendered development existed). 
Women were constituted as subjects and objects of development policy differently through each 
discourse, ranging from weak, dependent and vulnerable, through to hyper-responsible and 
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altruistic heroines of national development. While the former offered little room for agency, the 
latter offercd extensive possibilities, but the kind of agency it offered was contingent on the 
disciplinary logic of particular institutional norms and discursive practices. In other words, their 
agency was dependent on a strategy of empowering the individual rather than the collective, and 
empowerment as a particular kind of individual, a subjectivity based on integration into the 
mainstream rather than the transformation of the mainstream. Political leaders were positioned 
differently both through wider reformist and populist discourses of development and specifically 
gendered discourses of development, all of which offered different opportunities for agency, both 
enabling and constraining. Bureaucratic agency appeared to be high in both states but more so at 
the parastatal level in Andhra Pradesh, and was more conducive to an integrationist, expert- 
bureaucratic model of gender mainstrearning rather than an agenda-setting, participativ 
I 
e- 
democratic model. Women's movement organisations were positioned with relative little agency 
as a result of institutional norms and structures and discursive practices, and non-feminist NGOs 
occupied a far larger role instead. The wider institutional environment was also not conducive to 
their participation or critical engagement with state programs and policies and thus did not offer 
significant opportunities for a more participative-democratic model of gender mainstrearning. 
Another dimension that this thesis has sought to explore is the significance of the difference in 
institutional contexts between the central government and state governments. Beyond the 
comparative analysis of the two case study states, one clear finding was the absence of explicit 
attempts to adopt a mainstreaming strategy at the subnational level, when compared with the 
national level. In other words, at the national level gender mainstreaming was one of ýthe 
strategies being employed by state and non-state actors to bring about a more gender-responsive 
development policy. However, the main focus of this thesis was not on national but subnational 
policies. I posited that it was important to analyse gendered development policy and the 
possibilities of gender mainstrearning at the subnational level, given the increased autonomy of 
Indian states as a result of national level reforms after 1991. Significantly, when the focus shifted 
from the national level to the subnational level from Chapter 4 onwards, the case study chapters 
demonstrated that there was little activity in terms of explicit strategies to mainstream gender in 
development at the state level when compared with the national level. In fact, the strong concern 
in both states with efficiency and 'convergence' of policy resources was quite the reverse of a 
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mainstreaming strategy, in that both state governments attempted to increase the efficiency of 
delivery of development policies and programs with top-down, pre-designed policy, rather than 
reflexively introspecting on its own gendered norms and practices influencing policy. The lack of 
gender mainstreaming take-up at the subnational level is significant as it suggests that the 
opportunities for gender mainstrearning are different at the subnational level compared to the 
national level. One possible explanation for this is that, compared to state governments, the 
national government is less insulated towards its obligations to international fora, one of which is 
to demonstrate that it is engaging with initiatives to improve the gender-responsiveness of its 
development policy (for instance, in terms of being signatories to international conventions such 
as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Fourth World 
Conference on Women at Beijing). If this is so, then it has serious implications for gender 
rnainstreaming strategies at the subnational level. Furthermore, the institutional norms and 
practices of the state government departments in which women's development was concentrated 
as a policy issue showed that in neither state was this department more representative of what is 
often termed as a women's policy agency or part of the state level machinery for feminist policy 
goals. In other words, the (albeit partial and limited) transformation that had taken place at the 
national level in augmenting the status and policy orientation of the (now) Ministry of Women 
and Child Development had not occurred, or had been resisted, at the subnational level. Thus, 
state-level government departments for women's development or social welfare in AP and TN 
do not (yet) offer an institutional opening for mainstreaming strategies at the subnational level. 
Limitations and opportunities for further research 
Therefore, the research presented in this thesis generated a complex array of insights into how 
institutions, discourse, and agency affected efforts to mainstream gender in development policy 
at the subnational level in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and thus it may be concluded that 
the research aims and objectives were achieved. However, the research findings were also 
limited in a number of ways, all of which offer significant potential for further research. 
A limitation of the research design derived from the use of the comparative method, which at 
times restricted the depth of coverage that was possible for each case study. For example, for 
Chapter 7 the coverage of at four different sets of actors in two states and at (at least) two 
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different institutional levels of the state prohibited a deeper examination of each actor and their 
possible agency. However, the learning that a comp=tive approach made possible was more 
than that which could have been achieved with one case study (or even multiple case studies but 
without a comparative link) and therefore taking a comparative approach did play an important 
role in creating another layer of analysis and insight. For example, the use of the comparative 
method highlighted the different institutional developments at the subnational level which 
suggested a significant difference in the approach to gendered development policy between the 
two states and thus potentially differing possibilities for gender mainstreaming. 
Another limitation that emerged was the lack of focus on gendered development in the form of 
masculinity/ies, even though this would still be encompassed in a study of gendered 
development. Little has been written about development policies in India in terms of 
masculinities, and program components which focus on masculinity are not common, although 
there is evidence to suggest that they are emerging. For instance, one TNCDW official recounted 
to me that program officials increasingly realised the importance of sensitising the male family 
members of women SHG members, and particularly boys and young men, in managing 
expectations in relation to changing stereotypical gender roles and the gendered division of 
labour (interview, former TNCDW official, June 2007). There is also evidence to suggest, that 
wider gender equality program initiatives in India are beginning to include men and boys in their 
sensitisation efforts on domestic violence. Thus the practice of including men and boys in 
programs and policies concerning gendered development and understanding the impact of 
changing gender relations under processes of development is still at a nascent stage in India, 
particularly compared to the extent of initiatives in other regions such as Latin America an cl. -the 
Caribbean (Bedford, 2007), but it is emerging nonetheless. 
For some, perhaps this will come as a welcome development, in that the exclusive focus on 
women of a lot of programmes has meant that attention to gender becomes lost and limits the 
potential of programs for women to actually transform existing unequal gender relations. "A 
TNCDW official admitted that the programme was for women, but was perhaps not necessarily 
about gender (interview, former TNCDW official, June 2007). Furthermore, including a focus on 




destabilise the hegemonic negative stereotype of poor men as irresponsible, violent alcoholics, 
who are resistant to change. As Mary E. John explained more than a decade ago 
the discovery of women's economic efficiency ends up effectively collaborating with 
views of marginalised men as incapable and irresponsible... [P]oor women are being 
feted as 'good' subjects who make 'sound economic sense', whereas their unruly men, 
seen as prone to violence, especially if they be dalits or Muslims, become the 'bad' 
subjects of modernity... 
(John, 1996) 
Lirifortunately, such a stereotype often emerges as a result of well-intentioned program efforts to 
highlight the issues of domestic violence, alcoholism and the role of the program in generating 
changes in intra-households relationships, often between women SHG members and their 
husbands. This is certainly a controversial issue, and in no way am I attempting to suggest that 
this stereotype is only a stereotype and not bome out in practice, but it also needs to be examined 
for the discursive effects such a stereotype has in shaping the identity of male sub ects of 
development processes. In other words, we need to examine what are the potentially limiting and 
disciplining effects of discourses of gendered development on marginalised men as well as 
women. 
Perhaps a more important effect of focusing on development masculinities is the destabilisation 
that occurs in terms of making visible that which is invisible. As I demonstrated in Chapter 3 and 
in Chapter 6, a deconstruction of the discourses which are articulated within national 
development policy suggests that 'men as men' are commonly not made visible as a category of 
development and thus by focusing on developmental masculinities, men as subjects of 
development become centrally visible to any analysis of gendered development. While men are 
likely to occupy a number of development subject positions categorised in national development 
discourse, such as farmers, landless labourers, entrepreneurs and so on, focusing explicitly on 
men as subjects of development may work to make their privileged position within the hierarchy 
of gendered developmental subjectivities more visible and thus available for deconstruction - an 
essential part of any project which seeks to destabilise entrenched unequal relations of power. 
It is also important to bear in mind however that for others, focusing on developmental 
masculinities may be interpreted as diverting attention away from 'women's issues' and may 
represent an increasing dilution of commitments to women. For some, this has already happened 
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with the shift from women to gender, for instance in the terminology of gender budgeting rather 
t1han wotvien's budgets. lt is allso tempting for IndianINGOs to adopt this new agenua, employing 
the language of masculinities, because they are closely linked to donor funding agendas. Thus, to 
some extent, the priorities of international donors may have a role to play in introducing a 
component which addresses masculinities in development, but such initiatives need to be careful 
that at least non-governmental agencies consider the implications of adapting to changing 
demands in funding. It also highlights the importance of transnational feminist activism to 
critically engage with international development organisations to address the international 
asymmetrical power relations inherent in the production of hegemonic discourses of gendered 
development. 
A major finding of the study which requires further research is the lack of critical engagement of 
the women's movement with state-led self help group programs, in terms of scrutinising their 
effects on the women who participate in these programs. VAlile more engagement has emerged 
very recently, this is still a significant observation. As the research here has shown, a crucial 
element is the lack of critically informed and independent research on state-led self help group 
programs in India, which might enable the women's movement to engage the state. Perhaps an 
even more significant observation however is the reluctance of the women's movement to be 
involved in SHG programs for fear of co-optation. 
A fruitful area for further research is a comparative analysis of the presence of international 
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, in terms of the meeting of institutional norms and 
practices, and their relation to the type of gendered development discourses articulated within 
Indian development policy. As the discussion in Chapter 7 suggested, clearly the presence of 
international donors is an important factor in the State level initiation of programs on women, 
gender and development. Direct and indirect involvement of bilateral and multilateral donors 
include organisations such as the World Bank, the International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD), 
UNDP, DANIDA (the Danish development agency), UNICEF, and UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) to name just a few. A sizeable number of foreign non- 
governmental development organisatiops are also closely linked to state programs addressing 
gender and development issues. With the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Empowerment and 
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pc)verty Reduction Project in Tamil Nadu in late 2005, in both states the World Bank is now a 
connnon factor in gender and development policy. 
one issue that became even clearer in the course of the research for this thesis was just how little 
research had been conducted on the Indian state as a gendered institution, in terms of its 
gendered norms and practices of the civil service, particularly the latter's impact on the state's 
gendered development policy, and at the subnational level as opposed to the national level. This 
was surprising on several counts. Firstly, media coverage has included a few high profile cases 
where top women civil servants have been passed over for appointment to very senior positions 
or where alleged cases of sexual harassment in the civil services have come to public attention. 
Secondly, initiatives in India in the 1990s and beyond (which I discussed in Chapter 3) have 
explicitly focused on transforming state institutional norms and practices to make them more 
responsive to the gendered character of development policies, programs, processes, and 
outcomes. Thakur's study was one of a few studies that explicitly addressed this issue, but few 
11ave followed. To some extent, this seems to be partly due to issues of access - the two major 
initiatives to study institutional gendered norms and practices have come from the Indian civil 
service themselves. However, in order to understand how to transform the gendered institutional 
norms and practices of the state, much greater understanding is required. This thesis contributes 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I- Developments in the National Machinery for Women 
Source: Adaptrd from Murli Desai (1998). 
hase Date Event Key significance 
Central Social Welfare Board 
1953 Symbolised welfare approach to women's problems (CSWB) established 
Scheme of Condensed Courses of Education for Adult Women 
1956 CSWB; Schemes launched 
Scheme for Socio-Economic Programmes for Women 
Central Scheme of Assistance for 
1972 Construction of Hostel Buildings Widened in 1980 to include day care centres for children. 
for Working Women initiated 
lfare Phase W e Crash Scheme for Rural 
(1951-74) To strengthen base of rural economy 
Early 
Employment 
Seemingly gender-neutmL but male-biased as males seen as heads 
1970s 
Food for Work Progiamme 
of households, benefits assumed to trickle down to family Drought Prone Areas Programme 
members Desert Development Programme 
Report published by the Committee on Status of Women (CSWI), 
1974 Towards Eq-lily report published Department of Social Welfare. Operationalised by National Plan 
of Action 1976. 
-Wo-men's CSWB initiated two schemes in Scheme of Assistance to Voluntary Organisations for Cr6ches for 
Development 1975 accordance with Fifth Five Year Working and Ailing Women's Children, 
Phase Plan policy Scheme for Vocational Training of Adult Women 
(1975-1985) Ministry of Social Welfare scheme 1975 Scheme of Functional Literacy for Adult women launched 
Operationalised recommendations of Towards Equatity report 1976 National Plan of Action for Women 
(1974) 
Women's Welfare and 
1976 Development Bureau set up in 
Ministry of Social Welfare 
1976 Equal Remuneiation Act 
1977- Ministry of Social Welfare scheme Scheme for Setting up Women's Training Centres or Institutes for 
78 launched Rehabilitation of Women in Distress 
Gender-neutral policy supplying credit and subsidies to proportion 1978- Integrated Rural Development 
of the rural poor below the poverty line. Several more gender. 79 Programme (IRDP) launched 
neutral rural development schemes implemented 1980-83. 
Convention on the Elimination of Passed by UN, into force as a treaty in 198 1, but not ratified by 
1979 all Forms of Discrimination against India until 1993 as compulsory registration of marriages deemed 
I Women (CEDAW) impractical. 
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Sub-scheme called Development of Women and Children in Rural 1982 Sub-scbenie of IRDP launched Areas (DWCRA). 
New department within Ministry of Human Resource Department of Women and Child 1985 Development Department now funds CSWB sponsoring welfare Development set up 
and development schemes for women. 
1986 National Policy on Education Included a chapter on "Education for Women's Equality 
Twenty Point Programme against 1986 Included a separate point on Equality for Women 
poverty 
Published by core group led by Margaret Alva established by National Perspective Plan for 
1988 Department of Women and Child Development, focusing on Women, 1988-2000 
mainstrearning women's issues in policies and programmes. 
Study published by the National Commission into lives of poor 1988 Shramshakti 
women in rural and urban areas, led by Ela Bhatt. 
National Commission for Women National Commission for Women set up as a result in 1992 as a 1990 
Act national statutory body. 
National Plan of Action for the Women's Formulated by the Department of Women and Child 1991 SAARC Decade of the Girl Child Empowerment Development. 
1991-2000 
Phase 
New Economic Policy and (1986-) 1991 Reduction in social sector including the public distribution system. Structural Adjustment Programme 




Draft final ised. 
Em powerment of Women 
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Appendix II - Tables for Gendered Development Indicators (Supplementary to 
Chapter 4) 
Table 5 Population and general profile indicators for Tamil Nadu and all-India 
Tamil Nadu All4ndia 
Population (2001) - 62.4 million 1,028.6 million 
Decadal population growth rate (% increase, 1991-2001) 11.7 21.5 
Population density (persons per sq. km) 480 325 
SC Population (% of total population) 19.0 16.2 
ST Population (% of total population) 1.0 8.2 
Main language(s) spoken (3 most populous)' Tamil (87%) Hindi (40%) 
Telugu (7%) Bengali (8.3%) 
Kannada (2%) Telugu (8%) 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
Notes: 
1 Data from Census of Indial991 
Table 6 Economic Indicators for Tamil Nadu and all-India 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) (Rs. Crore)' 148907 NA 
per capita income (Rs. )' 23358 20936 
Sectoral composition of Gross State Primary 13.93 18.5 
I)omestic Product (G(S)DP) (%), 2006-07 
Secondary 28.53 26.4 
Tertiary 57.6 3 55.1 
Growth in State Domestic Product (G(S)DP, Total 8.34 9.2 
0/a increase, 2006-07 
Primary 10.04 2.7 
Secondary 8.1 4 10.0 
Terfiary B. e 11.1 
Source: Government of India Economic Survey 2006-07 (Gol, 2007b), Tamil Nadu Economic Appraisal 2005-06 
(GoTN, 2006c) 
' Figures for 2003-04, based on current prices. 
2 Advance estimates for 2006-07 at Constant (1999-2000) Prices, from Gol (Gol, 2007b: Table 1.2) 
3 Figures for 2005-06. 
4 Figures for growth over period 2004-05 to 2005-06. 
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Table 7 Poverty Incidence and Trends in Tamil Nadu and all-India 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
Incidence of Poverty, 1999-2000 Total 20.6 - 27.1 
(% population below poverty line) Rural 22.1 23.6 
Urban 21.1 26.1 
Decline In Poverty Incidence Total 16.63 8.51 
(in percentage points) 1983 to Rural 21.51 8.38 1993-94 
Urban 7.19 8.43 
Total 13.91 9.87 
1993-94 to Rural 11.93 10.18 1999-2000 
Urban 17.66 8.74 
Source: National Human Development Report (Gol, 2002c). 
Table 8 Work Participation Rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
% of Total Population Classified as Workers Total 58 31 52 26 
Rural 59 41 52 31 
Urban 56 18 20 4 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
Table 9 Distribution of workers by main and marginal status for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001 
Tamil Nadu All-India. 
Main Marqinal Main mamtLi- 
% Main and Marginal Workers of Total Males 90 10 87 13 
Workers Total Females 76 24 57 43 
Males 87 13 85 15 
Rural 
Females 73 27 54 46 
Males 94 6 93 7 
Urban 
Females 85 15 79 21 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
286 
Table 10 Distribution of males and females within worker categories for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
Male and Female Workers as a Cultivators Total 
64 36 67 33 
% of Total Workers Rural 63 37 67 33 
Urban 68 32 75 25 
Agricultural Total 49 51 54 46 
Labourers 
Rural 48 52 53 47 
Urban 56 44 60 40 
Household Total 43 57 52 48 
Industry 
Workers Rural 41 59 49 51 
Urban 46 54 57 43 
OtherWorkers Total 79 21 82 18 
Rural 76 24 77 23 
Urban 80 20 86 14 
Total Workers Total 65 35 68 32 
Rural 59 41 64 36 
Urban 75 25 83 17 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
Table 11 Literacy rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
% of Population Literate (aged 7 yrs and above) Total 82 64 75 54 
Rural 77 55 71 46 
Urban 89 76 86 73 
sc 64 46 55 35 
ST 43 28 48 28 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
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Table 12 Changes in literacy rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 1991-2001 
Tamil Nadu 
Males Females Males 
All-India 
Females 
Increases In literacy rates of population aged 7 Total 9 13 11 14 
years and above, 1991-2001 (percentage points) Rural 10 13 13 16 
Urban 36 5 9 
SC 5 11 5 11 
ST 78 8 10 
Source: Census of India, 1991,2001.1991 data cited in GoI (Gol, 2002c: 190- 1) 
Table 13 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001 
Tamil Nadu 
Males Females Males 
All-India 
Females 
Educational achievement Literate without educational level 10 10 3 4 
as % completing each Below Primary 15 17 24 28 
stage of formal education Primary 28 30 25 28 
Middle 17 18 17 15 




Non-technical diploma or 
certificate not equal to degree 
Technical diploma or certificate 
not equal to degree 
Graduate and above 
Total Secondary and above 
70 75 69 76 
16 13 15 13 
6 6 7 6 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
6 5 8 5 
30 25 31 24 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
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Table 14 Gross Enrolment Ratios and Dropout Rates for Tamil Nadu and All-India, 2004 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
Gross Enrolment Ratios Classes I to V (6-11 yrs) 119.52 117.23 110.70 104.67 
Classes VI to VIII (11-14 yrs) 109.22 104.66 74.30 65.13 
Classes IX to X (14-16 yrs) 82.89 78.32 57.39 45.28 
Classes A to XII (16-18 yrs) 42.65 45.14 30.82 24.46 
Total for Classes I to X11 97.08 94.54 79.75 72.32 
Higher Education (1 B-24 years) 13.03 9.95 11.58 8.17 
Dropout Ratios Classes I to V (6-11 yrs) 1.94 0.14 31.81 25.42 
Classes I to Vill (6-14 yrs) 24.62 23.24 50.49 51.28 
Classes I to X (6-16 yrs) 57.27 52.71 60.41 63.88 
Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 2004-05, Department of Higher Education, Government of India (Gol, 
2007c) 
I Notes: Defined as the percentage of enrolment in/dropout from classes to the estimated child population in the age 
band for that class. Figures exceeding 100% reflect enrolment in classes by children outside of the class age band. 
Table 15 Sex ratios for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001 
Tamil Nadu All-India 
All anpn ý -. - 
Sex ratio (no. of females per 1,000 Total 987 942 933 927 
males) Rural 992 933 946 934 
Urban 982 955 goo 903 
Change since 1991 
(no. of females per +6 . 12/01 +6 -141-321 
1,000 males) 
SC 999 959 936 938 
ST 980 N. A. 978 N. A 
Source: Census of India, 1991,2001. 
Notes: 'Figures show change for ruraVurban areas, using data from the Census of India 1991 cited in Gol (2003: 1- 
2). 
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Table 16 Population and general profile indicators for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Indicator Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Population (2001) 76.2 million 1,028.6 million 
Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001) 14.6 21.5 
Population dens4 (persons per sq. km) 277 325 
SC Population (% of total population) 16.2 16.2 
ST Population (% of total population) 6.6 8.2 
Main language(s) spoken (3 most populous)' Telugu (85%) Hindi (40%) 
Urdu (8%) Bengali (8.3%) 
Hindi (3%) Telugu (8%) 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
Notes: 
'Figures are from Census of India 1991. 
Table 17 Economic Indicators for Andhra Pradesh and all-India 
Indicator Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) (Rs. Crore)' 166953 NA. 
Per capita income (Rs. )' 21372 20936 
Primary 26.6 2 18.5 
Sectorall composition of G(S)DP Secondary 21.6 2 26.4 
Tertiary 51.8 2 55.1 
Total 7.15 9.2 3 
Growth In Gross State Domestic Product Primary -1.37 2.7 
3 
(G(S)DP, % Increase], 2006-07) Secondary 11.56 10.0 3 
Terfiary 10.24 11.1 3_ 
Source: Gol Economic Survey 2006-07 (Gol, 2007b); GoAP Socio Economic Survey 2007 (GoAP, 2007b); 
Notes: 
I Figures for 2003-04, based on current prices. 
2 Advance estimates for 2606-07 annual GDP growth on preceding year at Constant (1999-2000) Prices, from GOAP 
(2007b). 
3 Advance estimates for 2006-07 at Constant (1999-2000) Prices, from GoI (2007b: Table 1.2) 
290 
Table 18 Poverty Incidence and Trends in Andhra Pradesh and all-India 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Incidence of Poverty, 1999-2000 
Total 15.8 27.1 
(% population below poverty line) Rural 11.1 23.6 
Urban 26.6 26.1 
Decline in Poverty Incidence Total 6.7 8.5 
(in percentage points) 1983 to Rural 10.6 8.4 1993-94 
Urban (2.0)1 8.4 
Total 6.4 9.9 
1993-94 to Rural 4.9 10.2 1999-2000 
Urban 11.7 8.7 
Source: NSS data cited in National Human Development Report (Gol, 2002c) 
Notes: 
I Parentheses denote an increase in poverty incidence 
Table 19 Work Participation Rates for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
of Total Population Classified as Workers Total 56 35 52 26 
Rural 58 43 52 31 
Urban 51 13 20 4 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
Table 20 Distribution of workers by main and marginal status for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Main Marginal Main Marginal 
% Main and Marginal Workers of Total Total Males 90 10 
Workers Females 72 28 
Rural Males 89 11 





Urban Males 93 7 93 7 
Females 80 20 79 21 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
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Table 21 Distribution of males and females within worker categories for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Male Female Male Female 
Male and Female Workers as Cultivators Total 66 34 67 33 
a% of Total Workers Rural 66 34 67 33 
Urban 74 26 75 25 
Agricultural Total 47 53 54 46 
Labourers 
Rural 46 54 53 47 
Urban 56 44 60 40 
Household Total 43 57 52 48 
Industry 
Workers Rural 41 59 49 51 
Urban 50 50 57 43 
Other Workers Total so 20 82 18 
Rural 77 23 77 23 
Urban 84 16 86 14 
Total Workers Total 62 38 68 32 
Rural 58 42 64 36 
Urban 80 20 83 17 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
Table 22 Literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Andhra Pradesh 
Males Females Males 
All-India 
Females 
% of Population Literate (aged 7 yrs and above) Total 70 50 75 64 
Rural 65 44 71 46 
Urban 83 69 86 73 
sc 55 37 55 35 
ST 39 22 48 28 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
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Table 23 Changes in literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh, and all-India, 1991-2001 
Andhra Pradesh All4ndia 
Males Females Males Females 
Increases in literacy rates of population aged 7 Total 15 18 11 14 
years and above, 1991-2001 (percentage points) Rural 18 20 13 16 
Urban 7 12 5 9 
SC 13 16 5 11 
ST 14 13 8 10 
Source: Census of India, 1991,2001.1991 data cited in Gol (2002c: 190-1) 
Table 24 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
Educational achievement Literate without educational level 4 4 3 4 
as % completing each Below Primary 22 28 24 28 
stage of formal education Primary 29 34 25 28 
Middle 10 10 17 15 
Total before Secondary 65 75 69 76 
Matric/Secondary 16 13 15 13 
Higher secondary/Intermediate 9 7 7 6 Pre-University/Senior secondary 
Non-technical diploma or 0 0 0 0 certificate not equal to degree 
Technical diploma or certificate 1 0 1 0 not equal to degree 
Graduate and above 9 5 8 5 
Total Secondary and above 35 25 31 24 
Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 2004-05, Department of Higher Education, Government of India (Gol, 
2007c) 
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Table 25 Gross Enrolment Ratios and Dropout Rates for Andhra Pradesh and All-India, 2004 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
Males Females Males Females 
Gross Enrolment Ratios Classes Ito V (6-11 yrs) 96.05 97.40 110.70 104.67 
Classes VI to VIII (11-14 yrs) 73.73 69.68 74.30 65.13 
Classes IX to X (14-16 yrs) 55.83 50.18 57.39 45.28 
Classes XI to XII (16-18 yrs) 48.39 35.54 30.82 24.46 
Total for Classes I to XII 75.38 71.98 79.75 72.32 
Higher Education (I B-24 years) 14.57 8.55 11.58 8.17 
Dropout Rates Classes I to V (6-11 yrs) 31.77 32.14 31.81 25.42 
Classes I to Vill (6-14 yrs) 57.72 61.08 50.49 51.28 
Classes I to X (6-16 yrs) 62.30 65.24 60.41 63.88 
Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 2004-05, Department of Iligher Education, Government of India (GOI, 
2007c) 
Notes: Defined as the percentage of enrolment in/dropout from classes to the estimated child population in the age 
band for that class. Figures exceeding 100% reflect enrolment in classes by children outside of the class age band. 
Table 26 Sex ratios for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001 
Andhra Pradesh All-India 
All ages 0-6 yrs All ages 0-6 yrs 
Sex ratio (no. of females per 1,000 Total 978 961 933 927 
males) Rural 983 965 946 934 
Urban 965 958 900 903 
Change since 1991 
(no. of females per +12 -14/-41 +6 -14/-321 
1,000 males) 
SC 981 NA 936 N. A 
ST 972 N. A. 978 NA. 
Source: Census of India, 1991,2001. 
Notes: 
'Figures show change for ruraVurban areas, and are from Census of India 1991 data cited in Gol (2003). 
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